Holding

The representation of a detenu need only be considered by the State Government, and any authorized officer may do so; the State complied with the Advisory Board reference requirement and did not cause unreasonable delay, rendering the detention order valid.

Summary

The Supreme Court dismissed a writ petition filed by the wife of Hasnain Mukhtar Hussain Lakdawala, who was detained under section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA). The petitioner challenged the validity of the detention on the ground that the representation made by the detenu was considered by the Minister of State for Home rather than by the officer who issued the detention order, and alleged that the State had not complied with the statutory requirement of referring the case to the Advisory Board or had caused unreasonable delay. The Court held that Article 22(5) merely requires the representation to be considered by the detaining authority – the State Government – and that any officer authorized to act for the State, such as the Minister of State, could validly consider it. It further held that the State had made a proper reference to the Advisory Board within the prescribed five‑week period and that there was no unreasonable delay in processing the representation. Consequently, the detention order and its confirmation under section 8(f) of COFEPOSA were upheld.

Issues considered

Whether the representation of a detenu under Article 22(5) must be considered by the same officer who passed the detention order under COFEPOSA.
Whether the State Government complied with the requirement of referring the detenu to the Advisory Board within five weeks as mandated by section 8(b) of COFEPOSA.
Whether there was an unreasonable delay by the State in considering the detenu's representation.
Whether the confirmation of the detention order under section 8(f) of COFEPOSA was valid.

Legislation cited

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974s. 3(1), s. 8(b), s. 8(f)
Constitution of Indias. Article 22(4), s. Article 22(5)
Rules of Business of the Government of Maharashtras. Rule 15

Subjects

preventive detentionCOFEPOSArepresentation of detenuAdvisory BoardArticle 22detention orderunreasonable delayRule of Business

Judgment

288

A SMT. MASUMA
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.

August 12, 1981
B
[P.N. BHAGWATI AHO V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.J

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities
Act, 1974-DetentiDn order passed by the Secretary to Government, but the
) .
c
-representation made by the detenu considered by the Minister of State-Whether
Such a consideration was not a valid and proper consideration and therefore the
detention:ttse/fwas invalid-Constitution of India, 1950, Article 22(5) read with
Rule 15 of the Rules of Business of Government of Maharashtra read with clauses
14, 5 and 6 of the Instructions issued thereunder and further standing orders dated
-
18th July, 1980-Clause (b) of section 8 of COFEPOSA, explained.

One Hasnain Mukhtar Hussain Lakdawala was detained by the Government j .
of Maharashtra by an order of detention dated 31st December, 1980 passed
D under section 3(1) of COFEPOSA, 1974. The order of detention was served on
the detenu on 17th January, 1981 along with a communication dated 31st
December, 1980 and a letter dated 7th January, 1981 was also served enclosing
copies of the documents relied upon in the grounds of detention. A Jetter dated
6th February, 1981 along with nine copies of the representation to be made by '
the detenue sent by the detenu's advocate to the Superintendent, Bombay Central
Prison, though handed over to the detenu by the prison authorities on the same
day was carried by the detenu to the Nasik Road Central Prison to which he
was shifted on that day. The requisite copies of the representation duly signed by
E the detenu were forwarded to the Government and the Chairman of the Advisory
Board on 10th February, 1981. The State Government, however, rejected the
representation by its letter dated 25th February, 1981. A copy of the representa-
tion sent to the Central Government was also rejected on 26th February 1981.
In the meantime, the case of the detenu was referred to the Advisory Board and
on 11th March 1981, when the detenu was called for an oral hearing, the detenu
handed over four copies of a further representation dated 11th March 1981,
praying for revocation of the detention order. The Advisory Board consi-
F dered the case and by its report dated 12th March 198! advised the State
Government that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the detenu, and ,
through its letter dated 16th March, 1981 apprised the detenu's advocate of the
position. The State Government thereafter confirmed the order of detention.
Hence the writ petition by the detenu's wife.

