Holding

Land occupied by a building existing on the appointed day is excluded from "vacant land" and therefore cannot be counted towards the ceiling, so the appellant does not hold excess vacant land.

Summary

The appellant, Smt. Meera Gupta, purchased a vacant plot from Smt. Probhavati Poddar, the predecessor-in-interest, after obtaining a decree for specific performance. The predecessor owned a built‑up property (constructed before the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976) and a vacant plot, and the competent authority treated the combined area as excess land under the ceiling of 500 sq m, vesting it in the State. The appellant argued that the built‑up property, being pre‑appointed‑day construction, should be excluded from the definition of "vacant land" and therefore the vacant plot was within the ceiling limit. The Supreme Court examined Sections 2(g), 2(q), 4(9) and 4(11) of the Act, interpreting "vacant land" and "any other land" in light of the appointed day and the gap period. It held that land occupied by a building existing on the appointed day is not "vacant land" and cannot be counted towards the ceiling, so the appellant did not hold excess land. Consequently, the proceedings declaring excess land were quashed and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether land occupied by a building constructed before the appointed day falls within the definition of "vacant land" under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.
Whether the built‑up property should be counted towards the ceiling limit for vacant land in calculating excess land.
Interpretation of Sections 2(g), 2(q), 4(9) and 4(11) of the Act in the context of the appointed day and the gap period.

Legislation cited

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976s. 10, s. 26, s. 2A, s. 2(g), s. 2(q), s. 3, s. 33, s. 4(11), s. 4(9), s. 5, s. 6, s. 8, s. 9

Subjects

Urban land ceilingVacant landAppointed dayGap periodSpecific performanceExcess landStatutory interpretationSection 2(g)Section 2(q)Section 4(9)Section 4(11)West Bengal

Judgment

SMT. MEERA GUPTA A
\!.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS.

OCTOBER 22, 1991

(RANGANATH MISRA, CJ., M.M. PUNCHHI AND K. RAMAS- B
WAMY,JJ.]

Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976: Sections 2(g)(q)(ii) &
~ (iii), 2A, 4(9), 4(11)-Schedule 1-ltem JS-Category~·.

Land Ceiling-Mode of computation of 'Vacant land"-Wliat is-Dis-
c
tinction between--'Vacant land' and 'any other land'-4Vhat is-'Urban
Agglomeration'-Property built up before the commencement of Act-Held
outside the purview of 'Vacant Land'-Object of the Act explained.
The appellant's predecessor-in-interest, respondent herein, was the
D
owner of two properties consisting of a 'built up property' and a 'vacant
property' in the city of Calcutta. The built up property comprised of 414.56
.. ~
sq. mtrs. of land of which 321 sq. mtrs. was covered by a building with a
dwelling unit therein and the said property was constructed long before
the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 came into force. The·
second property comprised of 339.65 sq. mtrs. of vacant land. The Act E
came into force on February 17, 1976 but under Section 2A of the Act the
appointed day in relation to State of West Bengal was 28th January, 1976.
Thus between the appointed day and the date of enforcement of the Act
~ there was a 20 days' gap.

On 8th July, 1978 the respondent entered into an agreement with the F
appellant to sell the vacant property. Since both the properties were
covered by the Urban agglomeration as specifi~d in category 'A' in
Scheduled 1 to the 1976 Act, undtr which the cejling limit prescribed was
500 sq. mtrs., the appellant and the respondent gave a notice of the
proposed sale unJer Section 26 of the Act to the competent authority. G
~ The competent authority held that the respondent was holding
254.21 sq. mtrs. of land in excess of the ceiling limit. The excess land was
determined by totalling 414.56 sq. mtrs. of the built-up property and 339.65,
sq. mtrs. of vacant property to 754.21 sq,. mtrs,, and substracting H
501
502 ~tJPREME COURT REPORTS [1991) SUPP. 1 S. C.R.
____........
A therefrom 500 sq.mtrs. resulting in 254.21 sq. mtrs. in excess of the ceiling
limit. Accordingly the competent authority issued order vesting the excess
land in the State. Against the decision of the competent authority the
respondent preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority which was
dismissed in default.

B In the meantime the appellant filed a suit against the respondent for
specific performance of the agreement dated 8th July, 1978 which was
decreed and consequently a deed of conveyance was executed in favour of >---
the appellant and the possession of the property~s also given to her.

