Holding

A dying declaration that is truthful, voluntary and made by a fit person may be the sole basis for conviction and need not be corroborated.

Summary

The appellant, the mother‑in‑law of the deceased, was convicted of murder under Section 302 IPC for allegedly burning her daughter‑in‑law. The prosecution's case rested on four dying declarations made by the victim, three of which identified the appellant as the assailant. The trial court dismissed these statements, deeming them unreliable, but the Gujarat High Court accepted them and upheld the conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the admissibility and reliability of dying declarations, holding that when such statements are made by a fit person, are voluntary and trustworthy, they may constitute the sole basis for conviction without corroboration. The Court rejected the suicide theory, affirmed the conviction and life sentence, and declined to grant remission despite the appellant's age and length of incarceration.

Issues considered

Whether the dying declarations made by the deceased are admissible and can form the sole basis of conviction.
Whether the dying declarations are reliable despite alleged contradictions and alleged tutoring.
Whether corroboration is mandatory for a dying declaration under Indian law.
Whether the theory of suicide is plausible in the facts of the case.
Whether remission of sentence under Section 432 CrPC is warranted.

Legislation cited

Subjects

dying declarationsection 302 IPCmurderlife imprisonmentevidencecorroborationsuicide theorysentence remissionIndian Evidence ActCriminal Procedure Code

Judgment

SMT. PANIBEN A
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT

MARCH 13, 1992

[S. MOHAN AND G.N. RAY, JJ.] B

Indian Penal Code 1860:

Section 302-Bride burning-Conviction and sentence-Duty of Court.
r--
~
Section 32--Dying declaration-When can fonn sole basis of convic- c
tion-Plurality of dying declaration-Have to be accepted when trustworthy
and reliable.
~
Penology

Sentencin[5-l3n"de burning-Language ·of deterence to speak. D

The appellant in the appeal was convicted under Section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to life imprisonment by the High Court
reversing the acquittal of the Trial Court.
E
The Prosecution alleged that the deceased was married to the son of
the accused in the year 1972, and that there were frequent quarrels between
the appellant-mother-in-law and the deceased- daughter-in-law. On one
occasion, on account of a quarrel the daughter-in-law went away to her
parents' house and on the assurance of her father-in-law that nothing
would go wrong, the deceased was sent to the house of the accused. The F
accused, the deceased and her husband were all living in the same house•
... Even after the return, there used to be quarrels between the accused and
_>., the deceased. The accused developed a profound dislike for the deceased.

On the night of 7th May, 1977, at about midnight, the deceased was
sleeping all alone in the 'osri' of the House. The accused went there, poured G
kerosene on her person, and as the deceased got up, the accused lit the
fire and left the 'osri'. The deceased shouted for help and hearing her
)-..
shouts, her husband and other collected there and the fire was e:xtin-
guished. She was removed to the hospital in the cart. In ihe cart, she told
some witnesses that ht>r mother-in-law had burnt her. Later on, she was H
197
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 2 S.C.R:

A taken to the Government hospital in a taxi in a burnt condition. The police
constable on duty informed the Taluka police station and the .Head Con-
stable made an entry in tlie police station diary, and another Head Con-
stable went to the hospital and recorded the statement of the deceased in
the early hours. In that statement, she stated that her mother-in-law had
burnt her. The Head Constable wrote a 'yadi' for a dying declaration to
B the Executive Magistrate who reached the hospital at about 7.00 A.M. on
18.5.1977, and recorded the dying declaration Ex.29. In this declaration
also, the deceased stated that she was burnt by the accused. The Police
Sub-Inspector who took up the investigations, went to the scene of oc-
curence, made the panchnama of the scene of occurrence and recorded the
c statement of witnesses. He also recorded a statement of the deceased on
19.5.1977. In that also, the deceased stated that she was burnt by her
. mother-in-law. The Sub-Inspector arrested the accused on 18.5.1977. The
deceased succumbed to the injuries on 20.5.1977. On completing the neces-
sary investigations, the accused was charge-sheeted and committed before
D the Sessions Judge.

The Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the deceased might
have committed suicide, that it was also probable that someone else might
have burnt her alive, because she had a grievance against her mother-in-
law she implicated her in the dying declaration. The dying declarations,
E hence could not be accepted having regard to this inherent infirmity. On
these findings it was held that the prosecution had failed to prove that the
deceased was burnt alive by the accused, and the accused was acquitted.

The State appealed to the High Court, and a Division Bench con-
F sidered the circumstances under which the dying declarations were
recorded. It found that the dying declaration Ex. 24 clearly showed as to
how the occurrence had taken place. The second dying declaration Ex. 29
was recorded in a question and answer form that there was no scope for
tutoring the deceased for giving any statement which would involve the
accused, and that at that time, the deceased was all right and she was in
G a position to give the dying declaration. The third dying declaration was
made to the deceased's father who was a truthful witness and clearly
establishes that there was no scope of parents tutoring the deceased in any
way. The findings of the Trial Court it was held could not be accepted with
_ reference to the various aspects like enmity between the mother-in-law and
-~ H ... .the.::<le~eased, the failure of the deceased to narrate the incident to her
SMT. PANIBEN v. STATE 199

husband, and was not prepared to believe that the deceased attempted to A
commit suicide and only for revenge involved the accussed falsely. In the
result, the order of acquittal was set aside, the accussed was held guilty of
the offence of murder and was convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. and
sentenced to imprisonment for life; It was, however, recommended th~t the
Government consider the case favourably on the aspect of remission of B
sentence under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the
appellant that the High Court was not justified in convicting the accused
purely on the dying declarations which bristle with many contradictions
and improve from stage to stage, and that having regard to the fact that C
the relationship between the mother-in- law and the daughter-in-law, was
far from cordial the deceased had every motive to implicate the mother-
in-law. It was also contended that the appellant was 58 years of age and
that baving spent more than a decade in jail, the appeal calls for inter-
ference on the ground of sentence.
D
Dismissing the appeal, and upholding the conviction and sentence,
this Court

HELD 1. The situation in which a man is on death bed is so solemn
and serene when he is dying the grave position in which he is placed, is the E
reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason
the requirements of oath and cross-examination and dispensed with. Be-
sides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in mis-car-
riage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye witness in
a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court
without a scrap of evidence. [205E] F
2. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is
worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination.
Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath
could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declara- G
tion should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court
in the correctness. [205F]

3. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased
was not as a result of either tutoring or a product of imagination. The
Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 2 S.C.R.

A after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. [205G] Y

4. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and
voluntary, undoubtedly, it. can base its conviction without any further
corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the
dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is
B corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of
prudence. [205H]

5. If the plurality of dying declarations could be held to be truth-
worthy and reliable, they have to be accepted. [207E]
c In the instant case there are four dying declarations. The first dying
declaration is Ex. 24 recorded by a Head Constable who wrote down the
statement as deposed by the deceased. At that time, the deceased was
conscious. The second dying declaration is Ex. 29 and was recorded by the
Taluka Magistrate in question and answer form. There was no possibility
D of the deceased being tutored, prompted as to utter falsehood, so as to
implicate the accused. It is also clear when she made the statement, she
was in a fit mental condition. The third oral dying declaration was made
by the deceased to her father who has impressed the High Court as a
truthful witness. The fourth dying declaration Ex. 34 recorded by the police
E sub-inspector has been rightly rejected by the High Court. The High Court
was fully justified in accepting the dying declarations because they answer }...
every test which is required to be accepted for such acceptance.
[207E, H; 208 D, E, G]

In the instant case, the theory of suicide has been rightly rejected by
F the Court. A tender lass after only five years of married life with an
affectionate husband and a young daughter to foster could not have
resorted to that rash act merely because there were quarrels between her )
and her mother-in-law. In every house it is proverbial that such quarrels ~ . .,.__
do take place. It is impossible to contend that the deceased was so much
G frustrated in life so as to commit suicide. [208H-209D]

