Holding

A landlord who holds a long lease and owns the structure is deemed the ‘owner’ within the meaning of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

Summary

The tenant appealed against a decree of eviction granted to the landlord under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 on the ground of bona‑fide requirement. The landlord’s building stood on land leased from the Delhi Development Authority (DDA), and the lease had been subject to a cancellation notice, though the cancellation proceedings were stayed. The Supreme Court examined whether the term “owner” in the statute required absolute ownership of both land and structure, or whether a landlord who holds a long lease and owns the building could be deemed an owner for the purpose of the provision. The Court held that the word “owner” is to be interpreted in the context of the Act’s purpose and modern lease‑hold realities; a landlord who constructs the building and holds a long lease is considered the owner vis‑à‑vis the tenant. Since the lease had not been terminated and the landlord remained in possession, he satisfied the ownership requirement, and the eviction decree was upheld. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The meaning of ‘owner’ under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 when the premises are built on land held on lease from the DDA.
Whether a pending cancellation of the lease defeats the landlord’s claim of ownership for purposes of bona‑fide requirement.
Whether the tenant is estopped from challenging the landlord’s title.

Legislation cited

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14(1)(e)
Transfer of Property Act

Subjects

Delhi Rent Control Actowner definitionbona fide requirementleasehold propertyevictionlandlord‑tenantDDAestoppel

Judgment

SMT. SHANTI SHARMA & ORS.
A
v.
SMT. VED PRABHA & ORS.

AUGUST 26, 1987.
"1
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND G.L. OZA, JJ.] B
,,.,
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Section 14(1)(e)-'lf he is owner

-
thereof-Interpretation of-Landlord constructing building on land
taken on lease from DDA-Whether landlord 'owner' and entitled to
eviction-Cancellation of the lease of land and subsequent staying of the
'i cancellation-Effect of. c
Words and Phrases: 'Owner'-Meaning of.

An application was filed seeking eviction of the tenant-appellant
D
by the landlord-respondent on various grounds. The Rent Controller
granted an order for eviction only under Section 14(1)(•) of the Delhi
Rent Control Act for bona fide use and occupation. The order of the
Rent Controller for eviction was confirmed in appeal by the Tribunal.

"'~
Before the High Court, it was contended on behalf of the appel- E
-- lant that as the lease of the plot on which the building stood was cancel-
led by the DDA, the landlord-respondent ceased to be the owner thereof
and, therefore, the requirement of Section 14(l)(e) was not satisfied and

"' the respondent was not entitled to the decree for eviction. The High
Court held that the landlord, whose lease had been terminated, but was
in possession, continued to be a tenant holding over and, therefore, he F
continued to he the owner, and maintained the decree for eviction.

In the appeal before this Court, it was contended on behalf of the
appellant that in order to get a decree for eviction on the ground of bona
} fide reqnirement, the landlord must establish that he was the owner of
G
such property, that where the property was built up on a plot of land
taken on lease from the Delhi Development Authority, it could not be
said that the landlord was the owner of the property and that as the
, lease had been terminated, the landlord could not claim to be the owner
of the property, and, therefore, the decree for eviction on ground of
bona fide requirement could not be maintained. H

1075
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3 S.C.R.
.l
A On behalf of the respondent it was contended thllt although notice
was issued, but subsequently the matter remained stayed and the
respondent-landlord continued to be In possession and did not cease to
be the owner of the property, that whole of the premises in question did
not stand on the plot, lease of which had been cancelled by DDA and a
major part of. the premises stood on another plot which continued to be t
B on lease in favour of the respondent, and that the tenant was estopped
from challenging the title of the landlord, as the relationship of the
landlord and tenant was admitted and it was not open to the tenant to ~
contend that the respondent-landlord had no title to the property.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court -
c HELD: The word "owner" has not been defined In the Delhi y
Rent Control Act. [I081E]

The term "owner" has to be understood in the context of the
background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the
D Act. The Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But, at the ~
same time, it has provided that the landlord under certain circumst-
ances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of
such grounds. [IOSIG-H; 10820]

