Holding

The suit for possession falls within Article 67 (or alternatively Article 66) of the Limitation Act, giving a twelve‑year limitation period, so Article 113 does not apply and the suit is not time‑barred.

Summary

Shakuntala, a monthly tenant of a premises for an ice‑cream business, was alleged by the landlord to have made permanent alterations, caused waste and changed the use of the property, violating sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotels & Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The landlord gave a notice to quit in September 1978 and filed a suit for possession in 1979. The trial court decreed in favour of the landlord, but the Small Causes Court appellate bench dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by the three‑year limitation period under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. The High Court reversed this, holding that Articles 66 or 67, which provide a twelve‑year period, applied. The Supreme Court was asked to decide which article of the Limitation Act governs a landlord’s suit for possession under the Rent Act. The Court held that the suit falls within Article 67 (and alternatively Article 66) of the Limitation Act, giving a twelve‑year limitation period; Article 113 is inapplicable. Consequently, the suit was not time‑barred and the tenant’s appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or Articles 66/67 apply to a landlord’s suit for possession under sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotels & Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.
What is the date of accrual of the cause of action for eviction in such a case.

Legislation cited

Bombay Rent Acts. 12, s. 13, s. 14
Bombay Rents, Hotels & Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947s. 12, s. 13
Limitation Act, 1963s. 113, s. 66, s. 67
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 106, s. 111

Subjects

Limitation periodLandlord‑tenantEvictionBombay Rent ActSections 12 and 13Articles 66 67 113Possession suitRent controlBreach of tenancyPermanent alterations

Judgment

A SMT. SHAKUNTALA S. TIWARI
v.
HEM CHAND M. SINGHANIA

MAY 6, 1987

B [E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, JJ.]

Bombay Rents, H"telr and Lodging House Rates Control Act,
1947: Sections 12 and 13-Harmonious construction-Necessity for as
provisions co exist-Suit for recovery of possession by landlord-
C Period of limitation-What is.

Limitation Act 1963: Recovery of possession by. landlord
under section 13 of the Bombay Rent Act-Period of limita-
tion-Would be 12 years under Articles 66 or 67 and not 3 years under
D Article 113.

The appellant in the appeals was the tenant of the demised pre·
mises who was inducted as a montllly tenant for the purpose of conduct·
Ing the.ke-cream business carried on by her husband. The letting was
E done on an agreement dated December 29, 1975 by the landlord-res-
pondent which was to become effective from January 1, 1976.

The landlord alleged that in breach of the agreement and the
terms of the tenancy, as also in violation of the prohibition prescribed
under section 13(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotels & Lodging House
F Rates (Control) Act, 1947 the tenant had indulged in serveral acts of
commission by which not only there had been permanent alterations of
major nature, but the entire structure of the demised premises was
completely changed. It was also alleged that the tenant bad indulged in
acts of waste and damage to the property, and that she had changed the
user of the premises when some of the employees started residing there.
G
On the basis of the aforesaid allegations the landlord gave a notice
to.quit dated 20th September, 1978 to the tenant. Thereafter in 1979 the
landlord ftled a suit against the tenant in the Small Causes Court for
possession of the demised premises. The Trial Court on 1lth November,
H 1982 decreed the suit upholding the allegation that the tenant bad made

306
. -
SMT. SHAKUNTALA v. HEM CHAND 307

~,l. alterations of permanent nature in the demised premises and bad A
committed acts or waste and damage.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the tenant filed an appeal
before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court on 28th
September, 1985, and the respondent's suit for eviction was dismissed
on the ground that the suit was barred by lapse of time under Article B
113 of the Limitation Act, 1973, which prescribed a period of three
years.

The landlord thereafter filed a writ petition under Article 227

- which was allowed by the High Court which held that Article 66 or
Article 67 was applicable which prescribed a period of 12 years. The
writ petition filed by the tenant was however dismissed.
C

lo the appeals by the tenant to this Court the only question for
consideration was: whether Article 113 or either of Articles 66 or 67 of
the Limitation Act would be applicable, and what would be the date of
the accrual of the cause of action. D

On behalf of the tenant-appellant it was contended that on the
facts of the case Article 113 of the Limitation Act alone would apply and
that neither Article 66 nor Article 67 would have any applica-
tion. Article 67 of the Limitation Act bad no application inasmuch as
time begins to run only when the tenancy is determined and that E
determination of tenancy which takes place under the Transfer of Pro-
perty Act is wholly irrelevant for cause of action in ejectmeot. That
Article 66 contemplates an immediate right to recover possession.
Breach of a condition only leads to an immediate right to possession
without more, and not a determination in law. That Article 66 is a
general article which does not apply to landlord or tenant, and that F
when a specific Article applied the general Article should not be applied
specially when it was not free from doubt.

