Holding

Under Rules 7(b) and 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, the Commandant is the appointing authority and the DIG, being senior, may lawfully dismiss a Subedar (Inspector) without prior IG approval, making the dismissal order legal.

Summary

The appellant, Kanta Devi, challenged the dismissal of her husband, a Subedar (Inspector) of the CRPF, which was ordered by the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) under the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955. The High Court had quashed the dismissal, holding that prior approval of the Inspector General (IG) was required, but the Union of India appealed. The Supreme Court examined Rules 7(b) and 27, concluding that the Commandant is the appointing authority and that the DIG, being senior to the Commandant, can lawfully dismiss a Subedar without IG approval. The Court also held that where punishment is not disproportional to proved charges, courts should not interfere, and noted the lack of full disciplinary records. Consequently, the dismissal order was upheld and the appellant was awarded an ex‑gratia payment of Rs. 2.5 lakh. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the DIG has authority to dismiss a Subedar (Inspector) under CRPF Rules without prior IG approval.
Whether Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules requires prior approval of the IG for dismissal.
Whether the dismissal was disproportionate to the charges proved against the employee.
Whether the court can interfere in disciplinary dismissals that are not disproportionate.
Whether an ex‑gratia payment is warranted in the circumstances.

Legislation cited

Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955s. Rule 27, s. Rule 7(b)

Subjects

service lawdisciplinary dismissalcentral reserve police forceinterpretation of statutesproportionality of punishmentex-gratiarule of constructioncivil appellate jurisdiction

Judgment

A SMT. KANTA DEVI
V.
--
'

UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.

MARCH 12, 2003

B [SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND ARIJJT PASAYAT, 11.]

Service Law:

Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1955-Central Reserve Police Force
C Rules, 1955-Rules 7B and 27·-Dismissal order of Subedar (Inspector) by
Deputy Inspector General (DIG)-Justification of-Held: Since Commandant
is the appointing authority and Subedar (Inspector) can be dismissed or
removedjl·om the force by DIG, who is higher in rank than the Commandant,
thus dismissal order passed by DIG is legal-Ex-gratia amount-Payment
D of-Directed.

Disproportionate punishment-Interference-Scope of-Held: In cases
where punishmem is found not disproportionate to the proved charges
interference is not called for-Constitution of India, 1950.

E Interpretation of Statutes:

Rules of construction-Held: Words should not be read into a statute
unless it is absolutely necesswy to do so.

legal Maxims:
F Causus omissus-Discussed.

Appellant's husband-d-;:ceased employee (Subedar Inspector) was
charged with mis-conduct. On the basis of departmental enquiry he was
dismissed from service in terms of order passed by Deputy Inspector
G General of Police(DIGi. Employee filed a statutory appeal challenging the
dismissal order which was dismissed. Single Judge of High Court quashed
the dismissal order and directed re-instatement with consequential benefits
on the ground that DIG could not have removed the employee without
prior approval of the IG. Aggrieved respondent filed an appeal. Divisiqn
Bench referring to Rules 7(1) and 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force
H 992
KANTA DEVI v. U.0.1. 993
Rules, 1955 held that Commandant is the appointing authority and not A
JG; and DIG being an officer superior to Commandant had authority to
pass the order of dismissal, and restored the dismissal order.

Appellant contended that the Division Bench was not correct in
interpreting Rule 27 which prescribes the procedure for award of
punishment; that for the purpose of appointment or promotion, approval B
of the IG is necessary thus, approval is required in case of dismissal also;
that ·in view of unblemished service records of the employee, the
punishment of dismissal was highly disproportionate to the allegations
made and also debarring the family of th.e employee of the pensionary
benefits was not just; that the records of the proceedings were not C
produced on fallacious premises that they were not available, had the
records been produced it could have been proved that the punishment of
dismissal was disproportionate to the allegations made; and that the
allegations were not of such grave magnitude as to warrant dismissal.