Dismissing the petition, the Court,
G
HELD: 1:1. There was ho constitutional or legal infirmity in the repre-
sentation of the detenu having been considered by the Minister of State for
Home. (294 BJ

1:2. The only requirement of Article 22(5) of the Constitution is that the
representation of detenu must be considered by the detaining authority which in
MASUMA v. MAHARASHTRA 289

the present case was the State Government and this requirement was clearly A
satisfied, because when the Minister of State for Home considered the repreiienta·
tion and rejeeted it, he was acting for the State Government and the considera-
(' tion and rejection of the representation was by the State Government. [293 G]

1:3. There is no requirement express or implied in any provision of
COFEPOSA that the same person who acts for the State Government in making
the order of detention mu<it also consider the representation of detenu. More- B
over, it would really be to the advantage of the detenu, if his representation is
not considered by the same individual but fresh mind is brought to bear upon it.
~ \ [293 H-294 BJ

In view of the clear provisions of Rule 15 of the Rules of Business of the

- Government o( Maharashtra, clauses 4 to 6 of the Instructions issued by the
Governor thereunder and the two standing orders dated 18th July 1980 it was
immaterial, whether P.V. Nayak condidered the representation and disposed it of,
or the Minister of State for Home did so, since both had authority to act for
c
the State Government and whatever be the instrumentality, it would be the
State Government which would be considering and dealing with the representa~
tion. [292 D-H; 293 F]

Smt. Kavita v. State of Maharashtra, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 138, followed.
D
2. The State Government did not commit any breach of its constitutional
or legal obligation in making a reference to the Advisory· Board without first
determining the period for which the detenu was to be detained. [296 OJ

2:2. It is not at all necessary for the detaining authority to apply its mind
and consider at the time of passing the order of detention or before making
a reference to the Advisory Board, as to what shall be the period of detention
E
and whether the detention is to be continued beyond a period of three months
or not. The only inhibition on the detaining authority is that it cannot lawfully
continue the detention for a period longer than three months unless the Advisory

..
Board has, before the expiration of the period of three months, reported that
there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention. [296 EaF]
_
2:3. The requirement of clause (4) of Article 22 of the Constitution is F
satisfied by the enactment of section 8(b) of the COFEPOSA. This provision for
reference to the Advisory Board is not confined to cases where the decaining
authority has already come to a decision that the detention shaH be continued
' for a period longer than three months. It applies equally where the detaining
authority has not yet made up its mind as to how long the detention shall
continue or even where the detention is to continue for a period of three months
or less. Whenever any order of detention is made, whether the detention is to G
continue for a period longer than three months or a period of three months or
less or the detaining authority has not yet applied its mind and determined how
long the detention shall be continued, the appropriate Government is bound
within five weeks from the date of detention to make a reference to the Advisory
Board and if it fails to do so, the continuance of the detention after the expiraa
tion of the period of five weeks should be rendered invalid. The Advisory Board H
is, in every such case where a reference is made, required to submit its report
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] I S.C.R.

A within eleven weeks from the date of detention and if it reports that there is in
j ·-
its opinion no sufficient cause for detention, the detaining authority is bound to
release the detenuforthwith, even though a period of three months may not have
expired since the date of detention. This is :a safeguard provided by the
COFEPOSA, which is applicable in all cases of detention, whether the detention
is to"be continued beyond a period of three months or not and whether or not
the detaining authority has applied its mind and determined, before making a
8 reference to the Advisory Board, as to what shall be the period of detention.
[295 F-296 E]

3. The State Government, in the instant case, cannot be said to be guilty
J
of any unreasonable delay, at any stage, in considering the representation of
the detenu. [297,D, 299 B, D]

c ORIGINAL JURJSDICTION : Writ Petition Criminal
of 1981.
No. 1892 -
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India

Ram Jethmalani, Vineet Kumar, M. G. Karmali and Naresh K.
Sharma for the Petitioner.
n
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BHAGWATI J.: This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus
for securing the release of one Hasnain Mukhtar Hussain Lakdawala
(hereinafter referred to as the detenu) who has been detained by the
E Government of Maharashtra under an order of detention dated 31st
December 1980 made in exercise of the powers conferred under
section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Preven·
tion of Smuggling Activities Act 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the
..
COFEPOSA. This order of detention though dated 31st December
F
1980 was served on the detenu on 17th January 1981 and alongwith ...
the order of detention, a communication, also dated 31st December
1980, was served on the detenu containing the grounds of detention.
The Government of Maharashtra also served on the detenu at the
same time a letter dated 7th January 198! enclosing copies of the ,
documents relied upon in the grounds of detention. It appears that
on 6th February 1981 the advocate of the detenu addressed a letter
G to the Superintendent, Bombay Central Prison where the detenu was
then confined and alongwith this Jetter he forwarded nine copies of
the representation which was to be submitted by the detenu to the
Government of Maharashtra against the order of detention. This
letter was delivered by the authorities in charge of the Bombay
H Central Prison to the detenu on 6th February 1981, but on the same
day the detenu was shifted from the Bombay Central Prison to Nasik
MASUMA v. MAHARASHTRA (Bhagwati, J.) 291