On behalf of the respondent-landlord it was however submitted
that for any suit by a landlord against the tenant for recovery of posses·
"">' sion under the Rent Act the Limitation Act was inherently inapplicable. G

Dismissing the Appeals,

.,. HELD: 1. Recovery of possession is by a suit and there is no
section in the scheme of the Limitation Act to indicate that the Limita-
tion Act was inherently inapplicable. Io the scheme of the Rent Act or in H
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987) 3.S.C.R.

A the various contingencies contemplated under the Rent Act, there is
0

nothing to indicate or warrant th at there would be no limitation of any
period. [311E·F)

2. Sec:tions 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent Act co-exist and must
be harmonised to effect the purpo&e and Intent of the legislature for the
B purpose of eviction of the tenant. In that view of the matter Article 113
of the Limitation Act has no scope ofappUcation. [316C·D)

3. Article 67 Indicates that time begins to run only when the

C
tenancy is determined. It comprehends suit by a landlord and deals
with the right to recover possession from the tenant. Therefore it deals
with landlord and tenant. [311F·G) -
4. On the strict grammatical meaning Article 67 of the Limitation ....._•
Act would be applicable. This is indubitably a suit by the landlord
against the tenant to recover possession from the tenant. Therefore, the
suit clearly comes within Article 67 of the Limitation Act. The suit was
D ftled because the tenancy was determined by the combined effect of the
operation of Sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent Act. At the most it "Y"·
would be within Article 66 of the Limitation Act if It Is held that fore·
feltures have been incurred by the appeUant in view of the breach of the
conditions mentioned in Sec:tion 13 of the Bombay Rent Act, and on
lifting orthe embargo against eviction or tenant in terms of section 12 or
E the said Act. That being so, either or the two, Article 66 or Article 67
would be applicable to the facts of the instant case. There is no scope for .)._ .._
the application of Article 113 or the Limitation Act In any view or the
matter. The period of limitation in this case would therefore be 12
years. The suit was therefore not barred. [315H; 316A·E)

F Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, [1980) 1 S.C.R. 334;
Pradesh Kumar Bajpai v. Binod Behari Sarkar, (1980] 3 S.C.R. 93,
Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar & Other, (1985] 2 S.C.C. 683;
Hiralal Vallabhram v. Kastorbhai Lalbhai & Others, [1967) 3 S.C.R.
343 at 349 and 350; Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. Muni Subrat Dass &
Anr., [1969) 2 S.C.R. 43:<: at 436, Kaushalaya Devi & Others v. Shri
G K. L.. Bansal, [1969) 2 S.C.R. 1048 at 1050; Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal ~
and another, A.l.R. 1970 S.C. 794 at 795 and 796; and Haji Suleman
Haji Ayub Bhiwandiwala v. Narayan Sadashiv Ogale, [1967) 84
Bombay Law Report p. 122, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 116-
•·
H 117 of 1987.
-
SMT. SHAKUNTALA v. HEM CHAND (MUKHARJI, J.) 309

. ~ From the Judgment and Order dated 28.11.1986 of the Bombay A
High Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 5391And5515 of 1985.

F.S. Nariman, R.F. Nariman, Ashok Goel, Rajan Karanjawala
and Ejaz Mazbool for the Appellant.

