Holding

Explanation I to Section 2(2) is a deeming provision; the date of completion is the earliest of the three statutory dates, which in this case is the first assessment date of 1 April 1983, so the ten‑year exemption remains and the eviction suit is barred.

Summary

Landlords filed a suit for ejectment against Smt. Sudha Rani Garg under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, claiming the tenancy was at will. The tenants contended that the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 applied, which provides a ten‑year exemption from eviction after the building’s construction is deemed completed. The dispute centered on the date of completion: the assessment record showed "Q September 1982" (the quarter July‑September 1982), while the first assessment became effective on 1 April 1983. The trial court treated 1 July 1982 as the deemed completion date and dismissed the suit; the revisional and High Courts reversed, holding the Act inapplicable. The Supreme Court held that Explanation I to Section 2(2) is a deeming provision and that the date of completion is the earliest of the three statutory dates, here the first assessment date of 1 April 1983, so the ten‑year exemption was still in force. Consequently, the eviction suit could not proceed and the tenant was allowed to remain in possession until the end of 2005 subject to rent conditions. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The nature and effect of Explanation I to Section 2(2) of the UP Urban Buildings Act – whether it is a deeming provision.
How the date of completion of a building is to be determined under the Explanation.
Whether the ten‑year exemption period prescribed in Section 2(2) had elapsed at the time of the eviction suit.
Whether Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act applies or is excluded by the Act.

Legislation cited

Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 106, s. 148
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972s. 12(5), s. 21(1-A), s. 2(2), s. 24(2), s. 24-A, s. 24-B, s. 24-C, s. 29(3)

Subjects

rent controlevictiondeemed provisiondate of completionten-year exemptionU.P. Urban Buildings ActTransfer of Property Actlandlord‑tenantstatutory interpretation

Judgment

A SMT. SUDHA RANI GARG
v.
SRI JAGDISH KUMAR (DEAD) AND,ORS.

SEPTEMBER 8, 2004

B [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND PRAKASH PRABHAKAR NAOLEKAR, JJ.]

Rent Control and Eviction:

U.P. Urban Building Regulation of letting Rent and Eviction Act
C 1972-Sec. 2(2)-Stipulation of ten years period-applicability of-In a suit
for ejectment-Held, applicable and section 106 of the Transfer of Property
Act not applicable.

Explanation I to Sec. 2(2) date of determination of completion of
building-Deemed to have been completed prior to date of assessment.
D Words and Phrases- 'Deemed'-Meaning of-Explained

Respondents 1 to 5 filed a suit for ejectment against appellants
after giving 'notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. The
appellant-tenants resisted the suit on the ground that ten years period
E stipulated under Section 2(2) of the UP Urban Building (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 is applicable and the provisions of
Transfer of Property Act are not applicable. The Trial Court accepted
the plea of the appellants and dismissed the suit.

Respondents 1 to 5 filed a Revision Petition which was allowed and
F the view of Revisional Court was confirmed by the High Court.

Before this Court, the appellants contended that the Revisional
Court and the High Court have not considered the provisions of Section
2(2) of the UP Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
G Act, 1972; and that when the assessment clearly indicated that the period
was "Quarter of September 1982" the trial court was right in concluding
that the date of completion was 1.7.1982.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

H HELD : I. The Explanation -I to section 2(2) of the U. P. Rent Act
206
S.R. GARG v. JAGDISH KUMAR 207

is a deeming provision. The word "deemed" is used a great deal in A
modern legislation. [210-G)

Ali MK. and Ors. v. State ofKera/a & Ors., (2003) 11 SCC 632, relied
on.

St. Aubyn (L.M) v. A.G. (No.2), [1951) 2 ALL E.R. 473 (HL); Hunter B
Douglas Australia Pty v. Perma Blinds, (1970) 44 ALJR 257;
R v. Norfolk County Court, 60 LJQB 380; Ferguson v. McMillan,
(1954) SLT 109; St. Leon Village Consolidated School District v.
Ronceray, [1960) 23 DLR (2d) 32; Barclays Bank v. !RC, [1961) AC
609 and R v. Bnxion Prison Governor Exp. Sob/en~ (1962) 3 All ER 641, C
referred to.

