Holding

A statutory tenancy in commercial premises is heritable, and the heirs of a deceased statutory tenant are entitled to the protection against eviction afforded by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

Summary

The appellant's husband was a tenant of a shop under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. After the landlord served a notice of termination, the tenant died while still in possession as a statutory tenant. The widow and heirs claimed the right to remain in possession and the protection against eviction provided by the Act. The High Court held that statutory tenancy was not heritable for commercial premises and ordered eviction. The Supreme Court held that the definition of "tenant" in the Act includes any person continuing in possession after termination, giving the statutory tenant an estate that is heritable; the amendment restricting heirs' rights applies only to residential premises. Consequently, the heirs of a commercial statutory tenant inherit the tenancy and are entitled to the Act's protection. The appeal was allowed and the case remanded to the High Court for disposal on merits.

Issues considered

The definition of "tenant" under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and its application to statutory tenants of commercial premises.
Whether a statutory tenancy in respect of commercial premises is heritable upon the tenant's death.
Whether the heirs of a deceased statutory tenant are entitled to protection against eviction under the Act.
Whether the 1976 amendment restricting heirs' rights applies to commercial premises.

Legislation cited

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14, s. 14-25, s. 15, s. 2(1)(ii), s. 2(1)(iii), s. 3, s. 4-13, s. 50
Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 18 of 1976)s. 2(1)(iii)
Indian Easements Act, 1882s. 52
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961s. 14, s. 2(i)
Transfer of Property Acts. 106

Subjects

statutory tenancyheritable tenancycommercial premisesDelhi Rent Control Actevictionlandlord-tenant lawsuccessionrent control amendmentprotection against eviction

Judgment

I

SMT. GIAN DEVI ANAND
A
v.
JEEVAN KUMAR AND OTHERS

May 1, 1985
B
[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P.N. BHAGWATI, S. MURTAZA
FAZAL ALI, AMARENDRA NATH SEN AND
V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.j

Delhi Rini Control Act, 1958, ss. 14(1)(a) and 15(1)-Helrs of a dtceastd
tenant-Whether enjoy protection under the Act-Commercial tenancY-Whether c
heritable.

The appellant's husband was the tenant in respect of a shop under the
respondent-landlord since 1979. In 1970 the respondent-landlord served a notice
on the appellant's husband determining the tenancy. Thereafter, he filed a
petition under section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 for eviction of the D
tenant from the said shop on several grounds including the grounds of non·
• payment of rent and sub-letting. The Rent Controller dismissed the petition .
Against the order of the Rent Controller the respondent-landlord preferred an
appeal bef9re the Rent Control Tribunal and the tenant filed cross-objections.
During the pendency of the appeal, the tenant died and the present appelJant
was substituted. The Rent Control Tribunal remanded the case to the Rent
Controller to decide the question of sub-letting afresh after affording an E
opportunity to the parties to lead evidence.

Aggrieved by the order of the Rent Control Tribunal, the appellant filed
an appeal in the High Court. The respondent-landlord filed cross-objection
and further raised a contention that in view of the death of the original
tenant who continued to remain in possession of the shop as a statutory tenant, F
the widow and the heirs of the deceased-tenant were not entitled to coutinuc
to remain in occupation thereof. The High Court allowed the cross-objection
filed by the respondent-landlord and passed a decree for eviction against the
appellant mainly on the ground that the protection afforded to the statutory
tenant by the Act was not available to the heirs and the legal representatives.

In appeal to this Court the appellant while relying upon Damadi Lal and G
Ors. v. Parashram and Ors. [1976] Supp. S.CR. 645 and V. Dhanapa/ Chettiar
v. Yesodai Ammal [1980] 1 S.C.R. 334, contended that notwithstandina the
determination of the statutory tenancy of the tenant in respect of any
commercial premises, the position in law remains unchanged in so far as the
tenancy in respect of commercial premises is concerned by virtue of the
provisions of the Act. The respondent, however argued (i) that the protection H
against the eviction after termination of tenancy afforded to a tenant by the
Act creates a personal ri8:ht in favour of the tenant who continues to remain
in possession after termination of hi~ tenancy without aity estate or interest in
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . (1985) SUPPL. S.C.R.

the premises and therefore on the death of such a tenant his heirs who bad
A neither any estate or interest in the tepanted premises and who do not have
any pro~ection tinder the Act agaiust eviction are liable to be evicted as a
mattet of course under the ordioary law of the land ; and tii) that the amend~
ment to the definition of 'tenant' with retrospective effect introduced by the
Delhi Rent Control Amendment Act (Act 18 of 1976) to give personal pro·
tection and personal' right to continue in possession to the heirs of the deceased
statutory tenant in respect of residential pr~mises only and not with regard to
B the so called statutory tenant in respect of commercial premises indicated that
the heirs of so called statutory tenant, do not enjoy any protection under the
Act.
-
Allowing the appeal,

c [Per Y. V. Chandrachud C.J., S.M. Fazal Ali, A.N. Se11 and V.B. Eradi JJ.]
HELD: (l)(i) The term "statutory tenant" is used in English Rent
Act and though this term is not to be found in the Indian Acts, in the judg~
ments of the Supreme Court and also various High Courts in India, this term
has often been used to denote a tenant whose contractual tenancy has bf:en
terminated but who has become entitled to continue to remain in possession
by virtue of the protection afforded to him by the statutes in question; namely,
D the various Rent Control Acts prevailing in different States of lndia. It is
also important to note that notwithstanding the termination of the contractual
lllfl:c'
tenancy by tffe Landlord, the tenant is afforded protection against eviction and
is permitted to continue to remain in possession even after the termination of ~
the contractual tenancy by the Act in question and invariably by all the Rent
Acts in force fn various States so long as an order of decree for eviction
E against the tenant on any of the grounds specified in such Acts on the basis
of which an order or decree for eviction against the tenant can be passed, is
not passed. [14 H; 15 A-BJ

-
(l)(ii) Though provisions of all the Rent Control Acts are not uniform,
the common feature of all the Rent Control Legislation is that a contractual
tenant on the termination of the contractual tenancy is by virtue of the pro.
visions of the Rent Acts not liable to be evicted as a malter of course under
the ordinary law of the land and he is entitled to remain in possession even
after determination of the contractual tenancy and no order or decree for
,
eYiction will be passed against a tenant unless any ground which entitles the
landlord go get an order or decree for possession specified in the Act is
established. (25 D-E]
G
(2)(i) It is clear from the definition of tenant, whether in the original
Act or in the amended Act, that the tenant within the meaning of the definition
of the tern1 in the Act includes any person continuing in possession after the
termination of his tenancy. {28 G]

H (2)(ii) Section 14 of the Act clearly rostulates that despite the termina.
tion of the tenancy and notwithstanding the provisions of any other law
which might have been applicable on the termination of the contractual
tenancr, protection against eviction is applicabl~ t() r;very tenant as defined
GIAN DEVI ANAND V. JEBVAN KUMAR 3

in S. 2(i) of the Act. This section clearly establishes that determination of a
contractual tenancy does not disqualify him from continuing to be a tenant A
within the meaning of this Act and the tenant whose contractual tenancy has
been determined enjoys the same position an4 is entitled to protection against
eviction. The other sections in Chapter III also go to indicate that the tenant
whose tenancy has been terminated enjoys the same status and benefit as a
tenant whose tenancy has not been terminated, and a tenant after termination
of his tenancy stands on the same footing as the tenant before such termina-
tion. Chapter Ill A which provides for summary trial for certain applications B
also does not make any distinction between a tenant whose tenancy has
been determined and a tenant whose tenancy has not been terminated.
Chapter IV which deals with deposit of rent consists of ss. 26 to 29
and these sections make it clear that the tenant after determination of a
tenancy is treated under the Act on the same footing as a tenant whose
tenancy has not been determined. Chapter VI though not very material for
the purpose of adjudication of the point involved indicates that no discrimi .. c
nation is made in the matter of proceedings for eviction bet,veen the •so called
statutory tenant' and a contractual tenant. Chapter VII which consists of
sections 44 to 49 makes provisions regarding obligations of landlords and also
provides fo~ penalties in appropriate cases. The sections make it clear that
the duties and ooligations of landlords cast upon the landlord apply equally
whether the tenant is a so called 'statutory tenant' or the tenant is a con· D
tractual tenant. It may, however, be noted that section 50 which bars the
jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of certain matters does not in any way
discrimate between a 'so called statutory tenant' and a contractural tenant.
Thus, the various provisions of the Act, make it abundantly clear that the Act
does not make any distinction between a ·so called statutory tenant' and a
'contractual tenant' and the Act proceeds to treat both alike and to preserve
and protect the status and rights of a tenant after determination of the con- E
tractual tenancy in the same way as the status and rights of a contractural
tenant are protected and preserved. (30 A-H; 31 A]
V. Dhanpal Chattiar v. Yesodai Ammal, (1980] 1 SCR 334, relied upon,

- (3)(i} The termination of the contractural tenancy in view of the
definition of 'tenant' in the Act does not brin.g about any change in the status
and legal position of the tenant, unless there are contrary provisions in the
F
Act; and, the tenant notwithstanding the termination of tenancy does enjoy
an estate or interest in the tenanted premises. This interest or estate which
the tenant under the Act despite termination of the contractual tenancy con-
tinues to enjoy creates a heritable interest in the absence of any provision to
the contrary. The amendment of the definition of 'tenant' by Act 18 of 1976
introducing particulary section 2(i)(iii) does not in any way mitigate against G
this view. The said sub-section (iii) with all the three Explanations thereto
is not in any way inconsistent with or contrary to sub-section (iiJ of Section
2(1) which unequivocally states that 'tepant' includes any person continuing in
possession after the termination of his tenancy. In the absence of the
provision contained in sub-section 2(i)(iii), the heritable interest of the heirs
of the statutory tenant would devolve on all the heirs of the 'so called statutory H
tenant• on his death and the heirs of such tenant would in law step into his
position. (33 G-H; 33 A-CJ
Damadial & Ors. v. Pmaslirom & Ors., [1976] Supp. S.C.R. 645 followed,

·1
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985[SUPPL. S.C.R.

