SONUversusSONU YADAV AND ANOTHER

78                      [2021]
              SUPREME COURT    7 S.C.R. 78
                            REPORTS                         [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A                                    SONU
                                        v.
                       SONU YADAV AND ANOTHER
                       (Criminal Appeal No. 377 of 2021)
B                               APRIL 05, 2021
             [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
                        M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
            Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 439 – Unnatural death
     of married woman within a year of marriage – Charge-sheet against
C
     her husband (first respondent) for offences u/ss.498-A and 304-B
     IPC and ss.3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act – Bail application of
     first respondent rejected by Sessions Judge – Bail application u/
     s.439 CrPC before High Court – High Court allowed the application
     – Justification of – Held: In view of the provisions of s.304-B IPC,
D    as well as the presumption arising u/s.113-B of Evidence Act, the
     High Court, on facts, was clearly not justified in granting bail –
     Prima facie, there were serious allegations in the FIR in regard to
     harassment suffered by deceased in close proximity to her death
     over demands for dowry by the accused – Submission in support of
     bail as recorded by High Court was that deceased was undergoing
E
     treatment for a mental illness – Medical prescription, submitted
     before the Court, however, prima facie indicates that there was no
     serious ailment – Also, the order of High Court did not contain the
     kind of reasoning expected of a judicial order – The High Court
     merely recorded the rival submissions, and, without any evaluation
F    of the same, proceeded to grant bail without due application of
     mind to the relevant facts and circumstances as well to the provisions
     of the law – Grant of bail to first respondent accordingly stand set
     aside – Bail – IPC – ss.498-A and 304B – Dowry Prohibition Act,
     1961 – ss.3 and 4.
G          Bail – Evaluation of rival submissions – Requirement of –
     Held: The rival submissions have to be evaluated and not merely
     recorded by the court – While it is true that at the time of considering
     an application for bail, the High Court would not be required to
     launch into a detailed enquiry into the facts which have to be
     determined in the course of trial, equally an application of mind by
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                                       78
             SONU v. SONU YADAV AND ANOTHER                                79


the High Court to the rival submissions is necessary – Code of             A
Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 439.
       Bail – Reasoned bail orders – Necessity of – Held: An order
without reasons is fundamentally contrary to the norms which guide
the judicial process – While the reasons may be brief, it is the quality
of the reasons which matters the most – That there has been a              B
judicious application of mind by the judge who is deciding an
application u/s.439 CrPC must emerge from the quality of the
reasoning which is embodied in the order granting bail – Reasons
in support of orders granting bail comport with a judicial process
which brings credibility to the administration of criminal justice –
Judgment / Order – Reasoned order – Code of Criminal Procedure,            C
1973 – s. 439 – Administration of Justice.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
      HELD:1. The submission in support of bail recorded by
the High Court was that the sister of the appellant was undergoing         D
treatment for a mental illness. The medical prescription,
submitted before the Court, however, would prima facie indicate
that there was no serious ailment. Prima facie, there are serious
allegations in the FIR in regard to the harassment suffered by
the deceased in close proximity to her death over demands for
dowry by the accused. In view of the provisions of Section 304-B           E
of the Indian Penal Code, as well as the presumption which arises
under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, the High Court was
clearly not justified in granting bail. [Para 9][83-G, H; 84-A-B]
      2.1. The order of the High Court granting bail contains
absolutely no reasons at all. While it is true that at the time of         F
considering an application for bail the High Court would not be
required to launch into a detailed enquiry into the facts which
have to be determined in the course of trial, equally an application
of mind by the High Court to the rival submissions is necessary.
In the present case, the High Court has merely recorded the                G
submissions and proceeded to grant bail without any evaluation
of the rival submissions. [Para 10][84-B-D]
      2.2.The lone sentence in the order of the High Court,
intending to display some semblance of reasoning for justifying
                                                                           H
80            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A    the grant of bail, contains an omnibus amalgam of (i) “the entire
     facts and circumstances of the case”; (ii) “submissions of learned
     Counsel for the parties”; (iii) “the nature of offence”; (iv)
     “evidence”; and (v) “complicity of accused”. This is followed by
     an observation that the “applicant has made out a case for bail”,
     “without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case”. This
B
     does not constitute the kind of reasoning which is expected of a
     judicial order. The High Court cannot be oblivious, in a case such
     as the present, of the seriousness of the alleged offence, where a
     woman has met an unnatural end within a year of marriage. The
     seriousness of the alleged offence has to be evaluated in the
C    backdrop of the allegation that she was being harassed for dowry;
     and that a telephone call was received from the accused in close-
     proximity to the time of death, making a demand. There are
     specific allegations of harassment against the accused on the
     ground of dowry. An order without reasons is fundamentally
     contrary to the norms which guide the judicial process. The
D
     administration of criminal justice by the High Court cannot be
     reduced to a mantra containing a recitation of general
     observations. That there has been a judicious application of mind
     by the judge who is deciding an application under Section 439 of
     the CrPC must emerge from the quality of the reasoning which is
E    embodied in the order granting bail. While the reasons may be
     brief, it is the quality of the reasons which matters the most. That
     is because the reasons in a judicial order unravel the thought
     process of a trained judicial mind. Reasons in support of orders
     granting bail comport with a judicial process which brings
     credibility to the administration of criminal justice. [Para 11]
F
     [84-F-H; 85-A-E]
           3. The order of the High Court granting bail without due
     application of mind to the relevant facts and circumstances as
     well to the provisions of the law requires the interference of this
     Court. The grant of bail to the first respondent shall accordingly
G    stand set aside. [Paras 12, 13][85-E-F]
           Brij Nandan Jaiswal vs. Munna alias Munna Jaiswal
           (2009) 1 SCC 678: [2008] 17 SCR 1348 –relied to.