6. It would be a traversity of justice if sympathy is shown when such
a cruel act is commited. It is rather strange th~t the mother-in-law who
herself is a woman should resort to killing another women. It is hard to
fathom as to why even the "mother" in her did not make her feel. It is tragic,
H deep rancour should envelop her reason and drown her finer feelings. The
SMT. PANIBEN v. STATE [MOHAN, J.] 201

language of deterrance must speak in that it may be a conscious reminder A
to the society. Undue sympathy would be harmful to the cause of justice.
It may even undermine the confidence in the efficacy of law. [209C-D]

7. Merely because the accused has spent more. than a decade in jail
is no justification to show any leniency. [209E]
B
Mannu Raja v. State of M.P., (1976] 2 SCR 764; State of M.P. v. Ram
Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416; Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC
164; Ram Chandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 S.C. 1994; Rasheed
Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1974] 4 S.C.C. 264; Kake Singh v. State of
M.P., AIR 1982SC1021; Ram Manorath v. State ofH.P., 1981 SCC (Crl.) 531; C
State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR 1981 SC 617;
Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1505; Nanahau Ram and another
v. State, AIR 1988 SC 912; State of H.P. v. Madan Mohan, AIR 1989 S.C.1519;
Mohan Lal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1982, S.C. 839, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. D
487of1980.

From the Judgment and Order dated 17/18-4-80 of the Gujarat High
Court in Crl. A. No. 885 of 1978.

Vimal Dave for the Petitioner. E

R.N. Sachthey and Anip Sachthey for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MOHAN, J. Everytime a case relating to dowry death comes up, it F
causes ripples in the pool of the conscience of this Court. Nothing could
be more barbarous, nothing could be more heinous than this sort of crime.
The root cause for killing young bride or daughter-in-law is avarice and
greed. All tender feelings which alone make the humanity noble disappear
from the heart. Kindness which is the hallmark of human culture is buried. G
Sympathy to the fairer sex, the minimum sympathy is not even shown. The
seedling which is uprooted from its original soil and is to be planted in
another soil to grow and bear fruits is crushed. With this prefatory note,
we pass on to the matrix of facts.
The criminal appeal is directed against the conviction of the appel- H
'
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 2 S.C.R.

A lant under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentencing her to life
imprisonment reversing the acquittal by the Trial Court. The case of the
Prosecution shortly is as under:

Bai Kanta was married to Valji Savji sometime in the year 1972.
B Accused is the mother-in-law of Bai Kanta. There were frequent quarrels ...,,
between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law. Once Bai Kanta on
account of quarrel went away to her parent's house. Accused went to the
house of Bai Kanta to bring her back. The father-in-law of Bai Kanta gave
an assurance that nothing would go wrong. On this assurance, Bai Kanta
was sent to the house of Accused. The accused, Bai Kanta and her husband ~,-
c were all living in the same house. Even after the return, there used to be
quarrels between the accused and Bai Kanta. The acccused developed
profound dislike for Bai Kanta. On the night of 7th May, 1977 at about 12 ~-
mid night, Bai Kanta was sleeping all alone in the 'osri' of the house. The

D
accused went there, poured kerosene on her person. Bai Kanta got up as
she felt the kerosene was being poured and meanwhile the accused lit fire --
and left the 'osri'. Bai Kanta shouted for help. Hearing the shouts, the
husband and others collected there and the fire was extinguished. She was
removed to the hospital in the cart. In the cart, she had _told witnessess
Ratnabhai, Savji Dahya, Shantaben, Valji Ben and others that her mother-
in-law had burnt her. Up to the Gadhka village, she was taken in the cart.
E Lateron, she was brought to Rajkot Government hospital in a taxi in burnt
condition. The police constable on duty at the hospital informed Taluka
police station about Bai Kanta having been brought to the hospital in burnt
condition. So, Head Constable Kanji Ukabhai who was in-charge of the
police station made an entry in the police station diary. He directed Head
F Constable Abhal Mamaiya to go the hospital and enquire into this matter.
Accordingly- Head Constable Abhal Mamaiya went to the hospital and
recorded the statement of Bai Kanta in the early hours. It was stated by
her that the mother-in-law burnt her. Abhal Mamaiya worte a yadi for 1
dying declaration to the Executive Magistrate which was received by him
at 6 a.m. Abhal Mamaiya, thereafter filed a complaint on the strength of
G the statement of the deceased and the investigation started. The Executive
Magistrate reached the hospital at about 7.10 a.m. on 18.5.1977. He
-
recorded the dying declaration Ex. 29. In that declaration also, Bai Kanta
stated she was burnt by the accused. Police Sub-Inspector Tavde of Rajkot 1
Taluka police station took up the investigation; went to the seen of occur-
H rence; made the panchnama of the scene of occurrence; recorded the
SMT. PANIBEN v. STATE [MOHAN, J.] 203

