Holding

A woman’s right to a residence order in a shared household under the PWDV Act, 2005 cannot be defeated by an eviction order issued under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007; the two statutes must be read harmoniously.

Summary

The appellant, Smt. S. Vanitha, sought to remain in a house that she claimed was her matrimonial home and a "shared household" under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDV Act). Her parents‑in‑law, invoking the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (Senior Citizens Act), obtained an eviction order from the Deputy Commissioner. The High Court upheld the eviction, holding that her right of shelter lay only against her estranged husband. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the interplay between the two special statutes, interpreting the definition of "shared household" and the effect of the non‑obstante clauses. It held that the PWDV Act’s right to a residence order cannot be defeated by an eviction order under the Senior Citizens Act and that the statutes must be harmoniously construed. Consequently, the eviction order was set aside and the appellant was permitted to pursue remedies under the PWDV Act.

Issues considered

The validity of the eviction order under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 in view of the appellant's claim to residence under the PWDV Act, 2005.
Whether the definition of ‘shared household’ under Section 2(s) of the PWDV Act includes the appellant’s premises.
How to reconcile the overriding clause of Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act with the remedial provisions of the PWDV Act.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act to pass eviction orders that affect rights under another special statute.
The appropriate method of statutory interpretation when two special Acts contain non‑obstante clauses.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955s. 13(1)(ia), s. 13(1)(ib)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 498A
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007s. 10, s. 23(1), s. 23(2), s. 26, s. 27, s. 2(b), s. 3, s. 31
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005s. 12(1), s. 17, s. 19, s. 26(3), s. 2(s), s. 36

Subjects

shared householdevictionmaintenanceSenior Citizens ActDomestic Violence Actstatutory interpretationnon obstante clauseresidence order

Judgment

[2020] 12 S.C.R. 1057 1057

SMT. S. VANITHA A
v.
THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU URBAN
DISTRICT & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3822 of 2020) B
DECEMBER 15, 2020
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD,
INDU MALHOTRA AND INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.]
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act,
C
2007:
2(b) and 3 – Petition under the Act – By respondent Nos. 2
and 3 seeking eviction of their daughter-in-law (appellant) from
their house – Plea of appellant that she had been living in the house
as her matrimonial residence and that her husband (respondent
D
No. 4) had deserted her and their daughter – The authorities
concerned directed the appellant to vacate the house – Writ Petition
– Single Judge of High Court held that the appellant had no cause
of action against respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as they owned the house
and that her right to claim shelter lied only against her husband –
Division Bench of High Court affirmed the judgment of Single Judge E
– Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: The premises in question
constitute a ‘shared household’ within meaning of s. 2(s) of
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Object of
2005 Act is to recognize right of woman to reside in a shared
household – Both pieces of legislation are intended to deal with
F
salutary aspects of public welfare and interest – Both the Acts are
special Acts – Both sets of legislations have to be harmoniously
construed – The right of a woman to secure a residence order for a
shared household under the 2005 Act cannot be defeated by
securing an order of eviction under the 2007 Act. The over-riding
effect for the remedies sought under 2007 Act cannot preclude all G
other competing remedies under 2005 Act – It would be appropriate
for a Tribunal u/s. 2007 Act to grant such remedies of maintenance
as envisaged u/s 2(b) of 2007 Act that do not result in obviating
competing remedies under other statutes – The Tribunal under 2007
Act should appropriately mould reliefs after noticing competing
H
1057
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A claims of the parties claiming under 2005 and 2007 Acts – The
aggrieved woman after obtaining a relief for shared household from
the Tribunal constituted under 2007 Act, is duty bound to inform
the Magistrate under 2005 Act as per s.26(3) of 2005 Act – This
course of action would ensure speedy relief to both the groups –
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – ss. 2(s),
B
17, 26(3) and 36.
Interpretation of statutes:
Two special Acts – Prevailing effect – Held: Where both the
Acts contain non-obstante clauses, later Act will prevail – However,
C in the event of conflict between the Special Acts the dominant
purpose of both the statutes have to be analysed to ascertain which
one would prevail over the other – The primary effort of the
interpreter must be to harmonize, not excise.
Definition clause – Interpretation of – Held: Where the
D definition of an expression adopts ‘means and includes’ stipulation,
it is intended to be exhaustive.
Words and Phrases:
‘Shared household’ – Meaning of, in the context of Prevention
of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
E
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. On construing the provisions of sub-Section (2)
of section 23 of the Senior Citizen Act 2007, it is evident that it
applies to a situation where a senior citizen has a right to receive
maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part thereof is
F
transferred. The situation in the present case is that the eviction
was sought of the daughter-in-law, i.e. the appellant. The land,
where the house has been constructed, was originally purchased
by the son of the applicants who are seeking eviction of their
daughter-in-law. The son had purchased the property a few months
G before his marriage to the appellant. He had subsequently
transferred the property by a registered sale deed to his father
and the fact that it was for the same consideration after the lapse
of several years is of significance. The father, in turn, executed a
gift deed in favor of his spouse. The appellant has asserted that
she had been living in the house, as her matrimonial residence,
H
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1059
URBAN DISTRICT

until the application was filed. Her spouse has (according to her) A
deserted her and their minor daughter and left them in the lurch.
The electricity to the premises was disconnected for non-payment
of dues. Their daughter has sought admission to an engineering
degree course however her father- Fourth respondent has not
provided any financial support. The transfers which took place
B
cannot be viewed in isolation from the context of the on-going
matrimonial dispute which has taken place. [Paras 17 and
23][1087-C-D; 1077-E-H; 1078-A]
2.1 The appellant has submitted that the premises
constitute a “shared household” within the meaning of Section
2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, C
2005 (PWDV Act). The definition of the expression “shared
household” in Section 2(s) uses the familiar legislative formula
of a “means and includes” definition. Where the definition of an
expression in an enactment adopts a ‘means and includes’
stipulation, it is intended to be exhaustive. The ‘means’ part of D
the definition indicates what would normally fall within the ambit
of the expression, while the ‘includes’ element gives it an
extended meaning. Together they indicate that the legislature
has provided for an exhaustive enumeration of what falls within
the ambit of the definition. The use of the expression ‘means’ is
intended to make it exhaustive. On the other hand, the use of E
the expression ‘includes’ is intended to make it more extensive.
The legislature by using an expression ‘includes’ evinces,
notwithstanding the meaning of the phrase, an intention: “to
enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the
body of the statute”. “Includes” is utilized so as to comprehend: F
“not only such things as they signify according to their nature
and import but also those things which the interpretation clause
declares that they shall include”. [Para 18][1078-C; 1079-B-C;
D-F]
Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G P G
Singh, Lexis Nexis, 14th Ed. Page 197-199 – referred
to.
2.2 However, when a statutory definition incorporates the
‘means and includes’ approach, the intent is to make the definition
exhaustive. The definition of ‘shared household’ in Section 2(s) H
1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A of the PWDV Act 2005 is exhaustive. The definition of the
expression ‘shared household’ in Section 2(s) of the PWDV Act
of 2005 is in two parts: in the means part of the definition the
expression ‘shared household’ means (i) A household where the
person aggrieved lives in a domestic relationship either singly
or along with the respondent or; (ii) At any stage has lived in a
B
domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent.
This is followed by an inclusive element, so as to cover such a
household (i) whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the
aggrieved person and the respondent or (ii) owned or tenanted
by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person
C or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title or
equity. This has also been given an inclusive or extended
meaning, which extends to a household which may belong to the
joint family of which a respondent is a member, irrespective of
whether the respondent or the aggrieved person have any right,
title or interest in the shared household. The last part of the
D
inclusive definition is intended to extend the meaning of a shared
household to a situation where the household in fact belongs to a
joint family, of which the respondent is a member. The legislature
has made it clear that though neither the respondent, nor the
aggrieved person in such case may have a right, title or interest
E in the shared household it would irrespective fall within the ambit
of the definition. [Paras 18 and 19][1080-B-C, E-H; 1081-A-B]
Satish Chandra Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja Civil Appeal No.
2483 of 2020, decided on 15 October 2020 – relied
on.
F 3.1 Section 36 of the PWDV Act 2005 stipulates that the
provisions of the Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation
of, the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.
This is intended to ensure that the remedies provided under the
enactment are in addition to other remedies and do not displace
G them. The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior
Citizens Act 2007 is undoubtedly a later Act and Section 3 thereof
stipulates that its provisions will have effect, notwithstanding
anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment. However,
the provisions of Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 giving

