Supreme Court of India
SMT. DHANWANTIversusD.D. GUPTA
- Citation
- 1986 INSC 119
- Decided
- 9 May 1986
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- R S PATHAK
Holding
The Supreme Court held that no fraud was committed in obtaining the 1980 permission under Section 21, and the Tribunal’s finding of fraud was erroneous.
Summary
The appellant, a land‑lady, owned a house in Vasant Vihar and repeatedly let it out to the respondent, a judicial officer, for limited periods after obtaining permission under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. After the last two‑year tenancy expired in April 1982, the respondent refused to vacate, and the appellant sought possession. The respondent objected, alleging that the 1980 permission was obtained by fraud because the appellant had previously let the premises to the same tenant and had concealed material facts. The Rent Control Tribunal held that fraud had been committed and dismissed the appellant's application; the High Court affirmed that decision. The Supreme Court, exercising its special leave jurisdiction, found that the Tribunal had mis‑apprehended the facts, that no material fact was concealed, and that successive limited lettings do not per se indicate an intention to let the premises indefinitely. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the lower authorities and allowed the appellant's possession application.
Issues considered
- Whether the permission obtained under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act in 1980 was obtained by fraud or by concealment of material facts.
- Whether successive limited‑period lettings of the same premises to the same tenant constitute fraud or indicate that the premises were available for indefinite letting.
- Whether the Supreme Court may interfere with the factual findings of the Rent Control Tribunal and the High Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
- Whether the appellant is entitled to possession of the premises after the expiry of the tenancy.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 136, s. Article 36
- Delhi Rent Control Acts. 21
Subjects
Delhi Rent Control ActSection 21fraudleasepossessionSupreme Court interferenceArticle 136landlord‑tenantrent controlspecial leave petition
Judgment
A
SMT. DHANWANTI
v.
D.D. GUPTA
B
MAY 9, 1986
t
[R.S. PATHAK AND SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, JJ.)
Constitution of India, !950, Article !36-Interference by the
Supreme Court with findings of fact by Courts below-Supreme Court
c can interfere when grave injustice results consequent upon an order
passed by a statutory authority based on misconstruction of facts and
circumstances.
Delhi Rent Control Act, section 2 ', scope of-Whether successive
D letting out of the premises to the same party after obtaining on each
occasion pennission under section 2:' tantamounts to fraud.
The appellant land-lady is the owner of, a single storeyed house,
at Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. It was constructed in the year 1973. The
premises was let out to an official of the government after obtaining
E necessary permission under section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act for
a period of one year. The tenant vacated the premises after six or seven
months and thereafter the premises were let out to the respondent on
April 15, 1974, after obtaining permission again under section 21. The
respondent vacated the premises on 27. 2. 1977 after settling account in
respect of the rent. The premises were again let out by the appellant to \
F the respondent on March 11, 1977 after obtaining permission under
section 2 l of the Act for a period of three years. After the expiry of the
said period the respondent again vacated the premises and thereafter
once again at his request the appellant let out the premises for a limited
period of two years after obtaining the permission under section 21. The
two years period expired on April 21, 1982 but the respondent did not
G hand over possession of the premises to the appellant, forcing her to
move the Rent Controller for an order directing delivery of possession
of the premises. In the Execution Application, the respondent filed his
objection on October 20, 1982 alleging that the permission under sec-
tion 21 of the Act was obtained by fraud practised on the Rent Control-
ler. On January 21, 1984 the First Additional Rent Controller, Delhi
H upheld the objection filed by the respondent and dismissed the execu-
SMT. DHANWANTI v. D.D. GUPTA 19
L
tion application. In appeal, the Rent Control Tribunal held: (i) that the A
allegation of the respondent that he had already entered into possession
of the premises before permission was granted under section 21 of the
Act in 1974 was false, and even if it be assumed that he had done so
there was nothing to prevent him from surrendering the tenancy; and
(ii) that the respondent cannot be considered to be a tenant in possession
without interrruption ever since 1974 and that it was only the tenancy B
; pursuant to the last permission that he continued. Basing on a state·
\
ment made by the appellant regarding the transfer of her son to Delhi
and her omission to mention in her application about the additional fact
of unsuitability of climate of Bangalore and her grandson's illness, the
Tribunal, however, held that the appellant had practised fraud on the
Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal. The second appeal by the c
appellant was dismissed summarily by the High Court. Hence the ap·
peal by special leave.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: I. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court declines to interfere D
with findings of fact and refuses to entertain special leave petitions
questioning such findings under Article 136 of the Constitution. How·
ever, this is a case, where the entire approach of the statutory au·
thorities has been vitiated by a gross misconstruction of the facts and
circumstances of the case, ignoring material evidence of the record, and
arriving at inferences which fly in the face of reason and the law ,-all E
resulting in grave injustire-, calling for necessary interference. 123 D-F)
The evidence in this case, does not make out that any fraud was
practised on the Rent Controller when permission was granted in 1980
under section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The changing facts of
social existence do not permit the application of unimaginative perspec·
F
tives and inflexible assumptions. The mutating kaleidoscope of human
life portrays a different reality. It is this fundamental error into which
the Rent Control Tribunal has fallen and because of that it has unwit·
tingly fallen further into the error of misconstruing the significance of
the statement made by the appellant. [24 C-D I
G
2. It is perfectly possible for the owner of a premises, on looking
to the immediate future, to find that for certain reasons he is unable to
occupy the premises forthwith himself but that he may do so later in the
not every distant future. It is not always that a man can plan his life
ahead with any degree of definiteness. Prevailing uncertainty in the
H
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11986] 3 S.C.R.
