Holding

The conviction is justified as the approver’s testimony was fully corroborated and the procedure under Section 306 CrPC was properly followed.

Summary

The accused were convicted for the abduction, murder and dacoity of Gayatri Devi based largely on the testimony of an approver, Lalit Sanga, whose statement was recorded under Section 306 of the CrPC after he was granted pardon. The High Court had earlier remanded the case, finding procedural lapses in the recording of the approver's statement, but after a fresh committal the trial court again convicted the accused. The Supreme Court examined whether the conviction was legally sustainable despite the reliance on an approver’s uncorroborated testimony and whether the procedural requirements of Section 306 CrPC and the evidential standards of Sections 133 and 114(b) of the Evidence Act were met. It held that the approver’s evidence was fully corroborated by medical findings and recovered money, that the procedure under Section 306 was duly complied with, and that the conviction was therefore safe. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The conviction can be sustained on the basis of an approver’s testimony without independent corroboration.
Whether the trial court complied with the procedural requirements of Section 306 of the Criminal Procedure Code in recording the approver’s statement.
Whether the evidence of the approver, an accomplice, satisfies the prudential rule of corroboration under Sections 133 and 114(b) of the Evidence Act.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 306
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114(b), s. 133
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 364, s. 396, s. 412

Subjects

approver testimonycorroborationSection 306 CrPCEvidence Act Section 133Evidence Act Section 114(b)convictiondacoitymurderprocedural compliance

Judgment

SITARAM SAO@MUNGERI A
v.
STATE OF JHARKHAND

NOVEMBER 12, 2007
B
[DR.ARIJITPASAYATANDLOKESHWAR
SINGH PANTA, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860-ss. 364, 396and120 B-Abduction, dacoity
and murder-Recovery of looted money from the possession offew C
accused-One accused declared approver-Trial Court Convicting the
accused on the basis ofStatement ofthe approver-On appeal, High
Court remanding the case for fresh commital since the trial was based
on statement ofapprover not recorded as per procedure laid down ul
s 306 Cr.P.C.-Fresh Committal after recording statement of the D
approver-Conviction after fresh trial, on the basis of the statement
"
ofapprover-Confirmed by High Court-On appeal, held: Conviction
justified-Evidence of approver is fully corroborated and thus
reliable-There is no illegality in procedure adoptedfor recording his
statement after remand of the case-Code of Criminal Procedure, E
1973-s. 306.
Evidence Act, 1872-ss. 133 and 114 illustration (b)-Approver-
Statement of-Reliability on-Corroboration-NPed for-Held:
Necessity of corroboration of statement of approver is a matter of
prudence, except when it is safe to dispense with such corroboration- F
Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1973-s. 306.

Appellants-accused with others was charged for committing
dacoity and murder of a lady. Prosecution case was thatthe deceased
was coming in her car, with some amount of money, driven by her G
driver (accused). When she did not return home, her husband (PW
1) lodged a complaint against the driver-accused. Dead-body of he
deceased was found, car was found elsewhere in abandoned condition
by the Police. After arrest of driver-accused, part oflooted money
997 H
~
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.
.f-
..'
A was recovered from his house. He also disclosed the names of his
associates. Pursuant whereto other accused were arrested. Part of
the looted money was recovered also from the house of the other
accused. Still another accused confessed his guilt and expressed his
desire to give his statement with regard to the occurrence. His
B statement was recorded u/s 306 Cr.P.C. and was granted person as
~
approver. After trial appellant alongwith other accused was ....
convicted. In the appeals, High Court noticed that examination of
the approver u/s 306 Cr. P.C. was not in the presence of the other
accused and he was also not cross-examined. Therefore, setting
c aside the judgment of trial Court, it remanded the case for fresh
committal proceedings. Magistrate was directed to examine the
approver (PW-6) Magistrate after examining the approver, as per
the procedure, committed the case for trial. Trial court convicted the
accused u/ss 364, 396 and 120 BIPC. High Court upheld the
conviction. Hence the present appeals.
D ,.i_
~
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Section 133 of the Evidence Act expressly provides
that an accomplice is a competent witness and the conviction is not
E illegal merely because it proceeds on an uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice. This section renders admissible such
uncorroborated testimony. But this Section has to be read along with
Section 114, illustration (b). The latter section empowers the Court
to presume the existence of certain facts and the illustration
elucidates what the Court may presume and make clear by means
F
of examples as to what facts the Court shall have regard in :r
considering whether or not maxims illustrated apply to a given case.
Illustration (b) in express terms says that accomplice is unworthy
of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. The
Statute permits the conviction of an accused on the basis of
G
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice but the rule of prudence •
;

embodied in illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act strikes y
a note of warning cautioning the Court that an accomplice does not
generally deserve to be believed unless corroborated in material
particulars. Thus, the rule is that the necessity of corroboration is a
H
SITARAMSAO@MUNGERiv. STATE 999

