SOM RAJ @ SOMAversusSTATE OF H.P.

                     [2013] 4 S.C.R. 433


                     SOM RAJ @ SOMA                                 A
                               v.
                       STATE OF H.P.
             (Criminal Appeal No. 1772 of 2008)
                    FEBRUARY 22, 2013
                                                                    B
 [P. SATHASIVAM AND JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, JJ.]

      Penal Code, 1860- s.302- Assault with deadly weapon
on vital part of the body causing death of a person - Appellant
inflicted blow with a 'darat' (agricultural implement having a      C
large cutting blade) on the back of the deceased's head - The
blow proved to be fatal - Conviction of appellant uls.302 -
Justification of - Held: Justified - Appellant chose the sharp
side of the 'darat' and not the blunt side - The ferocity with
which the blow was struck clearly emerges from the fact that        D
the blow resulted in cutting through the skull of the deceased
and caused a hole therein, resulting in exposing the brain
tissue - It is not the case of the appellant, that the occurrence
arose out of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of the moment -
It is not even his case, that he had retaliated as a                E
consequence of provocation at the hands of the deceased -
Five witnesses stated in unison, that appellant was in the
process of inflicting a second blow on the deceased, when
they caught hold of him, whereupon one of them (PW6)
snatched the 'darat' from the appellant, and threw it away - In     F
such a situation, it would be improper to treat I determine the
culpability of the appellant by assuming, that he had inflicted
only one injury on the deceased - Appellant must be deemed
to have committed the offence of 'culpable homicide
amounting to murder' u/s.302 IPC, as he had struck the 'darat'      G
blow, with the intention of causing such bodily injury, which he
knew was so imminently dangerous, that it would in all
probability cause the death of the deceased.

    The prosecution case was that while a 'bhandara'
                        433                                         H
   434      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 4 S.C.R.

A (ceremonial feast) was being held at the residence of PW2,
  the accused-appellant started quarrelling with PW1's
  brother and then assaulted him with a 'daraf (a traditional
  agricultural implement) on the back portion of his head.
  The further case of the prosecution was that when
B appellant was in the process of giving a second blow,
  PW-1 alongwith others caught hold of him and snatched
  the 'darat' from his hands. PW1 's brother died
  subsequently. Almost all the witnesses were related to the
  deceased, as also the appellant. A large number of
c relatives collectively deposed against the appellant,
  whereas, only his brother (DW5) deposed in his favour.
  The trial court rejected the alternate version of the incident
  as stated by DW5 and convicted the appellant under
  Section 302 IPC. The conviction was affirmed by the High
  Court and, therefore, the instant appeal.
0
         Dismissing the appeal, the Court

      HELD: 1. On merits, there can hardly be any doubt
  about the fact, that the appellant inflicted the fatal blow
E with a 'darat' on the back of the head of the deceased.
  The affirmation, that the aforesaid blow had been inflicted
  by the appellant emerges from the statements of PW1,
  PW2, PW3, PW6 and PWS. Alf the aforesaid witnesses
  were present at the place of occurrence. There is no
F reason to doubt the veracity of their statements. The
  statement of DWS is insufficient to overturn the
  statements of the prosecution witnesses. It is
  untrustworthy. [Para 6] [445-8-E, F]

       2.1. It is apparent from the factual narration of the
G witnesses produced by the prosecution, that the
  appellant was not carrying the 'darat' but had picked up
  the same from the house of PW2. A 'darat' is a traditional
  agricultural implement used for cutting branches of trees.
  It is also used by butchers for beheading goats and
H sheep. A 'darat' has a handle and a large cutting blade.
        SOM RAJ @ SOMA v. STATE OF H.P.                 435


Having picked up the 'darat' for committing an assault on       A
the deceased, it is apparent that the appellant was aware
of the nature of injury he was likely to cause with the
weapon of incident. From the statements of the two
Doctors (PW4 and PW5), the nature of injuries caused to
the deceased has been brought out. A perusal thereof            B.
leaves no room for doubt, that the appellant had chosen
the sharp side of the 'darat' and not the blunt side. The
ferocity with which the aforesaid blow was struck clearly
emerges from the fact that the blow resulted in cutting
through the skull of the deceased and caused a hole             c
therein, resulting in exposing the brain tissue. When a
blow with a deadly weapon is struck with ferocity, it is
apparent that the assailant intends to cause bodily injury
of a nature which he knows is so imminently dangerous,
that it must in all probability cause death. The place          0
where the blow was struck (at the back of the head of the
deceased) by the appellant,. also leads to the same
inference. It is not the case of the appellant, that the
occurrence arose out of a sudden quarrel. It is also not
his case, that the blow was struck in the heat of the
                                                                E
moment. It is not even his case, that he had retaliated as
a consequence of provocation at the hands of the
deceased. He has therefore no excuse, for such an
extreme act. Another material fact is the. relationship
between the parties. The appellant was an uncle to the
deceased. In such circumstances, there is hardly any            F
cause to doubt the intent and knowledge of the appellant.
[Para 11] [458-8-H; 459-A-B]

     2.2. Besides, it would be incorrect to treat the instant
incident as one wherein a single blow had been inflicted        G
by the accused. As many as five witnesses of the
occurrence have stated in unison, that the appellant was
in the process of inflicting a second blow on the deceased,
when they caught hold of him, whereupon one of them
(PW6) snatched the 'darat' from the appellant, and threw        H
    436      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A it away. In such a situation, it would be improper to treat/
  determine the culpability of the appellant by assuming,
  that he had inflicted only one injury on the deceased. The
  appellant must be deemed to have committed the offence
  of 'culpable homicide amounting to murder' under Section
B 302 of IPC, as he had struck the 'darat' blow, with the
  intention of causing such bodily injury, which he knew
  was so imminently dangerous, that it would in all
  probability cause the death of the deceased. The appellant
  was thus justifiably convicted of the offence under Section
c 302 of IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous
  imprisonment for life. [Para 11] [459-B-G]

       Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana (1981) 3 SCC 616:
  1981 (3) SCR 839; Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 2
  SCC 342 and State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu
D Punnayya & Anr. 1977 (1) SCR 601: (1976) 4 SCC 382 -
  referred to.
                         Case Law Reference:
          1981 (3) SCR 839        referred to          Para 8
E
          (1983) 2 sec 342        referred to          Para 8
          (1976) 4 sec 382        referred to          Para 10
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
F   No. 1772 of 2008.

