SPECIAL MILITARY ESTATES OFFICERversusMUNIVENKATARAMIAH & ANOTHER

               SPECIAL MILITARY ESTATES OFFICER
                               v.                                              -~·
                MUNIVENKATARAMIAH & ANOTHER

                            JANUARY 10, 1990

B          [S. RANGANATHAN AND M.M. PUNCHHI, JJ.]

           Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act,
    1952: Sections 11 and 25( 1)-Award of compensation by Arbitrator
    under section 30-Defence of India Act 1962-Appeal-Maintainabi-
    lity of.
c         Defence of India Act 1962: Section 30-Requisitioning of land-
    Award of compensation by Arbitrator-Appeal against-Not maintain-



D
    able in view of Section 25 Requisitioning Act in respect of period prior
    to January JO, 1968.

        The Defence of India Act, 1962 was passed by Parliament in the
  wake of the Chinese aggre.~sion to ensure public safety and interest in
  the Defence of India and Civil Defence and other connected matters. It
                                                                               '
  had been passed when the Reqnisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable
  Property Act, 1952 was alneady in force. Under the provisions of both
  these Acts, immovable property could be requisitioned. Under both
E Acts compensation on such requisition was determinable and payable
  and any 1>erson interested, being aggrieved by the amount of compensa-
  tion so determined, could have an Arbitrator appointed to determine
  the same. The award of the Arbitrator on such determination under
  Section 8 was appealable under Section 11 of the Requisitioning Act
  before the High Court within whose jurisdiction the requisitioned pro•
F perty was situated. The award of the Arbitrator made under Section 30
  in pursuance of the requisition made under Section 29 of the Defence
   Act was apparently final, though specifically not provided, since no
                                                                                --
  right of appeal against the award of the Arbitrator had been conferred
   thereunder on any authority.

o         The Defence Act ceased being applicable as it perished on January
    10, 1968. Simultaneously Section 25 in the Requisitioning Act was
    substituted.

         Some lands belonging to the first respondent in either of the two
    appeals were requisitioned by the Union of India under Section 29 of the
H   Defence of India Act, 1962 by Issuing a notification to that effect on

                                       ,4
                  ESTA1ES OFFICER v. MUNIVENKATARAMIAH                      5

    April 8, 1963 and possession was taken by the military authorities on
                                                                                A
    May 28, 1963. The requisitioned property was not released before
    January 10, 1968 in terms of Section 25(1) of the Requisitioning Act.

          The Deputy Commissioner, the competent authority fixed Rs.280
    per acre per annum as crop compensation. Respondent No. I not being
    satisfied sought a reference from the competent authority to an             B
    arbicrator. The arbitrator went into the matter and made an award on
    June 30, 197 I.

         The Special Military Estates Officer being aggrieved with the
    award filed two appeals against the orders of the Arbitrator in the High
    Court, taking shelter under Section 11 of the Requisitioning and
    Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952.                                c



'
          Since the properties that had been requisitioned had not been
    released before January 10, 1968, it had to be treated deemingly to have
    been requisitioned by the competent authority under the provisions of
    the Requisitioning Act for the purpose for which such property was          D
    held immediately before the said date and all the provisions of the said
    Act were to apply.

          Objections to the maintainability of the appeals were taken rely-
    ing on proviso (a) to Section 25(1) on the ground, I
                                                             that the word
    ·determination' in the context meant determination only by the compe-       E
    tent authority under the Defence Act and since such determination held
    the field and was in force immediately before January IO, 1968, no
    challenge thereto could be made by appealing against the same, on the
    premises that a provision amongst all the provisions of the Requisition-
    ing Act provided an appellate forum challenging the same.
                                                                                F
          The High Court upheld the objection and dismissed the appeals.

          The Special Military Estates Officer appealed to this Court by
    special leave.

          Partially allowing the appeals, the Court,                            G
          HELD: l. The right of appeal is a substantive right conferred on
    a party by the statuie. The conferring of such right is not circumscri-
    bed by the right being available at the time of the institution of the cause
    in the court of the first instance. In a given situation it may already be
    aYailable at the institution of the cause in the court of first instance or H
    6                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1990] 1 S.C.R.

    may even be subsequently conferred. In either situation, witho\lt any
A
    distinction, such right is eonferred by statute. [lOE-F]

         2. The Legislature by enacting S.ection 25 of the Requisitioning
    Act and on the perishing: of the Defence Act has more than impliedly
    made available a right of appeal regarding the rate of compensation for
B   a property remaining u11der requisition for the post 10th January, 1968
    period, recurring as the rate of compensation would be. [llG-H]