Subsequently the appellant came to know of the dismissal of the
c respondent's appeal. Thereupon she filed a Review Petition before the
Appellate Authority stating that she had become the owner of the vacant
property and prayed for retrieval of the same from being treated as excess
land in the hands of respondent which was dismissed. The appellant filed a
writ petition in the High Court and a Single Judge allowed the same. On
D appeal by State a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the judgment >- .......
of the Single Judge. Against the decision of the Division Bench, appeal was
filed in this Court.

Setting aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court
and allowing the appeal, this Court,
E
HELD: 1. The primary objective of the Urban Land Ceiling and
Regulation Act, 1976 is to fix a ceiling limit on the holding of vacant lands, y-
conditioned as they are on the appointed day, and as held on the date of
commencement of the Act. (512-F)
F
2. Under Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,
1973 no person is entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling
limit. Ceiling limit of vacant land in case of every person like the
predecessor-in-interest of the appellant ·is 500 sq.· mtrs. as set up under
Section 4. (508 E-FJ
G ~ -"~

2.1 However, as per Section 2(g), 'Vacantland' does not include land
of three categories. The first category is land ori which construction of a
building is not permissible under building regulation in force in the area
in which such land is situated. The second category is of land occupied by
any building in an area, where there are, building regulations, which has
H
SMf.MEERAv. STATE 503

been constructed upon, or is under construction on the appointed day, A
with the approval of the appropriate authority, and the land appurtenant
tq such·building. Thus if the building stood constructed on the land prior
to January 28, 1976, the land occupied under the building is not vacant
land. It also covers the land on which any building was in the process of
construction on January 28, 1976 with the approval of the appropriate
authority. Additionally, the land appurtenant to these two kinds of B
buildings is also not "vacant land". The third category likewise conditioned
is of land occupied by any building in an area where there are no building
regulations, which has been constructed before January 28, 1976 or is in
the process of construction on such date, and the land appurtenant to
these two kinds of buildings. [510A·D] .C

2.2 The expression "land appurtenant" as defined in Section 2(g)
when related to any building in an area where there are building
regulations as well as in an area where there are no building regulations
reveals that the additional extent as permitted is based on the principle of
contiguity. The expression applies to buildings constructed before the D
"appointed day" as well as to buildings, construction of which commenced
before the "appointed day", and was in progress on that day. Th~refore, if
the construction of a building with a dwelling unit therein had begun after
the appointed day, then it is all the same "any other land" to be reckoned
for calculating the extent of vacant land held by a person. And if the E
construction of a ·building with a dwelling unit therein on land had been
cotnpleted or was in progress by and on the appointed day, then it is not
"any other land" to be reckoned for calculating the extent of vacant land
held by a person. [512G·H, 513A·B]

2.3 The built-up property in question had been constructed prior to F
the commencement of the Act. Therefore, it is outside the purview of
"vacant land". If that is excluded from being reckoned towards calculating
the extent of vacant land held by the predecessor-in-interest of the
appellant, the vacant land in the vacant property cannot be declared
excess for that is _within the permissible limits. Even if no land is left as G
land appurtenant to the built-up area, then 93.56 sq. mtrs. the remainder
plus 339.65 sq. mtrs. of the unbuilt property would total up to the figure
less than 500 sq.· mtrs.; which is again within the permissible limit.
) Accordingly the entire proceedings towards declaring excess land in the
hanfls of the appellant and her predecessor-in-title are quastied. [513C·E] H
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991) SUPP. 1 S. C.R.

A State of U.P. & Ors. v. L. J. Johnson & Ors. (1983) 4 SCC UO;beld
inapplicable.

Union of India etc. v. V.B. Chaudhary etc. etc. (1979) 3 SCR 802;
Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singliji etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors., (1981) 1
sec 166, referred to.
B Eastem Oxygen v. State AIR 1981 M.P.17; Prabhakar Narliar Pawar v.
State, AIR 1984 Born. 122; State v. Radha Raman Aggarwal, AIR 1987 All.
272, cited.