Ordinarily, the concept of the ownership may be absolute owner-
__.
E ship in the land as well as of the structure standing thereon. But in the
modern context, where all lands belong to the State, the persons who
hold properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on
some term from the Government or the authorities constituted by the
--
State. The legislature, when it used the term "owner" ins. 14(l)(e), did y
not think of ownership as absolute ownership. [1081F-G I
F
The meaning of the term "owner'' is vis·a·vis the tenant i.e. the
owner should be something more than the tenant. In cases where the plot
of land is taken on lease, the structure is built by the landlord and he is
the owner of the structure. So far as the land is concerned, he holds the
long lease and as against the tenant he will fall within the ambit of the
G meaning of the term "owner" as contemplated under s.14(l)(e). [1082B·C)
-I
In the instant case, although there were some proceedings for the
cancellation of the lease, the lease had not come to an end. No steps have
been taken for dispossesion and only the formality of depositing the '
penalitles and filing of the Indemnity Bond remained to be done, on
H fulfilling which the lease would be restored in the name of the legal
SMT. SHANTI SHARMA v. SMT. VED PRABHA [OZA, J.J 1077

representatives. Therefore, It could not be said that the respondent A
landlord had ceased to be the owner of the premises. [108SG-H, 10868)

T.C. Rekhi v. Smt. Usha Gujaral, [1971) Rent Control Journal
Page 322 at 326, referred to.

CIVIL APPE.LLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No, 2935 B
of 1981.

From the Judgment and Order dated 5.5.1981 of the Delhi High

- Court in S.A.O. No. 366 of 1980.

Shankar Ghosh and B.P. Maheshwari for the Appellants. c
A.B. Rohtagi, C.L. Sahu, Jose Verghese and O.P. Verma for
the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
OZA, J. This appeal has been filed after grant of special leave in
this Court by the tenant-appellant challenging a decree for eviction.

It appears that the respondent-landlord filed an application for
eviction before the Rent Controller, Delhi on various grounds. The
Rent Controller who heard the petition of the respondent rejected the E
petition on other grounds but only granted an order for eviction under
Section 14(1)(e) i.e. the premises were bona fide required by the
respondent-landlord for their own residence. It is not disputed that
these premises are residential and the courts below, the trial court and
the appellate court both came to the conclusion that the respondent-
landlord has established his bona fide requirement and on these find- F
ings the order of eviction on the ground of bona fide re.quirement
under Sec. 14(l)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 has been
maintained.

Before the Tribunal a contention was advanced that the
appellant-tenant had come to know that the Delhi Development G
Authority ('DDA' for short) has cancelled the lease in favour of the
respondent-landlord and therefore the respondent ceased to be the
owner of the property and as such is not entitled to a decree for
eviction under Sec. 14(1)(e). The landlord-respondent, on the other
hand, contended that as a small portion of the premises in occupation
of the appellant-tenant is on another plot which under the conditions H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987) 3 S.C.R.

of the DDA was meant for non-residential purposes and in this view of
A
the matter a notice for cancellation of the lease was given but on
representation made by the respondent-landlord the DDA has stayed
further action and it therefore could not be contended that the lease
has been terminated by the DDA or that the respondent has ceased to
be the owner of the property in question. The learned Tribunal there- '!--
B fore repelled the contention advanced by the tenant-appellant before
it and maintained the order of the Rent Controller for eviction.
'~