(3)(ii) Section 2(i)(iii) of the Act does not create any additional or
A special right in favour of the heirs of the 'so called statutory tenant' on his
death, but seeks to restrict the right of the heirs of such tenant in respect of
residential premises. As the status and rights of a contractual tenant even
after determination of his tenancy when the tenant is at times described as the
statutory tenant, are fully protected by the Act and the heirs of such tenants
become entitled by virtue of the provisions of the Act to inherit the status and
position of the statutory tenant on his death, the Legislature which has created
B this right has thought it fit in the case of residential premises to limit the
rights of the heirs in the manner and to the extent provided in s. 2(l)(iii).
However, 1he Legislature has not thought it fit to put any such restrictions
with regard to tenants in respect of commercial premises in this Act. So Jong
as the contractual tenancy of a tenant who carries on the business continues
there can be no question of the heirs of the deceased tenant not only inheritin~
c the tenancy but also inheriting the business and they are entitled to run and
enjoy the same. (33 D-G]

(3)(iii) The mere fact that in the Act no provision has been made with
regard to the heirs of tenants in respect of commercial tenancies on the
death of the tenant after termination of the tenancy, as has been done
in the case of heirs of the tenants of residential premises, does not
D indicate that the Legislature intended that the heirs of the tenants of
commercial premises will cease to enjoy the protection afforded to the
tenant under the Act. The Legislature could never have possible intended
that with death of a tenant of the commercial premises, the business carried
on by the tenant, however flOurisbing it may be and even if the same
constituted the source of livelihood of the members of the family, must
E necessarily come to an end on the death of the tenant; only because the tenant
died after the contractual tenancy had been terminated. (35 F·H]

(3) (iv) Jn case of commercial premises governed by tho Dolhi Act the
Legislature has not thought to fit in the light of the situation at Delhi to place
any kind of restriction on the ordinary law of inheritance with regard to
F succession. It may also be borne in mind that in case of commercial premises
the heirs of the deceased tenant not only succeed to the tenancy right in the
premises but they succeed to the business as a whole. It might have been open
to the Legislature to limit or restrict the right of inheritence with regard to the
tenancy as the Legislature had done in the case of the tenancies with regard to
the residential houses but it would not have been open tc the Legislature to
G alter under the Rent Act, the law of succession regarding the business which
is a valuable heritable right and which must necessarily devolve on all the
heirs in accordance with law. The absence of any provision restricting the
heritability of the tenancy in respect of the commercial premises only
establishes that commercial tenanceis n6twithstanding the determination of the
contractual tenanceis will devolve on the heirs in accordance with law and the
H heirs who step into the position of the deceased tenant will continue to enjoy
the protection afforded by the act and they can Qnly be evicted in accordance
\Vith the provisions of the Act. (36 B-E]
GIAN DEVI ANAND V. JBBVAN KUMAR

(3) (v) As the protection afforded by the Rent Act to a tenant after
determination of the tenancy and to his heirs on the death of such tenant is a A
creation of the Act for the benefit of the tenants, it is open to the Legislature
which provides for such portectioo to make appropriate provisions in the Act
with regard to the nature and extent of the benefit and protection to be enjoyed
and the manner in which the same is to be enjoyed. Jf the Legislature makes
any provision in the Act limiting or restricting the benefit and the nature of
the protection to be enjoyed in a specified manner by any particular class of
heirs of the deceased tenant on any condition laid down being fulfilled, the B
benefit of the protection has necessarily to be enjoyed on the fulfilment of the
condition in the manner and to the el:tent stipulated in the Act. The
Legislature which by the Rent Act seeks to confer the benefit on the tenants
and to afford protection against eviction, is perfectly competent to make
appropriate provisjon regulating the nature of protection and the manner and
extent of enjoyment of such tenancy rights after the termination of contractual
tenancy of the tenant including the rights and the nature of protection of the
c
heirs oa the death of the tenant. [38 C·FJ

(3) (vi) When the tenant is a Company or a Corporation or any body
with juristic personality, question of the death of the tenant will not arise.
Despite the termination of the tenancy, the Company or the Corporation of
such juristic personalities. however, Y.ill go on enjoying the protection afforded
D
to the tenant under the Act. 1t call hardly be conceived that the Legislature
would intend to deny to one class of tenants, namely, individuals the protection
which will be enjoyed by the other class, namely, the Cor'poration and
Companies and other bodies wHh juristic personality under the Act. [36 G-H)

(4) In the instant case' there is no provision in the Act regulating the E
rights of the heirs to inherit the tenancy rights of the tenant in respect of the
tenanted premises which is commercial premises, the tenancy right which is
heritable devolves on the heirs under the ordinary law of succession. The
tenancy right of appellant's husband therefore, devolves on all the heirs on his
death. The heirs and legal repersentatives of appellant's husband step into his
position and they are entitled to the benefft and protection of the Act. There- F
fore, the High Court was not right in coming to the conclusion that the heirs
of appellant's husband the so called statutory tenant, did not have any right
to rem~in in possession of the. tenanted premises and did not enjoy any
protection under the Act. The Judgment and order of the High Court is there-
fore set aside and the case is remanded to the High Court for decision of the
appeal and the cross objection on merits. The appeal is accordingly allowed
to the extent indicated above. [39 B; D-E; GJ G

Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde, [1978] 3 s. C. R. 198 dissented .

. The Legislature may consider the advisability of making bona fide
requirement of the landlord a ground of eviction in respect of commercial ff
premises as well. [40 FJ
SUPREME COURT RBPOR TS [198S] SUPPL s.C.il.,

A
Per Bhagwatl, J. (Concurring)
,,,.. .
Though genetically the parentage of the two legal conce,. ts, namely.
contractual tenancy and statutory tenancy is different, one owing its origin to
C('lntract and the other to rent control legislation, they are equated with each
other and their incidents are the same. If a contractual tenant has an estate or
interest in the premises which is heritable, it is difficult to understand why a
B statutory tenant should be held not to have such heritable estate or interest.
In one case, the estate or interest is the result of contract while in the other,
it is the result of statute. But the quality of the estate or interest is the same
in both cases. When the rent control legislation places a statutory tenant on
the same footing as a contractual tenant, wipes out the distinction between the
two and invests a statutory tenant with the same right, obligations and
incidents as a contractual tenant, why should it be difficult to hold that, just
c like a contractual tenant, a statutory tenant also has estate or interest in the
premises which can be inherited. (8 B-FJ

It is true that there are certain observations in Ganpat Ladha v.
Sashikant Vishnu Shinde, (1978] 3 S. C.R. 198, which go counter to what the
Court is ho1ding in the present case and to that extent these observations must
be held not to enunciate the correct law on the subject This Court was not
D really concerned in that case with the question of heritability of statutory
tenancy. The only question was in regard' to the true interpretation of Section
5 (ii) (c) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act
1947 which is almost in same tern1s as Section 2 (1) (iii) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act 1958 and while dealing with this question, the Court made certain
observations regarding the nature of statutory tenancy and its heritability. The
E attention of the Court was not focussed on the question ·Whether a statutory
tenant has an est~te or interest in the premises which is heritable anci no argu-
ment was advanced that a statutory tenancy is heritable. It was assumed that
a statutory tenancy is not heritable and on that footing the case was argued in
regard to the true meaning and con~truction of ~ection 5 {ii) (c). The
observations made in that case to the extent to which they conflict with the
judgment in the present case must therefore be regarded as overruled. l9 A-D]
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3441
of 1972.

From the Judgment and Order dated 11-10-1979 of the
G Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 8 of 1979.

S.N. Andiey, Uma Datta, T.C. Sharma and K.S. Mohan for
the Appellant.
H
Mrs. Shyam/a Pappu, B.B. Sawhney, Mrs. Indra Sawhney and
Miss Kittu Bansilal for the Respondents.
r GIAN DliYI ANAND v. JEEVAM KUMAR (Bhagwati, J.) 7

The following Judgments were delivered
A
BHAGWATI, J. I entirely agree with the Judgment just delivered
by my learned brother A.N. Sen, J. I am adding a few words of
my own since I was a party to the decision in Ganpat Ladha v.
Shashikant Vishnu Shinde(1) where certain observations were made
which seem to take a different view from the one we are taking in the
present case. B

The question which arises here for consideration is as to
whether statutory tanancy is heritable on the death of the statutory
tenant. 'Statutory tenant' is not an expression to be found in any
provision of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 or the rent control c
legislation of any other State. It is an expression coined by the
judges in England and, like many other concepts in English law, it
has been imported into the jurisprudence of this country and has
become an expression of common use to denote a tenant whose
contractual tenancy has been determined but who is continuing in
possession of the premises by virtue of the protection arainst eviction D
afforded to him by the rent control legislation. Though the expres-
sion 'statutory tenant' has not been used in any rent control legisla-
tion the concept of statutory tenant finds recognition in almost every
rent control legislation The definition of 'tenant' iit Section 2(1)
of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958-and I am referr ng here to the E
provisions of the Delhi.Rent Control Act 1958 because that is the
statute with which we are concerned in the present case-includes a
statutory tenant. It says in clause (ii) that 'tenant' includes any
person continuing the possession after the termination of his
tenancy'. Such a person would not be a tonant under the ordinary
Jaw but he is recognised as a 'tenant' by the rent control legislation F
and is therefore described as a statutory tenant as contra-distingui-
shed from contractual tenant. The statutory tenant is, by virtue of
inclusion in the definition of 'tenant', placed on the same footing as
contractual tenant so far as rent control legislation is concerned.
The rent control legislation in fact, as pointed out by this Court G
in a seven judge Bench decision in V. Dhanapa/ Chettiar v.
Yesodai Ammo/(') does not make any distinction between con-
tractual tenant and statutory tenant. "It does not permit the
landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant ·merely by his act
H
(I) 11978] 3 S.C.R. 198.
(2) (1980] 2 S.C.R. 334.
SUPRBME COURT REPORTS [ l98SJ SUPPL. s.c.k.

of serving a notice to quit on him. Inspite of the notice, the Jaw
A says that he continues to be a tenant and he does so enjoying all tbe
rights of a lessee and is at the same time deemed to be under all the
liabilities such as payment of rent etc. in accordance with the law."
The distinction between contractual tenancy and statutory tenancy
is thus completely obliterated by the rent control legislation. Though
B genetically the percentage of these two legal concepts is different, one
owing its origin to contract and the other to rent control legislation,
they are equated with each other and their incidents are the same.
If a contractual tenant has an estate or interest in the premises
which is heritable, it is difficult to understand why a statutory tenant
should be held not to have such heritable estate or interest. In one
c case, the estate or interest is the result of contract while in the other
it is the result of statute. But the quality of the estate or interest is
the same iu both cases. The difficulty in recognising that a statutory
tenant can have estate or interest in the premises arises from the
fact that throughout the last century and the first half of the present,
almost until recent times, our thinking has been dominated by two
D
major legal principles, namely, freedom of contract and sanctity of
private property and therefore we are unable to readily accept that
legal relationships can be created by statute despite want of contrac·
tual concensus and in derogation of property rights of the landlord.
We are unfortunately not yet reconciled to the idea that the law is
E moving forward from contract to status. Why can estate or interest
in property not be created by statute ? When the rent control
legislation places a statutory tenant on the same footing as a
contractual tenant, wipes out the distinction between the two and
invests a statutory tenant with the same right, obligations and inci·
F dents as a contractual tenant, why should it be difficult to hold that,
just like a contractual tenant, a statutory tenant also has estate or
interest in the premises which can be inherited. Of course, strong
reliance was placed on behalf of the landlord on Section 2(1) (iii) of
the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 to combat this conclusion but that
provision merely limits or circumscribes the nature and extent of the
G protection that should be available on tbe death of a statutory tenant
in respect of residential premises. It does not confer a new right of
heritability which did not exist aliunde. My learned brother A.N.
Sen, J. has discussed this aspect of the case in great detail and I find
myself wholly in agreement with what he has rnid in regard to the
H true meaning and import of Section 2(1) (iii).
CHAN DEVI ANAND v. JEEVAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 9