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             SONU v. SONU YADAV AND ANOTHER                                 81


                        Case Law Reference                                  A
      [2008] 17 SCR 1348            relied to          Para 10
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
377 of 2021
       From the Judgment and Order dated 01.12.2020 of the High Court       B
of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 17334
of 2020.
      Vishal Yadav, Kuldeep Singh Kuchaliya, Ajay Pal, Advs. for the
Appellant.
      Ravindra Singh, Sr. Adv., Raman Yadav, Syed Mehdi Imam, Ankit         C
Goel, Sanjay Jain, Advs. for the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
      1. Leave granted.                                                     D
      2. This appeal arises from a judgment and order dated 1 December
2020 of a Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in
Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No 17334 of 2020.
       3 A First Information Report, FIR No 0076 of 2019, was registered
on 9 February 2019 at Police Station Friends Colony, District Etawah        E
for offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code
and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1861. The First
Information Report was registered on the complaint of the appellant,
who is the brother of the deceased. The marriage between the deceased
and the first respondent was solemnized on 5 July 2018. It has been         F
alleged in the FIR that at the time of the marriage, a cash amount of Rs
15 lakhs, a motor vehicle and other household articles were provided in
dowry. It has been alleged that the first respondent and his parents were
not satisfied with the amount of dowry and an amount of Rs 5 lakhs was
being demanded. On 8 February 2019, it has been alleged that at about
8.45 pm, a phone call was received from a cell phone from the first         G
respondent when the appellant was informed that if he wished to see his
sister alive, an amount of Rs 5 lakhs should be arranged. It has been
alleged that the phone was then disconnected. However, at 1.30 am on
9 February 2019, the appellant is alleged to have received a phone call
requiring him to take away the dead body of his sister. The FIR records     H
82             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A    that the appellant together with the members of the family went to Etawah
     and found that the matrimonial home of the appellant’s sister was locked.
     They came to know that her dead body had been kept at the district
     hospital. On these allegations, the First Information Report came to be
     registered at 11.49 am on 9 February 2019.
B            4. A charge-sheet has been submitted on 3 May 2019 for offences
     alleged under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code and
     Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The bail application filed
     by the first respondent was rejected by the Sessions Judge on 18 June
     2019. The High Court was thereafter moved in a bail application under
     Section 439 of Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. After recording the
C    rival submissions, the High Court allowed the application, observing thus:
            “Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case,
            submissions of learned counsel for the parties and keeping in view
            the nature of offence, evidence, complicity of accused and without
            expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, the Court is of
D           the view that the applicant has made out a case for bail. The bail
            application is allowed.”
            5. We have heard Mr Vishal Yadav, learned counsel appearing on
     behalf of the appellant, Mr Ravinder Singh, learned senior counsel for
     the first respondent and Mr Sanjay Jain, learned counsel for the State of
E    Uttar Pradesh have appeared in pursuance of the notice issued by this
     Court on 27 January 2021.
            6. Mr Vishal Yadav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
     appellant submits that (i) the High Court has adduced absolutely no
     reasons for the grant of bail; (ii) the submission before the High Court
     that the deceased was suffering from a mental illness is patently false
F    and the so called medical prescription dated 1 January 2019 was issued
     by an Ayurvedic doctor about a month before the date of the incident on
     1 January 2019; (iii) ex facie, the medical prescription would indicate
     that the deceased was not undergoing treatment for a mental condition;
     (iv) the death has taken place within a year of the marriage; and (v)
G    having regard to the provisions of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal
     Code and the presumptions which arise under Sections 113-A and 113-
     B of the Evidence Act, there was no justification for the High Court to
     grant bail at the present stage.
           7. On the other hand, Mr Ravindra Singh, learned senior counsel
     appearing on behalf of the first respondent has supported the view of
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             SONU v. SONU YADAV AND ANOTHER                                    83
           [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