H
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1061
URBAN DISTRICT

it overriding force and effect, would not by themselves be A
conclusive of an intent to deprive a woman who claims a right in
a shared household, as under the PWDV Act 2005. [Para 20][1082-
G-H; 1083-A-C]
3.2 Principles of statutory interpretation dictate that in the
event of two special acts containing non obstante clauses, the later B
law shall typically prevail. In the present case, the Senior Citizen’s
Act 2007 contains a non obstante clause. However, in the event
of a conflict between special Acts, the dominant purpose of both
statutes would have to be analyzed to ascertain which one should
prevail over the other. The primary effort of the interpreter must
be to harmonize, not excise. In the present case, Section 36 of C
the PWDV Act 2005, albeit not in the nature of a non-obstante
clause, has to be construed harmoniously with the non obstante
clause in Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 that operates
in a separate field. [Para 20][1083-C-D; 1084-B-C]
Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services D
Ltd., (2001) 3 SCC 71 : [2001] 1 SCR 932; Bank of
India v. Ketan Parekh (2008) 8 SCC 148 : [2008] 9
SCR 346; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd.
v. Union of India (2019) 8 SCC 416 : [2019] 10 SCR
381 – relied on. E
3.3 Both pieces of legislation are intended to deal with
salutary aspects of public welfare and interest. The PWDV Act
2005 was intended to deal with the problems of domestic violence
which, as the Statements of Objects and Reasons sets out, “is
widely prevalent but has remained largely invisible in the public F
domain”. The Statements of Objects and Reasons indicates that
while Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code created a penal
offence out of a woman’s subjection to cruelty by her husband or
relative, the civil law did not address its phenomenon in its
entirety. Hence, consistent with the provisions of Articles 14, 15
and 21 of the Constitution, Parliament enacted a legislation which G
would “provide for a remedy under the civil law which is intended
to protect the woman from being victims of domestic violence
and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the
society”. [Para 21][1084-C-E]
H
1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A 3.4 The object of the legislation of PWDV Act, 2005 is to
provide for and recognize the rights of women to secure housing
and to recognize the right of a woman to reside in a matrimonial
home or a shared household, whether or not she has any title or
right in the shared household. [Para 21][1085-B-C]
B 3.5 Allowing the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to have an
overriding force and effect in all situations, irrespective of
competing entitlements of a woman to a right in a shared
household within the meaning of the PWDV Act 2005, would defeat
the object and purpose which the Parliament sought to achieve
in enacting the latter legislation. The law protecting the interest
C of senior citizens is intended to ensure that they are not left
destitute, or at the mercy of their children or relatives. Equally,
the purpose of the PWDV Act 2005 cannot be ignored by a sleight
of statutory interpretation. Both sets of legislations have to be
harmoniously construed. Hence the right of a woman to secure a
D residence order in respect of a shared household cannot be
defeated by the simple expedient of securing an order of eviction
by adopting the summary procedure under the Senior Citizens
Act 2007. [Para 21][1085-G-H; 1086-A-B]
3.6 The Senior Citizens Act 2007 was promulgated with a
E view to provide a speedy and inexpensive remedy to senior
citizens. Accordingly, Tribunals were constituted under Section
7. These Tribunals have the power to conduct summary
procedures for inquiry, with all powers of the Civil Courts, under
Section 8. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts has been explicitly
barred under Section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007. However,
F the over-riding effect for remedies sought by the applicants under
the Senior Citizens Act 2007 under Section 3, cannot be
interpreted to preclude all other competing remedies and
protections that are sought to be conferred by the PWDV Act
2005. The PWDV Act 2005 is also in the nature of a special
G legislation, that is enacted with the purpose of correcting gender
discrimination that pans out in the form of social and economic
inequities in a largely patriarchal society. [Para 22][1086-B-D]
3.7 In deference to the dominant purpose of both the
legislations, it would be appropriate for a Tribunal under the
H
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1063
URBAN DISTRICT

Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to grant such remedies of maintenance, A
as envisaged under S.2(b) of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 that do
not result in obviating competing remedies under other special
statutes, such as the PWDV Act 2005. [Para 22][1086-E]
3.8 Section 26 of the PWDV Act empowers certain reliefs,
including relief for a residence order, to be obtained from any B
civil court in any legal proceedings. Therefore, in the event that
a composite dispute is alleged, such as in the present case where
the suit premises are a site of contestation between two groups
protected by the law, it would be appropriate for the Tribunal
constituted under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to appropriately
mould reliefs, after noticing the competing claims of the parties C
claiming under the PWDV Act 2005 and Senior Citizens Act 2007.
Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be deployed to
over-ride and nullify other protections in law, particularly that of
a woman’s right to a ‘shared household’ under Section 17 of the
PWDV Act 2005. In the event that the “aggrieved woman” D
obtains a relief from a Tribunal constituted under the Senior
Citizens Act 2007, she shall be duty-bound to inform the
Magistrate under the PWDV Act 2005, as per Sub-section (3) of
Section 26 of the PWDV Act 2005. This course of action would
ensure that the common intent of the Senior Citizens Act 2007
and the PWDV Act 2005- of ensuring speedy relief to its protected E
groups who are both vulnerable members of the society, is
effectively realized. Rights in law can translate to rights in life,
only if there is an equitable ease in obtaining their realization.
[Para 22][1086-E-F; 1087-A-C]
F
3.9 The fact that specific proceedings under the PWDV Act
2005 had not been instituted when the application under the
Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was filed, should not lead to a situation
where the enforcement of an order of eviction deprives her from
pursuing her claim of entitlement under the law. The inability of a
woman to access judicial remedies may, as this case exemplifies, G
be a consequence of destitution, ignorance or lack of resources.
Even otherwise, recourse to the summary procedure
contemplated by the Senior Citizen Act 2007 was not available
for the purpose of facilitating strategies that are designed to defeat
H
1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A the claim of the appellant in respect of a shared household. A
shared household would have to be interpreted to include the
residence where the appellant had been jointly residing with her
husband. Merely because the ownership of the property has been
subsequently transferred to her in-laws (Second and Third
Respondents) or that her estranged spouse (Fourth respondent)
B
is now residing separately, is no ground to deprive the appellant
of the protection that was envisaged under the PWDV Act 2005.
[Para 23][1087-G-H; 1088-A-C]

3.10 Therefore, the claim of the appellant that the premises
C constitute a shared household within the meaning of the PWDV
Act 2005 would have to be determined by the appropriate forum.
The claim cannot simply be obviated by evicting the appellant in
exercise of the summary powers entrusted by the Senior Citizens
Act 2007. The Second and Third Respondents are at liberty to
make a subsequent application under Section 10 of the Senior
D Citizens Act 2007 for alteration of the maintenance allowance,
before the appropriate forum. [Para 24][1088-C-E]

Case Law Reference

[2001] 1 SCR 932 relied on Para 20
E
[2008] 9 SCR 346 relied on Para 20

[2019] 10 SCR 381 relied on Para 20

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3822
F
of 2020.