statement of witnesses. He arrested the accused in the evening. He also A
recorded the statement of Bai Kanta on 19.5.1977. In that also, Bai Kanta
stated, she was burnt by her mother-in-law, the accused. The Sub-Inspector
Tavde arrested the accused at about 6.45 p.m. on 18.5.1977. Bai Kanta
succumbed to the injuries on 20.5.1977 at 0045 hours. Thereafter, post-mor-
tem was carried out.
B
On completing the necessary investigation, the accused was charge-
sheeted and after committal, she was tried by the learned Sessions Judge
of Rajkot in Sessions Case No. 34 of 1977.

On consideration of the evidence, the learned Sessions Judge came C
to the conclusion that the deceased might have committed suicide. Besides,
it was also probable that someone else might have burnt her alive. Because
she had a grievance against her mother-in-law, in the dying declaration
she implicated her. Hence, the dying declarations could not be accepted
having regard to the inherent infirmity. Accordingly, it was held that the
prosecution has failed to prove that the deceased was burnt alive by the D
accused. Thus it ended in acquittal.

The State took up the matter in Criminal Appeal No. 885 of 1978 to
the High Court of Gujarat. The Division Bench considered the circumstan-
ces under which the dying declarations were recorded. It found that the E
dying declaration Ex. 24 clearly shows as to how the occurrence had taken
place.

The second dying declaration Ex. 29 which was recorded in question
and answer form. There was no scope of tutoring the deceased for giving
any statement which would involved the accused. At that time the deceased F
was allright and she was in a p.osition to give the dying declaration.

The third dying declaratiou made by the deceased's father Jadav who
was a truthful witness, clearly establishes there was no scope of p(l!ents
tutoring the deceased in any way.
G
It was further held that the findings of the Trial Court could not be
accer!cd with reference to the various aspects like enimity between the
mother-in-law and the deceased, the appreciation of the statement of
deceased, the failure of the deceased to narrate the incidence to her
husband. H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 2 S.C.R.

A The High Court considered the legal position whether the accused .,...
could be convicted on the basis of dying declaration in the light of relevant
case law. It ultimately held that the deceased was young girl aged about 18
years who had a married life of only 5 years to her share with all hopes of
living a happy married life in future with her husband who was affectionate
towards her. She had also a young daughter aged about 2:V2 years. Except
B the relationship with her mother-in-law, she was quite happy. There was _,,.-·
no possibility of her coming to a conclusion that she must end her life.
There was no indication that the deceased was so harassed as to have lost
her self-control so as to commit suicide. Thus, the High Court was not
prepared to believe that the deceased attempted to commit suicide and _,.._~

c only for the revenge, she involved the accused falsely. In the result, the
order of acquittal was set-aside. The accused was held guilty of the offence
of murder. She was convicted under section 302 of Indian Penal Code and
sentenced to imprisonment for life. However, it was recommended to the
~
Government to consider her case favourably on the aspect of remission of
her sentence under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
D
Special leave petition was directed to be treated as petition of appeal
by an order dated 6.8.1980 passed by this Court. Under these circumstan-
ces, the criminal appeal comes before us.