Now a word about Ganpat Ladha's case (supra). It is true
that there are certain observations in that case which go counter to A
what we are holding in the present case and to that extent these
observations must be held not to enunciate to correct law on the
subject. This Court was not really concerned in that case with the
question of heritability of statutory tenancy. The only question was
in regard to the true interpretation of Section 5(ii) (c) of the Bombay
Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 which is
B
almost in same terms as Section 2(1) (iii) of the Delhi Rent Control
Act 1958 and while dealing with this question, the Court made
certain observations regarding the nature of statutory tenancy and its
' heritability. The attention of the Court was not focussed on the
question whether a statutory tenant has an estate or interest in the c
premises which is heritable and no argument was advanced that a
statutory tenancy is heritable. It was assumed that a statutory
tenancy is not heritable and on that footing the case was argued in
regard to the true meaning and construction of Section 5(ii) (c).
The observations made in that case to the extent to which they
conflict with the judgment in the present case must therefore be
D
regarded as overruled.

I accordingly concur with the order made by my learned
brother A.N. Sen, allowing the appeal and remanding the case to the
High Court for disposal according to law. There will be no order E
as to costs.

A.N. SEN, J. The question for consideration in this appeal by
special leave is whether under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for
the sake of brevity hereinafter referred to as the Act), the statutory F
tenancy to use the popular phraseology, in respect of commercial
premises is heritable or not. To state is more precisaly, the question
is whether the heirs of a deceased tenant whose contractual tenancy
in respect of commercial premises has been determined, are entitled
to the same protection against eviction afforded by the Act to the
tenant.
G

The question is essentially a question of law. This very
question has been raised in a number of appeals, arising out of
different sets of facts giving rise, however, to this common question H
of law in all the appeals. As the decision on this corumon question
of law which arises in the other appeals pending in this Court may
effect the parties in the other appeals, we considered it proper to
IQ SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) SUPPL, s.c.k.

hear the counsel appearing in all the appeals on this common
A question of Jaw. We, however, feel that it will be convenient to deal
with the other appeals separately and dispose of the same, applying
the decision or thi; common que,tion of Jaw in the light of the facts
and circumstances of the other cases and pass appropriate orders
and decrees in the other appeals when they are taken up for
8 disposal

Though the question is mainly one of Jaw, it is necesrnry for a
proper appreciation of the question involved to set out in brief the
facts of the present appeal which is being disposed of by this
judgment.
c
One Wasti Ram was the tenant in respect of Shop No. 20,
New Market, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi under the respondent at
at the monthly rent of Rs. 110. He came into possession as such
tenant on and from 1.9.1959. In April, 1970 the respondent land·
D lord determined the tenancy by serving a notice to quit on the
tenant Wasti Ram, since deceased. In September, 1970, the respon·
dent landlord filed a petition under S. 14 of the Act for the eviction
of the tenant Wast! Ram from the said shop on the following
grounds :-(1) non-payment of rent, (2) bona·fide requirement,
(3) change of user from residential to commercial, (4) substantial
E damage to property and (5) sub-letting In the petition filed by the
landlord against the tenant Wasti Ram, the landlord had also
impleaded one Ashok Kumar Sethi, as defendant No. 2 alleging him
to be the unlawful sub-tenant of the tenant Wasti Ram. By
judgment and order dated 19.5.1975, the Rent Controller held that
F (I) the ground of bona fide requirement was not available to the
landlord under the Act in respect of any commercial premises (2) the
premises had been Jet out for commercial purposes and there had
been no change of user, (3) no substantial damage to property had
been done by tenant and (4) sub-Jetting had been established. On
the question of non-payment of Rent, the Rent Controller held I
G
that the tenant was liable to pay a sum of Rs. 24 by way of arrears
for the period of 1.3.1969 to 28.2.1970 after taking into considera-
tion all payments made and a further snm of Rs. 90 on account of
such arrears for the month of September 1970 and the rent sub-
H sequent to the month of March, 1975, if not already deposited. In
view of the aforesaid finding on the question of ·default in payment
of rent, the Rent Controller held that the tenant was liable to
eviction under S. 14(1)(a) of the Act and further held that in view of
GIAN DEVI ANAND v. JEEVAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, !.) 11

the provisions contained in s. 15( 1) of the Act there would however
be no order or decree for eviction if the tenant deposited all the A
aforesaid arrears within a period of one month from the date of the
order and in that case the ground of non-payment of rent would
be wiped out. The Rent Controller ordered accordingly.

Against the order of the Rent Controller, the landlord pre· B
ferred an appeal on 13.7.1975 and the tenant Wasti Ram filed his
cross-objection. The cross-objection of the tenant was against the
order of the Rent Controller regarding his fiinding on default in
payment of rent. The landlord in his appeal had challenged the
' finding of the Rent Controller on the question of sub;tantial damage
to the property by the tenant and also the finding of the Rent c
Controller on the question of sub-letting. It appears that during·
the pendency of the appeal, the tenant Wasti Ram died and on
5.9.1977 the prerent appellant Smt. Gian Devi Anand, the widow
of deceased Wasti Ram, was substituted in place of Wasti Ram on
the application of the landlord. The Rent Control Tribunal D
allowed the cross-objection of the tenant and held that there was no
default on tbe part of the tenant in the matter of payment of rent.
The Rent Control Tribunal rejected the first contention of the
landlord in the Landlord's Appeal regarding substantial damage done
to the property by the tenant. On the other question, namely, the E
question of sub-letting, the Rent Control Tribunal allowed the
appeal of the landlord and remanded the case to the Rent Controller
to decide the question of sub· letting after affording an opportunity
,. to the parties to lead evidence in this regard.

F
Against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal, Smt. Gian
Devi Anand, the widow of the deceased tenant, filed an appeal
in the High Court impleading in the said appeal the other heirs of
Wasti Ram as pro·forma respondents. The landlord also filed a
cross-objection in the High Court after the widow had presented the
appeal against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal directing G
remand on the question of sub-letting. In the cross·objection filed
by the landlord, the landlord bad challenged the finding of the
Tribunal on the question of non-payment of rent and had further
raised a contention that view of the death of the original tenant
Wasti Ram, who continued to remain in possession of the shop as H
a statutory tenant, the widow and the heirs of the deceased tenant
were not entitled to continue to remain in occuption thereof. The
High Court held that on the death of the statutory tenant, the heirs
12 SUAAl!ME COURT RllPOll.TS (1984] 1 s.c.a.

of the statutory tenant had no right to remain in possession of the
A premises, as statutory tenancy was not heritable and the protection
afforded to a statutory tenant by the Act is not available to the heirs
and legal representatives of the statutory tenant. In this view of the
matter the B:igh Court did not consider it necessary to go into
other questions and the High Court allowed the cross-objection filed
B by the landlord and passed a decree for eviction against lhe appellant
and the other heirs of W asti Ram, the deceased tenant.

The correctness of this view that on the death of a tenant
whose tenancy in respect of any commercial premises has been
terminated during this life time, whether before the commencement
c of any eviction proceeding against him or during the pendency of
any eviction proceeding against him, the heirs of the deceased tenant
do do not enjoy the protection afforded by the Act to the tenant and
they do not have any right to continue to remain in possession
because they do not inherit the tenancy rights of the deceased tenant,
D is challenged in this appeal.

The learned counsel for the appellant-tenant argues that there
could be no doubt that a contractual tenancy is heritable and he
contends that notwithstanding the termination of the contractual
E tenancy of the tena:it in respect of any commercial premises, the
position iu law remains unchanged in so far as the tenancy in respect
of commercial premises is concerned, the virtue of the provisions of
the Act. In support of this contention reference is made to the
provisions of the Act and strong reliance is placed on the decision
of this court in the case of Damadi Lal & Ors. v. Parashram &
F Ors.(') and also to the decision of this Court in the case of
V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal.('J.

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the landlord-
respondents have submitted that on the determination of the con·
G tractual tenancy, the tenancy comes to an end and the tenant ceases
to have any estate or interest in the premises. It is contended
that on determination of the tenancy, the tenant becomes
liable to be evicted in due process of law under the general law of
the land; but, the Act affoads a protection to the tenant against such
H evictiod in as the Act provides that inspite of the termination of

(!) [1976] Supp. S.C.R. 24S.
(2) [1977] l S.C.R. 334.
GIAN DEVI ANAND v. JEBVAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 13

the tenancy, no order or decree for procession shall he passed
against the tenant, unless any of the grounds mentioned in the Act A
which entitles a landlord to recover possession of the premises from
the tenant is established. It is contended that the protection to the
tenant under the Act is against eviction except on grounds recog-
nised by the Act and the protection is only in the nature of personal
protection to the tenant who continues to remain in possession after
B
the termination of the tenancy. The contention is that the tenant
loses the estate or interest in the tenanted premises after termination
of the contractual tenancy and the tenant by virtue of the Act is
afforded only a personal protection against eviction; and, therefore,
the heirs of such tenant on his death acquire no interest or estate
in the premises, because the deceased tenant had none, and they can c
also claim no protection against eviction, as the protection under
the Act is personal to the tenant as long as the tenant continues
to remain in possession of the premises after the termination of the
tenancy. The argument, in short, is that the protection against
eviction after termination of tenancy afforded to a tenant by the Act
creates a personal right in favour of the tenant who continues to
D
remain in possession after termination of his tenancy without any
estate or interest in the premises; and, therefore, on the death of
such a tenant, his heirs who have neither any estate nor interest in
the tenanted premises and who do not have any protection under
the Act against eviction, are liable to be evicted as a matter of E
course under the ordinary Law of the land. In support of this
argument various authorities including decisions of this Court, of
various High Courts, of English Courts and also passages from
Halsburys" Laws of England and other eminent English authors have
been cited.
r
It has been further argued that in view of the clear provision
in law that heirs of a deceased tenant whose tenancy had been termi-
nate!! during his life time and who was continuing in possession
by virtue of the provisions of the Act did not enjoy any protection
G
and was liable to be evicted as a matter of course, the Legislature
considered it fit to intarvene to give some relief to the heirs of the
deceased tenant in respect of the residential premises and amended
the Act of 1958 by Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976
(Act 18 of 1976) by changing the definition of 'tenant' with retros-
B
pective effect. The argument is that by virtue of the amendment
introduced in 1976 with retrospective effect, the heirs of the deceased
tenant specified in s. 2 (iii) enjoy the protection against eviction
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] SUPPL. s.c.R.

during their life time in the manner mentioned therein, provided the
A conditions mentioned therein are satisfied, only with regard to resi-
dential premises. It is contended that with regard to the residential
premises such limited protection essentially personal to the heirs
specified and to be enjoyed by them for their lives in the manner laid
down in the said sub-section 2 (1) (iii) has been provided by the
B amendment; but in respect of commercial premises'no such protection
has been given.