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.09.2019 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Writ Appeal No. 2874 of 2019.

G Yatish Mohan, E. C. Vidya Sagar, Subhash Chandra Sagar, Rajesh
Mahale, Harisha S.R., Advs. for the appearing parties.

H
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1065
URBAN DISTRICT

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
Index
A Background
B Submissions B
C Legislative scheme: Senior Citizens Act 2007
D A woman’s right of residence: safeguard against domestic
violence
E Harmonising competing reliefs under the PWDV Act 2005 C
and Senior Citizens Act 2007
F Summation
A Background
1. The present dispute arises out of an application filed by the D
Second and Third respondents against the appellant, who is their daughter-
in-law. The Second and Third respondents are the parents of the Fourth
respondent, who is the estranged spouse of the appellant. The Second
and Third respondents filed an application under the provisions of the
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act 2007 1,
and inter alia, sought the appellant and her daughter’s eviction from a E
residential house in North Bengaluru2.
2. The Assistant Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioner in
appeal, allowed the application under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 and
directed the appellant to vacate the suit premises. Aggrieved by this
order, the appellant unsuccessfully pursued a writ proceeding under Article F
226 of the Constitution before a Single Judge, and in appeal before a
Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka. The Division Bench by
its judgment dated 17 September 2019 held that the suit premises belonged
to the mother-in-law (the Second respondent) of the appellant and the
remedy of the appellant for maintenance and shelter lies only against G
her estranged husband (the Fourth respondent). The Division Bench
upheld the Order of the Deputy Commissioner, and directed the appellant
to vacate the suit premises before 31 December 2019. Challenging the

1 “Senior Citizens Act 2007”
2 “suit premises” H
1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A jurisdiction of the authorities3 to decree her eviction under the Senior
Citizens Act 2007, the appellant has moved this Court under Article 136
of the Constitution.
3. The appellant and the Fourth respondent were married on 30
May 2002. Soon thereafter, a matrimonial dispute arose between the
B parties. The appellant alleges that she was harassed for dowry and even
compelled to institute a suit for partition against her father in 20034 which
she later withdrew, after her spouse allegedly deserted her to be in a
relationship with another woman. The subject matter of the controversy
is a residential house situated at Gangondonahalli, Dasanapura, Hobli,
Bengaluru North Taluk. The land was purchased by the Fourth respondent
C on 2 May 2002, a few months before the appellant married him. The
appellant alleges that her father had financed a portion of this purchase.
4. On 5 October 2006, the Fourth respondent sold the land to his
father - the Third respondent. The transaction of sale between the father
and the son was for the same consideration of Rs.1.19 lacs, as was paid
D by the Fourth respondent for the original purchase of the property in
2002. By then, the appellant and the Fourth respondent had a daughter.
In 2009, the Fourth respondent instituted a petition for divorce 5 under
Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of Hindu Marriage Act 1955 before the Senior
Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nelamangala6. The Third
respondent, following the purchase of the property and after constructing
E
a house, gifted it to his spouse - the Second respondent, on 19 July 2010.
Soon thereafter, on 17 August 2010, the Second respondent instituted a
suit against the appellant7 before the JMFC, Nelamangala seeking a
permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with the
possession of the suit property. The suit is pending. On 5 December
F 2013, the petition for divorce was allowed by the Trial Judge and the
marriage between the appellant and the Fourth respondent was dissolved.
On 19 March 2014, the appellant instituted a proceeding 8 for
maintenance. She also filed an appeal before the High Court of
Karnataka9 against the dissolution of her marriage by the Trial Judge.
The proceedings for divorce and maintenance are also pending.
G
3 The Assistant Commissioner, Bengaluru North Sub-Division at Bengaluru and the
Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru District
4 OS 211 of 2003

5 MC 22 of 2009

6 “Trial Judge”

7 OS 312 of 2010
H 8 Criminal Miscellaneous 114 of 2014 before the Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.), JMFC Nelamangala

9 MFA 3968 of 2014
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1067
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

5. In 2015, the Third and Fourth respondents invoked the provisions A
of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 by instituting an application before the
Assistant Commissioner, Bengaluru North Sub Division. Their son (the
Fourth respondent) and the appellant were impleaded as respondents to
the petition10. The reliefs sought were:
(i) Eviction of the appellant from the suit premises where she B
was residing;
(ii) A direction to the Fourth respondent to pay an amount of
Rs.15,000 to the parents by way of monthly maintenance;
and
(iii) A direction to the appellant and fourth respondent to pay an C
amount quantified at Rs. 25,000 towards legal expenses.
The appellant filed an objection to the petition filed under the Senior
Citizens Act 2007, alleging it to be a malicious proceeding that was
instituted with the sole intent to evict her from the suit premises. The
appellant also claimed that the proceedings were collusive in nature and D
an attempt by the Second and Third respondents and her estranged spouse
(the Fourth respondent) to evict her from her matrimonial home. The
appellant specifically raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the
authorities to entertain the proceedings seeking her eviction from the
premises. She submitted that while the Senior Citizens Act 2007 provides E
for the maintenance of a senior citizen or a parent, there is no provision
envisaging an order of eviction, and that the authorities had no jurisdiction
to direct her removal from the premises.
6. The Assistant Commissioner by an Order dated 25 June 2015,
held that the residential house was the self-acquired property of the F
Third respondent which he subsequently gifted to the Second Respondent.
The appellant was residing in the property, but was held to have no right
or authority. The appellant’s plea for maintenance could (in the view of
the Assistant Commissioner) only be raised against the Fourth respondent.
Therefore, the Assistant Commissioner allowed the petition by directing
(i) the Fourth respondent to pay a monthly maintenance of Rs.10,000 to G
his parents; and (ii) the appellant to vacate the premises.
7. The appeal filed by the appellant under Section 28 of the Hindu
Marriage Act 1955 against the decree for dissolution of marriage, was
10 Petition 31 of 2015 H
1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A allowed by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court on 14 January
2016. The High Court set aside the order of the Trial Court and remanded
the proceedings to the jurisdictional Family Court, for passing fresh orders
after hearing the parties. During the pendency of the appeal, the Fourth
respondent entered into a marriage with another woman. On remand,
the proceedings for divorce and the application for maintenance are
B
pending disposal.
8. On 29 February 2016, the Deputy Commissioner, acting as the
appellate authority under the Senior Citizens Act 2007, dismissed the
appeal filed by the appellant as well as a companion appeal by the Fourth
respondent against the order of the Assistant Commissioner. The order
C requiring the appellant to vacate the suit premises was thereby confirmed.
The appellant challenged the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner
in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Single Judge
of the Karnataka High Court, by a judgement dated 18 June 2019, held
that the suit premises have been transferred by the Third respondent to
D his wife - the Second respondent - by a registered gift deed dated 19
July 2010. The Single Judge noted the contention of the Second and
Third respondents that following a matrimonial dispute, their son (the
Fourth respondent) had left the house after which the appellant had
ousted them on 12 August 2010 and they are currently living in their
“native place”. In light of the fact that the marriage between the appellant
E and Fourth respondent had been dissolved by the Trial Judge, the Single
Judge held that the appellant had no right over the suit premises and her
claim for maintenance could only by asserted against the Fourth
respondent. Though, the appellant has specifically questioned the
jurisdiction of the authorities under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to order
F her eviction, the Single Judge did not address the submission.
Aggrieved by the order of the Single Judge, the appellant
challenged the order in a writ appeal. Once again, it was urged in the
course of the hearing that the proceedings which were instituted under
the Senior Citizens Act 2007 were only a device to oust the appellant
G and that the authorities had no jurisdiction to direct her eviction. The
Division Bench reiterated the views of the Single Judge, and held that
the appellant had no cause of action against the Second and Third
respondents who owned the suit premises. It held that the appellant’s
claim for maintenance and shelter would lie only against the Fourth
respondent. In dealing with the preliminary objection as regards the
H
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1069
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner to direct eviction, the Division A
Bench merely observed that it was not in agreement with the submission
that “the Assistant Commissioner was powerless to pass an order
directing dispossession of the appellant”.
B Submissions
9. The appellant, aggrieved by the judgement of the Division Bench B
of the High Court, has preferred the present special leave petition.
Mr Yatish Mohan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
submitted that:
(i) The appellant is residing in her matrimonial home as the
lawfully wedded spouse of the Fourth respondent and she C
cannot be evicted from her shared household, in view of
the protection offered by Section 17 of the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act 200511;
(ii) The proceeding under Sections 3 and 4 of the Senior Citizens
Act 2007 was filed by her mother-in-law and father-in-law D
in connivance with her estranged spouse to deprive her of
her matrimonial home;
(iii) The finding of the Division Bench on the appellant’s current
residential status was based on a fraudulent set up. The
alleged postal cover was dispatched on 21 June 2018, during E
the pendency of the proceedings before the Single Judge,
and merely indicated a postal endorsement (“no such
person”) as it arrived when nobody was present at home to
receive it;
(iv) The decree for the dissolution of marriage which was passed F
against the appellant by the Trial Judge on 5 December
2013 has been set aside by the High Court on 14 January
2016 and the proceedings have been remanded back to the
jurisdictional Family Court for a disposal afresh. Hence, as
of date, the appellant continues to be in a lawful relationship
G
of marriage with the Fourth respondent and she has no other
place to live except the suit premises, with her minor
daughter;