2. In the instant case a quarter is a period oftirne, covering from 1st
July 1982 to 30th September, 1982. It only shows that when assessment
was made, construction was completed earlier sometime in the third
quarter of September 1982. The quarter started from 1st July, 1982. It D
cannot mean that the construction of the building was completed by the
date. The date of completion of construction can be any date falling
between two terminals i.e. 1st July 1982 to 30th September, 1982. The
hypothetical presumption that the first date of the quarter being 1st July
1982 it shall be deemed to be the date of completion of construction has no E
basis. In case the first three dates are available then the modality for
working out the date of completion is prov~ded in the Explanation. As the
records go to show, the first assessment cr1.'1e into effect on 1.4.1983. That
is the third date provided in the explanatfon. [212-A, B, CJ

3. Considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, the tenant is F
permitted to occupy the premises till the end of2005 subject to filing the
usual undertaking before the Trial Court with a clear stipulation that
the rent fixed shall be paid within the stipulated time, and arrears, if
any, shall be paid within two months. (212-E]

CIVIL APPELLATE WRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4963 of2000.
G

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.12.99 of the Allahabad High
Court in C.M.W.P. No. 47425 of 1999.

A.K. Sanghi for the Appellant. H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Gaurav Jain and Ms. Abha Rani Jain for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.: The tenant is in appeal against the judgment
of learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court. It was held by the
B High Court that the suit filed by respondents 1 to 5 in this appeal
(Respondents 3 to 7 before the High Court) has been rightly decreed by the
Revisional Court, as the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent, and Eviction) Act, 1972 (in short 'the Act') was not applicable
to the case.
c The respondents 1 to 5 filed a suit for ejectment giving notice under
Section I 06 of the Transfer of Property Act, (in short the 'T.P. Act'). The
ground set out in the suit was that the tenancy was at will and provisions of
the Act being not applicable, the tenant was liable for eviction. The only
issue which was taken up by the trial court related to applicability of the Act.
D Evidence was led. According to the respondents 1 to 5 as the assessment
in respect of the building came into effect from. 1.4.1983, and the suit was
filed on 21.8.1992 the ten years period stipulated in Section 2(2) ~f the Act
had no application, thereby making the Act inapplicable. Tenant on the other
r
hand submitted that in the first assessment of the shop at column 10 it was
E clearly indicated as "Q September 1982". According to her the date of
construction of building has to be.taken as 1.7.1982 and, therefore, the period
stipulated i.e. 10 years was over. The Trial Court accepted the plea, while
Revisional Court reversed it and as noted above the High Court confirmed
the Revisional Court's view.

F In support of the appeal, learned counsel submitted that the Revisional
Court and the High Court have not considered the provisions of Section 2(2)
in the proper perspective. The. burden is on the landlord to prove that the
building is exempt from the operation of the Act. There was no specific
pleading as to date of construction in the plaint or the date of reporting of
G the completion of construction. When the assessment clearly indicated that
the period was "Q September 1982" the trial Court was right in concluding
that the date of completion was 1.7.1982. Though mandated under Section
148, landlords have not reported the date of completion. They cannot be J==
benefited for the lapse.

H lt is submitted that the legislation being a beneficial one the meaning :;=
· S.R. GARG v. JAGDISH KUMAR [PASA YAT, J.] 209

given by the trial Court should have been accepted. It was submitted that A
in the absence of details which the landlord was to furnish, reference to the
Explanation to Section 2(2) as done by the Revisional Court and the High
Court has no relevance because the landlord was to prove that he was exempt
from the requirements of Section 2(2).

In response, learned counsel for the contesting respondents submitted
B
that the Revisional Court and the High Court have taken note of the
Explanation correctly and, therefore, there is no infirmity to warrant
interference.

Section 2(2) of the Act reads as follows: c
"2. Exemptions from operation ofAct: (1) Nothing in this Act shall
apply to

xxx xxx xxx
D
(2) Except as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12,
sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, sub-section (2) of Section
24, Sections 24-A, 24-B, 24-C or sub-section (3) of Section 29,
nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten
years from the date on which its construction is completed:
E
Provided that where any building is constructed substantially
out of funds obtained by way of loan or advance from the State
Government or the Life Insurance Corporation of India or a bank
or a co-operative society or the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas
Parishad, and the period of repayment of such loan or advance F
exceeds the aforesaid period of ten years than the reference in this
sub-section to the period of ten years shall be deemed to be a
reference to the period of fifteen years or the period ending with the
date of actual repayment of each loan or advance (including interest)
whichever is shorter.
G
Explanation I: For the purposes of this sub-section, -

(a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have
been completed on the date on which the completion
thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A authority having jurisdiction and in the case of a building
subject to assessment, the date on which the first
assessment thereof comes into effect and where the said
dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in
the absepce of any such report, rec~rd or assessment, the
date on which it is actually occupied (not including
B occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the
construction or guarding the buildi11g under construction)
for the first time:

Provided that there may be different dates of completion of
c construction in respect of different parts of a building which are
occupied separately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by
different tenants;"

The Explanation provides for four different dates for determining the
D date of completion of building. The dates are :

(1) When the completion of the building is reported to the local authority.