We do not consider it necessary to refer to the various
English cases and the other English authorities cited from the Bar.
c The English cases and the other authorities turn on the provisions
of the English Rent Acts. The provisions of the English Rent Acts
are not in pari materia with the provisions of the Act in question or
the other Rent Acts prevailing in other States in India. The English
Rent Acts which have come into existence from time to time were
no doubt introduced for the benefit of the tenants. It may be noted
D that the term "statutory tenant" which is not to be found in the
Act in question or in the other analogous Rent Acts in force in other
States in India, is indeed a creature of the English Rent Act. English
Rent Act. 1977 which was enacted to consolidate the Rent Act 1968,
parts III, lV and VIII of the Housing Finance Act, 1972, the Rent
Act 1974, sections 7 to 10 of the Housing Rents and Subsidies Act
E
1975 and certain related enactments, witw amendments to give effect
to recommendation of the Law Commission, speaks of protected
tenants and tenancies in S. I and defines statutory tenant in S. 2,
English Rent Act, 1977 is in the nature of a complete Code governing
the rights and obligations of the landlord and the tenant and their
F relationship in respect of tenancies covered by the Act. As the
provisions of the English Act are materially different from the provi-
sions of the Act in question and other Rent Control Acts in force
in other States in India, the decisions of the Engli;h Courts and the
passages from the various amhoritativc books including the passages
from Halsbury which are all concerned with English Rent Acts are
G not of any particular assistance in deciding the question involved in
this appeal. As we have already noticed, the term 'statutory
tenant' is used in English Rent Act and !bough this term is not be
found in the Indian Acts, in the Judgments of this Court and also of
the various High Courts in India, this term has often been used to
H
denote a tenant whose contractual tenancy has been terminated but
who has become entitled to continue to remain in possession by
virtue of the protection afforded to him by the statutes in question,
GIAN DEVI ANAND v. JEEVAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 15

- namely, the various Rent Control Acts, prevailing in different States
of India. It is .also important to note that notwithstanding the
termination of the contractual tenancy by the Landlord, the
tenant is afforded protection against eviction and is permitted to
continue to remain in possessiorr even after the termination of the
A

contractual tenancy by the Act in question and invariably by all the
Rent Acts in force in various States so long as an order or decree
B
1or evictions against the tenant on any of the grounds specified in
such Acts on the basis of which an order or decree for eviction
against the tenant can be passed, is not passed.

As various decisions of this Court on which reliance has
been placed by the learned counsel for the Landlord have been cited, c
it does not become very necessary to consider at any length the
various decisions of the High Courts on the very same question,
relied on by the Learned Counsel for the landlords. It may, however,
be noted that the decisions of this Court to which we shall refer in
due course and the decisions of the High Courts which were cited
by the learned counsel for the Landlordi do lend support to their D
contention.

We first propose to deal with the decision of his Court in
Damadi/a/'s case (supra) in which this Court considered some of the
English Authorities and also some of the decisions of this Court. In
this case the first question raised on behelf of the plaintiff-appellant
E
in this Court was whether the heirs of the statutory tenants had any
heritable interest in the demised premises and had the right to
prosecute the appeal in the High Court on the death of the statutory
tenant.
}<'
Dealing with this contention the Court held at pages 650 to
654:

"In illlpport of his first contention Mr. Gupta relied
on two decisions of this Court, Anand Nivas (Private)
Ltd. v. Anandji Ka/yanji Pedhi & Ors( 1) and Jagdish G·
Chander Cllatteriee & Ors. v. Sri Kishan & Anr.C). The
statute considered in Anand Nivas( 1 ) case was Bombay
Rents, Hotel and Lodging Rates Control Act, 1947 as
amended in 1959. The question there was, whether a
tenant whose tenancy had been terminated had any right H
(1) [1973] 4 S.C.ll. 892.
(2) (1973] 1 S.C R. 850,
16 SUPR.EME COURT R.EPORTS [1985) SUPPL. s.c.11..

to sublet the premises. Of the three learned Judges
A composing the Bench that heard the appeal, Hidayatullah
and Shah, JJ. held that a statulory tenant, meaning a
tenant whose tenancy has determined but who continues
in possesion, has no power of subletting. Sarkar 1.
delivered a dissenting opinion. Shah J. who spoke for
B himself and Hidayatullah J. observed in the course of
their judgment :

'A statutory tenant has no interest in the premises
occupied by him, and ne has no estate to assign or
transfer. A statutory tenant is, as we have already
c observed, a person who on determination of his con-
tractual right, is permitted to remain in occupation so
long as he observes and performs the conditions of the
tenancy and pays the standard rent and permitted
increases. His personal right of occupation is incapable
D of being transferred or assigned, and he having no
interest in the property there is no estate on which
subletting may operate.'

It appears from the judgment of Shah, J. that 'the
E Bombay Act merely grants conditional protection to a
statutory tenant and does not invest him with the right
to enforce the benefit of any of the terms and conditions
the original tenancy'. Sarkar, J. dissenting· held that
word 'tenant' as defined in the Act included both a
contractual tenant-a tenant whose lease is subsisting as
F also a statutory tenant and the latter has the same power
to sublet as the former. According to Sarkar, J. even if
a statutory tenant had no estate or property in the
demised premises, the Act had undoubtedly created a
right in such a tenant in respect of the property which he
could transfer. Jagdish Chander Chatterjee's case dealt
G
with the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1950, a!ld the question for decision was
whether on the death of a statutory tenant his heirs
succeed to the tenancy so as to claim protection of the
H Act. In this case it was .held by Grover and Palekar JJ.,
relying on Anand Nivas's ~ase, that after the termination
of contractual tenancy, a statutory tenant enjoys only a
personal right to continue in possession and on his death
GIAN DEVI ANAND v. JllEVAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 17

-
his heirs do not inherit any estate or interest in the
original tenancy. A

Both these cases, Anand Nivas and Jagdish Chander
Chatterjee, proceed on the basis that a tenant whose
tenancy has been terminated, described as statutory
tenant, has no estate or interest in the premises but only B
a personal right to remain in occupation. It would seem
as if there is a distinct category of tenants called statutory
tenants having separate and fixed incidents of tenancy.
The term 'statutory tenancy' is borrowed from the English
• Rent Acts. This may be a convenient expression for
referring to a tenant whose tenancy has been terminated
c
and who would be liable to be evicted but for the pro-
tecting statute, but courts in this country have sometimes
borrowed along with the expression certain notions
reg~rding such tenancy from the derisions of the English
Courts. In our opinion it has to be ascertained how far D
these notions are reconcilable with the provisions of the
statute under consideration in any particular case. The
expression 'statutory tenancy' was used in England in
several judgments under the Increase of Rent and Mort-
gage interest (War Restrictions) Act, 1915, to refer
E
to a tenant protected under that Act, but the term got
currency from the marginal note to section 15 of the
Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Act, 1920.
t That section which provided inter a/ia that a tenant who
by virtue of that Act retained possession of any dwelling
house to which the Act applied, so long as he retained F
possession, must observe and would be entitled to the
benefit of all the terms and conditions of the original
contract of tenancy which were consistent with the
provisions of the Act, carried the description in the
'- \ margin 'conditions of statutory tenancy'. Since then the
G

,
term has been used m England to describe a tenant
protected under the subsequent statutes until Section
• 49(1) of the Housing Repairs and Rent Act, 1954 for the
first time define 'statutory tenant' and 'statutory tenancy'.
'Statutory Tenant' was defined as a tenant 'who retains
possession by virtue of the Rent Acts and not as being
H
entitled to a tenancy' and it was added, 'statutory
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPPL. s.c.R.

tenancy' shall be construed accordingly.' This definition
A of 'statutory tenancy' has been incorporated in the Rent
Acts of 1957 and 1965. In England 'statutory tenancy'
does not appear to have had any clear and fixed
incidents; the concept was developed over the years from
the provisions of the successive Rent Restrictions Act
which did not contain a clear indication as to the charac-
B
ter of such tenancy. That a statutory tenant is entitled
to the benefit of the terms and conditions of the original
contract of tenancy so far as they were consistent with
-
the provisions of the statute did not as Scrutton L.J.
observed in Roe v. Russell(') 'help very much when one
•
c came to the practical facts of life', according to him
'citizens are entitled to. complain that their legislators did
not address their minds to the probable events that might
happen in cases of statutory ·tenancy, and consider bow
the legal interest they were granting was affected by
those probable events'. He added, '. .. it is pretty evident
D that the Legislature never considered as a whole the
effect on the statutory tenancy of such ordinary incidents
as death, bank-ruptcy, voluntary assignment, either inter
vivas or by will, a total or partial sub-letting; but from
time to time put into one of the series of Acts a provi-
E sion as to one of the incidents without considering bow
it fitted in with the general nature of the tenancy which
those incidents might affect.' On the provisions which
gave no clear and comprehensive idea of the nature of
statutory tenancy, the courts in England had been
slowly 'trying to frame a consistent theory (2 )' making
F bricks with very insufficient statutory straw'(') Evershed
M.R. in Boyer v. Warbey (4) said: 'The character of the
statutory tenancy, I have already said, is a very special
one. It has earned many epithets, including 'monstrum
horrendum' and perhaps it has never been fully thought
G out by Parliament'. Courts in England have held that a ,_
statutory tenant has no estate or property in the premises
he occupies because he retains possession by virtue of the

(I) [1928]2 K.B, 117.
H (2) Scrutton L.J in Haskins v. Lewis [193512 K.B. 1(9)
(3) Scrutton L.J. in Keeves v, Dean (1923] L.J.K.JI. 203 (207),
(4) (195312 K.B. 234.
GIAN DEVI ANAND v. JEEVAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 19

Rent Acts and not as being entitled to a tenancy; it has
been. said that he has only a personal right to remain in A
occupation, the statutory right of 'irremovability', and
nothing more.