3. Io the scheme of sub-section (9) of Section 4 of the Act the visible
C contrast between "vacant laod"-aod "any other land" held by a person on
which there is a building with a dwelling unit therein is .prominent. The
said "any other land" is reckoned and brought at par with the "vacant land"
for the purpose of calculating the final extent of vacant land. The
expression "vacant land" in the first portion of the provision connotes land
minus land under buildings constructed or in the process of construction
D before and on the appointed day, and the expression "vacant land" in the
latter portion of the provision connotes the sum total of "vacant land" of .>-
the first order and distinctly the "other land" on which is a building with a
dwelling unit therein of which construction commenced after the
appointed day, and the land appurtenant thereto. Such an interpretation
is required by the context as otherwise the concept of the appointed day
E and the gap period would be rendered otiose. The legislature cannot be
accused to have indulged in trickery in giving something with one hand
and taking it away with the othet'. "Any other land" in the sequence would
thus mean any other built-upon land except the one excluded from the y-
expression "vacant land" on account of it being occupied by a building
F which stood constructed, or was in the process of construction, on the
appointed day. [510F-H, SHA-BJ .

4. Section 5 is reflective of the scheme 'of the Act in as much as
transfers of vacant land within the gap period are ignorable, and likewise,
vacant land brought under construction of building by a person Within the
G gap period is also ignorable for the purposes of calculating the extent of
vacant land, so that the provision of law are not defeated by human
ingenuity. (512-BCJ

5. Though Sub-section (11) of Section 4 is not happily worded, yet
when meaningfully cm1strued in the context, it means that a building which
H
SMT.MEERAv. SfATE[PUNCHHl,J.) sos
gets excluded by virtue of the definition of "vacant land" gets clothed with A
the protective cloak for not being reckoned again as any other land, over
which there is· a building with a dwelling unit therein. 'Ibis provision
means to convey that what is not vacant land under sub-clauses (ii) arid
(iii) of clause (q) of Section 2 cannot go to add up as "vacant land" under
sub-section (9) of Section 4 by descriptive overlapping. To wipe out the
distinction of "vacant land" and "any other land" as demonstrated in B
sub-section (9) of section 4 is to strangulate and destroy the spirit and
life-blood of the "appointed day" and the gap period. (512 D-F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4235 of
1991.
c
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.6.1987 of the Calcutta High
Court in original order no. 129 of 1985 and 1915 o( 1983.

AK. Ganguly, AK. Chakraborty, AD. Sikri and Ms. Mridula Ray
for the Appellants.
D
D.N. Mukherjee and Rathin Das for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

PUNCHHI, J. We are required in this matter to interplay some of
the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 to E
determine whether the appellant herein had any excess vacant land.

Smt. Probhavati Poddar (Proforma respondent herein) was the
cf owner of two properties in the city of Calcutta being (i) premises No.
P-290, C.I.T. Road, comprising 414.56 sq; mtrs. of land of which 321 sq.
mtrs. was covered by a building, constructed thereon long before the com- F
ing into force of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.
(hereafter referred to as 'the Act'), with a dwelling unit therein, and (ii)
property No. P-210, C.I.T. Scheme VII(M), Calcutta comprising 339.65 sq.
rr.trs. of vacant land. Hereafter these would be referred to as the 'built-up
property' and 'vacant property' respectively. The exact date/period of the
construction of the built-up property is not available on the present record G
· ~ but the litigation has proceeded on the footing that it was constructed long
before February 17, 1976, the day when the Act came into force in the State
of West Bengal. . · · ·

'l'he State Legislatures of 11States, including the State of West Ben-
gal, considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parlia- H
506 SUPREME COURT REPOR'I'S (1991) SUPP. 1 S. C.R.

A ment for the imposition of ceiling on urban property for the country as a
whole, and in compliance with clause (1) of Article 252 of the Con5titution,
passed a Resolution to that effect. Accordingly, the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Bill, 1976 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on January 28,
1976 covering all the Union Territories and the 11 resolving States. After
the passing of the Bill by the Parliament, the Act came into force on
B February 17, 1976 at once.. Later from time to time, the Act was adopted by
some other States after passing Resolutions under Article 252(1) of the
Constitution. The Act now apparently is in force in 17 States and all the
Union Territories in the country.