Before the High. Court the contention advanced on behalf of the

c
appellant was that as the lease of the plot on which the building stands
is cancelled by the DDA the landlord i.e. the respondent ceases to be
the owner thereof and in this view of the matter, it was contended that
the requirement of Sec. 14(l)(e) of the Act is not satisfied and there- y
-
fore the respondent is not entitled to the decree for eviction.
The High Court after considering circumstances and the affidavit
filed by one of the appellants that the lease was cancelled but the
proceedings for taking possession have been stayed on a representa-
D tion made by the landlord, considered the question and felt that the
landlord whose lease has been terminated but is in possession as pas-
session has not been taken, he continues to be a tenant holding over
and on that basis came to the conclusion that it could not be held that
he ceases to be the owner and did not accept the contention advanced
by the appellant and maintained the decree for eviction.
p l
,-
Before us on the basis of lan_guage of Section 14(l)(e) the
learned counsel for the appellant contended that in order to get a
decree for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement the land- y
lord must establish that he is the owner of such property and learned
counsel attempted to contend that where the property is built up on a
F plot of land taken on lease from the Delhi Development Authority it
could not be said that the landlord is the owner of the property and on
this basis an attempt was made to contend that no eviction could be
sought on the ground of bona fide requirement. Although learned
counsel had to concede that in the Act itself the word 'owner' has not
been defined and in the modern context it could not be contended that ~ '
" G merely because the property situated on a plot of land taken on long
lease that the landlord could not be said to be the owner. The other
contention advanced on behalf of the appellant was that as there-was a
notice from the DDA cancelling the lease of the respondent-landlord
and as the lease has been cancelled of the plot of land on which part of
the premises in dispute stands the landlord-respondent is not entitled
H to this decree for eviction.
SMT. SHANTI SHARMA v. SMT. VED PRABHA [OZA, J.] 1079
,l
It is admitted that this question was not raised in the trial court A
and the parties had no opportunity to lead evidem:e. It is only based on
two papers and an affidavit which has been considered by the High
Court. On the basis of these papers what appears to be, is that notice
was issued to the landlord for cancellation of the lease and later on
i their representation the further proceedings have been stayed and it
has been further observed in the subsequent paper from the DOA that B
.·)-' the Authority is considering the restoration of the lease on the basis of
payment of penalty or other dues that may ultimately be settled. It is
nobody's case that ultimately the matter has been disposed of and it is

-
1'
also not in dispute that the landlord-respondent's possession has not
been taken by the DOA. It is also not in dispute that although the land
beneath the property is of the DOA given on lease to the landlord but
the structure thereupon is of the ownership of the respondent-land-
c
lord. It is also not in dispute that the portion of the premises only
stands on the plot of land the lease of which is alleged to have been
cancelled but later on the proceedings for restoration are pending and
the matter has been stayed. Nothing further has taken place .
•
-..( D
Arguments were advanced at length on behalf of appellant that
as the lease has been terminated and therefore the landlord could not
claim to be the owner of the property and therefore the decree for
eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement could not be main-
tained. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, con-

- -..

'(
tended that although some notice appears to have been issued but E
subsequently the matter remains stayed and admittedly the respondent-
landlord continues to be in possession and therefore it could not be
said that the respondent ceases to be the owner of the property. It was
also contended on behalf of the respondent that unless and until the
respondent's possession is taken it could not be said that he ceases to
be the owner as possession is substantially the ownership of the F
property.

It was also contended by learned counsel for the respondent that
even if the lease of the respondent-landlady is terminated by the

r ODA, DDA has to file a suit for possession and so long as she con-
tinues to be in possession, it could not be said that she is not the owner G
of the property. It was also contended that the premises in question do
not stand on the plot the lease of which has been cancelled but it is only
a small portion of the premises standing on that plot as apparently the
plot Nos. 34 & 35 are both allotted to the respondent and the
property in dispute stands on these two plots, the major part of the
premises in question stands on No. 34 whereas a small portion stands H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3 S.C.R.