Respondents contended that requirement of approval by the IG as D
a condition precedent to effectuate an order passed by the prescribed
authority, is clearly not warranted; that the disciplinary authorities after
due consideration of the materials on record came to hold that order of
dismissal would be proper; and that it has not been shown as to how the
same is disproportionate to the proved charges.
E
Disposing of the appeal, the Court

HELD: I. Rules 7 and 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules,
1955 show that while for the purpose of appointment, the approval of the
DIG or the IG, as th~ case may be, is required to be obtained, that does
not make the IG, the·appointing authority; and as per Rule 7(b) the F
appointing authority is the Commandant and this does not change the
position of the Commandant as the appointing authority. Further under
Rule 27, procedure for award of punishment, Subedar (Inspector) can be
dismissed or removed from the Force by the Deputy Inspector General of
Police, who is higher in rank than the Commandant. Therefore as per Rule G
7(b) the appointing authority is the Commandant and since the DIG is of
higher rank, there is no illegality in the dismissal order passed by him.
Therefore, the conclusion of the Division Bench in holding that the order
of dismissal passed by the DIG was legal, does not suffer from any
infirmities warranting interference. [997-G, H; 998-D, G]
H
994 SUPREME COURT.REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A State of Assam v. Kripanath Sarma and Ors., AIR (1967) SC 459,
referred to.

2. The submission that approval of IG is required if accepted, would
mean addition of words or expressions in Rule 27. It is not a case of causus
omissus. A construction which requires for its support, addition of words
B has to be avoided. The words of a statute never shared, in interpretation,
be added or subtracted from without almost a necessity. It is contrary to
all rules of construction to read words into a statute unless it is absolutely
necessary to do so. Courts cannot reframe the words used by the
Legislature as it has no power to legislate. A matter which, for the sake
C of argument, should have been provided but has not been provided for in
a statute cannot be supplied by the Courts as to do so will be legislation
and not construction. There is no presumption that a casus omissus exists,
and language permitting the Courts should avoid creating a casus omissus
where there is none. Johnson v. Moreton, [1978] 3 All E.R. 37 (H.L.),
referred to. (998-E-G]
D
Dr. Baliram Waman Hirayv.Mr. Justice B. Lentin and Ors., AIR (1988]
SC 2267, referred to.

3. There is no scope for interference in a case where punishment is
found not disproportionate to the proved charges that too in exceptional
E cases. The Single Judge or the Division Bench of High Court did not
consider thr.se stands. But only on the ground that DIG had no competence
to pass the order of dismissal, the order was quashed. In appeal, Division
Bench only dealt with legality of that conclusion. There is no definite
material as to whether these pleas were pressed into service before the
F High Court. No other aspect was considered. But, as records of disciplinary
proceedings are not available, but some particulars of the charges and the
conclusions are available on record, they are not sufficient to conclude one
way or the other. Therefore, taking into account past service records and
non-availability of full records of the disciplinary proceedings, the interest
of justice would be best served if on the peculiar facts Rupees 2.5 lacs is
G paid as ex-gratia payment by the respondents to the appellant. [999-B-D]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2313 of2003.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.08.2001 of the Delhi High
Court in L.P.A. No. 55 of 1996.
H
KANTA DEVI v. U.0.1. [ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.) 995
N.L. Bareja, Chander Shekhar Ashri and Naresh Kumar for the A
Appellant.

R.N. Trivedi, Additional Solicitor Gen.era!, K.S. Bhati, Ms. Aishwarya
Bhati and Ms.· Sushma Suri for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B
ARJJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.

Ansuya Parshad, husband of the appellant (hereinafter referred to as
'deceased employee') was charged with mis-conduct and on the basis of a
departmental enquiry held under the Central Reserve Police Force Rules,. C
1955 (in short 'the Rules') framed under Central Reserve Police Force Act,
1955 (in short 'the Act') was dismissed from service, in terms of an order
dated 26.6.1980 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (in short
'the DIG'). Said order of dismissal was challenged in a statutory appeal
under Rule 28 of the Rules which was dismissed. Matter was taken by a writ
petition to the Delhi High Court, and a learned Single Judge quashed the D
order of removal and directed re-instatement with consequential benefits. The
sole ground on which interference was made by learned Single Judge was
that the scheme of the Rules is such that either in the case of appointment or
promotion, prior approval of the Inspector General of Police (in short 'the
JG') is imperative. As a natural corollary any termination without approval E
of the IG, as in the present case, would-be bad in law. It was, therefore, held
that the order of dismissal passed by the DIG was non est. It was further
observed that DIG could not have removed the petitioner without prior
approval of the JG. Matter was taken in appeal by the Union of India by a
Letters Patent Appeal before the same Court. By the impugned order, the
order of dismissal has been restored; on the ground that the construction put F
by learned Single Judge is unsound. Reference was made to Rules 7(b) and
27 to conclude that the IG is not the appointing authority; Commandant was