11 “PWDV Act 2005” H
1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A (v) The provisions of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 have been
manipulated to defeat the rights of the appellant. The manner
in which the premises were transferred by the spouse of
the appellant to his father and the gift deed thereafter to
mother-in-law of the appellant are indicative of an attempt
to misuse the provisions of the Act, to defeat the claims of
B
the appellant; and
(vi) In asserting her right under Section 17 of the PWDV Act
2005, the appellant relies on the decision of this Court in
Satish Chander Ahuja vs Sneha Ahuja12.In sum and
substance, it has been urged that the authorities constituted
C under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 had no jurisdiction to
order the eviction of the appellant. Moreover, the
proceedings have been utilised to secure the eviction of the
appellant so as to deny her claim of a right to reside in the
shared household under the PWDV Act 2005.
D 10. On the other hand, while seeking to rebut the submissions of
the appellant, Mr Rajesh Mahale, learned Counsel appearing on behalf
of the Second and Third respondents submits that:
(i) Both the Second respondent (who is 72 years old) and the
Third respondent (who is 82 years old) are senior citizens;
E
(ii) The suit premises was constructed by the Third respondent-
the father-in-law of the appellant, on a plot of land
admeasuring 1200 square feet situated in Gangondanahalli,
Bengaluru North Taluk. This was subsequently gifted to
the Second respondent, the mother-in-law of the appellant;
F
(iii) The appellant has been concurrently found to have ousted
the Second and Third respondents from the property
belonging to them and to have illegally entered into
possession; and
(iv) The Second and Third respondents filed an application under
G
the Senior Citizens Act 2007 before the Assistant
Commissioner for evicting the appellant and for the
restoration of their possession, which has been allowed by
the authorities and the High Court concurrently.

H 12 Civil Appeal No. 2483 of 2020, decided on 15 October 2020
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1071
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

11. Dealing with the issue of jurisdiction, Mr Mahale submitted A
that
(i) The Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act 2007
has the jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders for protecting
the life and property of parents and senior citizens, including
orders of eviction; B
(ii) The intent and object of the Act is to provide for an
inexpensive and speedy relief to parents and senior citizens;
(iii) While Chapter II entitles parents and senior citizens to apply
for orders to provide monetary relief for sustenance and
maintenance, Chapter V contains provisions for protecting C
the life and property of parents and senior citizens;
(iv) The Tribunal constituted under the Act has been entrusted
to issue orders after a summary enquiry, for effective
maintenance of parents and senior citizens including relief
against neglect, harassment and protection of the property D
of senior citizens;
(v) Section 23 confers two separate and distinct rights:
(a) Section 23(1) empowers the Tribunal to declare a
transfer of property by a senior citizen void, where
E
the transfer was conditioned upon providing basic
amenities and physical needs to a senior citizen, where
the transferee fails to provide them;
(b) Section 23(2) recognises a pre-existing right of a
senior citizen to receive maintenance out of an estate
F
and secures the right of making it enforceable against
a transferee who had notice of the right;
(vi) The expression “maintenance” in Section 2(b) includes
provision for residence and a right to reside can be enforced
by a senior citizen, if the property is transferred without
making a suitable provision for maintenance; and G

(vii) Though the Senior Citizens Act 2007 does not contain an
express provision enabling the Tribunal to pass eviction
orders, the power has to be read within its jurisdiction by
necessary implication. Such an interpretation, it has been
H
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A urged, would be purposive, in order to effectuate the
provisions of the Act. The contrary view would cause
hardship to senior citizens who would be powerless, despite
being forcibly dispossessed of their means of sustenance.
Parliament has empowered the State governments to
authorise local authorities to take remedial measures for
B
protecting the life and property of senior citizens and it would
be incorrect to limit the relief that can be granted by a
Tribunal only to monetary relief. Relegating a senior citizen
to a civil court for the recovery of their property would
result in defeating the provisions of the Act. Hence, it has
C been urged that such an interpretation should not be adopted.
C Legislative scheme: Senior Citizens Act 2007
12. The rival submissions will now be analysed.
13. Our analysis of the rival submissions must begin with explaining
D and interpreting the salient feature of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 which
have a bearing on the present controversy. ‘Maintenance’ is defined in
an inclusive manner to incorporate, among other things, provisions for
food, clothing, residence, medical assistance and treatment13. In defining
the expression ‘property’, the legislation uses broad terminology
encompassing “property of any kind” and to include “rights or interests
E in such property”14. Overriding effect is given to the provisions of the
enactment by Section 315. Besides the definitions which are comprised
in Chapter I, Chapter II is titled “Maintenance of Parents and Senior
Citizens” while Chapter V is titled “Protection of Life and Property of
Senior Citizen”. The Statement of Objects and Reasons indicates the
F rationale for the enactment of the law:
“Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid stress on
providing care for the elderly. However, due to withering of the
joint family system, a large number of elderly are not being looked
after by their family. Consequently, many older persons, particularly
G 13 2(b) “maintenance” includes provisions for food, clothing, residence and medical
attendance and treatment
14 2(f) “property” means property of any kind, whether movable or immovable, ancestral

or self acquired, tangible or intangible and includes rights or interests in such property;
15 3. Act to have overriding effect.—The provisions of this Act shall have effect

notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other
than this Act, or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than
H this Act.
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1073
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