E The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently urged that the
High Court was not justified in convicting the accused basing purely the }...
dying declarations which bristles with so many contradictions and improve-
ments from stage to stage. Having regard to the fact that relationship
between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law was far from cardial,
the deceased had every motive to implicate the mother-in-law. Normally
F speaking deceased would not have failed to narrate this incidence to her
husband who was affectionate to her. Besides, there were also several other ....
infirmities pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge who had acquitted )
...__
the accused. That acquittal should not have been interfered with.
-'!>
In any event, the accused at the time of the judgment of the High
G
Court itself was 58 years of age. She having spent more than a decade in
jail, the appeal calls for interference on sentence.

The learned counsel appearing for the respondent State submits: the i
High Court has considered fully each and every aspect after administering
H to it the caution that an order of acquittal cannot be interfered with lightly.
SMT. PANIBEN v. STATE [MOHAN, JJ 205

It analysed the three dying delcarations. There again, it had in the forefront A
the law that it could not be safe to hold an accused guilty solely on the
basis of dying declaration. After doing so, it found that the implication of
the mother-in-law who was real offender was not on account of enimity. It
considered the other aspect as to why the husband was not informed and
the so called infirmities pointed out by the Sessions Court. In the light of B
the decision of this Court, it was found that the dying delcaration ought to
be accepted and rightly convicted the accused.

Having regard to the drastic nature of the crime, even on sentence,
no sympathy can be shown.

This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the three
c
dying declarations. The principle on which dying declarations are admitted
in evidence is indicated in legal maxim.

"nemo moriturus proesumitur mentiri-a man will not meet his
Maker with a lie in his mouth". D
The situation in which a man is on death bed is so solemn and serene
when he is dying the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in
law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the
requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, E
should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in. mis-carriage of
justice because the victim being generally the only eye witness in a serious
crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap
of evidence.

Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is F
worthwhile lo note that the accused has no power of cross-examination.
Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath
could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration
should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its
correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased
was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagina- G
tion. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state
of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants.
Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary,
undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration.
It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 2 S.C.R.

A cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule
requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid )" -
down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration,
which could be summed up as under:

(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying
B declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration.
Mannu Raja v. State of M.P., [1976) 2 SCR 764.

(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true
and voluntary it can base convictio:µ on it, without corrobora-
tion. State of M.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416;
c Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 164. ~-

(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully
and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutor-
ing, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity
D to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to
make the declaration. Ram Chandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor,
AIR 1976 S.C. 1994.

(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted
upon without corroborative evidence. Rasheed Beg v. State of
E Madhya Pradesh, [1974] 4 S.C.C. 264.

(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make ~
any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be
rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P., AIR 1982 S;C. 1021).
F (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot
form the basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P.,
1981 sec (Crl.) 531).

(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the
details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of
G
Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR 1981 SC
617)

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not
be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement
H itself guarantees truth. Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bi/tar, AIR 1979
SMT. PANIBEN v. STATE [MOHAN, J.] W7

SC 1505) A
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether deceased
was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look
up to the medical opinion. But where the eye witness has said
that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this
dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. 8
(Nanahau Ram and another v. State, AIR 1988 SC 912)

(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as
given in the dying declaration, thf. said declaration cannot be
acted upon. (State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan, AIR 1989 S.C. C
1519) _.,

In the light of the above principles, we will consider the three dying
declarations in the instant case and we will ascertain the truth with refer-
ence to all dying dedarations made by the deceased Bai Kanta. This Court
in Mohan Lal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1982, S.C. 839 referred to held: D

"Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying
declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred".

Of course, if the plurality of dyinr declarations could be held to be
truth worthy and reliable, they have to be ac~epted. E
The first dying declaration is Ex. 24. It .was recorded by Head
Constable Abhal Mamaiya. At that time, the deceased was conscious. He
wrote down her statement as deposed by her. That clearly shows that when
the deceased was sleeping in the Osri at night, her mother-in-law, her
father-in-law and others were sleeping in the pali, ac about 12 mid-night, F
the accused poured kerosene and ignited her. Because the deceased
shouted, people from round about gathered and fire was extinguished.
Therefore, her father-in-law, maternal aunt-in-law and sister-in-law and 2
to 3 other persons took her in a cart. It is admitted by Head Constable
Abhal Mamaiya in cross-examination that while recording the statement, G
he did not call the Medical Officer.