A on No. 35 and it is alleged that the proceedings or the notice for
termination of the lease pertain to plot No. 35 and on this basis it was
contended that as the major part of the plot on which the premises
stand continues to be on lease in favour of the respondent the conten·
tion that respondent ceases to be the owner of the property is of no
avail to the appellant. I'
B
It was also contended on behalf of the respondent that the tenant ,~
is estopped from challenging the title of the landlord and as the rela·
tionship of landlord and tenant is admitted, it is not open to the tenant
to contend that the respondent-landlord has no title to the property.
Counsel for parties also referred to some decisions on the question of -
C Trasnfer of Property Act, ownership and also on the question of
estoppel. ~

Sec. 14( l)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act reads as under:

"14( I) xxx xxx xxx
D
Provided that the Controller, may, on an application
made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for
the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more
of the following grounds only, namely:·

E (a) to (d) xxx xxx xxx

(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are
required bona fide by tl)e landlord for occupation as a resi-
dence for himself or for any member of his family depen·
dent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person
F for whose benefit the premises are held and that the land·
lord or such person has no other reasonably suitable resi·
dential accommodation;

Explanation-For the purposes of this clause "pre·
mises let for residential purposes" include any premises ~
G which having been let for use as a residence are, without
the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commer·
cial or other purposes;

xx xxx xxx''

H The phrase used 1n this provision is "if he is the owner thereof" and it
SMT. SHANTI SHARMA v. SMT. VED PRABHA {OZA, J.{ 1081

is on the basis of these words that the present controversy has been A
raised and it appears to be the only point on the basis of which the
learned counsel for the appellant had argued this appeal.

As regards the first contention that the word 'owner' thereof
.J indicates absolute ownership and where property stands on a plot of
land taken on long lease from the ODA, it could not be said that he is B
the owner thereof and therefore the eviction on the ground of bona
f'' fide requirement under Section 14( 1)(e) could not be granted.

- Admittedly if this contention of the learned counsel for the
appellant is accepted in Delhi more than 50% of the properties stand
on leasehold plots and therefore it would not be possible for any land-
-{ lord to seek an order or decree for eviction on the ground of bona fide
requirement. It appears that it is therefore clear that if the Legislature
c

had this narrow meaning of ownership in mind, it would not have used
it, as it could not be contended that the Legislature did not keep in
view that in most of the modern township in India the properties stand
"( on plots of land leased out either by the Govt. or the Development D
. Authorities and therefore it was not contemplated that for all such
properties the landlord or the owner of the property used in common
parlance will not be entitled to eviction on the ground of bona fide
requirement and it is in this context that we have to examine this
contention.

- The word 'owner' has not been defined in this Act and the word
'owner' has also not been define\! in the Transfer of Property Act. The
contention of the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be is
E

that ownership means absolute ownership in the land as well as of the
structure standing thereupon. Ordinarily, the concept of ownership
may be what is contended by the counsel for the appellant but in the F
modern context where it is more or less admitted that all lands belong
to the State, the persons who hold properties will only be lessees or
the persons holding the land on some term from the Govt. or the
authorities constituted by the State and in this view of the matter it
could not be thought of that the Legislature when it used the term
)- 'owner' in the provision of Sec. 14(l)(e) it thought of ownership as G
absolute ownership. It must be presumed that the concept of owner-
ship only will be as it is understood at present. It could not be doubted
that the term 'owner' has to be understood in the context of the back-
ground of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act.
This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the
same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumst- H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3 S.C.R.