widowed women are now forced to spend their twilight years all A
alone and are exposed to emotional neglect and to lack of physical
and financial support. This clearly reveals that ageing has become
a major social challenge and there is a need to give more attention
to the care and protection for the older persons. Though the parents
can claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
B
1973, the procedure is both time - consuming as well as expensive.
Hence, there is a need to have simple, inexpensive and speedy
provisions to claim maintenance for parents.”
Briefly reviewed, Section 4 recognises an entitlement of
maintenance to inhere in parents and senior citizens. Section 5 lays down
the procedure by which an application for maintenance can be made. C
Section 6 elucidates provisions governing jurisdiction and procedure.
Section 7 contains stipulations for the constitution of a Maintenance
Tribunal. Section 8 envisages a summary procedure for making an inquiry.
Section 11 provides for the enforcement of an order of maintenance.
14. A senior citizen, including a parent, who is unable to maintain D
themselves from their own earning or out of property owned by them, is
entitled to make an application under Section 4(i). A parent or grand-
parent may make an application against one or more of their children. A
childless senior citizen can make an application against a relative specified
in Section 2(g). Section 4 recognises a corresponding obligation on the E
part of the children or relative to maintain a senior citizen, extending to
such needs as would enable them to lead a normal life. In the case of a
relative, the obligation is if they are in possession of the property of the
senior citizen or would inherit property from them. Hence, in the case of
the children of a senior citizen, the obligation to maintain a parent is not
conditional on being in possession of property of the senior citizen or F
upon a right of future inheritance16.
16
4. Maintenance of parents and senior citizens.—(1) A senior citizen including parent
who is unable to maintain himself from his own earning or out of the property owned
by him, shall be entitled to make an application under section 5 in case of—
(i) parent or grand-parent, against one or more of his children not being a minor;
G
(ii) a childless senior citizen, against such of his relative referred to in clause (g) of
section 2.
(2) The obligation of the children or relative, as the case may be, to maintain a senior
citizen extends to the needs of such citizen so that senior citizen may lead a normal life.
(3) The obligation of the children to maintain his or her parent extends to the needs of
such parent either father or mother or both, as the case may be, so that such parent may
lead a normal life. H
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A 15. The procedure to be followed by a Maintenance Tribunal
(constituted under Section 7) is of a summary nature as provided in
Section 8(1) and with all the powers of a Civil Court, as provided in
Section 8(2)17. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 9, where a senior citizen
is not able to maintain himself or herself and the children or relatives, as
the case may be, neglect or refuse to maintain them, the Tribunal is
B
empowered to order them to make a monthly allowance at such monthly
rate for the maintenance of the senior citizen, as the Tribunal may deem
fit18. The amount of the monthly allowance can be altered inter alia
upon a change in circumstances, under Section 1019
16. Of particular relevance to the facts of the case at hand is
C Chapter V, which enacts provisions for protecting the life and property
of a senior citizen. Section 23 proceeds in the following terms:

(4) Any person being a relative of a senior citizen and having sufficient means shall
maintain such senior citizen provided he is in possession of the property of such
citizen or he would inherit the property of such senior citizen:
D
Provided that where more than one relatives are entitled to inherit the property of a
senior citizen, the maintenance shall be payable by such relative in the proportion in
which they would inherit his property.
17 8. Summary procedure in case of inquiry.—

(1)In holding any inquiry under section 5, the Tribunal may, subject to any rules that
may be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf, follow such summary
E procedure as it deems fit.
(2) The Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking
evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the
discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes
as may be prescribed; and the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the
purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(2 of 1974
18 9. Order for maintenance.—
F
(1) If children or relatives, as the case may be, neglect or refuse to maintain a senior
citizen being unable to maintain himself, the Tribunal may, on being satisfied of such
neglect or refusal, order such children or relatives to make a monthly allowance at such
monthly rate for the maintenance of such senior citizen, as the Tribunal may deem fit
and to pay the same to such senior citizen as the Tribunal may, from time to time,
direct.
19
G 10. Alteration in allowance.—
(1) On proof of misrepresentation or mistake of fact or a change in the circumstances of
any person, receiving a monthly allowance under section 9, for the maintenance ordered
under that section to pay a monthly allowance for the maintenance, the Tribunal may
make such alteration, as it thinks fit, in the allowance for the maintenance. (2) Where it
appears to the Tribunal that, in consequence of any decision of a competent Civil
Court, any order made under section 9 should be cancelled or varied, it shall cancel the
order or, as the case may be, vary the same accordingly
H
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1075
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“23. Transfer of property to be void in certain circumstances.— A
(1) Where any senior citizen who, after the commencement of
this Act, has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property,
subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic
amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such
transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical
B
needs, the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been
made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at
the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal.
(2) Where any senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance
out of an estate and such estate or part thereof is transferred, the
right to receive maintenance may be enforced against the C
transferee if the transferee has notice of the right, or if the transfer
is gratuitous; but not against the transferee for consideration and
without notice of right.
(3) If, any senior citizen is incapable of enforcing the rights under
sub-sections (1) and (2), action may be taken on his behalf by any D
of the organisation referred to in Explanation to sub-section (1) of
section 5.”
Sub-section (1) of Section 23 covers a situation where property
has been transferred after the enactment of the legislation by a senior
citizen (by gift or otherwise) subject to the condition that the transferee E
must provide the basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor. In
other words, Sub-section (1) deals with a situation where the transfer of
the property is accompanied by a specific condition to provide for the
maintenance and needs of a senior citizen. In such an event, if the
transferee fails to provide the maintenance and physical needs, the F
transfer of the property is deemed to have been vitiated by fraud, coercion
or under undue influence. Sub-section 1, in other words, creates a deeming
fiction of the law where the transfer of the property is subject to a
condition and the condition of providing for maintenance and the basic
needs of a senior citizen is not fulfilled by the person upon whom the
obligation is imposed. Then, at the option of the transferor, the transfer G
can be declared as void by the Tribunal. On the other hand, Sub-section
(2) of Section 23 envisages a situation where a senior citizen has a right
to receive maintenance out of an estate. Where such a right exists, the
right of maintenance can be enforced where the estate or a portion of it,
is transferred against a transferor who has notice of the right; or if the H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A transfer is gratuitous. The right however cannot be enforced against a
transferee for consideration and without notice of the right. Now, Sub-
section (1) of Section 23 envisages a situation where the transfer of
property is by the senior citizen. This is evident from the language of
sub-Section (1) namely “where any senior citizen who, after the
commencement of this Act, has transferred by way of gift or otherwise,
B
his property…”. On the other hand, sub-Section (2) of Section 23 does
not confine itself to a transfer by a senior citizen, unlike sub-Section (1).
Sub-Section (2) uses the expression “such estate or part thereof is
transferred”. Where a senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance
out of the estate and any part of it is transferred, sub-section 2 permits
C the enforcement of the right to receive maintenance out of the estate
against a transferee with notice or against a gratuitous transferee. Sub-
Section (2), in other words, may cover a situation where the transfer of
the estate (in which a senior citizen has a right to maintenance) is by a
third party, in which event, the provision provides the right to enforce the
claim of maintenance against such transferee (other than those transferees
D
for consideration or without notice of the pre-existing right). Arguably,
the language of sub-section (2) is broad enough to also cover a situation
where the transfer is by the senior citizen, in which event the transferee
with notice of the right; or a gratuitous transferee, can be made subject
to the enforcement of the right against the transferred estate. Another
E distinction between sub-Section (1) and sub-Section (2) of Section 23
must also be noticed. Under sub-Section (1), where a transfer has been
made by a senior citizen subject to the condition that the transferee will
provided for basic amenities or physical needs of the transferor and if
there is a failure of the transferee to fulfil the condition, two consequences
follow: (i) the transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made
F
by fraud or coercion or under undue influence; and (ii) the transfer shall,
at the option of the transferor, be declared to be void by the Tribunal.
The deeming consequence which is provided for in sub-Section (1) is
not incorporated in sub-Section (2). Sub-Section (2), in contradistinction,
stipulates that the right to receive maintenance can be enforced against
G a gratuitous transferee or a transferee with notice of the pre-existing
right of a citizen to receive maintenance out of an estate notwithstanding
who is the transferee of the estate. In keeping with the salutary public
purpose underlying the enactment of the legislation, the expression
‘transfer’ would include not only the absolute transfer of property but
also transfer of a right or interest in the property. This would also be in
H
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1077
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