\ Road Central Prison and the nine copies of the representation were
A
therefore carried by the detenu with him to the Nasik Road Central
Prison and from there, the requisite number of copies of the repre-
sentation duly signed by the detenu were forwarded to the Govern·
ment of Maharashtra and the Chairman of the Advisory Board on
I 0th February 1981. This representation was however rejected by

.
B
the Government of Maharashtra by its letter dated 25th February
1981. It appears that a copy of the representation was also sent by
\ the detenu to the Central Government and by its letter dated 26th
February 1981 the Central Government too rejected the representa·
tion. In the meantime, the case of the detenu was referred to the
Advisory Board and on 11th March 1981, the detenu was called for
• an oral hearing by the Advisory Board and at this meeting the
c
detenu handed over to the Chairman and Members of the Advisory
Board four copies of a further representation dated I Ith March 1981
addressed by him jointly to the Chairman and the Members of the
Advisory Board and the Government of Maharashtra praying that the
Government of Maharashtra may be pleased to revoke the order of
D
detention and set the detenu at liberty. The Advisory Board consi-
dered the case of the detenu and by a letter dated 16th March 1981,
the Secretary of the Advisory Board intimated to the advocate of
the detenu that the Advisory Board had by its report dated 12th
March 1981 advised the Government of Maharashtra that there was
sufficient cause for the detention of the detenu. The State Govern-
ment thereafter in exercise of the powers conferred under clause (f) E
of section 8 passed an order dated 23rd March 1981 reciting the
opinion given by the Advisory Board and confirming the order of the
detention. The petitioner who is the wife of the detenu thereupon
preferred the present writ petition challenging the order of detention
• made by the Government of Maharashtra as also the continuance of
the detention under the subsequent order dated 23rd March 1981.
F

There were several grounds urged on behalf of the petitioner in
' support of the petition and each one of them was seriously pressed
before us by Mr. Jethmalani on behalf of the petitioner. The first
ground was that the order of detention was made by one P. V. G
Nayak, Secretary to Government, Revenue and Forest Department
and Ex-Officio Secretary to Government, Home Department while
the representation made by the detenu against the order of detention
was considered and disposed of by the Minister of State for Home
Affairs not by P. V. Nayak and hence there was no effective consi- H
deration of the representation of the detenu as required by law. The
argument on behalf of the detenu was that the representation of a
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] I S.C.R.

A detenu must be considered by the same person who has passed the
order of detention and since in the present case, the representation
'
was considered by a different person, it was not a valid and proper
consideration of the representation and the continuance of the deten-
tion of the detenu was therefore invalid. There was also another
related ground urged on behalf of the petitioner and it was that the
B Minister of State for Home affairs who considered the representation
of the detenu was not competent to do so, both by reason of lack
of authority as also in view of the fact that the case had already j
been dealt with by P. V. Nayak. We do not think there is any subs-
tance in either of these two grounds. If we look at the order of the
detention, it is clear that it was not made by P. V. Nayak in his indi-
c vidual capacity as an officer of the State Government but it was made
by him as representing the State Government. It was the State
Government which made the order of detention acting through the
instrumentality of P. V. Nayak, Secretary to Government who was
authorised so to act for and on behalf of and in the name of the /
State Government nnder the Rules of Business. Rule 15 of the Rules
D of Business of the Government of Maharashtra provided that those
Rnles may "to such extent as necessary be supplemented by instruc-
tions to be issued by the Governor on the advice of the Chief
Minister" and in exercise of the power conferred under this Rule, the
Governor of Maharashtra issued Instructions for the more conve-
nient transaction of the business of the Government. Clauses (4), (5)
E and (6) of these Instructions as they stood at the material time provi-
ded inter alia as under : "

4. Except as otherwise provided in these Instructions, cases
shall ordinarily be disposed of by, or under the autho-
F rity, of the Minister-in-charge, who may by means of
standing orders give such directions as he thinks fit for
the disposal of cases in the Department, Copies of such
standing orders shall be sent to the Governor.and the
Chief Minister.