         From the Judgment & Order dated 13.04.2007 of the High
    Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla in Criminal Appeal No. 607
    of 2003.
G         Shashi Bhushan Kumar for the Appellant.

          Naresh K. Sharma for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

H         JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. 1. Consequent upon an
         SOM RAJ @ SOMA v. STATE OF H.P.                     437
            [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

 intimation to the police, by Dr. B.M. Gupta (PW5}, Senior           A
 Medical Officer, Community Health Centre, lndora (hereinafter
 referred to as the CHC, lndora); the statement of Nek Ram,
 (PW1) was recorded at the CHG, lndora, on 29.7.2000; leading
to the registration of First Information Report bearing no.123
 of 2000 under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,-at        B
 Police Station, lndora. The aforesaid statement was recorded
 by ASI Shiv Kanya (PW12). In his statement, Nek Ram (PW1)
asserted that there was a 'bhandara' (feast for devotees, during
a Hindu ceremonial congregation) following a 'yagya' (Hindu
 ritual ceremony) at the residence of Kishan Singh (PW2) at          c
village Khanda Saniyal on 29.7.2000. Nek Ram (PW1)
disclosed, that he along with his brother Sardari Lal (since
deceased) had been invited to the 'bhandara' and were present
at the residence of Kishan Singh (PW2). The complainant Nek
Ram (PW1) affirmed, that he was helping in serving food at the       0
'bhandara'. Whilst he was in the kitchen at about 9.30 p.m., he
(Nek Ram, PW1) was informed by his nephew Sohan (PW3)
and Shamsher Singh (PW8) that the accused-appellant Som
Raj alias Soma was quarrelling with his brother Sardari Lal. On
 being so informed, he had immediately reached the place of          E
altercation, and had found the accused-appellant Som Raj
assaulting his brother Sardari Lal. He also pointed out, that he
had seen Som Raj picking up a 'darat' (a traditional agricultural
implement used by agriculturists in northern India, for cutting
branches of trees. It is also used by butches for beheading
goats and sheep. The implement has a handle and a large              F
cutting blade), from the house of Kishan Singh (PW2) and
giving his brother Sardari Lal a blow with it, on the back portion
of his head. After the first blow, the accused-appellant was in
the process of giving a second blow when the complainant Nek
Ram (PW1) along with others present at the place of                  G
occurrence, had caught hold of him. The 'darat' was then
snatched from his hands. According to Nek Ram (PW1), blood
was oozing from the injury suffered by Sardari Lal. Accordingly,
Sardari Lal was immediately taken to the CHC, lndora. Sardari
                                                                     H
    438     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 4 S.C.R.


A   Lal had reached the hospital at about 10.45 p.m. He was
    declared dead at about 11.15 p.m.

       2. Consequence upon the registration of First Information
  Report no.123 of 2000 at Police Station, lndora, on 29.7.2000,
B the Police initiated investigation into the matter. On completion
  of the same, the accused-appellant was sent to face trial for
  commission of the offence under Section 302 of the Indian
  Penal Code. During the course of the trial, the prosecution
  examined as many as 13 witnesses including six witnesses of
C occurrence (Nek Ram - PW1, Kishan Singh - PW2, Schan -
  PW3, Mohinder Singh - PW6, Vakil Singh - PW7 and
  Shamsher Singh - PW8). The prosecution also examined two
  doctors who had examined Sardari Lal when he was taken to
  the CHG, lndora. One of them had treated Sardari Lal when
  he was brought to the CHG, lndora, whereas the other had
D conducted the post mortem examination. The other witnesses
  were formal police witnesses. Th.e prosecution also produced
  various exhibits to prove the charge levelled against the
  accused-appellant.

E      3. The statement of the accused-appellant was recorded
  under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after the
  prosecution had concluded its evidence. In his statement under
  Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused-
  appellant projected a different version of the incident. According
F to the accused-appellant, there was an altercation between his
  brother Hari Singh (DW5) at the entrance of the residence of
  Kishan Singh (PW2) during which a "gorkha" (a Nepali living
  in India) named Rana gave a 'darat' blow to his elder brother
  Hari Singh (DW5) which accidentally hit the deceased Sardari
G Lal. He further stated, that information about the occurrence (as
  narrated by him) was given by his brother Hari Singh (DWS) to
  the Magistrate, Nurpur, on the day following the incident, i.e.,
  on 30.7.2000. The accused-appellant examined five witnesses
  in his defence including Hari Singh (DW5) and Dr. V.K. Singla
H (DW2), Medical Officer, Community Health Centre, Choori, who
           SOM RAJ @ SOMA v. STATE OF H.P.                 439
              [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
had examined Hari Singh - DW5 and had recorded the injuries A
found on his person.