consonance with the provisions of Section 2(f) which defines the A
expression property to include “rights or interests in such property”. The
expression ‘transfer’ not having been defined specifically by the
legislation, it must receive an interpretation which would advance the
beneficent object and purpose of its provisions. Sub-section (2) of section
23 speaks of the enforcement of the “right to receive maintenance”
B
which is more comprehensive in its nature, than merely enforcing an
order for maintenance passed under Section 9 of the Act.
17. The substance of sub-Section (2) of section 23, as submitted
by the Second and Third respondents, is that the Tribunal had the
jurisdiction to pass an order directing the eviction of the appellant who is
their daughter-in-law. According to the submission, the power to order C
eviction is implicit in the provision guaranteeing a ‘right to receive
maintenance out of an estate’ and the enforcement of that right. In
supporting the submission, they have referred to the view which has
been taken by several High Courts, indicating that the Tribunal may
order the eviction of a child or a relative from the property of a senior D
citizen, where there has been a breach of the obligation to maintain the
senior citizen. The Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 may
have the authority to order an eviction, if it is necessary and expedient to
ensure the maintenance and protection of the senior citizen or parent.
Eviction, in other words would be an incident of the enforcement of the
right to maintenance and protection. However, this remedy can be granted E
only after adverting to the competing claims in the dispute. It is necessary
to recapitulate that the situation in the present case is that the eviction
was sought of the daughter-in-law, i.e. the appellant. The land, where
the house has been constructed, was originally purchased by the son of
the applicants who are seeking eviction of their daughter-in-law. The F
son had purchased the property a few months before his marriage to the
appellant. He had subsequently transferred the property by a registered
sale deed to his father and the fact that it was for the same consideration
after the lapse of several years is of significance. The father, in turn,
executed a gift deed in favor of his spouse. The appellant has asserted
that she had been living in the house, as her matrimonial residence, until G
the application was filed. Her spouse has (according to her) deserted
her and their minor daughter and left them in the lurch. The electricity
to the premises was disconnected for non-payment of dues. Their
daughter has sought admission to an engineering degree course however
her father- Fourth respondent has not provided any financial support. H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A The transfers which took place cannot be viewed in isolation from the
context of the on-going matrimonial dispute which has taken place. The
issue is whether the appellant as the daughter-in-law and the minor
daughter could have been ousted in the above manner.
D A woman’s right of residence: safeguard against domestic
B violence
18. In arriving at a decision of this issue it becomes necessary to
elucidate the right, which is asserted by the appellant. The appellant has
submitted that the premises constitute a “shared household” within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of the PWDV Act 2005. Section 2(s) defines
C the expression “shared household” in the following terms:
“(s) “shared household “means a household where the person
aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship
either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a
household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the
D aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by
either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or
the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest
or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the
joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of
whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right,
E title or interest in the shared household;”
(emphasis supplied)
Section 1920 contemplates the passing of a residence order by the
Magistrate on an application under sub-Section (1) of Section 12 of the
F 20 19. Residence orders-
1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate
may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order -
(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the
possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the
respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household; (b) directing the
respondent to remove himself from the shared household; (c) restraining the respondent
G or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the
aggrieved person resides; (d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off
the shared household or encumbering the same; (e) restraining the respondent from
renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate;
or (f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the
aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same,
if the circumstances so require: Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed
H against any person who is a woman.
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1079
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

PWDV Act 2005. The essence of the submission of the appellant is that A
the order of eviction which has been made in the exercise of the summary
powers entrusted by the Senior Citizens Act 2007 would completely
displace the appellant from seeking recourse to her remedies under
Section 12(1) read with Section 19 of the PWDV Act 2005 in respect of
the premises, which she claims to be her shared household. The definition
B
of the expression “shared household” in Section 2(s) uses the familiar
legislative formula of a “means and includes” definition. Where the
definition of an expression in an enactment adopts a ‘means and includes’
stipulation, it is intended to be exhaustive. The ‘means’ part of the
definition indicates what would normally fall within the ambit of the
expression, while the ‘includes’ element gives it an extended meaning. C
Together they indicate that the legislature has provided for an exhaustive
enumeration of what falls within the ambit of the definition. Justice G P
Singh in his seminal treatise on the Principles of Statutory Interpretation21
observes:
“The Legislature has the power to define a word even artificially. D
So the definition of a word in the definitions section may either be
restrictive of its ordinary meaning or it may be extensive of the
same. When a word is defined to ‘mean’ such and such, the
definition is prima facie restrictive and exhaustive.”
On the other hand, “includes” is titled so as to comprehend an E
extensive meaning:
“Whereas, where the word defined is declared to ‘include’ such
and such, the definition is prime facie extensive. When by an
amending Act, the word ‘includes’ was substituted for the word
‘means’ in a definitions section, it was held that the intention was F
to make it more extensive…..”
The use of the expression ‘means’ is intended to make it exhaustive.
On the other hand, the use of the expression ‘includes’ is intended to
make it more extensive. The legislature by using an expression ‘includes’
evinces, notwithstanding the meaning of the phrase, an intention: G
“to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the
body of the statute”.

21 Lexis Nexis, 14th Ed. Page 197-199 H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A “Includes” is utilized so as to comprehend:
“not only such things as they signify according to their nature and
import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares
that they shall include”
However, when a statutory definition incorporates the ‘means
B and includes’ approach, the intent is to make the definition exhaustive.
“Further, a definition may be in the form of ‘means and includes’,
where again the definition is exhaustive.”
[See in this context the decisions in Jagir Singh vs State of Bihar;
C AIR 1976 SC 997, pp. 999, 1001 :1976 SCC (Tax) 204 : (1976) 2
SCC 942; Kasilingam vs P.S.G. College of Technology, supra,
Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. vs Coop. Bank Employees
Union, (2007) 4 SCC 685 (para 23) : (2007) 4 JT 573 : (2007) 2
LLJ 825 : AIR 2007 SC 2320; Paul Enterprise vs Rajib Chatterjee
and Company, (2009) 3 SCC 709 para 28 : (2009) 1 JT 632]”
D
19. The definition of ‘shared household’ in Section 2(s) of the
PWDV Act 2005 is exhaustive. This has also recently been held to be
so, by a judgment of a three judge bench of this Court, delivered by
Justice Ashok Bhushan, in Satish Chandra Ahuja vs Sneha Ahuja22
[Satish Chandra].
E
The definition of the expression ‘shared household’ in Section
2(s) of the PWDV Act of 2005 is in two parts: in the means part of the
definition the expression ‘shared household’ means
(i) A household where the person aggrieved lives in a domestic
relationship either singly or along with the respondent or;
F
(ii) At any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly
or along with the respondent.
This is followed by an inclusive element, so as to cover such a
household (i) whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved
G person and the respondent or (ii) owned or tenanted by either of them in
respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both
jointly or singly have any right, title or equity. This has also been given an
inclusive or extended meaning, which extends to a household which may
belong to the joint family of which a respondent is a member, irrespective