the High Court, on the ground that (i) the High Court has desisted from        A
expressing any view on the merits which may impede the course of the
trial; (ii) the statements which have been recorded during investigation
would indicate that the death was as a result of hanging; (iii) there is no
complicity whatsoever of the first respondent; (iv) hence, it would be
appropriate for this Court not to interfere with the order granting bail to
                                                                               B
the first respondent.
       8. Mr Sanjay Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
State of UP has submitted that an attempt has been made on behalf of
the accused to improve upon the case in the course of the pleadings. He
sought to demonstrate this by making a reference to paragraph 21 of the
bail application filed before the High Court, in which it was denied that      C
the mobile number from which the informant was alleged to have
received the phone call demanding additional dowry was in any manner
associated with the family or the near relatives of the accused. On the
other hand, it has been pointed out that in paragraph 7 of the counter
affidavit before this court, the specific case of the first respondent is      D
that on 8 February 2019, when he was away from home to attend a
marriage of a close friend, he had received a call at 8.45 pm from the
same mobile number which is referred to in the FIR to the effect that his
spouse has committed suicide. Hence, it has been submitted that there
has been a clear attempt to improve upon the case which was set up in
the application for bail filed before the High Court.                          E

        9. At the present stage, certain basic aspects need to be noted. It
is not in dispute that the first respondent was married to the sister of the
appellant on 5 July 2018. She died on 8 February 2019, within a year of
the marriage. There are specific allegations in the First Information Report
in regard to the demand of dowry, as well as in regard to a phone call         F
being received from the accused in close proximity to the death of the
sister of the appellant when a demand for additional amounts of money
was made. The submission in support of bail recorded by the High Court
was that the sister of the appellant was undergoing treatment for a mental
illness. In this context, it is material to note that in paragraph 22 of the   G
bail application, the plea was that the deceased was “suffering from
severe headache and was mentally disturbed since the past nine months”
and that she was taken to a doctor by the first respondent. A copy of the
medical prescription, which has been submitted before this Court, would
prima facie indicate that there was no serious ailment. The medical
prescription of the Ayurvedic doctor and the remedies prescribed belie         H
84             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A    such a claim. Prima facie, there are serious allegations in the FIR in
     regard to the harassment suffered by the deceased in close proximity to
     her death over demands for dowry by the accused. In view of the
     provisions of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, as well as the
     presumption which arises under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, the
     High Court was clearly not justified in granting bail.
B
             10. The order of the High Court granting bail contains absolutely
     no reasons at all. While it is true that at the time of considering an
     application for bail the High Court would not be required to launch into a
     detailed enquiry into the facts which have to be determined in the course
     of trial, equally an application of mind by the High Court to the rival
C    submissions is necessary. The High Court has merely recorded the
     submissions and in the extract which we have reproduced earlier
     proceeded to grant bail without any evaluation of the rival submissions.
     In this context, it would be worthwhile to reproduce the principle which
     has been formulated in the two-Judge Bench decision of this Court in
D    Brij Nandan Jaiswal vs. Munna alias Munna Jaiswal (2009) 1 SCC
     678 where the Court observed thus:
           “It is now a settled law that the complainant can always question
           the order granting bail if the said order is not validly passed. It is