     4. Having narrated a birds eye view, of the accusation
levelled against the accused-appellant as also his defence, it
is considered expedient to summarily narrate the assertions      B
made by witnesses produced by the prosecution, in respect of
the occurrence of 29.7.2000 :

     (i)     Nek Ram, the complainant, was examined by the
             prosecution as PW1. He affirmed that on
             29. 7.2000, he and his brother Sardari Lal, had C
             gone to the house of Kishan Singh (PW2), for a
             'bhandara'. He deposed that he (Nek Ram - PW1)
             along with Sohan (PW3), Mohinder Singh (PW6)
             and others were helping in serving food at the
             'bhandara'. At about 8.00-8.30 p.m .. Sohan (PW3) D
             and Shamsher Singh (PW8) came to him while he
             was serving meals to the guests, and told him about
             exchange of hot words between Sardari Lal
             (deceased) and Som Raj (the accused-appellant)
             in the courtyard of Kishan Singh (PW2). Thereupon E
             he asserted, that he had proceeded to the
             courtyard where he saw the accused-appellant
             Somraj giving a 'darat' blow to Sardari Lal (the
             deceased) which landed on the back portion of his
             head. He pointed out, that when the accused- F
             appellant made a second attempt for giving a
             second 'darat' blow to Sardari Lal, he (Nek Ram -
             PW1), Mohinder Singh (PW6), Sohan (PW3),
             Kishan Singh (PW2) and others overpowered
             Sardari Lal. He further asserted, that Mohinder G
             Singh (PW6) had snatched the 'darat' from the
             hands of the accused-appellant Som Raj and had
             thrown it away. He also testified, that having
             received the 'darat' blow, Sardari Lal had fallen on
             the ground, and was bleeding profusely. Sardari Lal
                                                                  H
    440          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013) 4 S.C.R.


A                 was immediately taken to the CHC, lndora, where
                  he succumbed to his injuries. He confirmed, that the
                  Police had reached the hospital and had recorded
                  his statement. He also stated, that the accused-
                  appellant Som Raj alias Soma was his uncle. The
B                 statement of Nek Ram (PW1) was in consonance
                  with the prosecution version of the occurrence.
                  During the course of his cross-examination, Nek
                  Ram (PW1) was confronted with the version of the
                  incident depicted by the accused-appellant during
c                 the course of his statement recorded under Section
                  313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nek Ram
                  (PW1 ), however, denied the correctness thereof.

          (ii)    Kishan Singh, at whose residence the 'bhandara/
                  yagna' was held, was examined as PW2. He
D                 reiterated the factual position of the occurrence, in
                  identical terms and in consonance with the
                  statement of Nek Ram (PW1 ). While doing so, he
                  also affirmed that the accused-appellant had tried
                  to inflict a second blow with the 'darat' on Sardari
E                 Lal. However, he was held by those at the spot, and
                  the 'darat' was snatched from his hands by
                  Mohinder Singh (PW6). He also reiterated, that on
                  receipt of the injury at the hands of the accused-
                  appellant, Sardari Lal had fallen down and blood
F                 was oozing from his head. He also deposed, that
                  he had recovered the 'darat' used by Som Raj and
                  had handed over the same to the Police, during the
                  course of investigation. He also acknowledged, that
                  the 'darat' produced in the court was the same one
G                 with which Sardari Lal had been assaulted by the
                  accused-appellant. As in the case of Nek Ram
                  (PW1), Kishan Singh (PW2) was also confronted
                  with the version of the incident narrated by the
                  accused-appellant during the course of his cross-
H                 examination. He, however, denied the same.
    SOM RAJ @ SOMA v. STATE OF H.P.                     441
       [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
(iii)   Karnail Singh was examined by the prosecution as       A
        PW3. The statement of Karnail Singh (PW3) was
        on the same lines as those of Nek Ram (PW1) and
        Kishan Singh (PW2). He too was confronted during
        the course of cross-examination with the version of
        the accused-appellant, namely, that the injury in      B
        question had been caused by a "gorkha" named
        Rana. The aforesaid suggestion put to the witness,
        was denied by him.

(iv)    Mohinder Singh appeared before the Trial Court
        and recorded his statement as PW6. He affirmed
                                                               c
        the quarrel between the rival parties, namely, the
        deceased Sardari Lal and the accused-appellant,
        Som Raj. He also acknowledged, that Kishan Singh
        (PW2) and Nek Ram (PW1) had caught hold of the
        accused. He admitted, that he had seen the             D
        accused-appellant with the 'darat' in his hand. He
        also admitted, that he had snatched the 'darat' from
        the hands of the accused-appellant, and had thrown
        it away. He admitted having seen the injury on the
        head of Sardari Lal, who had fallen to the ground,     E
        and was in a pool of blood. He however denied in
        his examination-in-chief, that he had actually seen
        the incident by asserting, that he did not know how
        the deceased Sardari Lal had received the injury.
        Based on the aforesaid statement made by               F
        Mohinder Singh (PW6), he was declared hostile,
        and was permitted to be cross-examined by the
        Public Prosecutor. During the course of his cross-
        examination. he again acknowledged having seen
        the 'darat' in the hands of the accused-appellant      G
        Som Raj, and additionally, that the accused-
        appellant who had inflicted the first blow with the
        'darat' on the person of Sardari lal. He further
        confirmed that the accused-appellant had also tried
        to inflict another blow on Sardari Lal, but was        H
    442     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A               prevented by him and others from doing so. He
                testified, that he had caught the hands of the
                accused-appellant, and had thereby stopped him
                from inflicting the second blow. He also reiterated,
                that he had forcibly snatched the 'darat' from the
B               hands of the accused-appellant, and had thrown it
                away. Mohinder Singh (PW6) was cross-examined
                on the same lines as the previous three witnesses
                referred to above, but he reiterated the factual
                position recorded by him in his examination-in-
c               chief, as also during the course of his cross-
                examination by the Public Prosecutor.