A ances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of
such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitt50d to
have eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase 'owner' thereof
has to be understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is that
where the person builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and
subsequently needs it for his own use. he should be entitled to an order \.
B or decree for eviction, the only thing necessary for him to prove is
bona fide requirement and that he is the owner thereof. In this con- ~
text, what appears to be the meaning of the term 'owner' is vis-a-vis the ,
tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant.
Admittedly in these cases where the plot of land is taken on lease the
structure is built by the landlord and admittedly he is the owner of the -
C structure. So far as the land is concerned he holds a long lease and in
view of the matter as against the tenant it could not be doubted that he )'-
will fall within the ambit of the meaning of the term 'owner' as is
contemplated under this Section. This term came up for consideration
before the Delhi High Court and it was also in reference to Section
14( l)(e) and it was held by the Delhi High Court in T. C. Rekhi v. Smt.
D Usha Gujral, [ 1971] Rent Control Journal Page 322 at 326 as under: 'r
"The word "owner" as used in this clause, has to be
construed in the background of the purpose and object of
enacting it. The use of the word 'owner' in this clause
seems to me to have been inspired by the definition of the
E word 'landlord' as contained in section 2(e) of the Act ~
which is wide enough to include a person receiving or en- ,-
titled to receive the rent of any premises on account of or
on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person. Con-
strued in the context in which the word "owner" is used in Y
clause (e), it seems to me to include all persons in the
F position of Smt. Usha Gujaral who have taken a long lease
of sites from the Government for the purpose of building
houses thereon. The concept of ownership seems now to be
eclipsed by its social and political significance and the idea
of ownership, in case like the present is one of the better
right to be in possession and to obtain it. To accede to the ~
G contention raised by Shri Kapur would virtually nullify the
effect of clause (e) and would render all such landlords
remedyless against tenants however badly they may need
the premises for their own personal residence. I do not
think such a result was intended by the Legislature and I
repel the appellant's contention. I consider it proper before
H passing on to the next challenge to point out that the word
SMT. SHANTI SHARMA v. SMT. VED PRABHA [OZA, J.] 1083

"owner" as used in clause (e) in Section 14(1) does not
postulate absolute ownership in the sense that he has an A
absolutely unrestricted right to deal with the property as he
likes. To describe some one as owner, and perhaps even as
an absolute owner, of property is to say two things: it is to
... assert that his title to the property is indisputable and that
he has all the rights of ownership allowed by the legal B
.,.. system in question. Rights of ownership may, therefore, be
limited by special provisions of law and include in those
provisions such as are in force in New Delhi according to

- which citizens are granted long leases of sites for construct-
ing buildings thereon. Now, the words of a statute, though
normally construed in their ordinary meaning, may contain
inherent restrictions due to their subject-matter and object c
'i
and the occasion on which and the circumstances with re-
ference to which they are used. They call for construction
in the light of their context rathe{ than in what may be
either their strict etymological sense or their popular mean-
ing part from the context (See Halsbury's Laws of England D
Third Edition Vol. 36 Paragraph 843 P. 394). The meaning
of the word "owner" in clause (e) is influenced and control-
led by its context and the appellant's construction is un-
acceptable because it seems to be quite clearly contrary to
the reasonable operation of the statutory provision."

- '--• will notLearned
'(
counsel for the appellant also frankly conceded that it E
be possible for him to contend that the term 'owner' should be
so construed that all those persons who have their houses standing on
the leasehold plots will be deprived of the benefit of Section 14(1)(e ).
The next contention advanced on behalf of the appellant is that
as there is a notice addressed to the respondent-landlord about the F
cancellation of the lease of a plot over which a small portion of the
premises stands he ceases to be an owner thereof and therefore will not
be entitled to the decree for eviction.
In this connection the two documents, on which reliance has
·~ been placed are: one is a notice purporting to be of some date in Sept.
1981 which reads as under: G
"DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Regd.A.D. Old Scheme Branch
Process Server 9th Floor, Vikas Minar,

New Delhi, the Sept. 81 H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3 S.C.R.

A NOTICE

It is notified for information of all concerned that the
lease of the Plot No. 35, Block No. 15-A, W.E.A. scheme
stands cancelled since 28.8. 74. The action under PP. Act
1971 is being taken for taking over physical possession of 1-
B
the plot and building standing thereon. The occupants of
the plot and building are, therefore, advised not to deal
with any person except the D.D.A. who is now the lawful
owner of the premises and not to pay rent, if anybody deals
with any other person, he will be doing so at his own risk

c
and cost.

