SMT. MOHINI BADHWARversusRAGHUNANDAN SARAN ASHOK SARAN
- Citation
- 1989 INSC 146
- Decided
- 27 April 1989
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- R S PATHAK
Holding
Acquisition of vacant possession of the tenant's own house, even if later sold, fulfills the condition of "alternative accommodation" under Section 14(1)(h) and does not shield the tenant from eviction.
Summary
The landlord filed an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, alleging that the tenant had acquired vacant possession of her own house on 20 November 1973, thereby disqualifying her from retaining the rented premises. The tenant argued that she was not liable for eviction, contending that an oral agreement to sell the house existed before she obtained possession, which should preclude her from treating the house as alternative accommodation. The Rent Control Tribunal and the Delhi High Court held that the tenant obtained vacant possession on 20 November 1973, sold the house on 24 November 1973, and that this possession, even though brief, satisfied the statutory requirement of "alternative accommodation". The Supreme Court affirmed that the mere loss of possession on the date of filing the eviction petition does not protect the tenant, and that no oral agreement was proven. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether acquisition of vacant possession of the tenant's own house, even if subsequently sold, satisfies the requirement of "alternative accommodation" under Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
- Whether an oral agreement to sell the house, entered into before the tenant obtained possession, bars the application of Section 14(1)(h).
Legislation cited
- Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14(1)(h)
Subjects
Judgment
A
SMT. MORINI BADHWAR
v.
RAGHUNANDAN SARAN ASHOK SARAN
APRIL 27, 1989
B [R.S. PATHAK, CJ AND M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, J.]
f "\
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Section 14(1)(h)-Tenant
obtained vacant possession of own house-Sold it four days later-
Circumstance that tenant lost possession on the date of filing of eviction
petition-Whether affords protection against eviction-'Acquired vacant
C possession of a residence'-lnterpretation of.
The respondent-landlord filed a petition for eviction of the
appellant-tenant from the suit premises under s. 14(1)(h) of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958 on the ground that the appellant had acquired
vacant possession of her house on November 20, 1973, after the suit
D premises had been let out to her on April 1, 1971. The appellant con-
tended that she was not liable to be ejected.
The Assistant· Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal ;...
concurrently held that even though the house owned by the appellant
was not in her occupation on the date the petition was filed, it was
E sufficient for the purpose ofs. 14(1)(h) that sometime before the filing of
the petition she had obtained vacant possession of the house, and thus
had alternative accommodation during November 20-24, 1973, i.e.,
from the date she obtained vacant possession from her tenant till she
sold it. The High Court also held that the ground for ejectment had ~
been made out when the eviction petition was filed. !
F In the appeal before this Court, on behalf of the appellant-tenant
it was contended that before the earlier tenant had vacated the house,
?
the appellant had already entered into an oral agreement to sell the
house to another person, which was formalised on a written document
on November 24, 1973 and as the appellant was under legal obligation
G to sell the house she was not entitled to enter into and to continue in 'r--
possession of the house when it was vacated, and therefore, the house
could not be said to constitute alternative accommodation, for the
purpose ofs. 14(1)(h) of the Act.
Dismissing the appeal,
H
748
I
MOHINI v. RAGHUNANDAN [PATHAK, CJI 749
HELD: The Rent Control Tribunal has found against the exis-
A
tence of any oral agreement for the sale of the suit house. It was only
after four days of obtaining possession on November 20, 1973 from the
original tenant that the appellant executed an agreement for sale. Thus,
it is clear, that the appellant ,came into the house belonging to her on
November 20, 1973 and it was available to her for her occupation. The
circumstance that she lost possession on the date when the eviction B
petition was filed does not protect the appellant against s. 14(1)(h) of the
Act. t750F-G)
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No, 1842
•
of 1981.
From the Judgment and Order dated.30.4.1981 of the Delhi High
c
Court in S.A.O. No. 418 of 1978.
Mrs. Shyamala Pappu, H.K. Puri and S.D. Lal for the
Appellant.
D
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, S.N. Kacker, Mukul Mudgal and N.S. Das
Bahl for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PATHAK, CJ. This is a tenant's appeal arising out of proceed- E
ings for her ejectment.
The respondent, as landlord of the premises let to the appellant,
filed a petition for her eviction on the ground set forth ins. 14(1)(h) of
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, that is to say, that the appellant had
"acquired vacant possession of ....... a residence" after the com- f
mencement of the Act, viz, her own house D-196, Defence Colony,
New Delhi and was therefore liable to hand over possession of the
rented premises occupied by her to the respondent. It was alleged that
the appe1J1ant had acquired vacant possession of her house on 20
Novembeir, 1973 after the premises in suit had been let out to her on
1 April, 1971. The appellant denied that she was liable to ejectment. G
The Assistant Rent Controller, Delhi, and the Rent Control
Tribunal concurrently held that the appellant was owner of house
D-196, Defence Colony, New Delhi, that on 20 November, 1973 the
previous tenant had vacated the premises and handed over vacant
possession and that thereafter she had sold it to one Smt. Leela Wati H
,,
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 2 S.C.R.
on 24 November, 1973. It was observed that during the period
A 20 November, 1973 to 24 November, 1973 it must be taken that she was in
possession of alternative accommodation. It was also held con-
currently that even though on the date the petition for eviction was
filed, the house, D-196, Defence Colony, New Delhi, was no longer in
the occupation of the appellant it was sufficient for the purpose of s.
B 14(1)(h) that some time prior to the filing of the eviction petition the
appellant had obtained possession of the house. The High Court
endorsed the view taken by it earlier in Hem Chand Baid v. Smt. Prem
Wati Parekh., AIR 1980 Delhi 1 and in the view that the ground for
ejectment had been made out when the eviCtion petition was filed it
•
dismissed the appe,al.
c In this appeal it is urged on behalf of the appellant that before
the earlier tenant of the appellant had vacated the house the appellant
had already entered into an agreement to sell the house to another
person, and that therefore in the presence of that obligation it was not
possible to say that when the house was vacated the appellant was
D entitled to enter into and to continue in possession of the house. It is
contended before us that before the original tenant vacated the house
there was an oral agreement between the appellant and Smt. Leela
Wati to sell the house to Smt. Leela Wati and that the agreement was
only formalised in a written document on 24 November, 1973. It is
urged that when the original tenant vacated the house on 20 Novem-
E ber, 1973 the_ appellant was under a legal obligation to sell the
house to Smt. Leela Wati, and that in the circumstances, the house
cannot be said to constitute alternative accommodation for the
purpose of s. 14(1)(h) of the Act. The Rent Control Tribunal has
found against the eXistence of any such oral agreement. Upon that it
would seem that it was only after obtaining possession on 20 Novem-
F ber, 1973 from the 0riginal tenant, that is, four days later, that the
appellant executed an agreementfor sale with Smt. Leela Wati. It is
apparent that on 20 November, 1973 the appellant came into the house
belonging to her and it was available to her for her occupation. The
J
circumstances that she lost possession on the date when the eviction
petition was filed does not protect the appellant against s. 14(1)(h) of
G the Act.
In the result, the appeal fails .and is dismissed but there is no
order as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.
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