          (v)   The prosecution then produced Vakil Singh as
                PW?. Vakil Singh affirmed before the Trial Court,
                that he had seen the deceased Sardari Lal lying in
D               an injured condition, and he was informed that the
                injuries on Sardari Lal were caused by the accused-
                appellant Som Raj with a 'darat'. He asserted, that
                when he had seen Sardari Lal in the injured
                condition during which he could not speak anything.
E               People who had gathered at the place of
                occurrence, had informed him that the accused-
                appellant had run away from the spot after inflicting
                injuries on Sardari Lal. Based on the fact that Vakil
                Singh (PW?) was denying of having himself
F               witnessed the incident, he was declared hostile.
                Thereupon, the Public Prosecutor was permitted to
                cross-examine him. When confronted with the
                statement made to the Police, he reiterated that his
                statement had not been recorded correctly. He
G               stated, that he had not seen the accused Som Raj
                inflicting injuries on the person of the deceased
                Sardari lal. He however deposed that the people
                who had gathered at the place of the occurrence
                had informed him, that the accused-appellant Som
H               Raj had inflicted injuries on the person of the
         SOM RAJ @ SOMA v. STATE OF H.P.                      443
            [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)
             deceased Sardari Lal with a 'darat'. He also denied     A
             the version of the accused pertaining to the "gorkha'
             named Rana.
      (vi)   Shamsher Singh (PW8) was the last of the
             witnesses of occurrence. He fully supported the
                                                                     8
             prosecution version of the incident. He deposed on       /
             the same lines as Nek Ram (PW1), Kishan Singh
             (PW2), Karnail Singh (PW3) and Mohinder Singh
             (PW6). He also endorsed the fact, that the accused-
             appellant Som Raj had tried to inflict a second blow
             with the 'darat', but had not succeeded in doing so     C
             because Nek Ram (PW1), Kishan Singh (PW2)
             and Mohinder Singh (PW6) had caught hold of him.
             He also denied the version narrat~d by the
             accused-appellant.
     5. In so far as the accused-appellant is concerned, after
                                                                     0
recording his statement under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, he examined five witnesses in his defence.
The statement of Dr. Deepak Sharma, Block Medical Officer
Gangath was recorded as DW1. DW1 affirmed that on
30.7.2007, he had examined Hari Singh (DW5) and had found            E
bruises over his lower jaw and also found three shaky teeth.
During the course of his cross-examination, he acknowledged
that no application was filed by Hari Singh (DW!1) before him,
requiring him to conduct his medical examinati6n. He denied
as incorrect, the suggestion that he had prepared the medico-        F
legal certificate (Exhibit D3) in connivance with Hari Singh
(DWS). He also acknowledged, that the injuries suffered by Hari
Singh, could result from falling on a hard surface. Dr. V.K.
Singla, Medical officer CHC, Choori, was examined as DW2.
DW2 stated that on 31.7.2000 (two days after the occurrence),        G
he had examined Hari Singh in his capacity as Dental Surgeon,
Gangath, and had given his opinion as at Exhibit D1. Harnam
Singh, Havaldar Head Constable, Police Station Nurpur,
appeared as DW3. He confirmed that a rapat roznamacha
(entry in the Daily Diary of the Police Station) was recorded at     H
    444      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A   Police Station Nurpur, in respect of the injuries suffered by Hari
    Singh. He pointed out, that no action had been taken in the
    matter, as the incident in question was within the jurisdiction of
    Police Station, lndora. The statement of Dev Raj, Hawaldar
    Head Constable, Police Station, lndora, was recorded as DW4.
B   He merely produced the original 'rapat roznamcha' of Police
    Station, lndora, to affirm the factual position depicted by
    Harnam Singh, Havaldar Head Constable (DW3). The
    statement of Hari Singh was recorded as DW5. In his
    statement, he acknowledged, that the accused-appellant was
c   his younger brother and the deceased Sardari Lal was his
    nephew. He also acknowledged, that he alongwith his family
    members, attended the 'yagya' held by Kishan Singh (PW2)
    at his residence on 29.7.2000. During the course of his
    deposition, he attempted to provide an alibi to the accused-
D   appellant by asserting, that the accused-appellant Som Raj had
    gone to Chintpurni on the date of occurrence. He further stated,
    that Som Raj was visiting their other younger brother who lived
    at Chintpurni. He also endeavoured to substantiate the factual
    position asserted by the accused-appellant in his statement
    under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this
E   behalf he deposed, that a 'gorkha' named Rana had an
    altercation with him 0utside the house of Kishan Singh (PW2).
    During the aforesaid altercation, Rana had given him a blow
    on his mouth, which had resulted in one broken tooth. He further
    stated, that when the aforesaid Rana attempted a second blow
F   with a 'darat' at him, he had ducked, whereupon the blow had
    landed on the deceased Sardari Lal, which resulted in the death
    of Sardari Lal. Hari Singh (DW5) further testified, that he had
    lodged a report with the police. He deposed, that he had also
    gone to the Civil Hospital, Nurpur for treatment, whereupon he
G   was referred to the Dental Surgeon at Gangath. Hari Singh
    (DW5) deposed further, that having noted down his complaint,
    the same was forwarded by Police Station, Nurpur, to the
    Police Station, lndora.
      6. Based on the statements of witnesses noticed
H hereinabove, we shall endeavour to answer the legal issues
         SOM RAJ @ SOMA v. STATE OF H.P.                        445
            [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
 canvassed at the hands of the learned counsel for the accused-         A
 appellant. Suffice it to state, that almost all the witnesses, whose
 statements have been noticed hereinabove including the
 deceased, as well as, the accused-appellant, are cousins,
 nephews or uncles. Consequently, it is apparent, that a large
 number of relations have collectively deposed against the              B
accused-appellant, whereas, only the brother of the accused-
 appellant Hari Singh (DW5) has deposed in his favour. On
 merits, there can hardly be any doubt about the fact, that the
 accused-appellant inflicted the fatal blow with a 'darat' on the
 back of the head of the deceased Sardari Lal. The said singular        c
 blow proved to be fatal. The affirmation, that the aforesaid blow
 had been inflicted by the accused-appellant emerges from the
 statements of Nek Ram (PW1), Kishan Singh (PW2), Sohan
(PW3), Mohinder Singh (PW6) and Shamsher Singh (PW8).
All the aforesaid witnesses were present at the place of                0
occurrence. All the aforesaid witnesses were related to the
deceased Sardari Lal, as also the accused-appellant Som Raj.
 There is no reason for us to doubt the veracity of their
statements. In order to set up an alternative version, the
accused-appellant has narrated his own version of the incident,
wherein he acknowledges his presence at the 'bhandara/yagna'
                                                                        E
held at the residence of Kishan Singh (PW2) on 29.7.2000,
when the occurrence in question took place. The statement of
Hari Singh (DW5), in our considered view, is insufficient to
overturn the statements of the prosecution witnesses. The
statement of Hari Singh (DW5), to our mind, does not inspire            F
any confidence. The statement of Hari Singh (DW5), in our
considered view, was recorded at the behest of the accused-
appellant, who is his real brother. We would describe it as
untrustworthy. In view of the overwhelming evidence produced
by the prosecution, we have no doubt in our mind, that the fatal        G
'darat' blow was inflicted by the accused-appellant Som Raj on
the back of the head of the deceased Sardari Lal. We,
therefore, affirm the aforesaid conclusion drawn by the Trial
Court, as well as, by the High Court.
     7. It would be relevant to mention, that learned counsel for       H
    446     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 4 S.C.R.