' -· }-
matter of prudence except when it is safe to dispense with such A
corroboration must be clearly present in the mind of the Judge.
[Para 15] (1006-D, E, F, G]

Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, AIR (1994) SC 2420,
relied on.
a
Bhubon Sahu v. The King, AIR (1949) PC 257, referred to.
1.2. Although Section 114 illustration (b) provides that the Court
may presume that the evidence of an accomplice is unworthy of credit
unless corroborated, "may" is not must and no decision of Court can
make it must. The Court is not obliged to hold that he is unworthy of C
credit. It ultimately depends upon the Court's Yiew as to the
credibility of evidence tendered by an accomplice.
[Para 16] [1007-A, B]

G. S Bakshi v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR (1979) SC 569; D'
and Rameshwar v. ~late ofRajasthan, AIR (1952) SC 54, relied on.
Rex v. Baskerville, (1916) 2 KB 658;
"A Treatise on the Law ofEvidence" by Taylor 1931 Vol.1 para
967, referred to. E
Jnanendra Nath Ghose v. State ofWest Bengal (1960] 1 SCR 126;
Bhiva Doulu Patil v. State ofMaharashtra, AIR (1963) SC 599; DPP
v. Hester, (1972) 3 All ER 1056 and D.P.P. v. Kilbourne (1973); All
ER 440, referred to.
F
1.3. It is not necessary that there should be independent
confirmation of every material circumstance in the sense that the
independent evidence in the case, apart from the testimony of the
complainant or the accomplice, should in itself be sufficient to sustain
conviction. All that is required is that there must be some additional G
evidence rendering it probable that the story of the accomplice (or
complainant) is true and that it is reasonably safe to act upon it. The
independent evidence must not only make it safe to believe that the
crime was committed but must in some way reasonably connect or
tend to connect the accused with it by confirming in some material H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A particular the testimony of the accomplice or complainant that the
accused committed the crime. This does not mean that the
corroborntion as to identity must extend to all the circumstances
necessary to identity the accused with the offence. Thr corroboration
must come from independant sources and thus ordinarily the
B testimony of one accomplice would not be suffice in to corroborate
that of another. But of course the circumstances may be such as to
make it safe to dispense with the necessity of corroboration and in
those special circumstances a conviction so based would not be
illegal. The corroboration need not be direct evidence that the
c accused committed the crime. It is sufficient if it is merely·
circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime.
[Paras 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30] [1010-C, E, F, G; 1011-B, CJ

K. Hashim v. State ofTamil Nadu, [2005) 1SCC237, relied on.
D MO. shamsudhin v. State ofKera/a, [1995) 3 SCC 351, referred
~ ~
. ...
2. In the present case, the Approver, in his evidence has given
the sequence of events which led to the murder of the deceased and
he has also deposed as to how a conspiracy was hatched up and how
E the conspiracy was executed with the help of other accused persons
and how the deceased was stabbed by the driver-accused on the
instigation and active participation of accused 'L'. It has been stated
on behalf of the accused-appellant that this witness did not give the
name of the boy, who came to call him nor he gave the number of
F auto rickshaw and the place, where other associates were standing.
Though all these points are not material but the evidence of PW-6 1-
stands corroborated when doctor found injury on the body of the
deceased and further that abrasions were also found on the cheek
and neck when accused-appellant pressed the mouth of the deceased
G so that she may not raise alarm and further that money was looted
and part oflooted money was recovered from the possession of driv~r-
accused on the basis of his confessional statement. Although this Y.
fact has occurred prior to arrest of PW-6, but with the evidence of
PW-6 all these facts corroborate the evidence of PW-6 because he.·
H was not knowing all these facts and with his evidence all these facts
) SITARAMSAO@MUNGERiv. STATE[PASAYAT,J.] 1001