           not as if once a bail is granted by any court, the only way is to get
E          it cancelled on account of its misuse. The bail order can be tested
           on merit also. In our opinion, therefore, the complainant could
           question the merits of the order granting bail. However, we find
           from the order that no reasons were given by the learned Judge
           while granting the bail and it seems to have been granted almost
           mechanically without considering the pros and cons of the matter.
F          While granting bail, particularly in serious cases like murder some
           reasons justifying the grant are necessary.”
           11. In the earlier part of this judgment, we have extracted the lone
     sentence in the order of the High Court which is intended to display
     some semblance of reasoning for justifying the grant of bail. The sentence
G    which we have extracted earlier contains an omnibus amalgam of (i)
     “the entire facts and circumstances of the case”; (ii) “submissions of
     learned Counsel for the parties”; (iii) “the nature of offence”; (iv)
     “evidence”; and (v) “complicity of accused”. This is followed by an
     observation that the “applicant has made out a case for bail”, “without
     expressing any opinion on the merits of the case”. This does not constitute
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              SONU v. SONU YADAV AND ANOTHER                                     85
            [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

the kind of reasoning which is expected of a judicial order. The High            A
Court cannot be oblivious, in a case such as the present, of the seriousness
of the alleged offence, where a woman has met an unnatural end within
a year of marriage. The seriousness of the alleged offence has to be
evaluated in the backdrop of the allegation that she was being harassed
for dowry; and that a telephone call was received from the accused in
                                                                                 B
close-proximity to the time of death, making a demand. There are specific
allegations of harassment against the accused on the ground of dowry.
An order without reasons is fundamentally contrary to the norms which
guide the judicial process. The administration of criminal justice by the
High Court cannot be reduced to a mantra containing a recitation of
general observations. That there has been a judicious application of             C
mind by the judge who is deciding an application under Section 439 of
the CrPC must emerge from the quality of the reasoning which is
embodied in the order granting bail. While the reasons may be brief, it is
the quality of the reasons which matters the most. That is because the
reasons in a judicial order unravel the thought process of a trained judicial
                                                                                 D
mind. We are constrained to make these observations because the reasons
indicated in the judgment of the High Court in this case are becoming
increasingly familiar in matters which come to this Court. It is time that
such a practice is discontinued and that the reasons in support of orders
granting bail comport with a judicial process which brings credibility to
the administration of criminal justice.                                          E
       12. For the above reasons, we are of the view that the order of
the High Court granting bail without due application of mind to the relevant
facts and circumstances as well to the provisions of the law requires the
interference of this Court.
        13. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned           F
judgment and order of the Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court
dated 1 December 2020 granting bail to the first respondent. The grant
of bail to the first respondent shall accordingly stand set aside and the
first respondent shall surrender forthwith. We, however, clarify that the
observations contained in the present order are confined to the issue of         G
bail and shall not affect the merits of the trial.
       14. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                                           Appeal allowed.

                                                                                 H