A circumstances surrounding him may not permit clear sighted vision into -'
the future. The circumstances may justify his envisioning his need for
the premises two or three years later, and therefore, applying for
permission under section 21 of the Act to let out the premises accord-
ingly. And yet, thereafter, on the expiry of that period he may find that
the circumstances have changed and his use of the premises has now to
B be postponed by another few years. In cases such as this the mere fact
that the owner has let out the premises after obtaining permission under \
I
section 21 of the Act for a limited period, and thereafter on the expiry of
that period has found it necessary to obtain permission to let out the
premises again for another limited period cannot necessarily lead to the
inference that from the very beginning the premises were available for
c letting out indefinitely. 12 G-H; 24A-C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
1795 of 1986:
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.9. I984 of the Delhi High
D Court in S.A.O. No. 283 of 1984.
Mrs. Shyamla Pappu, N.S. Das Bahl, P.K. Bahl and P.S.
Mahindra for the Appellant.
R.P. Bansal, K.C. Dua and P.O. Gupta for the Respondent.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PATHAK, J. Special leave granted.
This is a land-lady's appeal by special leave directed against the
F order of the High Court of Delhi dismissing her second appeal in
limine. The appellant is the owner of the premises No. F-8/ 17, Vasant !
Vihar, New Delhi. It is a single storeyed house. She let out the pre-
mises for a limited period of two years to the respondent, who is a
judicial officer. She did so after obtaining the requisite permission
under s. 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act on April 22, 1980. A re-
G gistered deed was executed between the parties in that behalf. The
deed recorded the undertaking of the respondent to vacate the pre-
mises at the end of two years. The two years expired on April 21, 1982
but the respondent did not hand over possession of the premises to the
appellant. Accordingly the appellant prayed for an order directing
delivery of possession of the premises to her. A warrant of possession
H was issued.
SMT. DHANWANTI v. D.D. GUPTA [PATHAK, J.[ 21
"-- On October 20, 1982 the respondent filed his objection, alleging A
that the order granting permission under s. 21 of the Act was obtained
by fraud practised on the Rent Controller and was a nullity. It was
asserted that the premises were constructed in the year 1973 and were
let out to an official of the Government under s. 21 of the Act for a
period of one year. On the official vacating the premises after one B
year, it was alleged, they were let out to the respondent at a rent of
' Rs. 725 per mensem in the first week of April 1974 as a regular tenant.
It was said that on the request of the appellant the respondent joined
in an application for permission under s. 21 of the Act. When the
appellant applied for permission, it is alleged, she did not disclose to
the Rent Controller that earlier also she had inducted a person as
tenant after obtaining such permission. On the expiry of three years, c
the respondent said, the appellant again, in the year 1977, obtained
permission under s. 21 of the Act for letting out the premises at an
enhanced rent of Rs. 825 per mensem for a limited period of two years
to the respondent. That period expired in April 1980. It was thereafter
that the appellant obtained permission under s. 21 of the Act for D
letting out the premises to the respondent for a period of two years.
The respondent urged that he was in uninterrupted possession since
April 1974 and that no ground had been disclosed by the appellant in
the application for permission under s. 21 of the Act made in the year
1980 indicating the reason for letting out the premises for a limited
IL period of two years. It is alleged that permission was granted mechani-
E
cally by the Rent Controller, and that it could not be recognised as
binding on the respondent.