A the accused-appellant vehemently contended that even if the
  singular fatal blow is taken to have been inflicted by the
  accused-appellant Som Raj, he could only be punished for the
  offence under Section 304 Part-II of the Indian Penal Cod.e, and
  not for the offence of murder under Section 302. In this behalf,
B it was the submission of the learned counsel, that there was
  no premeditation to commit the offence on the date of
  occurrence. It was also pointed out, that the evidence produced
  by the prosecution, does not reveal any prior enmity between
  the accused-appellant and the deceased. Therefore, according
c to learned counsel, the action should be treated as 'culpable
  homicide not amounting to murder'. It was sought to be
  explained, that the action attributed to the accused-appellant,
  did not include any ingredient of intention of causing such bodily
  injury as is likely to cause death. To support his aforesaid
  submission, it was vehemently contended, that all the
0
  prosecution witnesses had stated in unison, that the accused-
  appellant had inflicted a singular blow on the deceased Sardari
  Lal.
        8. In order to support his aforesaid contention, learned
E   counsel for the appellant, in the first instance, placed reliance
    on the judgment of this Court in Jagrup Singh Vs. State of
    Haryana, (1981) 3 SCC 616, wherein this Court held as under:-
          "5.   In assailing the conviction, learned Counsel for the
                appellant contends that the appellant having struck
F               a solitary blow on the head of the deceased with
                the blunt side of the gandhala, can be attributed
                with the knowledge .that it would cause an injury
                which was likely to cause death and not with any
                intention to cause the death of the deceased. The
G               offence committed by the appellant, therefore,
                amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to
                murder, punishable under Section 304, Part II of the
                Code. He further contends, in the alternative, that
                there could be no doubt that the appellant acted in
H               the heat of the moment when he hit the deceased
     SOM RAJ @SOMA v. STATE OF H.P.                      447
        [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
       and is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of Exception   A
       4 of Section 300 of the Code. On the other hand,
       learned Counsel for the State contends that the
       matter squarely falls within clause Thirdly of Section
       300 of the Code. He submits that merely because
       the appellant rendered a solitary blow with the blunt     B
       side of the gandhala on the head would not
       necessarily imply that the offence amounted to
       culpable homicide not amounting to murder
       punishable under Section 304, Part II of the Code.
6.     There is no justification for the assertion that the      C
       giving of a solitary blow on a vital part of the body
       resulting the death must always necessarily reduce
       the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to
       murder punishable under Section 304, Part 11 of the
       Code. If a man deliberately strikes another on the        D
       head with a heavy log of wood or an iron rod or
       even a Jathi so as to cause a fracture of the skull,
       he must, in the absence of any circumstances
       negativing the presumption, be deemed to have
       intended to cause the death of the victim or such         E
       bodily injury as is sufficient to cause death. The
       whole thing depends upon the intention to cause
       death, and the case may be covered by either
       clause Firstly or clause Thirdly. The nature of
       intention must be gathered from the kind of weapon        F
       used, the part of the body hit, the amount of force
       employed and the circumstances attendant upon
       the death.

       xxx xxx          xxx              xxx             xxx
                                                                 G
9.     Looking at the totality of the evidence, it would not
       be possible to come to the conclusion that when
       the appellant struck the deceased with the blunt side
       of the gandhala, he intended to cause such bodily
       injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of        H
    448          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A                 nature to cause death. A gandhala is a common
                  agricultural implement consisting of a flat,
                  rectangular iron strip, three sides of which are blunt,
                  embedded in a wooden handle. The length of the
                  iron strip is in continuation of the wooden handle
B                 and the end portion is sharp, which is used to dig
                  holes in the earth to set up fencing on embankments
                  in the field. If a man is hit with the blunt side on the
                  head with sufficient force, it is bound to cause, as
                  here, death. There can be no doubt that it was used
                  with certain amount of force because there was
c                 cerebral compression. But that by itself is not
                  sufficient to raise an inference that the appellant
                  intended to cause such bodily injury as was
                  sufficient to cause death. He could only be attributed
                  with the knowledge that it was likely to cause an
D                 injury which was likely to cause the death. The
                  matter, therefore, does not fall within clause Thirdly
                  of Section 300 of the Code."