- the appointing authority; DIG being an officer superior to Commandant had
authority to pass the order of dismissal.
G
In view of the aforesaid background it is unnecessary to deal into the
factual aspects in detail, except noting that the deceased employee was
appointed as a Naik in Central Reserve Police Force (in short 'the CRPF') on
28.9.1959. ·He was promoted as a Subedar (Inspector) on 30.1.1975, which
was made by the Commandant with prior approval of the IG as required
under Rule 7(b) of the Rules. Since the employee had died on 10.7.1999 H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 2 S.C.R.

A during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, the present appellant
was substituted in his place.

In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the Division Bench was not correct in its interpretation of Rule 27 of the
Rules which prescribes the procedure for award of punishment. For the purpose
B of appointment or promotion, approval of the JG is necessary. Therefore,
requirement of approval; in case of dismissal also is a natural corollary. It
was further submitted that in view of unblemished service records of the
employee, the punishment of dismissal was highly dis-proportionate looking
into the allegations which led to the departmental proceedings. It was submitted
C that as a consequence of order of dismissal, even the pensionary benefits
would not be available to the family Of the deceased employee. That cannot
be a just proposition if the unblemished service career of the deceased
employee is taken note of. As noticed by the Division Bench, the records of
. the proceedings were not produced on fallacious premises that they were not
available. Had the records been produced it could have been proved that the
D punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the allegations made. In the
proceedings, main allegations were against another person. The only allegation
against the deceased employee was that he failed to keep proper watch over
the other employees. The allegations were not of such grave magnitude as to
warrant dismissal.
E Per contra, Mr. R.N. Trivedi, Additional Solicitor General submitted
that the view expressed by 'the Division Bench is on terra farma and on a
plain reading of the relevant provisions, requirement of approval by the JG
as a condition precedent to effectuate an order passed by the prescribed
authority, is clearly not warranted. He further submitted that the disciplinary
F authorities after due consideration of the materials on record came to hold
that order of dismissal would be proper. It has not been shown as to how the
same is disproportionate to the proved charges.

Rules 7 and 27 of the Rules deal with appointment other than that of
superior officers and procedure for the award of punishments respectively.
G They read as follows:

"Rule 7:

(a) Officers and men mentioned in Rules 5(b) and 5(c) shall be
appointed:
H
KANTA DEVI v. U.O.l. [ARIJIT PASA YAT, J.] 997
(I) by direct recruitment; A
(2) by deputation from Army or State Police Forces;

(3) by promotion as laid down in Chapter IX.

(b) ·The authority to make appointments to the various non-gazetted
ranks shall be the Commandant, provided that in the case of Sub- B
Inspectors and Subedar (Inspector) prior approval of the Deptity
Inspector Ge~eral of Police and the Inspector General respectively
shall be obtained.

(c) Non-gazetted officers and men ~fall ranks shall be enroUed subject
to sub-rule (b) above by the Commandant i_n the manner prescribed C
in Section 5 and be appointed by him as members of the Force after
such period of training as he may consider necessary.

Rule 27: Procedure for the award of punishment. (a)(The punishment
shown as in items I tu 11 in column 2) of the Table below may be D
inflicted on non-gazetted officers and men of the various ranks shown
in each of the heading of columns 3 to 6, by the authorities named
below such headings under the conditions mentioned in column 7.