          3. From the scheme of things and from the reading of Section 25
    of the Requisitioning Act as a whole, it is discernible that for the period
    of requisition before January 10, 1968, the determination for payment
    of compensation under the Defence Act would remain untouched and
c   unaltered for appeal had neve~ (l~e~ provided under the Act. The
    reason is not far to seek because the ord~r of the competent authority
    under the Defence Act was for the purpose of Defence oflndi~ Act. T~at


D
    purpose having gone with effect from January 10, 1968, the same
    determination for payment of compensation being applicabl~ '10 ·the
    post-date period was deemingly a requisition by the competent autho-
    rity under the Requisitioning Act and since all the provisions of the said
    Act applied to such a requisition, the payment of compensation as from
    January 10, 1968, became appealable as an appeal is provided under
                                                                                  '
    this Act. [lOH; llA-B]

a requisition
        4. The word 'determi111ation' so far as it related to the period of
              prior to January 10, 1968, was a determination, final in
    characte1· whether it was right or wrong as having been made under the
    Defence Act. But for the peritod thereafter, the word 'determination' in
    the context would mean 'final determination' i.e. the determination of
    the competent authority if lllnchallenged and becoming final, and if
F   appealed against, final determination by the appellate forum. (llC-D]

          5. A harmonious construction of the proviso to Section 25( l) with
    the whole of parent section illldicates that the rate of compensation as
    determined by the competent authority under the Defence Act was valid
    uptil the period January 10, A968, but from that day onward the same
    rate of compensation per annum would keep applying till upset or
a   altered in appeal, because deemlngly from that date it is a requisi-
    tion under the other Act and of a different worth and correctable in
    appeal. [HD-El

         6. The latter portion of proviso (a) cannot therefore be allowed to,
H   eat away the applicability of all the provisions of the Requisition Act,
             ESTATE OFFICE\l, v. MUNIVENKATARAMIAH [PUNCHHI, J.J           7

      inclusive that of appeal under Section 11 of the Act. [I ID I
                                                                               A
            7. In the instant case, the arbitrator passed both the awards on
      June 30, 1971, pertaining to the period commencing from May 28.
      1963, the date on which the possession of the land requisitioned was
      taken. Plainly the award was made covering a period no! ony prior to
      January 10, 1968 but to a period therealler. Having regard to section 25 B
      the objection as raised before !he High Court was valid for the period
,.)   b~fore January 10, 1968, bu! not !i~yond the period commencing there-
      after. The case has therefore to be remitted back to the High Court for
      disposal on merits. [llF, 12A]

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 204- C
      205of 1975.

           From the Judgment and Decree dated 9.8.1974 of the Karnataka
      High Court in M.F. Appeal Nos. 582 and 584 of 1971.

            V.(::. Mahajan (N.P.), Tarachand Sharma and C.V. Subba Rao D
      for the Appellant.

            K.R. Chaudhary (N.P.) for the Respondents.

            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

           M.M. PUNCHHI, J. It is to establish a right of appeal in the
      appellate forum of the High Court that the Special Military Estates
      Officer, Bangalore, the common appellant in these two Civil Appeals
      by Special Leave, is here in this Court, challenging the common judg-
      ment and order of the High Co11rt of Karnataka.
                                                                               F
             The facts leading to the present appeal are these. Some lands,
      the extent and description of which is not materi.al here, belonging to
      the first respondent in either of these two appeals, were requisi\ioned
      by the Union of India under Section 29 of the Defence of India Act,
      1962 (hereafter referred to as the Defence Act) by issuing a notifica-
      tion to that effect on April 8, 1963. The possession of such lands was G
      taken by the military authorities on May 28, 1963. The competent
      authority, being the Deputy Commissioner of the district, fixed Rs.280
      per acre per annum as crop compensation. Respondent No. I was not
      satisfied with the measure of compensation. He sought a reference
      from !he competent authority to an arbitrator. The Arbitrator so
      appointed went into the matter and finally made an award on June 30, H
    8                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [1990] 1 S.C.R.