          Reliance was also placed on the decision rendered by this
E         Court in Jagtar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC
          342, whereifl it has been held as under:-

           "5.    The only question that we are called upon to
                  examine in the facts and circumstances of this case
                  is whether the appellant could be said to have
F
                  committed murder of deceased Narinder Singh
                  punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
                  Code.

           6.     A quarrel took place on the spur of the moment.
G                 The appellant never expected to meet the
                  deceased. When the deceased was just passing
                  by the road in front of the house of the appellant,
                  his forehead dashed with the pamala of the house
                  of the appellant which provoked the deceased to
H                 remonstrate the appellant. It is in evidence that
     SOM RAJ @ SOMA v. STATE OF H.P.                    449
        [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
       there was exchange of abuses and at that time            A
       appellant gave a blow with a knife which landed on
       the chest of the deceased.

7.     Undoubtedly, PW 2 Dr H.S. Gill opined that the
       blow on the chest pierced deep inside the chest          B
       cavity resulting in the injury to the heart and this
       injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
       to cause death. The question is whether in the
       circumstances in which the appellant gave a blow
       with a knife on the chest, he could be said to have
       intended to cause death or he could be imputed the
                                                                c
       intention to cause that particular injury which has
       proved fatal? The circumstances in which the
       incident occurred would clearly negative any
       suggestion of premeditation. It was in a sudden
       quarrel to some extent provoked by the deceased,         D
       that the appellant gave one blow with a knife. Could
       it be said that para 3 of Section 300 is attracted.
       We have considerable doubt about the conclusion
       reached by the High Court. We cannot confidently
       say that the appellant intended to cause that            E
       particular injury which is shown to have caused
       death. There was no premeditation. There was no
       malice. The meeting was a chance meeting. The
       cause of quarrel though trivial was just sudden and
       in this background the appellant, a very young man       F
       gave one blow. He could not be imputed with the
       intention to cause death or the intention to cause
       that particular injury which has proved fatal. Neither
       para 1 nor para 3 of Section 300 would be
       attracted. We are fortified in this view by the          G
       decision of this Court in Jagrup Singh v. State of
       Haryana, (1981) 3 SCC 616. It was subsequently
       followed in Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab,
       (1981) 4 SCC 484, and Ku/want Rai v. State of
       Punjab, (1981) 4 SCC 245. Following the ratio of         H
    450        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2013] 4 S.C.R.


A                the aforementioned decisions, we are of the opinion
                 that the appellant could not be convicted for having
                 committed murder of the deceased Narinder Singh.
                 His conviction for an offence under Section 302, IPC
                 and sentence of imprisonment for life are liable to
B                be set aside.

          8.     The next question is what offence the appellant is
                 shown to have committed? In a trivial quarrel the
                 appellant wielded a weapon like a knife. The
                 incident occurred around 1.45 noon. The quarrel
c                was of a trivial nature and even in such a trivial
                 quarrel the appellant wielded a weapon like a knife
                 and landed a blow in the chest. In these
                 circumstances, it is a permissible inference that the
                 appellant at least could be imputed with a
D                knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury
                 which was likely to cause death. Therefore, the
                 appellant is shown to have committed an offence
                 under Section 304 Part II of the IPC and a sentence
                 of imprisonment for five years will meet the ends of
E                justice.

          9.     Accordingly this appeal is partly allowed. The
                 conviction of the appellant for an offence under
                 Section 302, IPC and sentence of imprisonment for
F                life are set aside. Appellant is convicted for having
                 committed an offence under Section 304-Part II of
                 the Indian Penal Code and he is sentenced to suffer
                 RI for five years. Conviction of the appellant for an
                 offence under Section 304 and the sentence
                 imposed for the same are confirmed. Both the
G
                 substantive sentences are directed to run
                 concurrently."

      9. In order to controvert the aforenoticed submission
  advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the accused-
H appellant, it was the vehement assertion of the learned counsel
        SOM RAJ @ SOMA v. STATE OF H.P.                   451
           [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
for the respondent State, that the weapon of offence would A
constitute a material basis for determining the purely legal
contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the
appellant. It was pointed out, that a 'darat' had been used by
the accused-appellant for inflicting the blow on the deceased
Sardari Lal. It was submitted, that a 'darat' is used by B
agriculturalists for cutting branches and trees. It was also
submitted, that butchers use a 'darat' for beheading goats and
sheeps. Based on the aforesaid factual position it was
submitted, that the very nature of the weapon of offence is
sufficient to infer, that the accused-appellant had the intention C
of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. It was
also the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent
State, that it would be wrongful to adjudicate the present
controversy under the assumption, that the accused-appellant
had caused a singular injury. As a matter of fact, it was the
vehement contention of the learned counsel for the respondent D
State, that the accused-appellant was in the process of inflicting
a second 'darat' blow on the deceased Sardari Lal, but was
prevented from doing so by those present at the place of
occurrence. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is
concerned, learned counsel for the respondent State placed E
reliance on the statements of Nek Ram (PW1 ), Kishan Singh
(PW2), Sohan (PW3), Mohinder Singh (PW6) and Shamsher
Singh (PW8), who unequivocally stated, that they had caught
hold of the accused-appellant when he was in the process of
inflicting a second 'darar blow on the deceased. They all F
affirmed, that the 'darat' was snatched away from the accused- ·
appellant by Mohinder Singh (PW6). Accordingly, it was
contended, that left to himself, the accused-appellant would
have inflicted a second blow, and probably still further blows,
had he not been restrained by those present at the place of G
occurrence. Besides the aforesaid, there is a third reason
highlighted by the learned counsel for the respondent State,
namely, the place on the body of the deceased and the nature
of injury caused to the deceased. Insofar as the instant aspect
of the matter is concerned, it was submitted, that the injury in H
    <t52       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2013] 4 S.C.R.