H 22 Civil Appeal No. 2483 of 2020, decided on 15 October 2020
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1081
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person have any right, title A
or interest in the shared household. The last part of the inclusive definition
is intended to extend the meaning of a shared household to a situation
where the household in fact belongs to a joint family, of which the
respondent is a member. The legislature has made it clear that though
neither the respondent, nor the aggrieved person in such case may have
B
a right, title or interest in the shared household it would irrespective fall
within the ambit of the definition.
The meaning which has been attributed above to the plain language
of the definition is in consonance with the judgment of the three judge
Bench in Satish Chandra where it has been explained as follows:
C
“55…the definition can be divided in two parts, first, which follows
the word “means” and second which follows the word “includes”.
The second part which follows “includes” can be further sub-
divided in two parts. The first part reads “shared household means
a household where the person aggrieved has lived or at any stage
has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the D
respondent”. Thus, first condition to be fulfilled for a shared
household is that person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived
in a domestic relationship. The second part subdivided in two parts
is- (a) includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either
jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent and owned or E
tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved
person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right,
title, interest or equity and (b)includes such a household which
may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member,
irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person
has any right, title or interest in the shared household. In the above F
definition, two expressions, namely, “aggrieved person” and
“respondent” have occurred. From the above definition, following
is clear:- (i) it is not requirement of law that aggrieved person
may either own the premises jointly or singly or by tenanting it
jointly or singly; (ii) the household may belong to a joint family of G
which the respondent is a member irrespective of whether the
respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest
in the shared household; and (iii) the shared household may either
be owned or tenanted by the respondent singly or jointly.”

H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A After noticing the ambit of the definition of ‘shared household’
and the object and purpose of the PWDV Act of 2005, Justice Ashok
Bhushan noted:
“Section 2(s) read with Sections 17 and 19 of Act, 2005 grants an
entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence under
B the shared household irrespective of her having any legal interest
in the same or not.”
The expression ‘respondent’ has been defined in section 2 (q) of
the PWDV Act of 2005 in the following terms:
“(q) “respondent” means any adult male person who is, or has
C been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and
against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under
this Act:”
Noticing the above definition and the provisions of section 2(s),
the Court in Satish Chandra held:
D “64…The definition of shared household as noticed in Section
2(s) does not indicate that a shared household shall be one which
belongs to or taken on rent by the husband. We have noticed the
definition of “respondent” under the Act. The respondent in a
proceeding under Domestic Violence Act can be any relative of
E the husband. In [the] event, the shared household belongs to any
relative of the husband with whom in a domestic relationship the
woman has lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are
satisfied and the said house will become a shared household.”
The Bench concluded that:
F “84…The definition of shared household given in Section 2(s)
cannot be read to mean that shared household can only be that
household which is household of the joint family of which husband
is a member or in which husband of the aggrieved person has a
share.”

G E Harmonising competing reliefs under the PWDV Act
2005 and Senior Citizens Act 2007
20. Section 36 23 of the PWDV Act 2005 stipulates that the
provisions of the Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the
2336-Act not in derogation of any other law- The provisions of this Act shall be in
H addition to, and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law, for the time being
in force.
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1083
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

provisions of any other law for the time being in force. This is intended A
to ensure that the remedies provided under the enactment are in addition
to other remedies and do not displace them. The Maintenance and
Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act 2007 is undoubtedly a later
Act and as we have noticed earlier, Section 3 stipulates that its provisions
will have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any
B
other enactment. However, the provisions of Section 3 of the Senior
Citizens Act 2007 giving it overriding force and effect, would not by
themselves be conclusive of an intent to deprive a woman who claims a
right in a shared household, as under the PWDV Act 2005. Principles of
statutory interpretation dictate that in the event of two special acts
containing non obstante clauses, the later law shall typically prevail.24 C
In the present case, as we have seen, the Senior Citizen’s Act 2007
contains a non obstante clause. However, in the event of a conflict
between special acts, the dominant purpose of both statutes would have
to be analyzed to ascertain which one should prevail over the other. The
primary effort of the interpreter must be to harmonize, not excise. A
D
two-judge bench of this Court, in the case of Bank of India v. Ketan
Parekh25, in examining a similar factual scenario, observed that:
“28. In the present case, both the two Acts i.e. the Act of 1992
and the Act of 1993 start with the non obstante clause. Section 34
of the Act of 1993 starts with non obstante clause, likewise Section
9-A (sic 13) of the Act of 1992. But incidentally, in this case Section E
9-A came subsequently i.e. it came on 25-1-1994. Therefore, it is
a subsequent legislation which will have the overriding effect over
the Act of 1993. But cases might arise where both the enactments
have the non obstante clause then in that case, the proper
perspective would be that one has to see the subject and the F
dominant purpose for which the special enactment was made and
in case the dominant purpose is covered by that contingencies,
then notwithstanding that the Act might have come at a later point
of time still the intention can be ascertained by looking to the
objects and reasons. However, so far as the present case is
concerned, it is more than clear that Section 9-A of the Act of G
1992 was amended on 25-1-1994 whereas the Act of 1993 came
in 1993. Therefore, the Act of 1992 as amended to include Section

24 Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd, (2001) 3 SCC 71
25 (2008) 8 SCC 148 H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A 9-A in 1994 being subsequent legislation will prevail and not the
provisions of the Act of 1993.”
(emphasis supplied)
This principle of statutory interpretation was also affirmed by a
three-judge bench of this Court in Pioneer Urban Land and
B Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India.26 In the present case, Section
36 of the PWDV Act 2005, albeit not in the nature of a non-obstante
clause, has to be construed harmoniously with the non obstante clause
in Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 that operates in a separate
field.
C 21. In this case, both pieces of legislation are intended to deal
with salutary aspects of public welfare and interest. The PWDV Act
2005 was intended to deal with the problems of domestic violence which,
as the Statements of Objects and Reasons sets out, “is widely prevalent
but has remained largely invisible in the public domain”. The Statements
D of Objects and Reasons indicates that while Section 498A of the Indian
Penal Code created a penal offence out of a woman’s subjection to
cruelty by her husband or relative, the civil law did not address its
phenomenon in its entirety. Hence, consistent with the provisions of
Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution, Parliament enacted a legislation
which would “provide for a remedy under the civil law which is intended
E to protect the woman from being victims of domestic violence and to
prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society”. The ambit
of the Bill has been explained thus:
“4. The Bill, inter alia, seeks to provide for the following:-

F (i) It covers those women who are or have been in a relationship
with the abuser where both parties have lived together in a shared
household and are related by consanguinity, marriage or through
a relationship in the nature of marriage or adoption. In addition,
relationships with family members living together as a joint family
are also included. Even those women who are sisters, widows,
G mothers, single women, or living with the abuser are entitled to
legal protection under the proposed legislation. However, whereas
the Bill enables the wife or the female living in a relationship in
the nature of marriage to file a complaint under the proposed
enactment against any relative of the husband or the male partner,
H
26 (2019) 8 SCC 416
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1085
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