    1971, whereby he worked out rental compensation at the rate of
A
    Rs.6969.60 per acre per annum on the premises that the value ofthe
    land worked out to be Rs. l, 16, 160 per acre and if 6 per cent interest
    were to be awarded themon the figure arrived at would be Rs.6969.60
    per acre, which could well be the rental income per annum. Obviously,
    the increase was sharply contrasted being Rs:Z80 per acre per annum
B   as awarded by the compi:tent authority and almost Rs. 7 ,000 per acre
    per· annum as awarded by the Arbitrator. The aggrieved Special Mili-
    tary Estates Officer filed two appeals against the orders of the
    Arbitrator in the High Court of Kamataka at Bangalore, taking shel-
    ter under Section 11 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immov-
    able Property Act, 1952 (hereafter referred to as the Requisitioning
    Act). At the time of their final disposal, a preliminary objection was
c   raised on behalf of the respondents that the appeals were not main-
    tainable, which found favour with the High Court. The appeals were
    consequen'tly held not maintainable and accordingly dismissed. This
     has led the appellant-Special Military Estates Officer, to this Court.

D         It is not far history that the Defence Act was passed by the
   Parliament in the wake of the Chinese aggression, in order to provide,
   inter alia, special measures to ensure public safety and interest in the
   Defence of India and Civil Defence and other connected matters. It
   had been passed when the Requisitioning Act was already in force.
  ·Under the provisions of both the Acts, immovable property could be
E requisitioned. Reference for the purpose may be had to section 3 of
   the Requisitioning Act and Section 29 of the Defence Act. Under both
   Acts compensation on such requisition is determinable and payable
   and any person interested, being aggrieved by the amount of compen-
   sation so determined, can have an Arbitrator appointed to determine
   compensation. The award of the Arbitrator on such determination
F under Section 8 is appealable under Section 11 of the Requisitioning
   Act before the High Court within whose jurisdiction the requisitioned
    property is situate. The award of the Arbitrator made under Section 30
   in pursuance of the requisition made under Section 29 of the Defence
    Act is apparently final, though specifically not provided so, since no
    right of appeal against the award of the Arbitrator has been conferred
G thereunder on any authority. The Defence Act ceased being applicable
    as it perished on January 10, 1968. Simultaneously Section 25 in the
    Requisitioning Act was substituted. The substituted Section 25 reads
    as follows:

                "25(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,
H               any immovable property requisitioned by the Central
    ESTATE OFFICER v. MUNIVENKATARAMIAH [PUNCHHI, J.]              9

       Government or by any officer or authority to whom powers
                                                                        A
       in this behalf have been delegated by that Government,
       under the Defence of India Act, 1962, and the rules made
       thereunder (including any immovable property deemed to
       have been requisitioned under the said Act) which has not
       been released from such requisition before the 10th
       January, 1968, shall, as from that date, be deemed to have       B
       been requisitioned by the competent authority under the
       provisions of this Act for the purpose for which such pro-
       perty was held immediately before the said date and all the
       provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly.

             Provided that:
                                                                        c
       (a) all determinations, agreements and awards for the pay-
}      meM of compensation in respect of any such property for
       any period of requisition before the said date and in force
       immediately before the said date, shall continue to be in
       force and shall apply to the payment of compensation in          D
       respect of that property for any period of requisition as
       from the said date;

       (b) anything done or any action taken (including any
       orders, notifications or rules made or issued) by the Central
       Government or by any officer or authority to whom powers         E
       in this behalf have been delegated by that Government, in
       exercise of the powers conferred by or under Chapter VI of
       the Defence of India Act, 1962, shall, in so far as it is not
       inconsisten.t with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to
       have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers
       conferred by or under this Act as if this section was in force   F
       on the date on which such thing was done or action was
       taken.

      (2) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (1), the pro-
      visions of the Defence of India Act, 19.62, and the rules
      made thereunder, in so far as those provisiqqs relate to the      G
      requisitioning of any such immovable pr.operty as is refer-
~
'     red to in sub-Section (1), shall as from the 10th January,
      1968, cease to operate except as respect things done or
      omitted to be done before such cesser and Section 6 of the
      General Clauses Act, 1897, shall apply upon such.cesser of
      operation as if such cesser were ·a repeal of an enactment by     H
      a Central Act.
    10                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1990] 1 S.C.R.

          The ~eCJ\l.isi(ioned property ad'l1\t\e\lly was not released before
A
    January 10, 1968, in terms of Section 25(1) of the Requisitioning Act,
    afore quoted, Since the requisition had not been released before
    January 10, 1968, from that day onwards it had to be treated deem-
    ingly to have been requisitioned by the competent authority under the
    provisions of the Requisitioning Act for the purpose for which such
B   property was held immediately before the said date and all the provi-
    sions of the said Act were to apply accordingly. The objection to the
    maintainability of the appeals rested on proviso (a), afore-quoted, on
    the ground that the word 'determination' in the context meant
    determination only by the competent authority under the Defence Act
    and since such determination held the field and was in force
    immediately before January 10, 1968, no challenge thereto could be
c   made by appealing against the same, on the premises that a provision
    amongst all the provisions of the Requisitioning Act provided an
    appellate forum challenging the same. The objection was met on the
    argument that the word 'determination' when considered in the con-
    text of the proviso, meant 'final determination' and not merely
D   determination of compensation at the level of the competent autho-
    rity. The High Court, as said before, upheld the objection, dismissing
    the appeals.