The primary object and purpose of the Act was to provide for the
C imposition of the ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the
· acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the con-
struction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith,
with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a
few persons and speculation and profiteering therein, and with a view to
bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to
D sub-serve the c0mmon good, and in furtherance of the directive-principles
of Articles 39(B) & ·(C) of the Constitution. These features were.spelled
ojit by this Court in Union of India etc. v. V.B. Chaudltary etc.etc. [1979)3
SCR 802. That it is valid piece of legislation, save and except Section 27(1),
and had received the protective Umbrella of Article 31-C as it stood prior
to its amendment by 42nd Amendment .Act was held by this C9urt in
E Maharao Sahib Shri Bhbii Singhj{ etc. etc. v. Union of India & Others.
[1981)1sec166. ·

"Appointed day" has been defined in Section 2-A of the Act. It
means (i) in relation to any State to which the Act applies in the first
instance, the date of introduction of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regula-
F tion) Bill, 1976 in Parliament, and (ii) in relation to any State which adopts
the Act under Clause (1) of Article 252 of the Constitution, the date of
such adoption. In relation to the State of West Bengal, in which the town of
Calcutta is situated, the "appointed day" is January 28, 1976. It is thus.
evident that between the appointed day and the date of enfor~ment-of the
Act, there is a 20 day's gap. ·
G
The Act ordains a ceiling limit of 500 sq. mtrs. for the urban ag-
glomeration of Calcutta, as per item 15 of Category A in,._Schedule I of the
Act. Both the properties of Smt. Poddar,. the proforma respondent herein,
thus became liable to be screened by the Authorities under the Act.
Before-hand on July 8, 1978, Smt. Poddar entered into an agreement with · ~
H Smt. Meera Gupta, the a~pellant herein, to sell the vacant property on
SMT. MEERA v. STATE 1PUNCHHI, J.] 507

• ~ terms entered. On November 23, 1978, the proposed vendor and the A
proposed vendee gave notice under Section 26 of the Act to the Competent
Authority, appointed for .the purpose of the proposed sale. On August 7,
1980, the competent authority in exercise of powers under Section 6(2) of
the said Act, issued a notice under Section 6(1) thereof to Smt. Poddar
directing her to file a statement in Form No. 1 on the basis that she held
vacant land in the Calcutta Urban Area in excess of the ceiling limit of 500 B
sq. mtrs.. Having got no response, a reminder was serit to her, but in vain.
----4.,
The Competent Authority thereafter initiated suo moto proceedings
against Smt. Poddar and sent her a draft statement on September 18, 1979,
exercising powers under Section 8(1) of the Act intimating that she could
submit her objection, if any, to the draft statement. It was specified in the
I
said statement that she was tentatively required to surrender 254.21 sq. c
mtrs. of land (figure arrived by totalling .414.56 sq. mtrs. of the built-up
property and 339.65 sq. mtrs. of the vacant property to 754.21 sq. mtrs, and
substracting therefrom 500 sq. mtrs. resulting in 254.21 sq. mtrs.). The
objections of Smt. Poddar filed to the draft statement were rejected by the
C<~mpetent Authority, who published the final statement under section 9 of
., t~ Act vesting the said 254.21 sq. mtrs. of excess land in the State, and the D
..4..
same was communicated to Smt. Poddar on June 22, 1981. She preferred
an appeal under Section 33 of the Act before the Special Secretary, Land
and Land Reforms Department, Government of West Bengal, the Appel-
late Authority under the Act, but the same was dismissed in default on
January 18, 1983.
E
Before-hand the appellant herein filed suit No. 121 of 1981 against
Smt. Poddar in the.Calcutta High Court claiming specific perfomnance of
---('
the agreement dated July 8, 1978. On August 21, 1981, a decree for specific
performance was passed in favour of the appellant in the usual terms.
Pursuant to the said decree, the deed of conveyance in respect of the
vacant property was executed in favour of the appellant on November 19, F
1981 for a consideration of Rs.1,26,000/- paid over to Smt. Poddar. Posses-
sion of the vacant property was delivered to the appellant and necessary
entries were made in the municipal and revenue registers.

The appellant then got scent of the dismissal of the appeal of Smt.
~ Poddar in default on July 2, 1983. The appellant then filed a Review Peti- G
tion before the Appellate Authority stating, inter alia, that she had become
the owner of the vacant property and prayed for retrieval of the same from
being treated as excess land in the hands of Smt. Podar. The Review Peti-
tion was rejected on August 10, 1983, which occasioned a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution being filed by the appellant in the Calcutta
H
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) SUPP. 1 S. C.R.