G 5. Each Minister shall arrange with the Secretary of the
Department what matters or classes of matters are to
be brought to his personal notice.

6. Except as otherwise provided in these instructions, cases
H shall be submitted by the Secretary in the Department
to which the case belongs to the Minister-in-charge.
MASUMA v. MAHARASHTRA (Bhagwati, J.) 293

Pursuant to the instructions contained in these clauses, Shri A
',. A. R. Antulay, Chief Minister of Maharashtra and Minister incharge
of the Home Department, issued a Standing Order dated 18th July
1980 directing that cases under sub-section (I) of section 3 of the
COFEPOSA Act need not be submitted to him or to the Minister of
State for the Home Department and that such cases may be allotted
to and disposed of by any of the six officers mentioned there one of B
them being P. V. Nayak. On the same day, another Standing Order
was issued by Sh. A. R. Antulay Chief Minister of Maharashtra and
Minister-in-charge of Home Department in pursuance of the provi·
sions contained in Rule 6 of the Rules of Business. directing inter alia
that all cases appertaining to the COFEPOSA Act and all other
matters arising under the provisions of that Act may be allotted to c
the Minister of State for Home Affairs. This latter Standing Order
provided that nothing contained in it shall affect the directions con-
tained in the earlier Standing Order issued on the same day. It will
therefore be seen that P. V. Nayak was authorised under the earlier
Standmg Order dated 18th July 1980 to deal with and dispose of
cases under sub·section (I) of section 3 of the COFEPOSA and it D
was in exercise of the authority thus conferred upon him that P. V.
Nayak acting for the State Government made the order of detention
against the assessee under sub·section (I) of section 3. It was the
State Government which made the order of detention and not P. V.
Nayak in his individual capacity. The representation made by the
detenu against the order of detention was also therefore required to E
be considered by the State Government and either it could be disposed
of by P. V. Nayak acting for the State Government under the earlier
Standing Order dated 18th July 1980 or the Minister of State for
Home could dispose it of under the later Standing Order dated 18th
July 1980. Whether P. V. Nayak considered the representation and
disposed it of or the Minister of State for Home did so would be F
• im 11aterial, since both had authority to act for the State Government
and whatever be the instrumentality, whether P. V. Nayak or the
\ Minister of State for Home, it would be the State Government which
would be considering and dealing with the representation. The only
requirement of Article 22 (5) is that the representation of the detenu
must be considered by the detaining authority which in the present case G
is the State Government and this requirement was clearly satisfied
because when the Minister of State for Home considered the repre-
sentation and rejectec it, he was acting for the State Government and
the consideration and rejection of the representation was by the
State Government. There is no requirement express or implied in H
any provision of the COFEPOSA that the same person who acts for
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] J S.C.R.

A the State Government in making the order of detention must also
consider the representation of the detenu. In fact, as pointed out by
Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Smt. Kavita v. State of Maharashtra(') a Go-
vernment business can never get through if the same individual has to
act for the Government in every case or proceeding or transaction,
however advantageous it may be to do so." Moreover it would really
B be to the advantage of the detenu if his representation is not consider-
ed by the same individual but fresh mind is brought to bear upon it.
We do not therefore see any constitutional or legal infirmity in the
)
representation having been considered by the Minister of State
for Home.

c The next contention of Mr. Jethmalani on behalf of the petitio-
ner was that there was nothing to show that the decision to confirm
the order of detention and continue the detention of the detenu was
taken by the State Government as required by clause (f) of section 8
and hence the continuance of the detention was invalid. It is really
difficult to appreciate this contention urged on behalf of the petitioner.
D H is clear from the annexures to the writ petition that after receipt
of the opinion of the Advisory Board that there was in its opinion
sufficient cause for the detention of the detenu, the State Government
in exercise of the powers conferred under clause (fJ of section 8,
made an order dated 23rd March 1981 confirming the detention order
and continuing the detention of the detenu. This order was expre-
E
ssed to be made "By Order and in the name of the Governor of
Maharashtra" and was authenticated by the Under Secretary to the
Government of Maharashtra Home Department. It recited in so
many terms that it was the State Government which was confirming
the order of detention and continuing the detention of the detenu
and no material has been placed before us on behalf of the detenu
F
to displace the correctness of this recital. There can therefore be no
doubt that the ord,r confirming the detention of the detenu was
made by the State Government. Moreover, we have the statement
on oath made by C. V. Karnik, Assistant Secretary to the Govern· j