          It is settled law that the right of appeal is a substantive right
    conferred on a party by the statute. The conferring of right of appeal is
E   not circumscribed by the right. being available at the time of the institu-
    tion of the cause in the court of the first instance. The right of appeal in
    a given situation may already be available at the institution of the
    cause in the court of the first instance or may even be subsequently
    conferred. In either situation, without any distinction, such right is
    conferred by statute. Here, as would be seen, Section 25(1) substan-
F   tively provides that the requisition of property under the Defence Act
    continuing upto January 10, 1968, is deemingly a requisition by the
    compet~nt authority under the provisions of the Requisitioning Act
    and all the provisions of the said Act shall apply thereto accordingly.
                                                                                   •
    Proviso (a) however, says that all determinations, agreements and
    awards for the payment of compensation in respect of any such pro-
G   perty for any period of requisition betore the said date and in force
    immediately before the said date, shall continue to be in force and
    shall apply to the payment of compensation in respect of that property
    for any period of requisition as from the said date. It is discernible
    from the scheme of things and from the reading of Section 25 of the
    Requisitioning Act as a whole that for the period of requisition before
    January 10, 1968, the determination for payment of compensation
       ESTATE OFFICER v. MUNlVENKATARAMlAH [PUNCHHl. J.J              11


 under the Defence Act would remain untouched and unaltered for A
appeal had never been provided under that Act. The reason is not far
to seek, because the order of the competent authohty under the
Defence Act was for the purpose of Defence of India. That jlUrpose
having gone with effect from January 10, 1968, the same determination
for payment of compensation being applicable to the post-date .period
was deemingly a requisition by the competent autht\tity tinder the B
Requisitioning Aci and since all the provisions of the said Act appiied
to such a requisiticin, ilie payrii'eiit of cc.>mpensatioil as from January
 10, 1968, became appealable as an appeal is provided under this Act.
In that sense, the word 'determination', so far as it related to the
period of requisition prior to January 10, 1968, was a determination,
final in character whether it was right or wrong as having been made
under the Defence Act. But for the period thereafter, the word c
 'determination' iii the context would mean 'final determination' i.e.
the determination of the competent authority if unchallenged and
becoming final, and if appealed against, final determination by the
appellate forum. In this sense, the latter portion of proviso (a) cannot
be allowed to eat away the applicability of all the provisions of the D
Requisitioning Act, indusive that of appeal under Section 11 of the
Act. Thus a harmonious construction of the said proviso with the
whole of parent section persuades us to hold that the rate of compensa-
tion as determined by the ccirilpeteni authority under the Defence Act
was valid uptil the period before January 10, 1968, but from that day
onward the same rate of compensation per annum would keep apply- E
ing till upset or altered in appeai, because deemingly from that date it
is a requisition under the other Act and of a different worth and
correctable in appeal. The Arbitrator as it appears had passed both the
awards on June 30, 1971, pertaining to the period commencing from
May 28, 1963, (the date on which the possession of the land
requisitioned was taken) and valid for the period following and ensu- F
ing. Plainly the award was made covering a period not only prior to
January 10, 1968 but to a period thereafter also. As we have inter-
preted Section 25, the objection as raised before the I-iigh Court was
valid for the period before January 10, 1968, liut not beyond ihe period
commencing thereafter. The High Court's view , irl sustaihing the
objection for the later period as well, does not commend to us. The G
Legislature by enacting Section 25 of the RecjliiSitioning Act and on
the perishing of the Defence Act, has mote than i.ilipliedly made avail-
able a right of appeal regarding the rate of compensation for a pro-
perty remaining under requisition for the post 10th January, 1968
period: recurring as the rate of compensation wolild be. We hold it
accordingly.                                                                H
    12                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [1990] 1 S.C.R.

A         For the view above taken, we partially allow these appeals and
    remit these cases back to the High Court of Kamataka for disposal on
    merits in accordance with law. We, however, make no order as to costs
    in the appeals before us.

B N.V.K.                                          App_eals allowed partly.