A High Court on a variety of grounds. The Writ Petition was opposed on
each and every ground. The learned Single Judge, before whom the writ ·
petition was placed, talcing aid from some observations in two decisions of
this Court in Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji's case (supra), and State of
U.P. & Others v. L J. Johnson & Others, [1983] 4 SCC 110 allowed the writ
petition on November 1:1, 1984. On appeal by the State of West Bengal and
-B its responding officers, a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the
judgment and order of the Single Judge on June 5, 1987 in Appeal No. 129
of 1985, leading to this appeal by special leave at the instance of the appel-
lant. The matter having come before a two-Judge Bench of this Court, of
which one of us was a member, on 1.8.7.1988, it was felt that lo/m.son's case
(supra) may have to be tested, and thus the matter was ordered to be-heard by
C a larger Bench at least of three Judges.This is how the matter stands placed
before us. ·

As said at the outset, we have to interplay some of the provisions
occurring in Chapter 3 titled as "Ceiling on Vacant Lands" in the Act. We
sha}ljresently set out those provisions which have a bearing in the case.
D But before we do that we do not wish to leave the impression that we have
not viewed the statute as a whole. The endeavour on our behalf to construe
the provisions has not left any part thereof altogether.

So we proceed thenceforth to the interpretative process.

E Section 3 of the Act provides that except as otherwise provided in
this Act, on and from the comme-ncement of this Act, no person shail be
entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the ter-
ritories to which this Act applies under sub-section (2) of Section 1. Ceiling
limit of vacant land in case of every person like the precedessor-in-interest
of the appellant is 500 sq. mtrs. .as set up under Section 4. Clauses (g) and
F (q) defining "vacant land" and "land appurtenant" and sub-sections (9) and
(11) of Section 4 which have precedence in engaging our attention are set
out below, but without the Explanation to sub-section (11), for it is not
relevant for our purpose: ·

"2(g) - "Land appurtenant", in relation to any building means -
G (i) ·in an area where there are building regulations, the mini-
mum extent of land required under such regulations to be kept
as open space for the enjoymi:nt of such building, which is no
case shall exceed five hundred square meters; or

(ii) in an area where there are no building regulations, an ex-
H tent of five hundred square metres contiguous to the land oc-
SMT. ME~RA v. SfATE [ PUNCHHI,J.] 500

cupied by such building, A
....... ')·
and includes, in the case of any building constructed before the
appointed day and with a dwelling unit therein, an additional
extent not exceeding five hundred square metres of land, if
any, contiguolis to the minimum extent referred to in sub-
clause (i) or the extent referred to in sub-clause (ii), as the case B
maybe;

2(q) - "Vacant Land", means land, not being land mainly used
-.__..,,;, for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban aggloni.eration, but
does not include -

(i) land on which constr~ction of a building is not permissible
c
. under the building regulations in force in the area in which
such land is situated;

(ii) in an area where there are building regulations, the land
occupied by any building which has been constructed before,
or is being constructed on, the appointed day with the approval
D
-4, of the appropriate authority and the land appurtenant to such
· building; and

(iii) in an area where there are no building regulations, the
land occupied by any building which has been constructed
before, or is being constructed on, the appointed day and the
E
land appurtenant to such building.

4(9) - where a person holds vacant land and also holds any
--y; other· land on which there is a building with a dwelling unit
therein, the extent of such other land occupied by the building
and the land appurtenant thereto shall also be taken into ac-
F
count in calculating the extent of vacant land held by such
person.

4(11) - For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that
nothing in sub-sections (5), (6), (7), (9) and (10) shall be con-
strued as empowering the competent authority to declare any G
-1' land referred to in sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) of clause
(q) of section 2 as excess vacarit land under this Chapter."

To begin with "vacant land" as per the definition given in clause (q)
of S(iction 2 means land as such, not being land mainly used for the pur- H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) SUPP. 1 S. C.R.