The appellant filed her reply to the objection and vehemently
~ denied that the order under s. 21 of the Act granting permission in
1980 was nullity or had been obtained by fraud or that any material F
fact had been withheld in the application for permission. The appellant
~ asserted that in the beginning the premises had been let out to an
official of the Government for a period of three years commencing
from August 29, 1973, but the tenant vacated the premises after 6 or 7
months and thereafter it became necessary to let out the premises to
the respondent on April 15, 1974 after obtaining permission under s. G
21 of the Act. It was denied that the respondent had already occupied
the premises as a regular tenant before permission under s. 21 of the
Act had been granted. It was maintained that the respondent occupied
" the premises on April 15, 1974 pursuant to the permission under s. 21
of the Act. The appellant stated further that the respondent had given
notice to the appellant on February 27, 1977 expressing his intention to H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19861 3 S.C. R.
A vacate the premises and that in fact he did vacate the premises on that
date after settling the account in respect of the rent. But a few days
after leaving the premises the respondent again approached the appel-
lant for taking the premises on rent. Accordingly, the premises were
let out by the appellant to the respondent on March 11, 1977 after
obtaining permission under s. 21 of the Act. It was pointed out that in
B
the application under s. 21 of the Act, the respondent gave his address
as Village Khandsara, near Gurgaon, Haryana where he was then \.
residing in the factory premises of his son. The possession of the
premises was handed over to the respondent on March 11, 1977 in
pursuance of the permission, and the rate ofrent agreed to was Rs.825
per mensem. The appellant further stated that on the expiry of the
c period, the respondent again vacated the premises and shifted to 13,
Palam Marg, New Delhi. Thereafter the respondent approached the
appellant again to let out the premises for a limited period of two
years. As the appellant's second son, who is an officer in the Indian
Air Force, was posted at Bangalore and the appellant was not in a
position to occupy the premises all alone, she agreed to let out the
D
premises to the respondent. On April 21, 1980 the appellant and the
respondent joined in the application for obtaining permission under s.
21 of the Act to enable the appellant to let out the premises to the
respondent for a period of two years. The appellant urged that the
premises were now reg uired by her as her son, an Indian Air Force
Officer, had to shift his family to Delhi, and it was further pointed out
E
that the premises were to be occupied by the appellant and the family
members of that son as the climate of Bangalore did not suit them. It
was denied that the premises were available for indefinite letting, and
the periodic tenancies, it was asserted, were entered into because of
the circumstances prevailing on each occasion. I
F
On January 21, 1984 the First Additional Rent Controller, Delhi
upheld the objection filed by the respondent and dismissed the execu-
tion application of the appellant made under s. 21 of the Act. The
appellant appealed to the Rent Control Tribunal and the Tribunal held
that the allegation of the respondent that he had already entered into
possession of the premises before permission was granted under s. 21
G
of the Act in 1974 was false, and even if it be assumed that he had done
so there was nothing to prevent him from surrendering the tenancy.
That was evident when he joined the appellant in the application for
permission under s. 21 of the Act in 1974. The case of the respondent
that he must be considered to be a tenant in possession without inter-
H ruption ever since 1974 could not, in the opinion of the Rent Control
SMT. DHANWANTI v. D.D. GUPTA [PATHAK, J.) 23
Tribunal, be accepted on the facts and circumstances of the case, and A
that it was only the tenancy pursuant to the last permission which
could be questioned. The Rent Control Tribunal then addressed itself
to the principal issue whether fraud had been practised on the Rent
Controller in obtaining permission under s. 21 of the Act in 1980. The
Tribunal referred to the circumstance that the appellant had let out the B
premises from time to time for limited periods on earlier occasions and
observed that it was evident that the premises were available for being
let out for an indefinite period. It adverted to a statement made by the
appellant regarding the transfer of her son to Delhi, and deduced from
the language employed by her that she wanted to convey that her son
had been posted earlier in Delhi and that he was now being transferred
back to Delhi. It also pointed out that the unsuitability of the climate c
of Bangalore in regard to her grandson as the reason for the family
desiring to settle in Delhi had not been mentioned at the initial stage of
~· the litigation. Upon that, the Rent Control Tribunal held that the
appellant had practised fraud on the Rent Controller when obtaining
permission under s. 21 of the Act in 1980. A second appeal by the D
appellant was dismissed summarily by the High Court.