The second dying declaration is Ex. 29. This is recorded by Taluka
Magistrate Bhalchandra Prabhashanker Trivedi. He reached the hospital at
6.35 a.m. He ascertained from the Doctor whether Bai Kanta was conscious.
The Doctor examined her and found her to be conscious. Thereafter, only H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 2 S.C.R.

A the Medical Officer was allowed to remain the room and the other persons
were sent out. He recorded the dying declaration in question and answer
form. The Executive Magistrate wrote down the answers given by the
deceased. This was completed by 7.10 a.m. This declaraion makes it clear
that the deceased was sleeping alone in the 'osri', someone came near her,
poured kerosene whereupon she woke up. At that time, she found out the
B person who poured kerosene on her, was her mother-in-law, the accused.
According to this statement, the accused poured kerosene because there
was dispute in the house for 8 to 10 days prior to the date of the occurrence,
during which time frequent quarrels took place and the mother-in~law
rebuked her since Bai Kanta did not do work.
c
It is important to note to the specific question as to whether she was
sleeping alone or someone else was also with her, she replied that her
husband had gone to the wadi and she was sleeping alone.

It is equally important to note that the parents of the deceased
D reached the hospital only round about 7.30 a.m. Hence there is no pos-
sibility of she being tutored, prompted as to utter falsehood, so as to
implicate the accused. It is also clear that at that time when she made the
statement, she was in a fit memal condition to make the statement.

The third oral dying declaration was made by the deceased to her
E
father Jadav. The deceased told him that her mother-in-law had burnt her.
Jadav impressed the High Court as a truthful witness because he did not
want to fall in line with the narratibn of the police in which minor details )...._
were attributed to him. We also on going through the evidence of Jadav
are fully impressed with the same.
F
As rightly held by the High Court the fourth dying declaration Ex.
34 stated to have been recorded bY. the police Sub-Inspector Tavde has to
be discarded. Thus, we are clearly of the opinion the High Court was fully -\
justified in accepting the dying declarations because they answer every test _J,
G which is required to be applied for such acceptance.

We concur with the High Court in reversing the findings of the
Learned Sessions Judge as to why the deceased could not try to run and
catch the miscreant and allow her cloth to burn. Equally, we agree with
the High Court with regard to the uther infirmities including not informing
H the husband. The theory of suicide has been rightly rejected by the High
SMT. PANIBEN v. STATE [MOHAN, J.) 209

Court. As was pointed out a tender less after only five years of married life A
with an affectionate husband and a young daughter to foster could not have
resorted tci that rash act merely because there were quarrels between her
and her mother-in-law. In every house it is proverbial that such quarrels
do take place. It is impossible to contend that the deceased was so much
frustrated in life so as to commit suicide.
B
In the result, we have no hesitation in upholding the conviction.

Turning to the sentence; sympathy is what is pleaded at our hands.
We are clearly of the opinion that it would be a traversity of justice if
sympathy is shown when such cruel act is committed. It is rather strange
that the mother-in-law who herself is a women should :esort to killing C
another woman. It is hard to fathom as to why even the "mother" in her
did not make her feel. It is tragic deep rancour should envelope her reason
and drawn her finer feelings. The language deterrance must speak in that
it may be conscious reminder to the society. Undue sympathy would be
harmful to the cause of justice. It may even undermirie the confidence in D
the efficacy of law.·

Merely because the accused has spent more than a decade in jail, we
see no justification to show any leniency. Of course, we are aware the High
(:ourt itself had recommended for remission under Sec. 432 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, in view of the accused being 58 years of age at that E
time. Whether of the counsel in favour or opposition have informed us as
to what had happened whether remission was granted or not. However, we
leave it at that.

In the result, we dismiss the appeal.

N.V.K. Appeal dismised.

_,.l.._