A pose of agriculture, but situated in an urban agglomeration. "Vaeant Land",
however, does not include, as per the definition, land of three categories.
The first category is land on which construction of a building is riot permis-
sible under the building regulations in force in the area in which such land
is situated. But this is a category with which we are not concerned in the
instant case.Johnson's case (supra) is of this category. The second category
B · is of land occupied by any building in an area, where there are building
regulations, which has been constructed upon, or is under construction on
the appointed day, with the approval of the appropriate authority, and the
land appurtenant to such building. This means that if the building stood
constructed on the land prior to January 28, 1976, the land occupied under
the building is not vacant land. It also covers the land on which any build-
C ing was in the process of construction on January 28, 1976 with the ap-
proval of the appropriate authority. That too is not "vacant iand".
Additionally, the land appurtenant to these two kirids of buildings is also
not "vacant land". The third category likewise conditioned is ·or land oc-
cupied by any building in an area where there are no building regulations,
which has been constructed before January 28, 1976 or is in the process of
D· construction on such date, and the land appurtenant to these two kinds of
buildings.

The. aforesaid three categories of lands would otherwise be "vacant
land" but for the definitional exclusion. The specific non-inclusion of these
three categories of land is by itself an integral part of the definitional and
E functional sphere. The question that arises what happens to lands over
which buildings are commenced after the appointed day and the building
progresses to complete thereafter. On the appointed day, these lands were
vacant lands, but not so thereafter because of the surface change. Here the
skill of the draftsman and the wisdom of the legislature comes to the fore in
cognizing and filling up the gap period and covering it up in the scheme of
F sub-section (9) of Section 4. The visible contrast between "vacant land" and
"any other land" held by a person on which there is a building with a
dwelling unit therein becomes prominent. The said "any other land" is
reckoned and brought at par with the "vacant land" for the purpose of
calculating the final extent of vacant land. It seems to us that the expression
"vacant land" in the first portion of the provision connotes land minus land
G under buildings constructed or in the process of construction before and
on the appointed day, and the expression "vacant land" in the latter portion
of the provision connotes the sum total of "vacant land" of the first order
and distinctly the "other land" on which is a building with a dwelling unit
therein of which construction commenced after the appointed day, and the
land appurtenant thereto. Such an interpretation is required by the conext
.. H
SMT. MEERA v. 5rATE [ PUNCHHI, J. J 511

as otherwise the concept of the appointed day and the gap period would be A
rendered otiose. The legislature cannot be accused to have indulged in
trickery or futility in giving something with one hand and taking it away
with the other. "Any other land" bi the sequence would thus mean any
other built-'Qpon land except the one excluded from the expression "vacant
land" on account of it being occupied by a building which s,tood con-
structed, or was in th~ .process of construction, on the appointed day. B
Such interpretation of ours finds support from Section 5 of the Act
which pursues and does not leave alone transfer of vacant land in the gap
period. It provides as follows:

"5. TRANSFER OF VACANT LAND - (1) ln,any State to C
which this Act applies in the first instance, where any person
who had held vacant la11d in excess of the ceiling limit at a11y
time 1during the period commencing on the appointed day and
ending with the comme11ceme11t of this Act, has tra11sfe1Ted such
la11d of part thereof by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or other-
wise, the extent of the land so tra11sfe1Ted shall also be taken into D
account in calculati11g the exte11t of vaca11t la11d held by such
perso11 and the excess vacant land in relation to such person
shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be selected out of the
vacant land held by him after such transfer and in case the
entire excess vacant land cannot be so selected, the balance,
or, where no vacant land is held by him after the transfer, the . E
entire excess vacant land, shall be selected out of the vacant
land held by the transferee:

Provided that where such person has transferred his vacant
land to more than one person, the balance, or, as the case may
be, the entire excess vacant land aforesaid, shall be selected F
out of the vacant land held by each of the transferees in the
same proportion as the area of the vacant land transferred to
him bears to the total area of the land transferred to all the
transferees.

(2) 'Where a11y excess vaca11t la11d is selected out of the vaca11t G
la11d tra11sfe1Ted 1111der sub-sectio11 (1), the tra11sfer of the excess
vaca11t land so selected shall be deemed to be null a11d void.
(3) In any State to which this Act applies in the first instance
and in any State which adopts this Act under clause (1) of
Article.252 of the Constitution, no person holding vacant land
H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) SUPP: 1 S. C.R.