A question was inflicted on the head of the deceased Sardari Lal.
  Learned counsel invited our attention to the statements of Dr.
  Suman Saxena (PW4) and Dr. B.M. Gupta (PW5). Having
  examined Sardari Lal, they had deposed, that the deceased
  bore an incised wound 6 cm x 4 cm brain deep, cutting parts
8 of the underlying bone. The injury under reference was caused
  just lateral to the midline on the left side of the occipital bone.
  The underlying brain tissue, according to these witnesses, could
  be seen and felt through a hole at the place of the wound. The
  size of the hole in the occipital bone was 3 cm x 2 cm. The
C underlying brain membranes were found to have been torn off,
  and brain tissues were found lacerated. It was accordingly his
  submission, that the fact that the accused-appellant had aimed
  the 'darat' blow on the head of the deceased with such force,
  that it caused a hole in the occipital bone and exposed the
  brain, was sufficient to arrive at the conclusion, that the same
D was inflicted with the intention, that it would cause death of the
  person hit.
       10. In order to support his contention, that the offence
  committed by the accused-appellant constitutes 'culpable
E homicide amounting to murder', reliance was placed by the
  learned State counsel on the decision rendered by this Court
  in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya & Anr.,
  (1976) 4      sec
                 382, wherein it has been held as under:-
           "13. The academic distinction between 'murder' and
F          'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has vexed the
           courts for more than a century. The confusion is caused, if
           courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the
           terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow
           themselves to be drawn into minutae abstractions. The
G          safest way of approach to the interpretation and application
           of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the
           keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and
           300. The following comparative table will be helpful in
           appreciating the points of distinction between the two
H          offences.
        SOM RAJ @ SOMA v. STATE OF H.P.                     453
           [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
         Section 299                 Section 300                   A
A person commits culpable      Subject to certain exceptions
homicide if the act by which   culpable homicide is muder
the death is caused is         if the act by which the death is
done -                         caused is done -
                                                                   B
                         INTENTION

(a) with the   intention of    (1) with the intention of causing
death; or                      causing death; or
(b) with the intention of (2) with the intention of causing        c
such bodily injury as is likely causing such bodily injury as
to cause death; or              the offender knows to be
                                likely to cause the death of
                                the person to whom the harm
                                is caused; or                      D
                               (3) with the intention      of
                               causing bodily injury to any
                               person and the bodily injury
                               intended to be inflicted is
                               sufficient in the o rd in a r y     E
                               course of nature to cause
                               death; or

                       KNOWLEDGE
                                                                   F
(c) with the knowledge th~t    (4) with the knowledge that
 he act is likely to cause··    act is      so imminently
                                death dangerous that it must
                               in all probability     cause
                               death or such bodily injury         G
                               as is likely to cause death,
                               and without any excuse for
                               incurring the risk of causing
                               death or such injury as is
                               mentioned above.                    H
    454     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A         14.   Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses
                (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing
                feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2)
                is the knowledge possessed by the offender
                regarding the particular victim being in such a
B               peculiar condition or state of health that the internal
                harm caused to him is likely to be fatal,
                notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not
                in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause
                death of a person in normal health or condition. It
c               is noteworthy that the "intention to cause death" is
                not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the
                intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with
                the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such
                injury causing the death of the particular victim, is
                sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this
D
                clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by
                Illustration (b) appended to Section 300.

          15.   Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any
                such knowledge on the part of the offender.
E               Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of
                Section 300 can be where the assailant causes
                death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that
                the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or
                enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow
F               is likely to cause death of that particular person as
                a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the
                failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the
                assailant had no such knowledge about the disease
                or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to
G               cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary
                course of nature to cause death, the offence will not
                be murder, even if the injury which caused the
                death, was intentionally given.

          16.   In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words
H               "likely to cause death" occurring in the
  SOM RAJ @SOMA v. STATE OF H.P.                            455
     [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
      corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words            A
      "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have
      been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between
      a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily
      injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
      cause death. The distinction is fine but real, and, if        B
      overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice.
      The d)fference between clause (b) of Section 299
      and clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degree
      of probability of death resulting from the intended
      bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree       c
      of probability of death which determines whether a
      culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the
      lowest degree. The word "likely" in clause (b) of
      Section 299 conveys the sense of 'probable' as
      distinguished from a mere possibility. The words
                                                                    0
      "bodily injury ... sufficient in the ordinary course of
      nature to cause death" mean that death will be the
      "most probable" result of the injury, having regard
      to the ordinary course of nature.
17.   For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not                E
      necessary that the offender intended to cause
      death, so long as the death ensues from the
      intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause
      death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwant v.
      State of Kera/a, AIR 1966 SC 1874, is an apt                  F
      illustration of this point.
18.   In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC
      465, Vivian Bose, J. speaking for this Court,
      explained the meaning and scope of clause (3),
      thus (at p. 1500):-                                           G
      ''The prosecution must prove the following facts
      before it can bring a case under Section 300,
      "thirdly". First, it must establish quite objectively, that
      a bodily injury is present; secondly the nature of the
      injury must be proved. These are purely objective             H
    456     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A               investigations. It must be proved that there was an
                intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say,
                that it was not accidental or unintentional or that
                some other kind of injury was intended. Once these
                three elements are proved to be present, the
B               enquiry proceeds further, and fourthly it must be
                proved that the injury of the type just described
                made up of the three elements set out above was
                sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
                nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective
c               and inferential and has nothing to do with the
                intention of the offender."
          19.   Thus according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh
                case of even if the intention of accused was limited
                to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause
D               death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not
                extend to the intention of causing death, the offence
                would be 'murder'. Illustration (c} appended to
                Section 300 clearly brings out this point.
          20.   Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section
E               300 both require knowledge of the probability of the
                act causing death. It is not necessary for the
                purpose of this case to dilate much on the
                distinction between these corresponding clauses.
                It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section
F               300 would be applicable where the knowledge of
                the offender as to the probability of death of a
                person or persons in general - as distinguished
                from a particular person or persons - being
                caused from his imminently dangerous act,
G               approximates to a practical certainty. Such
                knowledge on the part of the offender must be of
                the highest degree of probability, the act having
                been committed by the offender without any excuse
                for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury
H               as aforesaid.
  SOM RAJ @ SOMA v. STATE OF H.P.                      457
     [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
21.   From the above conspectus, it emerges that               A
      whenever a court is confronted with the question
      whether the offence is 'murder' or 'culpable
      homicide not amounting to murder', on the facts of
      a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the
      problem in three stages. The question to be              B
      considered at the first stage would be, whether the
      accused has done an act by doing which he has
      caused the death of another. Proof of such causal
      connection between the act of the accused and the
      death, leads to the second stage for considering         c
      whether that act of the accused amounts to
      "culpable homicide" as defined in Section 299. If the
      answer to this question is prima facie found in the
      affirmative, the stage for considering the operation
      of Section 300 of the Penal Code, is reached. This
                                                               D
      is the stage at which the court should determine
      whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring
      the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses
      of the definition of 'murder' contained in Section
      300. If the answer to this question is in the negative
                                                               E
      the offence would be 'culpable homicide not
      amounting to murder', punishable under the first or
      the second part of Section 304, depending,
      respectively, on whether the second or the third
      clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question
      is found in the positive, but the case comes within      F
      any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300,
      the offence would still be 'culpable homicide not
      amounting to murder', punishable under the first
      part of Section 304, of the Penal Code.
                                                               G
22.   The above are only broad guidelines and not cast-
      iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance
      will facilitate the task of the court. But sometimes
      the facts are so intertwined and the second and the
      third stages so telescoped into each other, that it      H
    458     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013) 4 S.C.R.