We have considered the case with great care. Ordinarily, this
Court declines to interfere with findings of fact and refuses to entertain
special leave petitions questioning such findings. But it seems to us
that in this case the entire approach of the statutory authorities has
E
been vitiated by a gross misconstruction of the facts and circumstances
of the case, ignoring material evidence on the record, and arriving at
inferences which fly in the face of reason and the law. All this has
resulted in grave injustice. At the outset it is apparent from the record
that the finding of the Rent Control Tribunal that the property was
available for being let for an indefinite period proceeds on the unwar- F
ranted assumption that the grant of the three leases, from 1974
through 1977 to 1980, points to that as the only conclusion. That as-
sumption would have been justified if there was positive material to
indicate that from the very beginning there was never any intention on
the part of the appellant to occupy the premises herself. There is no
such material at all on the record. It seems to have been ignored G
altogether that it is perfectly possible for the owner of a premises, on
looking to the immediate future, to find that for certain reasons he i•
unable to occupy the premises forthwith himself but that he may do so
later in the not very distant future. It is not always that a man can plan
his life ahead with any degree of definiteness. Prevailing uncertainty in
the circumstances surrounding him may not permit clear sighted vision H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.
A into the future. The circumstances may justify his envisioning his need ~
for the premises two or three years later, and therefore applying for
permission under s. 21 of the Act to let out the premises accordingly.
And yet, thereafter, on the expiry of that period he may find that the
circumstances have changed and his use of the premises has now to be
B postponed by another few years. In cases such as this the mere fact that
the owner has let out the premises after obtaining permission under s.
21 of the Act for a limited period, and thereafter on the expiry of that
(
period has found it necessary to obtain permission to let out the pre-
mises again for another limited period cannot necessarily lead to the
inference that from the very beginning the premises were available for '
letting out indefinitely. The Rent Controller and the Rent Control
c Tribunal should have examined the circumstances prevailing on each
occasion when an application was made under s. 21 of the Act. The
changing facts of social existence do not permit the application of
unimaginative perspectives and inflexible assumptions. The mutating
kaleidoscope of human life portrays a different reality. It is this fund a-
D mental error into which the Rent Control Tribunal has fallen. Because
of that it has unwittingly fallen further into the error of misconstruing
the significance of the statement made by the appellant. A copy of her
statement is before us, and all that the appellant said was that the
premises could be spared for letting because her son had been posted ·
at Bangalore and that after two years he would be back in Delhi. Much I
E has been made by the Rent Control Tribunal of this minor incon-
sistency, of the circumstance that instead of stating that her son would
be posted in Delhi the appellant had stated that her son would be
posted "back" in Delhi. It seems to us wholly irrelevant to the issue in
the case whether the son was being posted in Delhi for the first time or
was being posted again in the city. It was wholly immaterial to the
F question in 1980 whether the premises, which had been constructed a /
few years before, should be let out for a period of two years. What was
material was the expectation that the son and his family would be in ~
Delhi after two years. The central issue in the case has been clouded by
a circumstance which has no bearing on it.
G
In our judgment, the orders of the First Additional Rent Con-
troller, the Rent Control Tribunal and of the High Court -cannot be
sustained.
An attempt was made by learned counsel for the appellant to
refer to material, now placed on the record, establishing that the ap-
H pellant's son had in fact been transferred to Delhi in May 1985 and that
SMr. DHANWANTI v. D.D. GUPTA [PATHAK, J.] 25
,.
he was compelled, with a family of six members, to share a small A
· accommodation with a friend at Delhi. There is also clear evidence
showing that his eldest child was suffering from bronchial asthma and
had been hospitalised in the Command Hospital at Bangalore three
times, and that medical specialists had advised a change of place im-
mediately. We need not take this material into consideration. After
B
examining the material already on the record, a task to which.we are
compelled by the erroneous approach adopted by the statutory au-
thorities to the case, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence
does not make out that any fraud was practised on the Rent Controller
I
when permission was granted in 1980 under s. 21 of the Act, and there
is nothing to show that the permission can be regarded as a nullity or
that material facts were concealed. On the contrary, it seems to us that c
the haphazard manner in which the case has been dealt with by the
First Additional Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal leaves
much to be desired.
The appeal is allowed, the order dated January 21, 1984 of the
D
First Additional Rent Controller, the order dated May 2, 1984 of the
Rent Control Tribunal and the order dated September 25, 1984 of the
High Court are set aside and the objection filed by the respondent to
the appellant's application for possession under s. 21 of the Delhi Rent
Control Act is rejected and the said application is allowed. The appel-
lant will be entitled to delivery of possession of the premises. But in
E
the circumstances, we allow the respondent a period of two months
from today for vacating the premises. There is no order as to costs.
S.R. Appeal allowed.
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