H.C. Tunara, M.N. Shroff, A.G. Parekh and K.M.K. Khan for B
........ the Respondent.
~ The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

- SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This appeal by special leave is
by the tenant from the judgment and order of the High Court of
Bombay dated 28th of November, 1986. The only question involved in
c
·~ this appeal is what is the period of limitation for the recovery of
possession of the demised premises. The premises in question is
located on the Municipal Street No. 16 in Fanaswadi area of Bombay.
The tenant was inducted as a monthly tenant in respect of the said
premises at a monthly rent of Rs.105 .60 for the purpose of conducting D
"j ice-cream business which was being carried on by her husband who
was the holder of the power of attorney on her behalf. The premises
consisted of the entire structure on the ground floor with a loft cover-
ing the entire area with corrugated iron sheets. The letting was done on
an agreement dated 29th of December, 1975 which was to become
effective from the 1st of January, 1976. It is the case of the landlord, E
the respondent herein, that in breach of the agreement and the terms
~· of tenancy as also in violation of the prohibition prescribed under
section 13( 1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel & Lodging House Rates
(Control) Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act), the
~
tenant had indulged in several acts of commission by which not only
there has been permanent alterations of major nature but .the entire F
structure was completely changed so much so that even the height of
the structure was increased and thus, the loft lost its initial character
and became almost as a first floor which was the creation of the appel-
lant-tenant herein. Several other breaches were alleged to have been
committed in respect of the terms of tenancy. It was alleged that the
"').- tenant had indulged in the acts of waste and damage to the property G
and that further she had changed the user of the suit premises when
some of the employees started residing there. On the basis of those
and other allied allegations on the 20th of September, 1978 the land-
lord, respondent herein, gave a notice to quit to the tenant, the appel-
!ant herein, on the ground that the tenant had (1) made alterations of
permanent nature in respect of the demised premises, (2) committed H
--
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

A acts of waste and damage and (3) changed the user of the premises. In
1979 the landlord filed R.A.E. Suit No. 1326/4557 of 1979 against the
tenant in the Small Causes Court, Bombay for poss~ssion of the
demised premises. The Trial Court on 11th November, 1982 decreep
the suit upholding, inter alia, that the tenant had made alterations of
permanent nature in the demised premises and had committed acts of
B waste and damage. Aggrieved by the said decision Appeal No. 667 of
1982 was filed by the tenant against the decree of the Trial Court. The
same was allowed by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court
on 28th September, 1985 and the respondent's suit for eviction was
dismissed on the ground that the suit was barred by lapse of time under
article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter called the Limita-
C lion Act). The High Court of Bombay on 28th of November, 1986
allowed the writ petition being Writ Petition No. 5391 of 1985 filed by
-
the landlord under Article 227 of the Constitution against the iudg-
ment of the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court. The High
Court allowed the said Writ Petition filed by the landlord and dismis-
sed the Writ Petition being Writ Petition No. 5515 of 1985 filed by the
D tenant. In the premises the High Court's judgment and order dated
28th of November, 1986 impugned in this appeal restored the judg-
ment of the Trial Court decreeing the respondent's suit for possession.

All the three courts have held that the tenant, appellant herein,
had made alterations of pennanent nature and had committed acts of
E waste and damage. The Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court
and the High Court, however, differed on the question of limitation.
The Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court had held that the suit
was barred under article 113 of the Limitation Act which prescribed a
period of 3 years while the High Court held that articles 66 or 67 was
applicable which prescribed a period of 12 years. According to the
F landlord-respondent, the suit though filed after 3 years was filed within
12 years of t!)e accrual of the cause of action. The only question which
was argued in this appeal was the question of limitation. No factual
aspect was agitated before this Court. This appeal must therefore,
decide the question which article of the Limitation Act would be appl-
icable, that is to say, whether article 113 or either of the article 66 or 67
G and what would be the date of the accrual of cause of action.

On behalf of the appellant, it was submitted by Mr. Nariman that
on the facts of this case, article 113 of the Limitation Act would alone
apply because according to him neither article 66 nor article 67 would
,H have any application. It may not be inappropriate to set out article 66
and article 67 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act. The said articles
-
SMT. SHAKUNTALA v. HEM CHAND (MUKHARJI, J.I 311

appear in Part V of the Schedule First Division dealing with suits
A
relating to immovable property. The first column gives the description
of suit, the second column gives the period of limitation and the third
column deals with time from which period begins to run. Articles 66
and 67 read as follows:-

"66. For possession Twelve When the forfeiture B
of immovable property years is incurred or the
when the plaintiff condition is
, has become entitled broken.

- to possession by
reason of any forfeiture
or breach of condition.
c
67. By a landlord to Twelve When the
recover possession years tenancy is
from a tenant. determined.''