in excess of. th~ ceiling limit immediately before the commen-
A .cement of this Act shall transfer any·such land or part thereof ·(
~
· by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise until he has
furnished "a statement under Section 6 and a notification
regarding the excess vacant land held by him has been publish-
ed under sub-section (1) of Section 10; and any such transfer
a- made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be
null and void." [Underlining ours]. The underlining is reflective
of the scheme of the Act in as much as transfers of vacant land·
within the gap period are ignorable, and likewise, in our view,
vacant land ·brought under construction of building by a person
within the g~p period is also ignorable for the purposes of
caJculating the extent of vacant land, so that the provisions of
c law are not defeated by human ingenuity. ·
At this juncture, sub-section (11) of Section 4 may be noticed. It
provides removal of doubts declaring, inter alia, that nothing in sub-section
(9) shall be construed as empowering the competent authority to declare
any land referred to in sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) 9f clause_ (q) of
D Section 2 as excess vacant land under this Chapter. Though this-provision is
not happily worded, yet when meaningfully construed in the context, it
means that a building which gets excluded by virtue of the definition of
"vacant land" gets clothed with the protective cloak for not being reckoned
again as any other land, over which there is a building with a dwelling unit
therein. Sub-section (11) of Section 4 means to convey that what is not
E vacant land under sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (q) of Section 2 cannot
go to add up as "vacant land" under sub-section (9) of Section 4 by descrip-
tive overlapping. If we wipe out the distinction of "vacant land" and "any
other land" as demonstrated in sub-section (9) of section 4, we strangulate ''¥-
and destroy the spifit and life-blood of the "appointed day" and the gap
period. We would loathe giving such a construction and would rather opt
F for a construction which carries out the objectives of the Act, primary of
which is to fix a ceiling limit on the holding of vacant lands, conditioned as
they are on the appointed day, and as held on the date of the commence-
ment of the Act.
It would be worthwhile at this stage to take note of the expression
G "land appurtenant" as defined in Section 2(g). When related to any building
in an area where there are building regulations, as well as in an area where
there are no building regulations, the additional extent as permitted is
based on the principle of contiguity. The expression applies to buildings
constructed before the "appointed day" as well as to buildings, construction
of which commenced before the "appointed day", and was in progress on
H that day. It, no doubt, applies to buildings,· constructed thereafter too.
SMT. MEERA v. STATE [ PUNCHHI, J.) 513

When we import this understanding to sub-section (9) of Section 4, two A
)f different results discernably follow, based on the commencement of the
construction. If the construction of a building with a dwelling unit therein
had begun after the appoint~d day, then it is all the same "any other land"
to be reckoned· for calculating the extent of vacant land held by a person.
And if the construction of a building with a dwelling unit therein on land
had been completed or was in progress by and on the appointee day, then
it is not "any othe.r land" to be reckoned for calculating the extent of vacant B
land held by a person. This is the interpretation which commends to us of
. sub-section (9) of Section 4 as also of sub-section (11) of Section 4 and the
definitive expressions used therein as explained and highlighted earlier.
Applying that interpretation on the facts found by the High Court we hold
that the built-up property, which in any event had been built-up prior to C
the commencement of the Act, and it is nobody's case that construction
thereof had begun after the "appointed day'', is outside the purview of
"vacant land". If that is excluded from being reckoned towards calculating
the extent of vacant land held by the predecessor-in- interest of the appel-
lant, the vacant land in the vacant property cannot be declared excess for
that is within the permissible limits. Even if no land is left as land appur- D
tenant to the built-up area, then 93.56 sq. mtrs, the remainder plus 339.65
sq. mtrs, of the unbuilt-property would total up to the figure less than 500
sq. mtrs.; again within the permissible limit. Therefore, interpretation to
the contrary of the dealt with provisions by the Division Bench of the High
Court, bereft as it is of the concept of the appointed,day and the gap
period, would have to give way, meriting the acceptance of this appeal and E
setting aside of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court by
issuing the necessary writ, direction and order so as to quash the entire
proceedings towards declaring excess land in the hands of the appellant
and her predecessor-in-title. We order accordingly. The interpretation we
have put to the provisions pertinently relate to sub-clause (ii) and (iii) of
clause (q) of Section 2. This interpretation in express terms cannot apply to F
sub-clause (i) of clause (q) of Section 2. Johnson's case (supra) as said
before, is a case under sub-clause (i) of clause (q) of Section 2. In the
instant case, there appears to be no oceasion to test its correctness or even
to dilate upon the judgments of the High Courts reported in AIR 1981
Madhya Pradesh 17, AIR 1984 Bombay 122 and AIR 1987 Allahabad 272,
cited at the bar. G
As a result, this appeal is allowed. The appellant shall have her costs
throughout.

T.N,A. Al'peal allowed.