We find it difficult to appreciate how in thh country
we can proceed on the basis that a tenant whose contra-
ctual tenancy has determined but who is protected B
against eviction by the statute, has no right of property
but only a personal right to remain in occupation, with-
out ascertaining what his rights are under the statute.
• Th!' concept of a statutory tenant having no estate or
property in the premises which he occupies is derived
from the provisions of the English Rent Acts. But it is
not clear how it can be assumed that the position is the
same in this coutry without any reference to the provi-
·sions of the relevant statute. Tenancy has its origin in
contract. There is no dispute that a contractual tenant
has an estate or property in the subject matter of the n
' tenancy, and heritability is an incident of the tenancy.
It cannot be assumed, however, that with the determina-
tion of the tenancy the estate must necessarily disappear
and the statute can only preserve his status of irremova-
bility and not the estate he had in the premises in his E
occupation. It is not possible to claim that the 'sanctity'
of contract cannot be touched by legislation. It is there-
fore necessary to examine the provisions of the Madhya

- Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 to find out
whether the respondents' predecessors-in-interest retained
a heritable interest in the disputed premises even after -F
the termination of their tenancy.

Section 2(i) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation
Control Act 1961 defines 'tenant' to mean, unless the
- ' context otherwise requires :
G
'a person by whom or on whose account or
behalf the rent of any accommodation is, or, but for
a contract express or implied would be payable for
any accommodation and includes any person occupy-
ing the accommodation as a sub-tenant and also any
H
person continuing in possession after the termina-
tion of his tenancy whether before or after thq
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) SUPPL. s.c.R.

commencement" of this Act; but shall not include
A any person against whom any order or decree for
eviction has been made'.

The definition makes a person continuing in
possession after the determination of his tenancy a
B tenant unless a decree or order for eviction has been
made against him, thus putting him on par with a
person whose contractual tenancy still subsists. The
incidents of such tenancy and a contractual. tenancy
must therefore be the same unless any provision of
the Act conveyed a contrary intention. That under
c this Act such a tenant retains an interest in the
premises, and not merely a personal right of occupa-
tion, will also appear from section 14 which contains
provisions restricting the tenant's power of subletting.
Section 14 is in these terms :
D
'Sec. 14 Restriction on sub-Jetting.-(!) No
tenant shall without the previous consent in
writing of the landlord.-

(a) sublet the whole or any part of the acco-
E mmodation held by him as a tenant : or

(b) transfer or assign bis rights in the tenancy
or in any part thereof.

F (2) No landlord shall chim or receive the
payment of any sum as premium or pugree or
claim or receive any consideration whatsoever
in cash or in kind for giving bis consent to the
sub-letting of the whole or any part of the
accommodation held by the tenant'.
G I

There is nothing to suggest that this section does not
apply to all tenants as defined in Section 2(i). A contra-
ctual teiiant bas an estate or interest in premises from
H which be carves out what he gives to the sub-tenant.
Section 14 read with section 2 (i) makes it clear that the
so called statutory tenant has the right to sub-let in
~omjllon wjth a contractual tenant and this i$ because he
OiAN DEVI ANANb v. iEEVAN KUM•R (A.N. Sen,/.) 21

also has an interest in the premises occupied by
him." A
It may be noted that in deciding Damadila/'s case (supra),
this Court considered the two decisions of this Court, namely, the
decisions in Anand Nivas and Jagdish Chander Chatterjee's cases
(supra) which have been relied on by the learned counsel for the
landlords. B

The decision of this Court in the case of Ganpat Ladha v.
Sashikant Vishnu Shinde(1) is another decision on which very strong
reliance has been placed on behalf of the landlords. In this case
under Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, c
1947, the Court was concerned with the question whether the heirs
of deceased tenant whose tenancy has been determined and against
whom eviction proceeding was pending, were entitled to the benefit
of protection afforded to the tenant after the determination of the
tenancy in respect of the business premises. This Court noticed at
page 202 that the tenancy right was being claimed under S. 5(11) (c)
D
of the said Act which, as recorded in the judgment, is in the follow-
ing terms :

"5(1l)(c) : 'tenant' means any person by whom
or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and E
includes-

(a)

(b)
-
F
(c) any member of the tenant's family residing with
him at the time of his death as may be decided
in default of agreement by the Court."

While dealing with this question, this Court held at pp. 202-204 : G
"In these circumstances, the question arose for
decision whether the present respondent, whose residence
is given in the special leave petition as 'Agakhan
Building, Haines Road, Bombay', could po;sibly claim to H

(I) [1978) 3 S.C.R. 198.
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) SUPPL. s.c.R.

be a tenant in respect of the shop which admittedly
A constitutes business premises by reason of Section
5(11} (c} of the Act. The High Court took the view
that section 5(11) (c} applies not only to residential
premises but also to business premises and therefore, on
the death of a tenant of business premises, any member
B of tenant's family residing with him at the time of bis
death would become a tenant. We do not think this
view taken by the High Court is correct. It is difficult
to see how in case of business premises, the need for
showing residence with the original tenant at the time
of bis death would be relevant. It is obvious from the
c language of Section 5(11) (c) that the intention of the
legislature in giving protection to a member of the family
of the tenant residing with him at the time of his death
was to secure that on the death of the tenant, the
member of his family residing with him at the time of
D his death is not thrown out and this protection would be
necessarily only in case of residenti~l premises. When
a tenant is .in occupation of business premises, there
would be no question of protecting against dispossession
a member of the tenant's family residing with him at the
time of death. The tenant may be carrying on a business
E in which the member of his family residing with him may
not have any interest at all and yet on the construction
adopted by the High Court, such member of the family
would become a tenant in respect of the business
premises. Such a result could not have been intended
F to be brought about by the legislature. It is difficult to
discern any public policy which might seem to require it.
The principle behind section 5(11) (c) seems to be that
when a tenant is in occupation of premises, the tenancy
is taken by him not only for his own benefit, but also
for the benefit of the members of the family residing with
G him and, therefore, when the tenant dies, protection '
should be extended to the members of the family who
were participants in the benefit of the tenancy and for
whose needs inter alia the tenancy was originally taken
by the tenant. This principle underlying the enactment
H of section 5(11) (c} also goes to indicate that it
is in respect of residential premises that the protection
GIAN DEVI ANAND v. JEBVAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) l3
of that section is intended to be given. We can
appreciate a provision being made in respect of A
business premises that on the death of a tenant in
respect of such premises, any member of the tenant's
family carrying on business with the tenant in such
premises at the time of his death shall be a tenant and
the protection of the Rent Act shall be available to him. B
But we fail to see the purpose the legislature could have
had in view in according protection in respect of business
premises to a member of the tenant's family residing with
him at the time of his death. The basic postulate of the
protection under the Rent Act is that the person who is
sought to be protected must be in possession of the c
premises and bis possession is protected by the legisla-
tion. But in case of business premises, a member of the
family of the tenant residing with him at the time of his
death may not be in possession of the business premises;
be may be in service or he may be carrying on any other D
business. And yet on the view taken by the High Court,
he would become tenant in respect of the business
premises with which he has no connection. We are,
therefore, in agreement with the view taken by one of us
(Bhagwati J.) in the Gujarat High Court about the
correct meaning of Section 5(11) (c) in Perupai Manila/ E
Brahmin & Ors. v. Baldevdas Zaverbhai Tapodhan(')
in preference to the view adopted in the subsequent
decision of the Gujarat High Court in Heirs of deceased
Darji Mohan/al Lavji v. Muktabai Shamji( 2) which
decision was followed by the Bombay High Court in the
judgment impugned in the present appeals before us."

This decision proceeds entirely on the construction of
S.5(1 J)(c)(i) and it does not appear that the case of Damadila/
• (supra) which also was in respect of commercial premises was cited
G
before this Court or was considered by the Court while deciding
this case. Section 5(11)(b) and Section 5(1l)(c)(ii) were also not
discussed.

H
(I) 11964] 5 Guj, LR 563.
(2) [1971112 Guj. LR 272.
SUPREME COURT REPOltTS (1984) SUPPL S.C. R.

The aforesaid decisions indicate that there is a divergence of
A opinion in this Court on the question whether the heirs of a deceased
tenant whose contractual tenancy in respect of commercial premises
•
has been determined, can inherit the tenancy rights of the deceased
tenant and can claim the benefit and protection to which the deceased
tenant was entitled nnder the Act.
B
For an appreciation of the question it is necessary to
understand the kind of protection that is sought to be afforded to a
tenant under the Rent Acts and his status after the termination of the
contractual tenancy under the Rent Acts. It is not in dispute that
so long as the contractual tenancy remains subsisting, the contractual
c tenancy creates haritable rights; and, on the death of a contractual
tenant, the heirs and legal representatives step into the position of
the contractual tenant; and, in the same way on the death of a
landlord the heirs and legal representatives of a landlord become
entitled to all the rights and privileges of the contractual tenancy
and also come under all the obligations under the contractual tenancy.
D
A valid termination of the contractual tenancy puts an end to the
contractual relationship. On the determination of the contractual
tenancy, the landlord becomes entitled nnder the law of the
land to recover possession of the premises from the tenant in
due process of law and the tenant under the general
E law of the land is hardly in a position to resist eviction, once the
contractual tenancy has been duiy determined. Because of scarcity
of accommodation and gradual high rise in the rents due to various
factors, the landlords were in a position to exploit the situation for
unjustified personal gains to the serious detriment of the helpless
tenants. Under the circumstances it became imperative for the
F
legislature to intervene to protect the tenants against harassment
and exploitation by avaracious landlords and appropriate legislation
came to be passed in all the States and Union Territories where the
situation required an interference by the legislature in this regard. It
is no donbt true that the Rent Acts are essentially meant for the
G benefit of the tenants. It is, however, to be noticed that the Rent •
Acts at the same time also seek to safeguard legitimate interests of
the landlords. The Rent Acts which are indeed in the nature of
social welfare legislation are intended to protect tenants against
harassment and exploitation by landlords, safeguarding at the same
H time the legitimate interests of the landlords. The Rent Acts seek to
preserve social harmony and promote social justice by safeguarding
O!AN DEVI ANAND v. JEEVAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 2~

the interests of the tenants mainly and at the same time protecting
the legitimate interests of the landlords. Though the purpose of the A
various Rent Acts appear to be the same, namely, to promote
social justice by affording protection to tenants against undue
harassment and exploitation by landlords, providing at the
same time for adequate safeguards of the legitmate interests
of the landlords, the Rent Acts undoubtedly lean more
B
in favour of the tenants for whose benefit the Rent Acts are
essentially passed. It may also be noted that various amendments
have been introduced to the various Rent Acts from time to time
as and when situation so required for the purpose of mitigating the
hardship of tenants.
c
Keeping in view the main object of Rent Control Legislation, the
position, of a tenant whose contractual tenancy has been determined
has to be understood in the light of the provisions of the Rent Acts.
Though provisions of all the Rent Control Acts are not uniform, the
common feature of all the Rent Control Legislation is that a con- D
tractual tenant on the termination of the contractual tenancy is by
virtue of the provisions of the Rent Acts not liable to be evicted as a
matter of course under the ordinary law of the land and he is entitled
to remain in possession even after determination of the contractual
tenancy and no order or decree for eviction will be passed against a
tenant unless any ground which entitles the landlord to get an order E
or decree for possession specified in the Act is established. In other
words, the common feature of every Rent Control Act is that it
affords protection to every tenant against eviction despite termi-
nation of tenancy except on grounds recognised by the Act and no
order or decree for eviction shall be passed against the tenant unless F
any such ground is established to·the satisfaction of the Court.