Article 113 on the other hand which is in Part X dealing with D
suits provides that for any suit for which no period of limitation is
provided elsewhere in the Schedule the period would be three years
from the date when the right to sue accrues.

It was submitted by Shri Tunara, learned counsel for the res-
pondent-landlord that for any suit by a landlord against a tenant for E
--). recovery of possession under the Rent Act, the Limitation Act was
inherently inapplicable. We are, however, unable to accept this argu-
ment. Recovery of possession is by a suit and there is no section in the
scheme of the Limitation Act to indicate that Limitation Act was in-
-4
herently inapplicable. In the scheme of the Rent Act or in the various
contingencies contemplated under the Rent Act, there is nothing to F
indicate or warrant that there would be no limitation of any period.
Article 67 of the Limitation Act which has been set out hereinbefore
indicates that time begins to run only when the tenancy is determined.
It comprehends suit by a landlord and deals with right to recover
possession from the tenant. Therefore, it deals with landlord and
~ tenant. We are therefore unable to accept the argument of the respon- G
dent that limitation was inapplicable to ejectment.

On behalf of the appellant it was however submitted that article
67 of the Limitation Act had no application inasmuch as time begins to
run only when the tenancy is determined. A determination of tenancy
which takes place under the Transfer of Property Act is wholly irrele- H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

••
A vant for cause of action in ejectment. It is an act in law and not an act ,..._.,
of law because under the scheme a determination of tenancy which
takes place untler the Transfer of Property Act, according to the
appellant, is wholly irrelevant for founding a cause of action in eject-
ment because the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are
superseded by the provisions of the Rent Act and according to the
B appellant a cause of action for eviction is to be founded only on one of J.._
the grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Rent Act. For this reliance
was placed on V. Dhanpal Chettiarv. Yesodai Ammal, [1980] 1 S.C.R.
334 where this Court held that a lease between a lessor and a lessee j

-
comes into existence by way of contract when the parties to the con-
tract agree on the rent, duration of tenancy and other relevant terms.
C Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act provides vario11s methods
by which a lease of immovable property can be determined. Under
clause (h) of section 111 a lease determines on the expiry of a notice to i 4.
determine the 'lease given by the landlord to the tenant. But a notice is
not compulsory or obligatory nor must it fulfil all the technical require-
ments of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, because as a
D result of the various State Rent Acts the liability to be evicted if
incurred by the tenant, he cannot tum round and say that the con- ~
tractual tenancy had not been determined. It was further reiterated
that the action of the landlord in instituting a suit for eviction on the
ground mentioned in the State Rent Act would tantamount to an
expression of the intention of the landlord that he does not want the
E tenant to continue as his lessee and the jural relationship between the
lessor and the lessee would come to an end on the passing of an order -f-
or a decree for eviction. Until then, under the extended definition of
'tenant' under the various State Rent Acts, the tenant continued to be
a tenant even though the contractual tenancy had been determined by \---
giving a valid notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. ·
F Therefore notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
terminating the tenancy is no longer necessary. At page 353 of the said
report, the Court was of the view that making out a case under the
Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself was sufficient and it was
not obligatory to the proceeding on the basis of the determination of
the lease by issue of a notice in accordance with section 106 of the
G Transfer of Property Act. This view was also reiterated again in ~
Pradesh Kumar Bajpai v. Binod Behari Sarkar, [1980] 3 S.C.R. 93
where this Court observed that once the requirements of Rent Act
were satisfied, the tenant could not claim the double protection of
invoking the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or the terms of
the contract. Therefore, in the case before this Court the question of
H termination of lease by forfeiture did not arise on the facts of that case
-
SMT. SHAKUNTALA v. HEM CHAND [MUKHARJI, J.] 313

and after the Rent Act came into force, the landlord could not avail
A
himself of clause 12 which provided for forfeiture, in that case, even if
the tenant had neglected to pay the rent for over two months and
further the landlord could not enter into possession forthwith without
notice. The only remedy for him is to seek eviction under the provi-
sions of the Rent Act. See also in this connection the observations in
Gian Devi Anandv. Jeevan Kumar & others, [1985] 2 S.C.C. 683. B