TABLE

S.No. Punishment Subcdar Suh-Ins. Others Const. Remarks E
(Inspector) Inspector except and
enrolled enrolled
followers foilowers

I. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

I. Disrhissal or DIGP DIGP Commandant Commandant To be F
removal fron1 inflicted
the Force after formal
Departmental
enquiry

A bare reading of the provisions show that while for the purpose Of G
appointment, the approval of the DIG or the lG, as the case may be, is
required to be obtained, that does not make the JG, the appointing authority.
The punishments shown as items I to 11 in column 2 of the table cail be
imposed on non-gazetted officers and men of various ranks by the authorities
named under headings at columns 3 to 6 in terms of the conditions mentioned
in column 7. So far as item No. I in Rule 27 is concerned, Subedar (Inspector) H
..(_·

998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003J 2 s.c_.R.

A can be d~smissed or removed from the Force by the Deputy Inspector General
of Police, who is higher in rank than the Commandant. While considering an
almost identical provision, this Court h_eld that even when prior
recommendation is necessary,. it does not make the recommending/approving
authority the appointing authority. (See State of Assam v. Kripanath Sarma
and Ors., AIR (1967) SC 459. In that case, the question was whether the
B Deputy Inspector of Schools in his capacity as the Assistant Secretary of the
State Bo11rd, could terminate the service of the concerned employees in view
of Section 14(3)(iii) of the Assam Elementary Education Act (No.30) of 1962
read with Section I 8 of the Assam General Clauses Act (No.II) of 1915. It
was held that as the Assistant Secretary did not have complete power to
C appoint teachers, he can do so on the advice of the Advisory Board. Even
assuming that recommendation of the Committee is necessary before
appointment is made by the Assistant Secretary, the fact still remains that it
is not the committee which appoints _,1d the appointing authority is the
Assistant Secretary.

D According to Rule 7(b ), the appointing authority is the Commandant
and since the DIG is of higher rank, there is no illegality in the order passed
by him in passing the order of dismissal. Just because the !G's approval is
required for the purpose of appointment or promotion, the position of. the
Commandant as the appointing authority is not changed and the JG does not
E become the appointing authority. If the submission made is accepted, it would
mean addition of words or expressions in Rule 27. It is not a case of causus
omissus as contended. A construction which requires for its support, addition
of words has to be avoided. The words of a statute never shared, in
interpretation, be added or subtracted from without almost a necessity. It is
contrary to all rules of construction to read_ words into a statute unless it is
F absolutely necessary to do so. Courts cannot reframe the words used by the
Legislature as it has nc power to legislate. A matter which, for the sake of
argument, should have been provided but has not been provided for in a
statute cannot be supplied by the Courts as to do so will be legislation and
not construction. (See Johnson v. Moreton, (1978) 3 All E.R. 37 (H.L.), Dr.
G Baliram Waman Hiray v. Mr. Justice B. Lentin and Ors., AIR (1988) SC
2267). There is no presumption that a casus omissus exists, and language
permitting the Courts should avoid creatin2 a casus omissus where there is
none: Therefore, the conclusion of the Division Bench in holding that the
order of dismissal passed by the DIG was legal, does not suffer from any
infirmity to warrant interference.
H
KANTA DEVI v. U.0.1. [ARIJITPASAYAT,J.] 999
However, the other questions raised by the appellant need consideration. A
Undisputedly, the order of dismissal was passed in disciplinary proceedings.
Referring to the nature of allegations, it was highlighted that when for more
than 20 years the deceased employee had rendered unblemished service order
of dismissal should not have been passed.

There is no scope for interference in a case where punishment is found B
not disproportionate to the proved charges that too in exceptional cases. It is
to be noted that there was no consideration of these aspects by learned Single
Judge or the Division Bench. Before learned Single Judge such a stand appears
to have been taken. But only on the ground that DIG had no competence to
pass the order of dismissal, the order was q~ashed. In appeal, Division Bench C
only dealt with legality of that conclusion. There is no definite material as to
whether these pleas were pressed into service before the High Court. No
other aspect was considered. But, as noted above, records of disciplinary
proceedings are not available, but some particulars of the charges and the
conclusions are available on record. They are not sufficient to conclude one
way or the other. Taking into account past service records and non-availability D
of full records of the disciplinary proceedings, the interest of justice would
be best served if on the peculiar facts· Rupees 2 .5 lacs is paid as ex-gratia
payment by the respondents to the appellant within two months from today.

The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

N.J. Appeal disposed of.