This Court has very aptly observed in Damadi/a/'s case (supra)
that it cannot be assumed that with the determination of the tenancy,
the estate must necessarily disappear and the statute can only
preserve the status of irremovability and not the estate he has in
G
the premises in his occupation; and it is not possible to claim that
the sanctity of contract cannot be touched by legislation. As already
noticed, this Court in Damadi/al'• case (supra) after refe:ring mainly
to the definition of tenant in S. 2(i) of the Madhya Pradesh Accom- B
modation Control Act, 1961 came to the so-called statutory
tenant bad an interest in the premises occupied by him and the heirs
of the statutory tenant "had a heritable interest in the premises". A
26 SUPllBME COURT REPORTS (1985) SUPPL. S.C.R.

tenant has been defined in S. 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
A which reads as follows:· .....
" 'tenant' means any person by whom or on whose
account or behalf the rent of any premises is, or, but for
a special contract would be, payable, and includes-
8
(i) a sub-tenant;

(ii) any person continuing in possession after the termi·
nation of his tenancy; and

C (iii) in the event of the death of the person continuing in
possession after the termination of his tenancy,
subject to the order of succession and conditions
specified respectively, in Explanation l and Expla·
nation II to this clause, such of the aforesaid
person's-
0
(a) spouse,

(b) son or daughter, or, where there are both son
and daughter, both of them,
E
(c) parents,

(d) daughter-in-law, being the widow of his pre-
deceased son,

F
as had been ordinarily living in the premises with such
person as a member or members of his family upto the
date of his death, but does not include, -

(A) any person against whom an order or decree for
G eviction has been made, except where such decree or
order for eviction is liable to be re-opened under the
proviso to section 3 of the Delhi Rent Control
(Amendment) Act, 1976.

H (B) any person to whom a licence, as defined by
section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 has
been grantCd.
GIAN DEVI ANAND \', lEEVAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 2?

Explanation 1.-The order of succession in the event
of the death of the person continuing in possession after A
the terminatton of his tenancy shall be as follows.-

(a) firstly, his surviving spouse;

(b) secondly, his son or daughter, or both, if there is no
B
surviving spouse, or if the surviving spouse did not
ordinarily live with the deceased person as a member
of his family upto the date of his death;

(c) thirdly, his parents, if there is no surviving spouse,
son or daughter of the deceased person, or if such c
surviving spouse, son or daughter or any of them,
·did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member
of the family of the deceased person upto the date
of his death; and
D
(d) fourthly, his daughter-in-law, being the widow of
his pre-deceased son, if there is no surviving spouse,
son, daughter or parents of the deceased person, or
if such surviving spouse son, daughter or parents, or
any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises
as a member of the family of the deceased person up E
to the date of his death.

Explanation 11.-If the person, who acquires, by
succession, the right to continue in possession after
the termination of the tenancy, was not financially F
dependent on the deceased person on the date of
his death, such successor shall acquire such right for
a limited period of one year; and, on the expiry of
that period, or on his death, whichever is earlier,
the right of such successor to continue in possession
after the termination of the tenancy shall become G
extinguished.

Explanation III.-For the removal of doubts, it is
hereby declared that,- H
(a) where, by reason of Explanation II, the right of
any successor to continue in possession after
28 SUl'REME C-OURt REPORTS (198~] SUPl'L. $,C.li..

the termination of the tenancy becomes extin·
A guished, such extinguishment shall not affect
the right of any other successor of the same
category to continue in possession after the
termination of the tenancy; but if there is no
other successor of the same category, the right
to continue in possession after the termination
B of the tenancy shall not, on such extinguishment
pass on to any other successor, specified in any
lower category or categories, as the case
may be;

(b) the right of every successor, referred to in
c Explanation I, to continue in possession after
the termination of the tenancy, shall he personal
to him and shall not, on the death of such
successor, devolve on any of his heirs ;"

D The definition of tenant as it stands at present in the Act, is after
the amendment of the definition in S. 2(1) of the earlier Act, by the
Amendment Act (Act 18 of 1976) which was introduced with retros-
pective effect. Prior to the amendment, the definition of tenant as
it stood in the original Act, 1958 was in the following terms:-
E " 'tenant' means any person by whom or on whose
account or behalf the rent of any premises is, or, but for
a special contract would be, payable and includes a sub-
tenant and also any person continuing in possession after
the termination of his tenancy but shall not include any
F person against whom any Order or decree for eviction
have been made".

G
It is, therefore, clear from the definition of tenant, whether in the
original Act or in the amended Act, that the tenant within the
meaning of the definition of the term in the Act includes any person
continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy. It
.-
will be seen that the definition of tenant in Madhya Pradesh
Accommodation Control Act, 1961 on which the decision in
Domodilal's case (supra) mainly turns, is similar to the definition
H of tenant as given in the Delhi Act in the sense that the tenant
under both the Acts includes for the purpose of the Rent Act any
person continuing in possession after the termination of the
tenancy.
GIAN DEVI ANAND Y. JEBVAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 29

The other section of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act
1961 considered by this Court in deciding Damadilal's case (supra) A
was section 14 which deals with sub-letting and this Court held that
there was nothing in that section to suggest that the section would
not apply to all tenants as defined in section 2( I) of the said Act.
S.14 was considered in Damadilal's case (supra) to ascertain whether
the 'so called statutory tenant' enjoyed the same right as the contra•
B
ctual tenant in the matter of sub-letting and this Court held that the
'so called statutory tenant' enjoyed the same right as the contractual
tenant.

Let us now analyse the provisions of the Delhi Act to find out
whether there is anything in the other provisions to indicate that the
c
tenant as defined in S. 2(1)(ii) will stand on any different footing
from a contractual tenant in the matter of enjoyment of the protec·
lion and benefits sought to be conferred on a tenant by the Act.

D
S. 2(e) defines landlord and clearly indicates that the landlord
continues to be tbe landlord for the purpose of the Act even after
termination of the contractual tenancy. S. 2(1) which defines 'tenant'
has been set out earlier in its entirety. We shall consider the true
effect of S. 2{J)(iii) on which as earlier noted, reliance has been
placed by the learned counsel of the landlords, when we deal with E
the argument which has been advanced on the basis of this sub-
section. Section 3 mentions premises which are outside the purview
of this Act and has no bearing on the question involved. Chapter II
of the Act consists of Sections 4 to 13 and makes provision regard-
ing rent. These sections indicate that they are applicable to tenants
F
as defined in S. 2(1) including 2(l)(iii). Chapter III consists of
sections 14 to 25 of the Act and deals with eviction and control of
eviction of tenants. S. 14 starts as follows :-

"notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the
G
recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by
any Court or Controller in favour of the landlord against
a tenant ;
H
...........................
..... ... .. ....... ... ...... ... ..
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) SUPPL. s.c.R.

Thereafter various provisions are made as . to grounds and under
A what circumstances a decree for eviction may be passed. This
section, therefore, clearly postulates that despite the termination of
the tenancy and notwithstanding the provisions of any other law
which might have been applicable on the termination of the contra·
ctual tenancy, protection against eviction is applicable to every
B tenant as defined in S. 2(1) of the Act. This section clearly establi·
shes that determination of a contractual tenancy does not disqualify
him from continuing to be a tenant within the meaning of this Act .
and the tenant whose contractual tenancy has been determined
enjoys the same position and is entitled to protectiou against
eviction. The other sections in this chapter also go to indicate that
c the tenant whose tenancy has been terminated enjoys the same
status and benefit as a tenant whose tenancy has not been termina·
ted, and a tenant after termination of his tenancy stands on the
same footing as the tenant before such termination. Chapter III A
which provides for summary trial for certain applications also does
D not make any distinction between a tenant whose tenancy has been
determined and a tenant whose tenancy had not been terminated.
Chagter IV which deals with deposit of rent consists of sections 26
to 29 and these sections make it clear that the tenant after deter·
mination of a tenancy is treated under the Act on the same footing
as a ienant whose tenancy has not been determined. Chapter V
E which consists of sections 30 to 34 deals with hotels and lodging
houses and does not have any relevance to the question involved.
Chapter VI which consists of sections 35 to 43 provides for appoint·
ment of Controllers and their powers and functions and also makes
provisions with regard to appeals. This chapter though not very
material for the purpose of adjudication of the point involved
F indicates that no discrimination is made in the matter of proceedings
for eviction between the 'so called statutory tenant' and a contra·
ctual tenant. Chapter VII which consists of sections 44 to 49
makes provisions regarding obligations of landlords and also pro-
vides for penalties in appropriate cases. The sections make it clear
G that the duties and obligations cast upo.1 the landlord apply equally
whether the tenant is a so called 'statutory tenant' or the tenant is a
contractual tenant. Chapter VIII which makes various misce!lane·
ous provisions does not have any bearing on the question involved.
It may, however, be noted that section 50 which bars the jurisdiction
H of Civil Courts in respect of certain matters does not in any way
discriminate between a 'so called statutory tenant' and a contractual
tenant. The provisions of the Act, therefore, make it abundantly
GIAN DEVI ANAND v. JEEVAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 31

clear that the Act does not make any distinction between a 'so
called statutory tenant' and a contractual tenant and the Act A
proceeds to treat both alike and to preserve and protect the status
and rights of a tenant after determination of the contractual tenancy
in the same way as the status and rights of a contractual tenant are
protected and preserved.