stand corroborated and, therefore, there is complete corroboration A
of the evidence of PW-6 and there is no ground for disbelieving the
evidence of PW-6 and therefore on the basis of the evidence of PW-
6 accused-appellant and co-accused 'L' were found guilty and they
were involved in the abduction as well as in the occurrence under
Section 396 IPC. [Para 32] [1011-E, F, G; 1012-A, BJ B
3. There is no illegality in the order and in the procedure
adopted by the CJM after remand of the case. There was complete
compliance of Section 306 Cr. P.C. The stage of examining the
approver comes only after he has been granted pardon and after
pardon, he was examined as a witness in presence of the accused C
and also he was cross-examined. [Para 34) [1012-D, E]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
1528of2007.
,.... From the final Judgment and Order dated 29.6.2005 of the High D
I
Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Criminal Appeal No. 575 of2002.
WITH
Crl. A. No. 1531 of2007.
E
P.S. Mishra, Tathagat H. Vardhan, Dhruv Kumar Jha, Ravi C.
Prakash and Manu Shanker Mishra for the Appellant.
Santosh Singh, (A.C.) for the Appellant in Crl. A. No. 1531 of
2007.
_..,. F
\
Anil K. Jha for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Cqurt was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment of a Division Bench G
"°-\ of the Jharkha.nd High Cotut dismissing the appeals filed by the appellants
and upholding the conviction for offences ptmishable under Sections 364
and 396 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short
the 'IPC'). In fact, the High Court disposed of two appeals both directed
H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A against the judgment of conviction dated 16th July, 2002 and 23rd July,
2002 passed in Sessions Trial No.156/1997. As noted above, the trial
Court found both the accused appellants guilty and awarded the sentence
of imprisonment for life for the offences punishable under Sections 364
and 396 IPC. However, no separate sentence under section 120B was
B awarded, while the co-accused Laxmi Prasad was further sentenced to
the period already undergone for offence punishable under Section 412
IPC.
3. The High Court did not find any substance in the appeals and
dismissed the same as noted above.
c
4. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
On 8.1.1992, Gayatri Devi, wife of the informant, had gone to
Pandra Agricultural Market by her Ambassador car bearing registration
No. AA Y 7375 and from there she left for her residence at about 8 PM
D after collecting the sale proceeds of the day of shop Nos.244 to 251.
The driver of the car, Laxmi Paswan, who was one of the accused, was
driving the car. Gayatri Devi after collecting a sum ofRs. l,84,405/- did
not return to her house, the informant informed Sukhdeo Nagar P.S.
regarding the missing of his wife and the driver of the car, Laxmi Paswan.
E Laxmi Paswan was employed by the informant as the driver of his car on
the recommendation of the previous driver, namely, Rajendra Choudhary.
When the wife of the informant as well as the driver did not return till
night, the informant, on the next morning i.e. on 9.1.1992, submitted a
written report alleging therein that Laxmi Paswan, driver of the car, in
F collusion with anti-social elements, abducted his wife and car in order to ·r-
(
kill her and snatch the money. It was alleged that informant "came to know
from reliable sources that his car was seen in the night on Ranch Ramgarh
road.
G On the basis of the aforesaid information, Sukhdeo Nagar P.S.
registered a case under Section 364 IPC against Laxmi Paswan only and
in course of investigation the dead body of the wife of the informant, Y.~
namely, Gayatri Devi, was found on Giddi National road under Ramgarh
P.S. After preparing the inquest report, in the presence of the witnesses,
the 1.0. of the case sent the dead body to RMCH for post-mortem.
H
_,,.. J SITARAMSAO@MUNGERI v. STATE[PASAYAT,J.] 1003
- )-
Subsequently, the car of the informant bearing registration No. AAY 7375 A
was found lying abandoned near Kujju town outpost. Subsequently the
officer incharge ofSukhdeo Nagar P.S. took the said car from the Kujju
TOP in his possession and a search was made in the presence of the
witnesses and in the course of search, certain articles were seized. The
seizure list was prepared and in the course of investigation, accused Laxmi B
Paswan was arrested on 14.1.1992 from his village Mungrahi within the
district of Aurangabad and a part of the money stolen from Gayatri Devi
amounting to Rs.30,695/- was also recovered from his house on the basis
of his confessional statement. Laxmi Paswan disclosed the name of his
associates to the police and subsequently, the other accused persons were c
also arrested. In course of investigation, on the basis of confessional
statement, a sum ofRs.27,220/- was also recovered from the house of
Girja Singh. Later, one of the accused, namely, Lalit Sanga was also
arrested, who confessed his guilt before the police and expressed his desire
to give statement with regard to the occurrence. His statement was D
recorded by Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 306 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'Cr. P.C. ')and was granted pardon.
The case was committed to the Court of Sessions, which was registered
as ST No.319/92 and thereafter the accused persons faced trial in the
court of learned VIth Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi and the E
learned Additional Judicial Commissioner, on consideration of evidence
on record, found them guilty; but acquitted two accused persons, namely,
Girja Singh and Dinesh Kumar Singh by his judgment dated 1.10.1992.
One of the accused, namely, Laxmi Paswan was sentenced to death, while
other accused persons were sentenced to undergo RI for life. Thereafter,
,,.,,...._\•
\ both the State and the accused persons preferred appeal against the F
impugned judgment and the High Court, by its judgment dated 28th July,
1993, set aside the judgment of conviction passed by the Vlth Additional
Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi and the case was remanded to the Court
of Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi for fresh commitment
proceeding and learned C.J.M. was directed to examine Lalit Sanga, the G
approver, (PW6), as prosecution witness in accordance with law and
procedure. After remand of the case, the learned C.J.M. examined
approver Lalit Sanga under Section 306 Cr.P.C. and thereafter committed
the case to the Court of Sessions by order dated 19 .2.1997 and after
H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 11 S.C.R.

