Holding

The arbitrator’s award, including solatium and interest, is valid and enforceable, and the authority must pay the amount; the appeal is dismissed.

Summary

The Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) General, Hyderabad requisitioned land for defence purposes and offered compensation of Rs 4,000 per acre under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952. The claimants rejected the offer and an arbitrator was appointed, who awarded Rs 9,000 per acre plus solatium at 30% per annum and interest at 6% per annum. The authority failed to pay, prompting the claimants to obtain a writ directing payment; the High Court's order was upheld on appeal. The appellant contended that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to award solatium and interest and that the award was not final. The Supreme Court held that the arbitrator’s award, including solatium and interest, was valid, had attained finality, and the public authority must comply, and further ruled that the case did not merit exercise of Article 136 jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The arbitrator under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, had jurisdiction to award solatium and interest.
Whether the award passed in 1991 had attained finality and was binding on the authority.
Whether the High Court could direct the authority to pay the award.
Whether the Supreme Court could entertain the appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 136
Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952s. 10, s. 11, s. 3, s. 4, s. 5, s. 6, s. 7, s. 8, s. 9

Subjects

land acquisitionrequisitionarbitration awardsolatiuminterestcompensationfinality of awardArticle 136public authority compliance

Judgment

SPECIAL DEPUlY COLLECTOR (LAND ACQUISITION) GENERAL, A
-~ HYDERABAD
v.
B. CHANDRA REDDY AND ORS.

APRIL 16, 2007
B
[C.K. THAKKERANDLOKESHWARSINGHPANTA,JJ.]

"-<
Requisitioning and Acquisitioning of Immovable Property Act, 1952:
Land acquisition-Authority fixing compensation.@ Rs. 4,0001- per acre-
Non-acceptance by land owners-Appointment of an arbitrator-Awarding
c
compensation @ Rs. 9,000/- per acre, solatium @ 30% per annum and
interest @ 6% per annum-Execution of award-Held: Once an award was
passed validity of which was never under challenge, a public authority ought
to have acted in accordance with the directions issued in the award and
should have made the payment-Jn the present case, since payment was not D
made, claimants approached the High Court for directions for payment in
terms of the award-Single Judge directing the authorities for payment-
J' Appeal filed against the order was dismissed on ground of delay as well as
on merits-Under the circumstances, it is not a fit case for this Court to
interfere with, in exercise of discretionary power under Article 136 of the
Constitution-Constitution of India, 1950-Article 136. E

Respondents-claimants were the land owners whose land was
requisitioned for defence purpose by the Central Government. The Competent
Authority offered compensation to the land-owners at the rate of Rs. 4000/-
per acre. They did not accept the amount of compensation as offered and the
F
case was referred to an Arbitrator in terms of provisions under the
Requisitioning and Acquisitioning of Immovable Property Act. The Arbitrator
awarded compensation @Rs. 9000/- per acre to the land-owners. In addition,
solatium @ 30% per annum and interest@ 6% per annum have also been
awarded. The amount was not paid by the authorities. The claimants
approached the High Court by filing Writ Petition for issuing appropriate G
directions to the authorities. A Single Judge of the High Court issued
necessary directions to the authorities for payment of the amount within sixty
tJ.. days. Writ Appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the Division Bench
of the High Court. Hence the present appeals.
163 H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 5 S.C.R.

A Appellant contended that the Arbitrator had committed an error of law
y.
and of jurisdiction in granting solatium and interest; that solatium and
interest can only be granted under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and not
under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act under
which acquisition has been made by the appellant; and that neither the
Arbitrator could have ordered payment of solatium and interest to the
B claimants nor the High Court could have issued the direction to pay such
amount.