it does not enable any female relative of the husband or the male A
partner to file a complaint against the wife or the female partner.
(ii) It defines the expression “domestic violence” to include actual
abuse or threat or abuse that is physical, sexual, verbal, emotional
or economic. Harassment by way of unlawful dowry demands to
the woman or her relatives would also be covered under this B
definition.
(iii) It provides for the rights of women to secure housing. It also
provides for the right of a woman to reside in her matrimonial
home or shared household, whether or not she has any title or
rights in such home or household. This right is secured by a C
residence order, which is passed by the Magistrate.
(iv) It empowers the Magistrate to pass protection orders in favour
of the aggrieved person to prevent the respondent from aiding or
committing an act of domestic violence or any other specified act,
entering a workplace or any other place frequented by the D
aggrieved person, attempting to communicate with her, isolating
any assets used by both the parties and causing violence to the
aggrieved person, her relatives or others who provide her
assistance from the domestic violence.
(v) It provides for appointment of Protection Officers and E
registration of non-governmental organisations as service
providers for providing assistance to the aggrieved person with
respect to her medical examination, obtaining legal aid, safe shelter,
etc.”
The above extract indicates that a significant object of the F
legislation is to provide for and recognize the rights of women to secure
housing and to recognize the right of a woman to reside in a matrimonial
home or a shared household, whether or not she has any title or right in
the shared household. Allowing the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to have an
overriding force and effect in all situations, irrespective of competing
entitlements of a woman to a right in a shared household within the G
meaning of the PWDV Act 2005, would defeat the object and purpose
which the Parliament sought to achieve in enacting the latter legislation.
The law protecting the interest of senior citizens is intended to ensure
that they are not left destitute, or at the mercy of their children or relatives.
Equally, the purpose of the PWDV Act 2005 cannot be ignored by a
H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A sleight of statutory interpretation. Both sets of legislations have to be
harmoniously construed. Hence the right of a woman to secure a
residence order in respect of a shared household cannot be defeated by
the simple expedient of securing an order of eviction by adopting the
summary procedure under the Senior Citizens Act 2007.
B 22. This Court is cognizant that the Senior Citizens Act 2007 was
promulgated with a view to provide a speedy and inexpensive remedy to
senior citizens. Accordingly, Tribunals were constituted under Section 7.
These Tribunals have the power to conduct summary procedures for
inquiry, with all powers of the Civil Courts, under Section 8. The
jurisdiction of the Civil Courts has been explicitly barred under Section
C 27 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007. However, the over-riding effect for
remedies sought by the applicants under the Senior Citizens Act 2007
under Section 3, cannot be interpreted to preclude all other competing
remedies and protections that are sought to be conferred by the PWDV
Act 2005. The PWDV Act 2005 is also in the nature of a special
D legislation, that is enacted with the purpose of correcting gender
discrimination that pans out in the form of social and economic inequities
in a largely patriarchal society. In deference to the dominant purpose of
both the legislations, it would be appropriate for a Tribunal under the
Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to grant such remedies of maintenance, as
envisaged under S.2(b) of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 that do not result
E in obviating competing remedies under other special statutes, such as
the PWDV Act 2005. Section 2627 of the PWDV Act empowers certain
reliefs, including relief for a residence order, to be obtained from any
civil court in any legal proceedings. Therefore, in the event that a
composite dispute is alleged, such as in the present case where the suit
F premises are a site of contestation between two groups protected by the
law, it would be appropriate for the Tribunal constituted under the Senior
Citizens Act 2007 to appropriately mould reliefs, after noticing the
2726. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.—(1) Any relief available under sections
18, 19,20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court,
family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent
G
whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act.
(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along
with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding
before a civil or criminal court.
(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings
other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of
H the grant of such relief.
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1087
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

competing claims of the parties claiming under the PWDV Act 2005 A
and Senior Citizens Act 2007. Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007
cannot be deployed to over-ride and nullify other protections in law,
particularly that of a woman’s right to a ‘shared household’ under Section
17 of the PWDV Act 2005. In the event that the “aggrieved woman”
obtains a relief from a Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act
B
2007, she shall duty-bound to inform the Magistrate under the PWDV
Act 2005, as per Sub-section (3) of Section 26 of the PWDV Act 2005.
This course of action would ensure that the common intent of the Senior
Citizens Act 2007 and the PWDV Act 2005- of ensuring speedy relief to
its protected groups who are both vulnerable members of the society, is
effectively realized. Rights in law can translate to rights in life, only if C
there is an equitable ease in obtaining their realization.
23. Adverting to the factual situation at hand, on construing the
provisions of sub-Section (2) of section 23 of the Senior Citizen Act
2007, it is evident that it applies to a situation where a senior citizen has
a right to receive maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part D
thereof is transferred. On the other hand, the appellant’s simple plea is
that the suit premises constitute her ‘shared household’ within the meaning
of Section 2(s) of the PWDV Act 2005. We have also seen the series of
transactions which took place in respect of the property: the spouse of
the appellant purchased it in his own name a few months before the
marriage but subsequently sold it, after a few years, under a registered E
sale deed at the same price to his father (the father-in-law of the
appellant), who in turn gifted it to his spouse i.e. the mother-in-law of the
appellant after divorce proceedings were instituted by the Fourth
respondent. Parallel to this, the appellant had instituted proceedings of
dowry harassment against her mother-in-law and her estranged spouse; F
and her spouse had instituted divorce proceedings. The appellant had
also filed proceedings for maintenance against the Fourth respondent
and the divorce proceedings are pending. It is subsequent to these events,
that the Second and Third respondents instituted an application under
the Senior Citizens Act 2007. The fact that specific proceedings under
the PWDV Act 2005 had not been instituted when the application under G
the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was filed, should not lead to a situation
where the enforcement of an order of eviction deprives her from pursuing
her claim of entitlement under the law. The inability of a woman to
access judicial remedies may, as this case exemplifies, be a consequence
of destitution, ignorance or lack of resources. Even otherwise, we are H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A clearly of the view that recourse to the summary procedure contemplated
by the Senior Citizen Act 2007 was not available for the purpose of
facilitating strategies that are designed to defeat the claim of the appellant
in respect of a shared household. A shared household would have to be
interpreted to include the residence where the appellant had been jointly
residing with her husband. Merely because the ownership of the property
B
has been subsequently transferred to her in-laws (Second and Third
Respondents) or that her estranged spouse (Fourth respondent) is now
residing separately, is no ground to deprive the appellant of the protection
that was envisaged under the PWDV Act 2005
F Summation
C
24. For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion that
the claim of the appellant that the premises constitute a shared household
within the meaning of the PWDV Act 2005 would have to be determined
by the appropriate forum. The claim cannot simply be obviated by evicting
the appellant in exercise of the summary powers entrusted by the Senior
D Citizens Act 2007. The Second and Third Respondents are at liberty to
make a subsequent application under Section 10 of the Senior Citizens
Act 2007 for alteration of the maintenance allowance, before the
appropriate forum. For the above reasons, while allowing the appeal, we
issue the following directions:
E (i) The impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of
the High Court of Karnataka dated 17 September 2019
affirming the order of eviction against the appellant shall
stand set aside with the consequence that the order of the
Assistant Commissioner ordering and directing the appellant
F to vacate the suit premises shall stand set aside;
(ii) We leave it open to the appellant to pursue her remedies
under the PWDV Act 2005. For that purpose, it would be
open to the appellant to seek the help of the District Legal
Services Authorities and if the appellant does so, all
G necessary aid and assistance shall be furnished to her in
pursuing her legal remedies and rights;
(iii) IA 111352/2020 for restoration of the electricity connection
is allowed by directing the Fourth respondent to take all
necessary steps for restoration of the electricity connection
to the premises within a period of two weeks from the
H
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU 1089
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. The Fourth A
respondent shall also continue to pay the electricity dues in
future; and
(iv) In order to enable the appellant to pursue her remedies under
the PWDV Act 2005, there shall be an order and direction
restraining the respondents from forcibly dispossessing the B
appellant, disposing of the premises or from creating any
right, title and interest in favor of any third party in any
manner whatsoever for a period of one year, to enable the
appellant to pursue her remedies in accordance with law.
The appellant is at liberty to move the Court to espouse her
remedies under the PWDV Act 2005 for appropriate orders, C
including interim protections.
The directions contained in (iii) and (iv) above emanate in exercise
of the powers of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution.
25. The Appeal is allowed in the above terms. The appellant is D
entitled to costs quantified at Rs 25,000 from the private respondents.
26. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal allowed.
E

F

G

H