It was further submitted on behalf of the appellant that columns
1 and 3 of the Sehedule of the Limitation Act should be read together
and if a case does not fall within either column 1 o( ',column.. '1 the

- residuary article must apply. Reference may be made to the bbserva-
tions in Kripal Shah Sant Singh v. Shri Harkishan Das Narsingh Das,
A.LR. 1957 Punjab 273 at 275; M/s. Swastik Agency, Madras v. The
C

Madras Port Trust and another, A.LR. 1966 Madras 130 at 135 and
Mulla Vitti/ Seeti, Kutti and others v. K.M.K. Kunhi Pathumma and
others, A.LR. 1919 Madras 972.

Mr. Nariman, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that D

t the expression "determination" appears in section 111 of the Transfer
of Property Act. Under section 14 of the Bombay Rent Act, the same
expression was used in the context of a sub<tenant becoming a direct
tenant of the landlord. This expression however, according to the
appellant, is not to be found in section 11.gf the Act. This Court has
held that this expression contained in section 14 of the Rent Act is E
different from the expression contained in section 111 of the Transfer
of Property Act inasmuch as the tenancy only determines under the
Rent Act for a decree only for eviction is passed, and not before.
Reliance was placed in support of this argument on the ob§ervation of
this Court in Hiralal Vallabhram v. Kastorbhai Lalbhai & Ors., [1967]
3 S.C.R. 343 at 349 and 350. It was further urged therefore that article F
67 of the Limitation Act would not apply.

Article 66, according to the appellant, contemplates an
immediate right to recover possession. Breach of a condition must lead
to an immediate right to possession without more. This would not be a
determination in law according to the appellant. Section 13 of the Rent G
Act contemplated, however, two conditions being fulfilled one is a
ground for ejectment subsisting and the other is the Court's satis-
faction which is a condition precedent before which there is a no
immediate right to possession. Reliance in support of this proposition
was placed on Sharoop Dass Monda/ v. Joggessur Roy Chowdhry,
I.LR. 26 Calcutta 564 at 568; Annamalai Pathar v. Sri-la-sri H
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S,C.R.

A Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi Avergal and another, A.LR. 1937
Madras 295 at 297; Mahalinga Bandappa Lakhannavar v. Venkatesh
Waman Karnataki, 59 B.L.R. 227 at 233; Bahadur Singh & Anr. v.
Muni Subrat Dass & Anr., [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432 at 436; Kaushalaya
Devi & Ors. v. Shri K.L. Bansal, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1048 at 1050 and
Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal and another, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 794 at 795
B and 796. Under section 13 of the Rent Act, possession is not recover-
able only for breach of a condition, and it is recoverable on fulfilment
of and not breach of a condition precedent to the Court's satisfaction,
according to counsel for the appellant. It was further submitted on
behalf of the appellant that section 13(1) of the Rent Act was to be
contrasted with section 12( !)-recovery of possession under section
c 13( I) was not directly upon a breach of condition of tenancy, but only
upon the Court's satisfaction that a ground for recovery of possession
-
was made out. Under section 12(1), however, a landlord is not entitled
to recover possession so long as the tenant observed the "conditions of
tenancy". It was further submitted that section 13 is subject to sections
15 and !5A of the Rent Act if the landlord and the tenant respectively
D have fulfilled (not breached) according to the counsel, the provisions
of these two sections, no suit for ejectment will lie. It was urged
that again showed that section 13(1) of the Rent Act contained condi-
tions that were to be fulfilled before a landlord can recover possession
for a tenant's breach of condition. Section 13( I) contained grounds for
eviction of a tenant which need not be for breach of any condition.
E According to the appellant only one article for recovery of possession
is reserved under the Limitation Act by a landlord from a tenant, that
is article 139 of the Limitation Act, 1908. This article is the exact
predecessor of article 67. Article 66 is a general article, says the appel-
lant, which does not apply to landlord or tenant and it was further
submitted that when a specific article applied, a general article should
F not be applied specially when it was not free from doubt. Some
authorities were referred to in this behalf.