Respondents-claimants submitted that even if this Court is of the view ,.,
that the award passed by the Arbitrator was not strictly in accordance with
law, it may not exercise discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under Article
c 136 of the Constitution; that considering the fact that the award was passed
in 1991, that it was never challenged by the Land Acquisition Officer it had
attained finality. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the Land Acquisition
Officer to comply with the directions in the award in the award and to pay the
amount.
D Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I.I. The offer of amount as compensation by the Competent
Authority under the Requisitioning and Acquisition oflmmovable Property
Act had not been accepted by the claimants and theY. opted for appointment of
Arbitrator under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property
E Act. An Arbitrator was appointed and Arbitration Case was registered. Award
was made by the Arbitrator even though it was asserted by the appellant at
one stage before this Court that the award was not final and an appeal wa~
filed against it. Subsequently it was admitted that no such appeal had been
filed and the award had attained finality. On the contrary, record revealed that
F on the basis of the award in which solatium and interest was granted by the
Arbitrator, other land-owners had also claimed the similar benefit of solatium
and interest which was allowed. Therefore, the claimants are right in
submitting that once an award was passed, validity of which was never under
challenge, a public authority ought to have acted in accordance with directions
issued in the award and should have made the payment.
G [Para 24] [172-F, G, H; 173-A, BJ

National Insurance Co. Ltd., Calcutta v. Life Insurance Corporation of
India, AIR (1963) SC 1171 and Nagpur Improvement Trust & Anr. v. Vithal
...
Rao & Ors., [1973] l SCC 500, followed.

H Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh & Anr., AIR (1961) SC 908 and Union
SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR {LAND ACQUISITION) GENERAL, HYDERABAD v. B. CHANDRA REDDY (C.K. THAKKER. JI 165

- ._, of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla (dead) by Lrs., (1993] Supp 2 sec 149, A
referred to.

Swift & Co. v. Board of Trade, (1925) A.C. 520, (HL) and Birch v. Joy,
(1852) 3 H.L.C. 565, referred to.

1.2. The claimants were constrained to approach the High Court for B
the award being executed and payment made. When the requisite diri;ctions
were issued by the Single Judge of the High Court, the order was challenged
by filing intra-Court appeal. There was delay in filing appeal. The Division
Bench was not satisfied as to 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay. Even
on merits, the Court felt that it was not a case to interfere with the award
passed by the Arbitrator in 1991 and accordingly, the Letters Patt!nt Appeal c
was dismissed on both the grounds, on the ground of delay as well as on merits.
(Para 24) (173-B, CJ

1.3. The Case in hand is not one which calls for exercise of discretionary
power under Article 136 of the Constitution in Favour of the appellant
D
(Para 25)

~
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6063-6064 of
I
2000.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.04.1999 of the High Court of
E
Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderbad in W.A.M.P. No. 1001of1995 in
W.A.S.R. No:38345of1995.

Manoj Saxena, Rahul Shukla and Rajnish Singh (for T.V. George) for the
Appellant.
F
-I, C. Mukund, Avanish Garg, Neeraj Anand and T.V. Ratnam for the
Respodents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

C.K. THAKKER, J. I. Present appeals are filed against the judgment
G
and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
on April 12, 1999 in Writ Appeal M.P. No. 1001of1995 and W.A.S.R. No.
~ 38345 of 1995 by which it confirmed the order passed by the learned Single
Judge on January 27, 1995 in Writ Petition No.12016 of 1993 directing the
appellant herein to comply with the award passed by an Arbitrator appointed
under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act of 1952 H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 5 S.C.R.

A (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). ,_. .