ment of Maharashtra, Home Department that "the Government of
Maharashtra thereafter under clause (f) of section 8 of the said Act
G
confirmed the said detention order by an order dated 23rd
March 1981."

It was then contended by Mr. Jethmalani on behalf of the
petitioner that under clause (b) of section 8 it was the obligation of
H
(!) [ 1982] I SCR 138.
MASUMA v. MAHARASHTRA {Bhagwati, J.) 295

\ the State Government to make a reference to the Adfisory Board A
' within five weeks from the date of detention of the detenu and there
was nothing to show that the State Government had made such a
reference to the Advisory .Board. This contention is also without
substance and totally futile, because it is clear from the statement of
C. V. Karnik in his affidavit that it was the State Government which
referred the case of the detenu to the Advisory Board under clause B
{b) of section 8 and no material has been placed before us on behalf of
the detenu controverting the correctness of this statement. Mr. Jeth-
malani also raised another contention in this connection and it was
that, before making a reference to the Advisory Board, the State
Government had not applied its mind to the question whether it was
necessary to detain the detenu for a period longer than three months c
and this non application of mind vitiated the reference to the Advi-
sory Board and the subsequent order of confirmation following upon
it. The argument of Mr. Jethmalani was that it was only if the State
Government decided to detain a person for a period longert han
three months that it was required to refer the case of such person to
the Advisory Board and it was therefore necessary for the State 0
Government in every case of detention to apply its mind and consi-
der at least before making a reference to the Advisory Board whether
the detention was to be continued for a period longer than three
months. We are of the view that this argument is not well founded
and must be rejected. It is clear that under clause (4) of Article 22
no law providing for preventive detention can authorise the detention E
of a person for a period longer than three months unless the Advi-
sory Board has reported before the expiration of the period of three
months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention.
This requirement of clause (4) of Article 22 is satisfied by the enact-
ment of section 8 in the COFEPOSA. Section 8 clause {b) provides
that in case of every detentior., the appropriate Go·;ernment shall, F
within five weeks from the date of detention, make a reference to the
Advisory Board and the Advisory Board is required to make a report
' as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the
detenu and submit the same to the appropriate Government within
eleven weeks from the date of detention of the detenn. The period
of eleven weeks from the date of detention is prescribed for the sub- G
mission of the report obviously because under clause (4) of Article
22 no detention can lawfully continue for a period longer than three
months unless the Advisory Board has reported before the expiration
of the period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient
cause for such detention. But one thing is clear that this provision
H
for reference to the Advisory Board is not confined to cases where
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 1 S.C.R.

A the detaining authority has already come to a decision that the dete,1- )
tion shall be continued for a period longer than three months. It '
applies equally where the detaining authority has not yet made up
its mind as to how long the detention shall continue or even where
the detention is to continue for a period of three months or Jess.
Whenever any order of detention is made, whether the detention is
B to continue for a period longer than three months or a period of
three months or Jess or the detaining authority has not yet applied
its mind and determined how long the detention shall be continued,
the appropriate Government is bound within five weeks from the
date of detention to make a reference to the Advisory Board and if
it fails to do so, the continuance of the detention after the expiration
c of the period of five weeks would be rendered invalid. The Advisory
Board is, in every such case where a reference is made, required to
submit its report within eleven weeks from the date of detention and
if it reports that there is in its opinion no sufficient cause for detention
the detaining authority is bound to release the detenu forthwith, even
D though a period of three months may not have expired since the date
)

of detention. This is a safeguard provided by the COFEPOSA Act,
which is applicable in all cases of detention, whether the detention
is to be continued beyond a period of three months or not and
whether or not the detaining authority has applied its mind and
determind, before making a reference to the Advisory Board, as to
E what shall be the period of detention. We are clearly of the view
that it is not at all necessary for the detaining authority to apply its
mind and consider at the time of passing the order of detention or
before making a reference to the Advisory Board, as to what shall be
the period of detention and whether the detention is to be continued
beyond a period of three months or not. The only inhibition on the
F detaining authority is that it cannot lawfully continue the detention
for a period longer than three months unless the Advisory Board has,
before the expiration of the period of three months, reported that
three is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention. We must
therefore hold that the State Government did not commit any breach
of its constitutional or legal obligation in making a reference to the
Advisory Board without first determining the period for which the
G
detenu was to be detained.