While on this question it will be appropriate to quote the B
following observations of this Court in the case of V. Dhanapa/
Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal (supra) at 340 :-

"Once the liability to be evicted is incurred by the
tenant, he 'Cannot turn round and say that the contrac·
tual lease has not been determined. The action of the
c
landlord in instituting a snit for eviction on the ground
mentioned in any State Rent Act will be tantamount to
an expression of his intention that he does not want the
tenant to continue as his lessee and the jural relationship
of lessor and lessee will come to an end on the passing D
of an order or a decree for eviction. Until then, under
the extended definition of the word 'tenant' under the
various State Rent Acts, the tenant continues to be a
tenant even though the contractual tenancy has been
determined by giving a valid notice under section 106 of E
the Transfer of Property Act. In many cases the distinc-
tion between a contractual tenant and a statutory tenant
was alluded to for the purpose of elucidating some parti-
cular aspects which cropped up in a particular case.
That led to the criticism of that expression in some of
F
the decisions. Without detaining ourselves on this
aspect of the matter by any elaborate discussion, in our
opinion, it will suffice to say that the various State Rent
Control Acts make a serious encroachment in the field
. of freedom of contract. It does not permit the landlord
. -.. to snap bis relationship with the tenant merely by his G
Act of serving a notice to quit on him. Inspite of the
notice, the law says that be continues to be a tenant and
and he does so enjoying all the rights of a lessee and is
at the same time deemed to be under all the liabilities
such as payment of rent etc. in accordance with the law." H

These observations were made by a seven-Judge Bench of this
Court. It is no doubt true that these observations were made while
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) SUPPL. s.c.R.

considering the question of requirement of a notice under section 106
A of the Transfer of Property Act before the institution of suit for
recovery of possession of premises to which the Rent Act applies.
These observations, however, clearly go to establish that mere deter·
mination of the contractual tenancy does not in any way bring
about any change in the status of a tenant. As aptly observed in
this decision, "it will suffice to say that the various State Rent
B
Coutrol Acts make a serious encroachment in the field of freedom
of contract. It does not permit the landlord to snap his relationship
with the tenant merely by his act of serving a notice to quit on him.
Inspite of the notice, the law says that he continues to be a tenant
and he does so, enjoying all the rights of a lessee and is at the same
"
c time deemed to be under all the liabilities such as payment of rent
etc. in accordance with the law."

We now proceed to deal with the further argument advanced '
on behalf of the landlords that the amendment to the definition of "
'tenant' with retrospective effect introduced by the Delhi Rent
D Control Amendment Act (Act 18 of 1976) to give personal protection
and personal sight of continuing in possession to the heirs of the
deceased statutory tenant in respect of residential premises only and
not with regard to the heirs of the 'so called statutory tenant' in
respect of commercial premises, indicates that the heirs of so called
E statutory tenants, therefore, do not enjoy any protection under the
Act. This argnment proceeds on the basis that in the absence of
any specific right created in favour of the 'so called statutory tenant'
in respect of his tenancy, the heir~ of the statutory tenant who do

F
not acquire any interest or estate in the tenanted premises, become
liable to be evicted as a matter of course. The very premise on the
basis of which the argument is advanced is, in our opinion, unsound.
-
The termination of the contractual tenancy in view of the definition
of tenant in the Act does not bring about any change in the status
and legal position of the tenant, unless there are contrary provisions
in the Act; and, the tenant notwithstanding the termination of
G tenancy does enjoy an estate or interest in the tenanted premises. < -

This interest or estate which the tenant under the Act despite termi·
nation of the contractual tenancy continues to enjoy creates a
heritable interest in the absence of any provision to the contrary.
We have earlier noticed the decision of this Court in Damadi/al's
H case (supra). This view has been taken by this Court in Damadi/al's
case and in our opinion this decision represents the correct position
GIAN DEVI ANAND V, JEEVAN KUMAR (A.N.Sen, J.) 33

in law. The observations of this Court in the decision of the Seven
Judge Bench in the case of V. Dhanapa/ Chtttiar v. Yesodai Ammal A
(supra) which we have earlier quoted appear to conclude the question.
The amendment of the definition of tenant by the Act 18 of 1976
introducing particularly 2(1 )(iii) does not in any way mitigate against
this view. The said sub-section (iii) with all the three Explanations
thereto is not in any way inconsistent with or contrary to sub- B
section (ii) of Section 2(1) which unequivocally states that tenant
includes any person continuing in possession after the termination
of his tenancy. In the absence of the provision contained in 'sub-
section 2(l)(iii). the heritable interest of the heirs of the statutory
tenant would devolve on all the heirs of the 'so called statutory
tenant' on bis death and the heirs of such tenant would in law step c
into his position. This sub-section (iii) of S. 2(1) seeks to restrict
this right in so far as the residential premises are concerned. The
heritability of the statutory tenancy which otherwise flows from the
Act is restricted in case of residential premises only to the heirs
mentioned in S 2(l)[iii) and the heirs therein are entitled to remain D
in possession and to enjoy the protection under the Act in the
manner and to the extent indicated in sub-section 2(1)(iii). The
legislature, which under the Rent Act affords protection against
eviction to tenants whose tenancies have been terminated and who
continue to remain in possession and who are generally termed as
statutory tenants, is perfectly competent to lay down the manner and E
extent of the protection and the rights and obligations of such tenants
and their heirs. S. 2(1)(ii1) of the Act does not create any additional
or special right in favour of the heirs of the 'so called statutory tenant'
on his death, but seeks to restrict the right of the heirs of such tenant
in respect of residential premises. As the status and rights of a F
contractual tenant even after determination of bis tenancy when the
tenant is at times described as the statutory tenant, are fully
protected by the Act and the heirs of such tenants become entitled
by virtue of the provisions of the Act to inherit the status and
position of the statutory tenant on his death, the legislature which
bas created this right has thought it fit in the case of residential G
premises to limit the rights of the heirs in the manner and to the
extent provided in S. 2(1)<iii). It appears that the legislature has
not thought it fit to put any such restrictions with regard to tenants
in respect of commercial premises in this Act.
H
It may be noted that for certain purposes the legislature in the
Delhi Act in question and also in various other Rent Acts bas treated
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPPL. ~.C.R.

commercial premises differently from residential premises S. 14(J)(d)
A provides that it will be a good ground for eviction of a tenant from
residential premises, if the premises let out for use as residence is
not so used for a period of six months immediately before the filing
of the application for the recovery of possession of the
premises. Similarly S. 14(J)(e) makes bonafide requirement
B of the landlord of the premises let out to the tenant for residential
purposes a good ground for eviction of the tenant from such
premises. These grounds, however, are not made available in
respect of commercial premises.

We find it difficult to agree with the observations which we
c have quoted earlier made by this Court in the case of Ganapat Ladha
v. Sashi Kant Vishnu Shinde (supra).

It may be noticed that the Legislature itself treats commercial
tenancy differently from residential tenancy in the matter of eviction
of the tenant in the Delhi Rent Act and also in various other Rent
D Acts. All the grounds for eviction of a tenant of residential pre-
mises are not made grounds for eviction of a tenant in respect of
commercial premises. S. 14(1 )(d) of the Delhi Rent Act provides
that non-user of the residential premises by the tenant for a period
of six months immediately before the filing of the application for the
E recovery of possession of the premises will be a good ground for
eviction, though in case of a commercial premises no such
provision is made. Similarly, S. 14(t)(e) which makes bona
fide requirement of the landlord of the premises let out to
the tenant for residential purposes a ground for eviction of
the tenant, is not made applicable to commercial premises. A
F tenant of any commercial premises has necessarily to use the
premises for business purposes. Business carried on by a tenant
of any commercial premises may be and often is, his only occupation
and the source of livelihood of the tenant and bis family. Out of
the income earned by the tenant from his business in the commercial
premises, the tenant maintains himself and bis family; and the
G
tenant, if he is residing in a tenanted house, may also be paying his
rent out of the said income. Even if tenant is evicted from his
residential premises, he may with the earnings out of the business
be in a position to arrange for some other accommodation for bis
H residence with his family. When, however, a tenant is thrown out
of the commercial premises, his business which enables him to
maintain himself and his family comes to a stand-still. It is common
GIAN DEVI ANAND v. ]E<VAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 35

knowledge that it is much more difficult to find suitable business
'.'remises than to find suitable premises for residence. It is no A'
secret that for securing commercial accommodation, large sums' of
money by way of salami, even though not legally payable, may have
to be paid and rents of commercial premises are usually' very high.
Besides,'a business which has been carried on for years at a parti·
cular place has its own goodwill and other distinct advantages. The B
death of the person. who happens to be the tenant of the com·
mercial premises and who · was running the business out of the
income of which the family used to be maintained, is itself a great
loss to the members of the family to' whom the death, naturally,
comes as a great blow. ·Usually; on the death of the person \vho
runs the business and maintains his family out of the. income of the c
. business, the other· members of the family who suffer the bereavment
have necessarily to carry on the business for the maintaince and
support of the family. A running business is indeed a very valuable
asset and often a great source of comfort to the family as the ·
business keep; the family going. So long as the contractual tenancy D
of a tenant who carries on the business continuest there can be no
question of the heirs of the deceased tenant not only inheriting the
tenancy but also inheriting the business and th'ey are entitled to run
and enjoy the same. We have earlier held that mere termination of
the contractual tenancy does not bring · about any change in the
status of the tenant and the· tenant by virtue of the definition of E
the 'tenant' in the Act and the other Rent Acts continues to enjoy
the same status and position unless there be any provisions in the
Rent Acts which in.dicate to the contrary. The mere fact that in the
Act no provision has been made with regard to the heirs of tenants
in respect of commercial tenancies on the death of the tenant after F.
termination of the tenancy, as has been done in the case of heirs of
the tenants of· residential premises, does not indicate that the
Legislature intended that the heirs of the tenants of commercial
premises will cease to enjoy the protection afforded to the tenant
under the Act. Tbe Legislature could never have possibly intended
that with the death of a tenant of the commercial premises, the busi· . G
ness carried on by the tenant, however, flourishing it may be and even
if the same constituted the source of livelihood of the members of
the family, must necessarily come to an end on the death· of the
tenant, only because the tenant died after the contractual tenancy
· had been terminated. It could never have been the intention of the H
Legislature that the entire family ·Of a tenant· depending upon the