2. The facts giving rise to the present appeals are that the respondents-
claimants were the owners of the land bearing Survey No 83 admeasuring 12
acres and 5 gunthas and Survey No. 86/2 admeasuring 12 acres and 30
guntas, situated at Devarayamzal Village, Medchal Manda!, Rangareddy District
B of Andhra Pradesh. The land was initially requisitioned for defence purpose,
i.e. for the purpose of extension of rifle range of Hakimpet Airfield, EMC
Centre, Secunderabad. The Competent Authority thereafter initiated
proceedings for acquisition of land and by an award dated February 6, 1978,
offered compensation to the respondents-land-owners at the rate of
c Rs. 4000/- per acre. The respondents-land-owners did not accept the amount
of compensation as offered by the Competent Authority under the Act and
the case was referred to an Arbitrator under the Act. Arbitration Case No. 1
of 1988 was registered. The parties were granted an opportunity to adduce
evidence and finally by an award dated November 13, 1991, the learned
Arbitrator awarded an amount of Rs. 9000/- per acre to the land-owners. Over
D and above the amount of compensation., the Arbitrator also awarded solatium
@ 30% per annum and interest @ 6% per annum. The amount was not paid
by the appellant to the claimants. The claimants, in the circumstances, were
constrained to approach the High Court by filing Writ Petition No. 12016 of
1993 for issuing appropriate directions to the authorities to pay the amount
awarded by the Arbitrator. By an order dated January 27, 1995, a Single Judge
E
of the High Court issued necessary directions as prayed by the claimants and
ordered the authorities to pay the amount within sixty days. Writ Appeal filed
by the appellant before the Division Bench of the High Court was dismissed
on the ground of delay as also on merits. The said decision has been
challenged by the appellant in this Court.
F
3. On February 14, 2000, when the matter was placed for admission -
hearing, a two-Judge Bench issued notice limited to solatium and interest and
the following order was passed-

"Issue notice on SLP restricted to solatium and interest. Notice
G will also issue on application for condonation of delay. Ld. counsel
is permitted to file a copy of grounds of appeal in the CMA which
is pending in the High Court. There is no stay in respect of the other 5-
amount covered by the award."

4. On October 9, 2000, leave was granted. The matter was placed for
H final hearing before us on January 23, 2007. We heard the matter for some time
SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR (LAND ACQUISITION) GENERAL, HYDERABAD v. B. CHANDRA REDDY (C.K. TliAKKER. J.J 167

- ,, and passed the following order- A
We have heard learned counsel for the parties for some time. It
was stated by learned counsel for the appellant that aggrieved by the
Award passed by the Arbitrator under Section 8 of the Requisitioning
& Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Act'), the appellant has preferred an appeal under Section B
11 of the said Act and it is pending in the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh at Hyderabad. He prays for some time so as to enable him
-~
to produce a copy of the Memorandum of Appeal as well as the latest
status of the said appeal. Two weeks' time is granted for the purpose.
List the appeals thereafter."
c
5. As per our direction, the Registry placed the matter on Board on
February 13, 2007. We observed on that day that on January 23, 2007, when
the matter was called out for final hearing, a statement was made that an
appeal was filed against the award passed by the Arbitrator and was pending
for final hearing. The matter was, therefore, adjourned to enable the parties
D
to produce a copy of Memorandum of Appeal and latest status of the appeal.
But it was stated at the date of hearing, i.e. on February 13, 2007 that on
't
J. inquiry by the learned counsel for the appellant, he was informed that no such
appeal had been filed by the appellant. The appeal was instituted by other
claimants. Accordingly, we had proceeded with the matter and heard the
learned counsel for the parties. E
6. The only point which is pressed before us by the learned counsel for
the appellant is that the Arbitrator had committed an error of law and of
jurisdiction in granting solatium and interest. According to him, solatium and
interest can only be granted under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and not
under the Act under which acquisition has been made by the appellant. The F
Arbitrator has no power to grant solatium and interest and the award is,
therefore, vulnerable. Neither the Arbitrator could have ordered payment of
solatium and interest to the claimants nor the High Court could have issued
the direction to pay such amount. The said direction, hence, deserves to be
,. set aside by allowing the appeals. G
..._,, 7. Though in the appeals filed before this Court, a ground was taken
that the High Court could not have passed an order asking the appellant to
pay to the claimants the amount awarded by the Arbitrator in view of the fact
that the appellant had challenged the award passed by the Arbitrator under
the Act and the appeal was pending, as stated earlier, at the time of hearing H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 5 S.C.R.

A of appeals, it was admitted that the award passed by the Arbitrator was never
challenged by the Land Acquisition Officer and it had attained finality. The >---
question, therefore, is confined to legality or otherwise of the order of Arbitrator
granting solatium and interest under the Act.