-f-
A remand of the case, the case was registered as Sessions Trial No.156/
97. The Learned Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi transferred the case to
another Court for holding the trial of the accused persons. On receipt of
the record, charges were framed against the accused persons for offences
punishable under Sections 396, 412 and 120 (B) IPC.
B 5. Trial proceeded and in the course of trial the trial court recorded
evidence of twenty-three witnesses, besides documentary evidence and
material exhibits and ultimately came to a finding that the appellants are
guilty and accordingly convicted them. After recording of the statement,
accused Girja Singh fled away and, therefore, his trial was separated from
C the trial of other accused.
6. The trial court recorded evidence of23 witnesses and scrutinized
their evidence and found the accused-appellants guilty. In this case, all
necessary witnesses such as 1.0., doctor and informant were exarriined.
D In appeal the High Court held that the prosecution has not left any laches
on its part in examining the witnesses connected with this case.
7. The basic contention of the appellants, as contended before the
High Court, was that there was no eye witness in the occurrence and
simply on the basis of evidence ofLalit Sanga, the approver, the accused
E persons have been found to be guilty. It is submitted that the manner in
which Lalit Sanga was granted pardon is illegal. Reference was made to
the judgment passed by the High Court in Criminal Appeal No.20211992.
It is pointed out that the evidence recorded in the first sessions case where
Sessions trial No.319/1992 was set aside and when the judgment in
F question was set aside, the procedure should have been started afresh.
By the judgment, the case was remanded to the Court of C.J.M. who
was directed to examine Lalit Sanga as a witness. It is the grievance of
the accused appellants that the procedure laid down under Section 306
Cr.P. C. was not followed after the direction of the High Com1 in the first
G judgment. Lal it Sanga was examined in the presence of the accused
persons and he was cross-examined and thereafter case was committed
to the Court of Sessions but Lalit Sanga was not granted pardon and he
was examined again by the order of the High Court. Therefore, it is
submitted that there was non-compliance of the requirements of Section
H 306 Cr.P.C. It was submitted that he should have been granted pardon
) SITARAM SAO@MUNGERI v. STATE [P ASA YAT,J.] 1005