. "t
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . (1985] SUPPL. S.C.R.

business 'carried o~ by the tenant_ will be completely · stranded and
A . the business carried on for years in the premises· which had been
Jet out to the tenant must stop functioning at the premises which the
heirs of the deceased tenant must necessarily vacate, as they are
afforded no protection under the Act. We are of the opinion that
in case of. commercial premises governed by· the Delhi Act, the·
·Legislature has not thought it fit in the light of the situation at Delhi
B to place any kind of restriction 0,1 the ordinary law of inheritance
with regard -to succession. It may also be borne in mind that in
case of commercial premises the heirs of the deceased tenant not
only succeed to the tenancy rights in the premises but they succeed
to the business as a whole. It might have been open to the Legisla-
c ture to limit or restrict the right of inheritance with regard to the
tenancy as the Legislature had done in the ca;e of the tenancies with
regard to the residential houses but it would not have been open to ·
the Legislature to alter under the Rent Act, the Law of Succession
regarding the bu;ines_s which is a valuable heritable right and which
must necessarily devolve on all the heirs in accordance with law.
D The absence of any provision restricting the heritability of the
tenancy in respect of the commercial premises only establishes . that
commercial tenancies notwitb.standin~ the determin.ation of the
contractual tenancies will devolve on the heirs in accordance with
law and the heirs who step into the position of the deceased tenant
will continue to enjoy the protection afforded by the Act and they
can only be evicted in accordance with the provisions of_ the Act.
There is another significant consideration which, in our opinion, .
lends support to the view that we are taking. Commercial premises
are let out not only to individuals but also to Companies, Corpora-
tions and other statutory bodies having a juristic personality. In fact,
F tenancies in respect of commercial premises are usually taken by
Companies and Corporations. When the tenant is a Company or a
· , Corporation or anybody with juristic personality, question of the
death of the tenant will not arise. Dospite the termination of the.
tenancy, the Company or the Corporation or _such juristic" personali-
G ties, however, will go on enjoying the protection afforded to the
tenant under the Act. It can hardly be, . conceived that the Legis-
lature would intend to deny. to one class of tenants, namely,
individuals the protection which will be enjoyed by the other class'
namely, the Corporations and Companies and other bodies with \_
H juristic personality .under the Act. If it be,· held that commercial
tenancies after the termination of the contractual tenancy of the
GIAN DEVI ANAND v. JEEVAN KUMAR (A;N. Sen, J.) 37

tenant are not heritable on the death of the tenant and the heirs
of the tenant are not entitled to enjoy the protection under the Act, A
an irreparable mischief which the Legislature could never have
intended is likely.to be caused. Any time after the creation of the
contractual tenancy, the landlord may determine the contractual
tenancy, allowing the tenant to continue to remain in possession of
the premises, hoping for an early death of the tenant, so that on
B
the death of a tenant he can immediately proceed to institute the
proceeding for recovery and recover. possession of the premises as a
matter of course, because the heirs would not have any right to
remain in occupation and would not enjoy the protection of the
Act. This could never have been intended by the Legislature while
framing the Rent Acts for affording protection to the tenant against c
eviction that the landlord would be entitled to recover possession,
even no grounds for eviction as prescribed in the Rent Acts are
made out.

In our opinion, the view expressed by this Court in Ganpat D
Ladha's case and the observations made therein which we have
earlier quoted, do not lay down the correct law. The said decision
does not properly construe the definition of the 'tenant' as given in
S. 5(1 l)(b) of the Act and does not consider the status of the tenant,
as defined in the Act, even after termination of the commercial
tenancy. In our judgment in Damadi/al's case this Court has E
correctly appreciated the status and the legal position of a tenant
who continues to remain in possession after termination of the
, contractual tenancy. We have quoted at length the view of this
Court and the reasons in support thereof. The view expressed by
a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Dhanapal Chetttiar's case and F
the observations made therein which we have earlier quoted, lend
support to the decision of this Court in Dhamadila/'s case. These
decisions correctly lay down that the termination of the contractual
tenancy by the landlord does not bring about a change in the status
of the tenant who continues to remain in possession after the termi-
nation of the tenancy by virtue of the provisions of the Rent Act. G
A proper interpretation of the definition of tenant in the light of
the provisions made in the Rent Acts makes it clear that the tenant
continues to enjoy an estate or interest in the tenanted premises
despite the t~rmination of the contractual tenancy.
H
j ~ccordingly, we hold that if the Rent Act in question defines
a tenant in substance to mean a tenant who continues to remain in
38 \ SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984) SUPPL. s.c.R. I
posse,.ion even after the termination of the contractual tenancy till LJ
A a decree for eviction against him is passed', the tenant even after
tho . determination of the tenancy continues to have an estate or
interest in the tenanted premises and the tenancy rights both in
. respect of residential premises and commercial premises are heritable•.
The heirs of the deceased tenant in the absence of any provision in
B the Rent Act to the contrary 'wili step into the position of the
decreased tenant and all the rights and obligations of the deceased
tenant including the protection afforded to the deceased tenan't under
. the Act will devolve on the heirs of the deceased teanant. As the
protection afforded by the Rent- Act to a tenant after determination
of the tenancy and · to bis heirs on the death of such tenant is a
c creation of the Act for the benefit of the tenants, it is open to the
Legislature which provides for such protection to make appropriate ·
provisions in the Act with regard to the nature .and extent of the
' benefit and protection to be enjoyed and the manner in which the
iame is to be enjoyed. If the Legislature makes any provision in the
D Act limiting or restricting the benefit and tbe nature of the protection
to be enjoyed in a specified manner_ by any particular class of
heirs of the deceased tenant on any condition laid down being ful·
filled, the benefit· of the protection has necessarily to be enjoyed on
the fulfilment of the condition in the manner and to the extent stipu-
lated in' th• Act. The Legislature which by the Rent Act seeks to
E confer the benefit on the tenants and to afford protection against
eviction, is perfectly competent to make appropriate provision regu~ .
la ting the nature. of protection and the manner and extent of
enjoyment of such tenancy rights after the termination of contractuai
tenancy of the tenant including the rights and the nature of protecticin
of the heirs on the death of the tenant. Such appropriate provision
F may be made by the Legislature both with regard to the residential·
tenancy and commercial tenancy. It is, however, entirely for the
' Legislature to decide whether the Legislature will make such pro-
vi,ion or not. In the absence of any provision regulating the right
of inheritance, and the manner and extent thereof and in the absence
G . of any condition being stipulated with regard to the devolution of
tenancy rights on the heirs on the death of the tenant, the devolution
of tenancy rights must necessarily be in accordance with the ordinary
law of succession. ·

In the D~lbi Act, the Legislature bas thought it fit to niake
proyision_s regulating the right to inherit the tenancy rights in resrect
GIAN DEVI ANAND v. JEEYAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 39
I
I -
..__,· of residential premises. The relevant provisions are contained in
S. 2(1}(ih) of the Act. With regard to the commercial premises, the A
Legislature in the Act under consideration has thought it fit not to
make any such provision. It may he noticed that in some Rent
Acts provisions regulating heritability of commercial premises, have
also been made whereas in some Rent Acts no such provision either
in respect of residential tenancies or commercial tenancies has been
.B
made. As In the present Act, there is no provision regulating the
rights of the heirs to inherit the tenancy rights of the tenanted
premises which is commercial premises, the tenancy right which is
heritable devolves on the heirs under the ordidary law of succession.
The tenancy right of Wasti Ram, therefore, uevolves on all the heirs
of Wasti Ram on his death; - c
We must; therefore, hold that Wasti Ram enjoyed the statute
of the premises in dispute even after determination of the contractual
tenancy and notwithstainding the terimination' of the contractual
tenency, Wasti Ram had an estate or interest in the demised premises; D
and tenancy rights of Wasti Ram did not come to an end with his
death but they_ devolved on the heirs and leral representative_of Wasti
Ram. 1The heirs ~nd legal representatives of Wasti Ram step 'into
his position and they are entitled to the benefit and protection of the
Act. We must; accordingly, hold that the High Court was not right
iu coming to the conclusion that the heirs of Wasti Ram, the so called E
statutory tenant, did not have any right to remain in possession
of the tenanted premises and did not enjoy any protection _under
the Act. It appears that the High Court passed an order for
_eviction against the heirs of Wasti Ram only on this ground without
going into the merits of the appeal filed by the appellant in the High F
Court_ agairist the order of remand and also without considering the
cross-objections filed in the High Court by the landlord. \\ e accord-
ingly, set asled the judgment and order of the High Court' -and we
remand the case to the High Court for decision of the appeal and the
cross -objection on.merits. The appeal is accordingly allo~ed to the
extent indieated above with no order as to costs. G

Before concluding, there is one !'aspect which we consider it
desirable to make certain observations. The owner of any premises,
whether residential or commercial, let out to any tenant, is permitted
by the Rent Control Acts to seek eviction of the tenant only on tne H
ground specified in the Act, entitling 'the landlord to evict the tenant
•
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1985] SUPPL s.c.R.

from the premises. The restrictions on the power of the landlords
A in the matter of recovery of possession of the premises let out by him
to a tenant have been imposed for the benefit of the tenants. Inspite
of various restrictions put on the landlords's right to recover posses-
sion of the premises from a tenant, the right of the landlord to re-
cover possession of the premises from the tenant for the bona fide
B need of the premises by the landlord is recognised by the Act, in case
of residential premises. A landlord may let out the premises under
various circumstances. Usually a landlord lets out the premises when
he does not need it for own use. Circumstances may change and a
situation may arise when the landlord may require the premises let
out by him for bis own use. It is just and proper that when the land- )
c lord requires the premises bona fide for his own use and occupation,
the landlord should be entitled to recover the possession of the pre-
mises which continues to be his property inspite of his letting out the
same to a tenant. The legislature in its wisdom did recognise this \
'.
fact and the Legislarure has provided that bona fide requirement of
D the landlord for his own use will be a legitimate ground under the
Act for the eviction of his tenant from any residential premises. This
ground is, however, confined to residential premises and is not made
available in case of commercial premises. A landlord who lets out
commercial premises to a tenant under certain circumstances may
need bona fide the premises for his own use under changed conditions
E in some future date should not in fairness be deprived of his right to
recover the commercial premises. Bona fide need of the landlord
will stand very much on the same footing in regard to either class of
permises, residential or commercial. We therefore, suggest that Legis-
lature may consider the advisability of making the bona fide require-
F ment of the landlord a ground of eviction in respect •of commercial
premises as well.

M.L.A. Appeal a/lowed.