8. The learned counsel for the respondents-claimants supported the
B award as also directions by the High Court asserting the award to be legal,
valid and in consonance with law and calling for 'no interference'. It was
alternatively argued that even if this Court is of the view that the award
passed by the Arbitrator was not strictly in accordance with law, it may not
exercise discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
C Constitution considering the fact that the award was passed in 1991, it was
never challenged by the Land Acquisition Officer and it had attained finality.
It was, therefore, incumbent upon the Land Acquisition Officer to comply
with the directions in the award and to pay the amount which was not done.
Even though the claimants succeeded, they were constrained to approach the
High Court and in 1995, a Single Judge directed the appellant to comply with
D the Award. Even Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed. This is, therefore, not
a fit case to grant any relief in favour of the appellant.

9. The learned counsel for the parties invited our attention to the i

relevant provisions of the Act. Section 3 enables the Competent Authority •
to requisition immovable property in certain cases. Section 4 empowers the
E Authority to take possession of requisitioned property. Section 5 deals with
rights over requisitioned property. Section 6 relates to release of property
from requisitioning. Section 7 authorises the Government to acquire the
requisitioned property. Section 8 Jays down principles and fixes method of
determining compensation. Section 9 deals with payment of compensation.
F Sections I0 and 11 provide for appeals in certain cases.

10. Reliance was also placed by both the sides on several decisions of
this Court. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the
question is no longer res integra so far as payment of solatium and interest
1
under the Act of 1952 is concerned and it has been held that the provisions I
G of Land Acquisition Act cannot be invoked while deciding the cases under .,
the present Act and Arbitrator has no power, authority or jurisdiction to grant
solatium and interest.

11. On behalf of claimants, on the other hand, it was urged that under
the provisions of the Act of 1952, solatium and interest had been awarded
H
SPECIAL DEPUIT COLLECTOR (LAND ACQUISITION) GENERAL, HYDER.A.BAD"· 8. CHANDRA REDDY fC.K. TIIAKKER, J.) 169
r
in several cases and those orders had been upheld by this Court. One of the A
- -( grounds which weighed with this Court in upholding such award was equity
in favour of claimants. We may deal with some of the decisions in this regard.

12. In Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh & Anr., AIR (1961) SC 908, this
Court was considering the case of acquisition of land under the East Punjab
Requisition oflmmovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act, 1948. The question B
before the Court was whether the claimants would be entitled to interest on
the amount of compensation. It was argued on behalf of the claimants that
_, the amount of compensation awarded must carry a reasonable rate of interest
from the date of acquisition when the claimants lost possession of the property.
The argument was, however, negatived by the High Court mainly on the
ground that the Act of 1948 made no provision for payment of interest.
c
Omission to make such provision amounted in law to an intention not to
award interest on compensation amount determined under the Act.

13. The Court then considered the question on principle and stated;
D
What then is the contention raised by the claimants? They contend
that their immovable property has been acquired by the State and the
~ State has taken possession of it. Thus they have been deprived of the
} right to receive the income from the property and there is a time lag
between the taking of the possession by the State and the payment
of compensation by it to the claimants. During this period they have E
been deprived of the income of the property and they have not been
able to ~eceive interest from the amount of compensation. Stated
broadly the act of taking possession of immovable property generally
• implies an agreement to pay interest on the value of the property and
it is on this principle that a claim for interest is made against the State.
This question has been considered on several occasions and the
F
_:J
general principle on which the contention is raised by the claimants
has been upheld. (emphasis supplied)

14. The Court there referred to Swift & Co. v. Board of Trade, (1925)
A.C. 520, (HL) wherein the House of Lords held that in a contract for sale and
":
G
purchase of land it is the practice of the Court of Chancery to require the
purchaser to pay interest on his purchase money from the date when he took,
).. or might safely have taken, possession of the land.

..... 15. The Court also noted that the principle had been recognized since
more than a century and referred to another English decision in Birch v. Joy, H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 5 S.C.R.

A (1852) 3 H.L.C. 565. In Birch, Viscount Cave, L.C. observed that this practice
rests upon the view that the act of taking possession is an implied agreement ...
to pay interest. The Court also referred to a decision of the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in Inglewood Pulp & Paper Co. Ltd. v. New Brunswick
Electric Power Commission, (1928) AC 492 : AIR (1928) PC 287 wherein it was
held that upon the expropriation of land under statutory power (whether for
B private gain or for public good), the owner is entitled to interest upon the
principal sum awarded from the date when possession was taken, unless the
statute clearly shows an intention to the contrary.
,,_
16. The Court, therefore, concluded that the claim for interest proceeds
c on the assumption that when the owner of immovable property loses possession
of property, he can claim interest in lieu of right to retain possession.