We accept this submission on the principle of construction. It is
further reiterated that a strained construction to give a more favour-
able limitation period is to be avoided-considerations of equity were
G out of place in construing the articles under the Limitation Act. It was .f'
submitted before us that section 12(1) of the Rent Act did not apply to
the facts of the present case. The decree for eviction was grounded
upon section 13(i)(b) of the Rent Act and not on section 12(1). It was
further reiterated that the non-obstante clause of section 13 made it
clear that where a condition of tenancy coincided with a ground for
H eviction, the ground for eviction alone is to be looked at-and to that
SMT. SHAKUNTALA v. HEM CHAND [MUKHARJJ, J.] 315

·~ extent, any breach of the condition of tenancy was superseded by the
A
ground for eviction. Also in the instant case, clause 3 of the agreement
dated 29th December, 1975 is inconsistent with the provisions of the
Act inasmuch as even temporary structures were not allowed to be
erected and tliere is no provision for the written consent of the land·
lord. It was further submitted without prejudice to the aforesaid sub·
mission that section 12(1) of the Rent Act was a section that was B
~ designed to afford protection to a tenant if his lease was determined
under the Transfer of Property Act and it was thus designed to be a
~ shield but not a word. It was submitted that the decision in Haji Sule·
man Haji Ayub Bhiwandiwala v. Narayan Sadashiv Ogale, [1967] 84
Bombay Law Report p. 122 is against the current of modem rent
jurisprudence.
c
,. ~ Haji Suleman Haji Ayub Bhiwandiwala v. Narayan Sadashiv
Ogale, (supra) which is a decision of the Bench of three judges and as
such binding on this Court held that sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay
Rent Act dealt with different topics and have different objects. It was
held that section 12(1) clothed a tenant with the cloak of. statutory D

~(
protection against eviction so long as he performs the conditions of
tenancy. Section 13 provides that notwithstanding that protection the
landlord can sue for eviction provided he established any one of the
circumstances set out in that section. This Court further observed that
it was impossible to say that it was only when circumstances set out in
section 13 arose that a landlord could evict and that eviction on the E
-+ ground of the failure to perform the conditions of tenancy would not
deprive the tenant of the protection under section 12(1) of the Rent
Act. Such a reading would be contrary to the whole scheme underlying
the objects of the two sections. We accept the aforesaid legal position.
·~
It is not against the trend of the principle behind rent legislation. It
affords protection to the tenant inasmuch as it says that it was only on F
the fulfilment of the condition stipulated in the two sections and on
satisfaction of the contingencies mentioned in section 12 which would
deprive the tenant of the protection that the tenant can be evicted.
Much argument was advanced to the contrary--but in our opinion to
prevent unreasonable eviction, in balancing and harmonising the
'--}· rights of the landlords and tenant if the sections are so read as done in G
Haji Suleman's case, it would meet the ends of justice and that would
be proper construction.

If that is so then on the strict grammatical meaning article 67 of
the Limitation Act would be applicable. This is indubitably a suit by
the landlord against the tenant to recover possession from the tenant. H
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987) 3.S.C.R.

A Therefore the suit clearly comes within article 67 of the Limitation
Act. The suit was filed because the tenancy was determined by the
combined effect of the operation of sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay
Rent Act. In this connection, the terms of sections 12 and 13 of the
Bombay Rent Act may be referred to. At the most it would be within
article 66 of the Limitation Act if we hold that forfeiture has been
B incurred by the appellant in view of the breach of the conditions
mentioned in section 13 of the Bombay Rent Act and on lifting on the
embargo against eviction of tenant in terms of section 12 of the said
Act. That being so, either of the two, article 66 or article 67 would be
applicable to the facts of this case; there is no scope of the application
of article 113 of the Limitation Act in any view of the matter. Sections
c 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent Act co-exist and must be harmonised to
effect the purpose and intent of the legislature for the purpose of
eviction of the tenant. In that view of the matter article 113 of the
Limitation Act has no scope of application. Large number of autho-
rities were cited. In the view we have taken on the construction of the
provisions of articles 67 and 66 of the Limitation Act and the nature of
D the cause of action in this case in the light of sections 12 and 13 of the
Bombay Rent Act, we are of the opinion that the period of limitation
in this case would be 12 years. There is no dispute that if the period of
limitation be 12 years, the suit was not barred.

In that view of the matter, the appeals fail and are accordingly
E dismissed with costs.

N.V.K. Appeals dismissed.