Mr. Jethmalani on behalf of the pet1t10ner lastly submitted
that there was unreasonable delay on the part of the State Govern·
ment in considering the representation of the detenu and this delay
H
was fatal to the validity of the continuance of the detention. This /
contention is also without substance and must be rejected. It is no
MASUMA v. MAHARASHTRA (Bhagwati, J.) 297

doubt true that the advocate of the detenu sent nine copies of the A
representation to the detenu on 6th February, 1981 and these nine
copies came to be forwarded to various authorities only on I 0th
February, 1981 but the affidavit of B. B. Mulay, Jailer attached to
the Bombay Central Prison, shows that these nine copies were handed
over by B. B. Mulay to the detenu as soon as they were received by
him from the emissary of the detenu's advocate and the detenu got B
these documents on the same day, namely 6th Februa,y, 1981. B. B.
Mulay asked the detenu to sign the representation and hand over
the same for being forwarded to the State Government but the detenu
stated that he would sign the representation only after going through
it and he therefore carried the nine copies of the representation with
him to the Nasik Central Jail where he was shifted in the evening of c
6th February, 1981 and it was only on 10th February, 1981 that he
signed all the nine copies of the representation and handed over the
same to C. P. Gaekwad, Jailer, In-charge of the Nasik Central Prison
and according to the affidavit of C. P. Gaekwad, these nine copies of
the representation duly signed by the detenu were forwarded to the
respective authorities on the same day. There was therefore noun- D
reasonable delay on the part of the State authorities at this stage.

Proceeding further we find that the representation sent by the
detenu was received in the Home Department of the State Govern-
ment on 13th February, 1981 and on the same day, a letter was
E
addressed by the Home Department to the Collector of Customs
callir g for his remarks in regard to the various allegations contained
in the representation and parawise comments were received from the
Customs Department on 21st February, 1981. Now, it cannot be
said that the Government acted unreasonably in forwarding the
representation of the detenu to the Collector of Customs and waiting
F
for the para-wise comments of the Customs Authorities, since there
were various allegations made in the representation which called for
the comments of the Customs Department and without such comme-
nts, the State Government could not fairly and properly consider
the repres~ntation of the detenu. It may be noted that the communi-
cation from the Home Department dated 13th February, 1981 could
G
not have reached the Collector of Customs until 16th February, 1981
because 14th and 15th February were Saturday and Sunday and
therefore closed holidays. The reply of the Customs Authorities
which was received on 21st February 1981 must have been despat-
ched on 20th February and therefore the Customs Authorities did
not have more than four or five days within which to give their H
comments in regard to the various allegations contained in the repre-
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) I s.c.R.
A sentation ot the detenu and this time taken by the Customs Authori-
ties cannot be regarded as unreasonable. We do not think that in
these circumstances the State Government could be said to be guilty
of any unreasonable delay so far as the period between 13th February
and 21st February, 198l is concerned.
B There was also no unreasonable delay after 21st February,
1981. The affidavit of C. V. Karnik shows that the representation of
the detenu was immediately put up before the Minister of State for r
Home for consideration, in the light of the comments received from
the Customs Authorities and the representation was considered and
rejected by the Minister of State for Home on 23rd February, ·"
c 1981 and necessary intimation to that effect was conveyed to """ 'j

the detenu by a letter dated 25th February 1981. It is
impossible to hold in these circumstances that there was any
unreasonable delay on the part of the State Government in consider-
ing the representation of the detenu and this contention of Mr. Jeth- j
malani must be rejected.
D
These were all the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner
and since there is no substance in them, the petition fails and
is dismissed. •

E S. R. Petition dismissed.
_,

)