17. Dealing with the contention of difference between two Acts, namely,
the East Punjab Requisition of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act,
1948 and the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Court observed;
D I.
The question which we have to consider is whether the application of
this rule is intended to be excluded by the Act of 1948, and as we have
already observed, the mere fact thats. 5(3) of the Act makes s. 23(1) of the
~
Land Acquisition Act of 1894 applicable we cannot reasonably infer that the
Act intends to exclude the application of this general rule in the matter of the I

E payment of interest.

18. A similar issue came up for consideration before a Constitution
Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd., Calcutta v. Life Insurance
Corporation ofIndia, AIR (1963) SC 1171. There, the Court was considering •
the question whether the Corporation under the Life Insurance Corporation ...
I
F Act, 1956 was or was not required to pay compensation with interest to the
insurer. TI1e Court noted that neither the Act nor the Rules contained any ""'
express provision for grant of interest. Relying on English cases referred to
earlier, however, the Court held that the insurer would be entitled to claim

G
interest once it is proved that he was illegally deprived of the amount to
which he was legally entitled and there was delay on the part of the Corporation
in making payment of such amount.

19. Strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the claimants .....
-
on a decision of seven-fodge Bench in Nagpur Improvement Trust & Anr. v.

H
Vitha/Rao & Ors., [1973] l SCC 500. That was a case in which constitutional
validity of certain provisions of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1963 was
"
SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR (LAND ACQUISITION) GENERAL HYDERABAD "- B. CHANDRA REDDY IC.K. THAKKER, J.1 ) 71

- ·1 under challenge. The contention of the claimants was that difference in rate A
of payment of compensation under the Improvement Trust Act and the Land
Acquisition Act was arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of equality clause
under Article 14 of the Constitution." The High Court declared the provisions
unconstitutional and ultra vires infringing Article 14 of the-Constitution. This
Court considered the relevant provisions as also the factum of acquisition of
property and posed a question whether such classification could be said to B
be 'reasonable classification' in law.
__,
This Court then stated;

It would not be disputed that different principles of compensation
cannot be formulated for lands acquired on the basis that the owner c
, is old or young, healthy or ill, tall or short, or whether the owner has
inherited the property or built it with his own efforts, or whether the
owner is a politician or an advocate. Why is this sort of classification
not sustainable? Because the object being to compulsorily acquire for
a public purpose, the object is equally achieved whether the land D
belongs to one type or another type.
t
-1- 20. The Court proceeded to state;
_. Can classification be made on the basis of the public purpose for
the purpose of compensation for which land is acquired? In other
words can the legislature lay down different principles of, compensation
E
for lands acquired say for a hospital or a school or a Government
. building? Can the legislature say that for a hospital land will be
acquired at 50% of the market value, for a school at 60% of the value.
and for a Government building at 70% of the market value? All three
.>( objects are public purposes and as far as the owner is concerned it F
does not matter to him whether it is one public purpose or other.
Article I4 confers an individual right and in order to justify a
classification there should be something which justifies a different
treatment to this individual right. It seems to us that ordinarily a
< classification based on the public purpose is not permissible under
Article 14 for the purpose of determining compensatio:J.. The position G
is different when the owner of the land himself is the recipient of
;)..
benefits from an improvement scheme, and the benefit to him is taken

- into consideration in fixing compensation. Can classification be made
on the basis of the authority acquiring the land? Jn other words can
different principles of compensation be laid if the land is acquired for H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 5 S.C.R.

A or by an Improvement Trust or Municipal Corporation or the
Government? It seems to us that the answer is in the negative because
.-
as far as the owner is concerned it does not matter to him whether
the land is acquired by one authority or the other.