Sdl-
-
(S.L. JAIN)
EXECUTIVE OFFICER (VI)
17.9.81

D To: All tenants:

I. M;s Nanik Ram and Sons,
15-A/35, W.E.A.
0 M;s Modern Centre.
E 15-A/35, W.E.A, Karol Bagh"

The other document is a letter to Smt. Ved Prabha and purport-
ing to have been issued by the Deputy Director, ODA. This document
apparently is dated October 30, l98 l and the relevant portion of this y
reads as under:
F
"! am directed to inform you that your unconditional re-
quest for the purpose of being considered and necessary
penalities for the past misuse and the continuing misuse till
the date of its vacation by the tenants of the said premises
under restoration of charges etc. are being worked out and
G the same will be communicated to you in due course." ~

It is further stated in this letter that "after the necessary dues on this
account are recovered and requisite formalities like submission of
Indemnity Bond etc. are completed and accepted by the DOA, the
lease of the plot would be restored in the name of the legal representa-
H tives of late R.S. Dinanath. ,. A perusal of these documents therefore
SMT. SHANTI SHARMA v. SMT. VED PRABHA [OZA, J.] 1085

clearly indicates that about plot No. 35 same notice was issued which is A
understood to mean that the lease was cancelled and later on on a
representation made by the landlord to the legal representatives of the
original allottees the further proceedings are suspended and it is
clearly stated that the question of penalty and other dues is being
.... worked out and on them being worked out and paid and Indemnity
Bond being filed, the lease will be restored. It is also apparent that B
,Irr;. nothing further has happened and therefore it could not be said that
T the lease has come to an end even what is attempted to be contended
on the basis of the first document that the lease is cancelled. The
second document, reference to which has been made above, clearly
- goes to show that has been suspended and at present it could not be
said that the lease has come to an end. Admittedly nothing has been
started for taking possession. Under these circumstances therefore it is
c
only on these facts that all these contentions have been advanced by
learned counsel for the appellant.

Before going into the legal questions as to whether this question
~-
could be raised at this stage and also as to the question of estoppel or D
whether the tenant has a right to challenge the title of the landlord, as
quoted above from the two documents which are the basis of all this
controversy if are carefully examined, it appears to be certain that a
notice for determination of the lease appears to have been issued by
the ODA sometime before 1981. The document which is purporting to
be a notice in 1981 shows that this notice is issued showing the cancel- E
lation of the lease and the subsequent letter from the DOA addressed
to _the legal representatives of the original allottee i.e. the present
respondents indicates that on their representation the ODA is working
out the penalities and details of payment which have to be recovered
and on the payment being made and Indemnity Bond being filed the
restoration of the lease will be considered and no further steps are F
being taken either for dispossession of the allottee or for any other
purpose. In view of these two documents what appears to be clear is
that although there were some proceedings for the cancellation of the
lease but at present it could not be contended that the lease has come
to an end. It is also clear that no steps have been taken for dispossession
t" and the second document which has been quoted above clearly shows G
that only the formality of depositing the penalities which are being
worked out in the Office of the DOA and the filing of the Indemnity
Bond remains thereupon the lease will be restored in the name of the
legal representatives. Under these circumstances at the best what
could be contended is that so far as plot No. 35 is concerned some
shadow was cast on its title. That shadow also appears to by very thin. 1-i
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3 S.C.R.
,,'
A Apart from it the subsequent letter from the DDA indicates that what
remains is only a formality of depositing the penalities and the
Indemnity Bond. It is also clear that so far as the structure in the
building is concerned it is not disputed that that is one of the owner-
ship of the respondent. It is also not in dispute that the premises
mainly stand on plot No. 34 about which there is not even a shadow of ~
B
doubt about its title either of the property or of the land and in this
view of the matter, on the basis of the two documents put together in
the context of the circumstances as they stand it could not be said that ~
the respondent-landlord has ceased to be the owner thereof, in view of
broad meaning of term 'owner' as has been discussed and considered

c
above. In our opinion, it could not be said that the landlord is not the
owner of the premises and therefore we see no substance in the con-
tention advanced by learned counsel for the appellant. y
-
No other question was raised. We therefore see no reason to
entertain this appeal. It is, therefore, dismissed. The respondents shall
be entitled to the costs of this appeal.
D
- )>-
N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.