and thereafter as per the provisions of Section 306 Cr.P .C. he should have A
been examined as a witness in the presence of accused and he should
have been cross examined. But only one part has been complied with
and thereafter case was committed to the Court of Sessions but the first
part that he was to be granted pardon has not been complied with. It is
~ also submitted that the alleged confession of this witness does not satisfy B
..-- the requirements of Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in'
short the 'Evidence Act'). Accused Lalit Sanga had not confessed to his'
active participation in the occurrence. His evidence is also not fully truthful.
8. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand supported the
impugned judgment. C
9. The High Court noted that the order ofCJM was not set aside.
What was set aside partly was that Lalit Sanga was examined but not
cross examined and his statement was not recorded in the presence of
, ,.... the accused. That part of the order has been complied with and Lalit Sanga D
was examined in the presence of the accused and he was also cross ·
examined and thereafter case was committed to the Court of Sessions.
10. We shall deal with this part of the appeal later. It is to be noted
that learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted that the procedure
mandated under Section 306 Cr.P.C. has been fully complied with. E
11. Learned counsel for the State has submitted that not only has
there been compliance with the requirements of Section 306 Cr.P.C. but
also Section 133 read with Section 114 (b) of the Evidence Act.
12. Sections 133 and 114 (b) of the Evidence Act read as follows: F
"133. Accomplice- An accomplice shall be a competent
witness against an accused person; and a conviction is not illegal
merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of
an accomplice.
G
114(b)- The Court may presume that an accomplice is
unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars.
13. Section 133 of the Evidence Act is of significance. It relates to
the evidence of an accomplice. In positive terms it provides that the H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A conviction based on the evidence of an accomplice is not illegal merely
because it proceeds upon the '.lilcorroborated testimony of an accomplice,
because the accomplice is a competent witness.
14. In Bhubon Sahu v. The King, AIR (1949) PC 257, it was
B observed that the rule requiring corroboration for acting upon the evidence
of an accomplice is a. rule of prudence. But the rule of prudence assumes
great significance when its reliability on the touchstone of credibility is
examined. If it is found credible and cogent, the Court can record a
conviction even on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. On
C the subject of the credibility of tht> testimony of an accomplice, the
proposition that an accomplice.must be corroborated does not mean that
there must be cumulative or independent testimony to the same facts to
which he has testified. At the same time, the presumption available under
Section 114 of the Evidence Act is of significance. It says that the Court
may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is
D corroborated in "material particulars".
15. Section 133 of the Evidence Act expressly provides that an
accomplice is a competent witness and the conviction is not illegal merely
because it proceeds on an uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
E In other words, this section renders admissible such uncorroborated
testimony. But this Section has to be read along with Section 114,
illustration (b). The latter section empowers the Court to presume the
existence of certain facts and the illustration elucidates what the Court may
presume and make clear by means of examples as to what facts the Court
F shall have regard in considering whether or not maxims illustrated apply
to a given case. Illustration (b) in express terms says that accomplice is
unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. The
Statute permits the conviction of an accused on the basis of
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice but the rule of prudence
G embodied in illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act strikes a
note of warning cautioning the Court that an accomplice does not generally
y
deserve to be believed unless corroborated in material particulars. In other
words, the rule is that the necessity of corroboration is a matter of
prudence except when it is safe to dispense with such corroboration must
be clearly present in the mind of the Judge. [See Suresh Chandra Bahri
H
SITARAMSAO@MUNGERI v. STATE(PASAYAT,J.] 1007