(2) When the completion of the building is otherwise recorded by the local
authority.

E (3) When the first assessment of the building comes into effect.

(4) When it is actually occupied.

The Explanation further provides that in case for the first three
f categories the dates are available then the earliest of the three dates will be
the date of completion of the building and in case the first three dates are
not available,"then the fourth date will be the date on which construction of
the building shall be taken to have been completed.

The Explanation I is a deeming provision. The word 'deemed' is used
G a great deal in modem legislation. Sometimes it is used to impose for the
purposes of a statute an artificial construction of a word or phrase that would
not otherwise prevail. Sometimes it is used to put beyond doubt a particular
construction that might otherwise be uncertain. Sometimes it is used to give
a comprehensive description that includes what is obvious, what is uncertain
H and what is, in the ordinary sense, impossible". (per Lord radcliffe in St.
S.R. GARG v. JAGDISH KUMAR [PASA YAT, J.] 211

Aubyn (L.M) v. A.G. (No.2), [1951] 2 ALL E.R. 473 (HL). A
"Deemed", as used in statutory definitions "to extend the denotation of
the defined term to things it would not in ordinary parlance denote, is often
a convenient devise for reducing the verbiage of an enactment, but that does
not mean that wherever it is used it has that effect; to deem means simply B
to judge or reach a conclusion about something, and the words 'deem' and
'deemed' when used in a statute thus simply state the effect or meaning which1
some matter or thing has - the way in which it is to be adjudged; this need
not import artificially or fiction; it may simply be the statement of an
undisputable conclusion" (per Windener J. in Hunter Douglas Australia Pty.
y. Perma Blinds, [1970) 44 A.L.J.R. 257. C

When a thing is to be "deemed" something else, it is to be treated as
that something else with the attendant consequences, but it is not that
something else (per Cave J. R. v. Norfolk County Court, 60 L.J.Q.B.380).

"When a statute gives a definition and then adds that certain things shall D
be 'deemed' to be covered by the definition, it matters not whether without
that addition the definition \'tould have covered them or not: (per Lord
President Cooper in Ferguson v. McMillan, 1954 S.L.T. 109).

Whether the word "deemed" when used in a statute established a
E
conclusive or a rebuttable presumption depended upon the context (See St.
Leon Village Consolidated School District v. Ronceray, (1960) 23 D.L.R.
(2d) 32).

"!...regard its primary function. as to bring in something which would
otherwise be excluded." (Per Viscount Simonds in Barclays Bank v. J.R.C.,, F
(1961) A.C.509)

"Deems" means "is of opinion" or "considers" or "decides" and there
is no implication of steps to be taken before the opinion is formed or the
decision is taken." (See R. v. Brixion Prison Governor ex.p.Soblen, [1962)
3 All E.R. 641) (See Ali MK. and Ors. v. State of Kera/a and Ors., [2003)
G
11 sec 632)

It is not in dispute that the first assessment came into effect from
1.4.1983 and in the relevant column relating to enhancement or reduction of
the tax "Q September 1982" is recorded. H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A According tp learned counsel _for the appellant it means that the
completion of th~ shop has been recorded by the local authority on 1. 7. l 982.
The plea is clear}y untenable. A quarter is a period of time, covering in the
instant case fro~ l st July 1982 to 30th September, 1982. It only shows that
when assessment was made, construction was completed earlier sometime
in the third qm,1rter of September 1982. The quarter started frQm 1st July,
B 1982. It cannot mean that the construction of the building was completed
by the date. The date of completion of construction can be any date falling
be.tween two tenninals i.e. lst July, 1982 to 30th September, 1982. The
hypothetical presumption tha~ the first date of the quarter being 1st July 1982
it shall be deemed to be the date of completion of construction has no basis.
c In case the first three dates are available then the modality for, working out
the date of completion is provided in the Explanation. As the records go to
show, the first assessment came into effect on 1.4.1983. Th~t is the third
date provided in the Explanation.

Above being the position, the High Court's judgment confinning the
D Revjs~onal Court's order is in order and ner.ds no interferen.ce.

A residual plea was raised by learned counsel for the appellant that the
tenant occupied the premises for nearly two decad_es and a r~asonable time
for vacating the premises may be granted. Considerin~ the peculiar
E circumstances of the case, we permit the tenant to occupy the premises till
the end of2005 subject to filing the usual undertaking before the Trial Court
- ' '
with a clear stipulatjon that the rent fixed shall be paid with~n_the stipulated
time, and arrears, if any, shall be paid within two months_.

Appeal is dismissed. No costs.
F
V.M. Appeal dismissed.