21. In the opinion of the Court, it was immaterial whether acquisition is
B under one Act or another and held that if the two Acts could enable the State
to give one owner a different treatment from another equally situated, the
owner who is discriminated against can claim the protection of Article 14. It
was, therefore, held that the High Court was right in declaring such 'so-called'
classification unreasonable and violative of Article 14.
c 22. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, invited our attention
to a three-Judge Bench decision in Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla
(dead) by Lrs., [1993] Supp 2 SCC 149. According to the learned counsel, the
Court in Hari Krishan Khosla considered the scheme of both the Acts,
referred to earlier decisions including Nagpur Improvement Trust, and held
D that the scheme of Requisitioning Acts and Acquisition Acts is totally different,
distinct and independent and the principles applicable to Acquisition Laws
cannot ipso facto be applied to Requisitioning Laws. The Court observed that
if the Requisitioning Laws do not provide for payment of solatium or interest, ·f
such provision would not be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. The
claimant, therefore, would not be entitled to the benefit of solatium or interest,
E on the analogy of Acquisition Laws.
23. The counsd also referred to subsequent cases. In some of the
decisions, grant of solatium and inter~st under the Act in question has been
upheld whereas in other cases, the claim had been negatived.

F 24. In view of above decisions, we would have considered the larger
question posed before us. In our opinion, however, it is not necessary to
enter into such question in view of the fact that to us, the alternative
submission made by the learned counsel for the claimants deserves acceptance.
Admittedly, the offer of amount as compensation by the Competent Authority
G under the Act had not been accepted by the claimants and they opted for
appointment of Arbitrator under the Act. An Arbitrator was appointed as
early as on February 8, 1988 and Arbitration Case No. 1 of 1988 was registered.
Award was made by the Arbitrator on November 13, 1991. Even though it was
asserted by the appellant at one stage before this Court that the award was
not final and an appeal was filed against it, subsequently it was admitted that '
H no such appeal had been filed and the award had attained finality. On the
SPECIAL DEPUIT COLLECTOR (LAND ACQUISITION) GENERAL. HYDERABAD 1•. B. CHANDRA REDDY (C.K. THAKKER. J.J l 73

contrary, record revealed that on the basis of the award in which solatium and A
- 'j
interest was granted by the Arbitrator, other land-owners had also claimed the
similar benefit of solatium and interest which was allowed. In ou; view,
therefore, the claimants are right in submitting that once an award was
passed, validity of which was never under challenge, a public authority ought
to have acted in accordance with direction~ issued in the award and should B
have made the payment. The authorities, however, virtually ignored the award
though it was never challenged by taking appropriate action in accordance
with law. The claimants were constrained to approach the High Court for the
award being executed and payment made. When the requisite directions were
issued by the learned Single Judge, the order was challenged by filing intra-
Court appeal. There was delay in filing appeal. The Division Bench was not c
satisfied as to 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay. Even on merits, the
Court felt that it was not a fit case to interfere with the award passed by the
Arbitrator in 1991 and accordingly, the Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed
on both the grounds, i.e. on the ground of delay as well as on merits.
D
25. We are of the considered view that the case in hand is not one
which calls for exercise of discretionary power under Article 136 of the
I Constitution in favour of the appellant. In some cases, this Court had refused
\"
to interfere with the orders passed by the High Courts. Thus, in Prabhu
Dayal & Ors. v. Union of India, [1995] Supp 4 SCC 22, it was contended on
behalf of the Union of India that the claimants were not entitled in law to E
solatium. But the court held that for about 22 years, no arbitrator was appointed
by the Union to determine market value of the land acquired by the Government
and hence, the claimants were entitled to solatium on the ground of equity.
The Court followed an earlier decision in Harbans Singh v. Union of India,
[1995] Supp 4 SCC 223 wherein on similar ground, such relief was granted.
Even in Hari Krishan Khosla, equitable aspect was considered by this Court.
F
[See also Girdhari & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors; [2005] 11 SCC 291.

26. For the foregoing reasons, in our considered opinion, this is not a
fit case to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution. The appeals deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly G
dismissed with costs.

-~ S.K.S. Appeal is dimissed.