v. State ofBihar, AIR (1994) SC 2420]. A'
16. Although Section 114 illustration (b) provides that the Court may
presume that the evidence of an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless
corroborated, "may" is not must and no decision of Court can make it
must. The Court is not obliged to hold that he is unworthy of credit. It
d ultimately depends upon the Court's view as to the credibility of evidence B
tendered by an accomplice.
17. In Rex v. Baskerville, (1916) 2 KB 658, it was observed that
the corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed
the crime; it is sufficient if there is merely a circumstantial evidence of his c
connection with a crime.
18. G.S. Bakshi v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR (1979) SC
569 was dealing with a converse case that if the evidence of an accomplice
is inherently improbable then it cannot get strength from corroboration.
i > D
..A
19. Taylor, in his treatise has observed that "accomplice who are
usually interested and always infamous witnesses, and whose testimony
is admitted from necessity, it being often impossible, without having
recourse to such evidence, to bring the principal offenders to justice".
(Taylor in "A Treatise on the Law of Evidence" (1931) Vol. I para 967). E
20. The evidence of the approver must, however, be shown to be
of a reliable witness.
21. In Jnanendra Nath Ghose v. State of West Bengal, [1960] I
,. \' SCR 126, this Court observed that there should be corroboration in F
' material particulars of the approver's statement, as he is considered as a
self-confessed traitor. This Court in Bhiva Doulu Patil v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR (1963) SC 599 held that the combined effect of
Sections 133 and 114 illustration (b) of the Evidence Act was that an
accomplice is competent to give evidence but it would be unsafe to convict G ,
the accused upon his testimony alone. Though the conviction of an accused
on the testimony of an accomplice cannot be said to be illegal, yet the
Courts will, as a matter of practice, not accept the evidence of such a
witness without cmrnboration in material particulars. In this regard the
Court in Bhiva Doulu Patil 's case observed as under:
H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A "In coming to the above conclusion we have not been unmindful
of the provisions of S. 133 of the Evidence Act which reads:
Sec.133. "An accomplice shall be a competent witness against
an accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely
because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an
B accomplice."
It cannot be doubted that under that section a conviction based
merely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may not
be illegal, the Courts nevertheless cannot lose sight of the rule of
c prudence and practice which in the words of Martin B. in R. v.
Boyes, (1861) 9 Cox CC 32 "has become so hallowed as to be
deserving of respect and the words of Lord Abinger "It deserves
to have all the reverence of the law:." This rule of guidance is to
be found in illustration (b) to S. 114 of the Evidence Act which is
D
as follows:
"The Court may presume that an acc01riplice is unworthy of
credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars."
22. The word 'corroboration' means not mere evidence tending to
E confirm other evidence. In DPP v. Hester, (1972) 3 All ER 1056, Lord
Morris said :
"The purpose of corroboration is not to give validity or credence
to evidence which is deficient or suspect or incredible but only to
confirm and support that which as evidence is sufficient and
F satisfactory and credible; and corroborative evidence will only fill
its role ifit itselfis completely credible ...... "
23. In D.P.P. v. Kilbourne, (1973) 1 All ER 440, it was observed
thus:
G "There is nothing technical in the idea of corroboration. When in
the ordinary affairs oflife one is doubtful whether or not to believe
a particular statement one naturally looks to" see whether it fits in
with other statements or circumstances relating to the particular
matter; the better it fits in the more one is inclined to believe it.
H The doubted statement is corroborated to a greater or lesser extent
SITARAM SAO@MUNGERI v. STATE [PASAYAT, J.] 1009
. )-
by the other statements or circ:umstances with which it fits in." A

24. In R. V. Baskerville, (supra), which is a leading case on this
aspect, Lord Reading said :
"There is no doubt that the uncorroborated evidence of an
accomplice is admissible in law ..... But it has long been a rule of B
practice at common law for the judge to warn the jury of the danger
of convicting a prisoner on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice or accomplices, and, in the discretion of the judge, to
advise them not to convict upon such evidence; but the judge should
point out to the jury that it is within their legal province to convict c
upon such unconfirmed evidence ...... This rule of practice has
become vi1tually equivalent to a rule oflaw, and since the Court
of Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, came into operation this Court has
held that, in the absence of such a warning by the judge, the
conviction must be quashed ...... If after the proper caution by the D
. judge the jury nevertheless convicts the prisoner, this Court will
not quash the conviction merely upon the ground that the testimony
of the accomplice was uncorroborated."
25. In Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR (1952) SC 54,
Bose, J., after referring to the rule laid down in Baskerville case with E
regard to the admissibility of the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice, held thus:
"That, in my opinion, is exactly the law in India so far as
accomplices are concerned and it is certainly not any higher in the F
case of sexual offences. The only clarification necessary for
purposes of this country is where this class of offence is sometimes
tried by a judge without the aid of a jury. In these cases it is
necessary that the judge should give some indication in his judgment
that he has had this rule of caution in mind and should proceed to O
give reasons for considering it unnecessruy to require corroboration
on the facts of the particular case before him and show why he
considers it safe to convict without corroboration in that particular
case."
H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A Justice Bose in the same judgment further observed thus :
"I turn next to the nature and extent of the corroboration required
when it is not considered safe to dispense with it. Here, again,
the rules are lucidly expounded by Lord Reading in Baskerville
case at pages 664 to 669. It would be impossible, indeed it would
B be dangerous, to formulate the kind of evidence which should, or ~
would, be regarded as corroboration. Its nature and extent must .....
necessarily vary with circumstances of each case and also
according to the particular the offence charged. But to this extent
the rules are clear.
c
26. First, it is not necessary that there should be independent
confirmation of every material circumstance in the sense that the
independent evidence in the case, apart from the testimony of the
complainant or the accomplice, should in itself be sufficient to sustain
D conviction. As Lord Readings says -
~
'Indeed, if it were required that the accomplice should be confirmed )..,"""