A               may not be convenient to give a separate treatment
                to the matters involved in the second and third
                stages."

          11. We shall now venture to apply the parameters laid down
    by this Court, to determine whether the accused-appellant
8
    herein can be stated to have intentionally caused such bodily
    injury to the deceased, as he knew was so imminently
    dangerous, that it would in all probability cause his death. First
    and foremost, it is apparent from the factual narration of the
    witnesses produced by the prosecution, that the accused-
C   appellant was not carrying the 'darat' but had picked up the
    same from the house of Kishan Singh (PW2). A 'darat', as
    noticed above, is a traditional agricultural implement used for
    cutting branches of trees. It is also used by butchers for
    beheading goats and sheep. A 'darat' has a handle and a large
D   cutting blade. Having picked up the 'darat' for committing an
    assault on the deceased, it is apparent that the accused-
    appellant was aware of the nature of injury he was likely to
    cause with the weapon of incident. From the statements of Dr.
    Suman Saxena (PW4) and Dr. B.M. Gupta (PW5), the nature
E   of injuries caused to the deceased has been brought out. A
    perusal thereof would leave no room for doubt, that the
    accused-appellant had chosen the sharp side of the 'darat' and
    not the blunt side. The ferocity with which the aforesaid blow
    was struck clearly emerges from the fact that the blow resulted
F   in cutting through the skull of the deceased and caused a hole
    therein, resulting in exposing the brain tissue. When a blow with
    a deadly weapon is struck with ferocity, it is apparent that the
    assailant intends to cause bodily injury of a nature which he
    knows is so imminently dangerous, that it must in all probability
G   cause death. The place where the blow was struck (at the back
    of the head of the deceased) by the accused-appellant, also
    leads to the same inference. It is not the case of the accused-
    appellant, that the occurrence arose out of a sudden quarrel. It
    is also not his case, that the blow was struck in the heat of the
H   moment. It is not even his case, that he had retaliated as a
         SOM RAJ @ SOMA v. STATE OF H.P.                        459
            [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)
consequence of provocation at the hands of the deceased. He             A
 has therefore no excuse, for such an extreme act. Another
material fact is the relationship between the parties. The
 accused-appellant was an uncle to the deceased. In such
circumstances, there is hardly any cause to doubt the intent and
 knowledge of the accused-appellant. Besides the aforesaid              B
factual position, it would be incorrect to treat the instant incident
 as one wherein a single blow had been inflicted by the accused.
As many as five witnesses of the occurrence have stated in
unison, that the accused-appellant was in the process of
 inflicting a second blow on the deceased, when they caught             c
 hold of him, whereupon one of them (Mohinder Singh - PW6)
snatched the 'darat' from the accused-appellant, and threw it
away. In such a situation, it would improper to treat/determine
the culpability of the accused-appellant by assuming, that he
had inflicted only one injury on the deceased. Keeping in mind
                                                                        D
the parameters of the judgments referred to by the learned
counsel for the rival parties (which have been extracted above),
we have no doubt in our mind, that the accused-appellant must
be deemed to have committed the offence of 'culpable
 homicide amounting to murder' under Section 302 of the Indian
Penal Code, as the accused-appellant Som Raj had struck the
                                                                        E
'darat' blow, with the intention of causing such bodily injury,
which he knew was so imminently dangerous, that it would in
all probability cause the death of Sardari Lal. Having recorded
the aforesaid conclusion, we are satisfied, that the accused-
appellant was justifiably convicted of the offence under Section        F
302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo
Rigorous Imprisonment for life, as also, to pay a fine of
Rs.10,000/- (and in default, to undergo further simple
imprisonment for a period of one year).
                                                                        G
    12. In view of our aforesaid conclusions, the instant appeal
being devoid of merit, is dismissed.

B.B.B.                                         Appeal dismissed.

                                                                        H