in every detail of the crime, his evidence would not be essential
to the case, it would be merely confirmatory of other and
independent testimony.'
E
27. All that is required is that there must be some additional
evidence rendering it probable that the story of the accomplice (or
complainant) is true and that it is reasonably safe to act upon it.
28. Secondly, the independent evidence must not only make it safe
F to believe that the crime was committed but must in some way reasonably -f
connect or tend to connect the accused with it by confirming in some
material particular the testimony of the accomplice or complainant that
the accused committed the crime. This does not mean that the
corroboration as to identify must extend to all the circumstances necessary
G to identify the accused with the offence. Again, all that is necessary is
that there would be independent evidence which will make it reasonably
safe to believe the witness's story that the accused was the one, or among
those, who committed the offence. The reason for this part o( the rule is
that -
H
SITARAMSAO@MUNGERiv. STATE[PASAYAT,J.] 1011

"a man who has been guilty of a crime himself will always be able A
to relate the facts of the case, and if the confinnation be only on
the truth of that history, without identifying the persons, that is really
no corroboration at all ...... It would not at all tend to show that
the party accused participated in it."
B
29. Thirdly, the corroboration must come from independent sources
and thus ordinarily the testimony of one accomplice would not be sufficient
to corroborate that of another. But of course the circumstances may be
such as to make it safe to dispense with the necessity of corroboration
and in those special circumstances a conviction so based would not be
illegal. I say this because it was contended that the mother in this case C
was not an independent source.
30. Fourtl-Jy, the corroboration need not be direct evidence that the
accused committed the crime. It is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial
evidence of his connection with the crime. Were it otherwise, "many crimes D
which are usmilly committed between accomplices in secret, such as incest,
offences 1,vith females' (or unnatural offences) 'could never be brought to
justice". [See: MO. Shamsudhin v. State ofKera/a, [1995] 3 SCC 351]
31. The above position was highlighted in K. Hashim v. State of
Tamil Nadu, [2005] I SCC 237. E
32. Accused Lalit Sanga in his evidence has given the sequence of
events which led to the murder of Gayatri Devi and he has also deposed
as to how a conspiracy was hatched up and how the conspiracy was
executed with the help of other accused persons and how Gayatri Devi F
,.._ \
was stabbed by Laxmi Paswan on the instigation and active participation
of accused Lalu Ram. It has been stated on behalf of the accused-
appellant that this witness did not give the name of the boy, who came to
call him nor he gave the number of auto rickshaw and the place, where
other associates were standing. Though all these points are not mate1ial G
but the evidence of PW-6 stands con-oborated when doc!or found injury
on the body of Gayatri Devi and furthet that abrasions were also found
on the cheek and neck when accused-appellant pressed the mouth of
Gayatri Devi so that she may not raise alarm and further that money was
looted and part of looted money was recovered from the possession of H
1012 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A Laxmi Paswan on the basis of_his confessional statement. Although this
fact has occurred prior to arrest of PW-6, but with the e"idence of PW-
6 all these facts corroborate the evidence of PW-6 because he was not
knowing all these facts and with his evidence all these facts stand
corroborated and, therefore, there is complete corroboration of the
B evidence of PW-6 and there is no ground for disbelieving the evidence
of PW-6 and therefore on the basis of the evidence of PW-6 accused-
appellant and co-accused Lalu Ram were found guilty and they were
involved in the abduction as well as in the occurrence under Section 396
IPC.
c 33. We shall now deal with the question relating to the pardon.
34. So far as pardon portion of the order of CJM is concerned,
that has not been set aside and the proceeding relating to other portion
has been set aside by which Lalit Sanga was examined but he was not
D cross examined nor his statement was recorded in presence of the accused
and so the trial court below, after remand of the case completed this part
of the order and Lalit Sanga was examined in presence of the accused
and he was also cross examined and thereafter case was committed to
the Court of Sessions, and therefore, there was complete compliance of
E Section 306 Cr.P.C. The stage of examining the approver comes only after
he has been granted pardon and after pardon he was examined as a
witness in presence of the accused and also he was cross examined. So
there is no illegality in the order and in the procedure adopted by the
learned CJM after remand of the case.
F 35. In view of the factual position and the legal principles set out
above the inevitable conclusion is that the appeals are sans merit and
deserve to be dismissed which we direct.
K.K.T. Appeals Dismissed.