Holding

A panchnama recorded by the revenue officer is sufficient to constitute possession, vesting the land in the Government under Section 16, thereby precluding withdrawal under Section 48.

Summary

The Sita Ram Bhandar Society owned agricultural land (Khasra No.157) that was included in a 1959 notification for acquisition for the planned development of Delhi. After objections were dismissed, a declaration under Section 6 was made and an award was issued on 19 June 1980. The Collector recorded a panchnama between 20‑24 June 1980, taking possession of 1933 bighas 2 biswas, including the Society’s land, and handed it over to the revenue department. The Society contended that because the land was surrounded by a boundary wall, only symbolic possession was effected and therefore the Government could withdraw under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. It also relied on later stay orders to claim continued possession. The Delhi High Court held that possession had been duly taken and dismissed the writ petitions. The Supreme Court affirmed that a panchnama constitutes valid possession, that the land vested in the Government under Section 16, and that re‑entry by the owner does not undo vesting; consequently Section 48 was inapplicable and the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The procedure adopted by the Naib Tehsildar in taking possession of the acquired land was valid.
Whether the panchnama recorded constitutes actual possession for purposes of the Land Acquisition Act.
Whether the presence of a boundary wall necessitates physical possession beyond symbolic possession.
Whether Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act can be invoked to withdraw the acquisition.
Effect of subsequent stay orders and re‑entry by the landowner on the vesting of the land.

Legislation cited

Delhi Development Act, 1957s. 22(1)
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 16, s. 4, s. 48, s. 5A, s. 6, s. 9

Subjects

Land acquisitionPossessionSection 48Symbolic possessionPanchnamaDelhi Development AuthorityPublic purposeVestingDeterrent action

Judgment

[2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 507
~

> )!. SITA RAM BHANDAR SOCIETY, NEW DELHI A
v.
LT. GOVERNOR, GOVT. OF N.C.T. DELHI & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 4849-4850 of 2000)

SEPTEMBER 15, 2009
B
[DALVEER BHANDARI AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss. 4, SA, 6, 18 and· 48 -
Land acquisition - Revenue official taking possession of 1933
bighas 2 biswas of land and handing over to beneficiary c
department- Case of land owner that land was extensive and
surrounded by boundary wall and symbolic possession was

•
~
meaningless and as such Government to withdraw from
r,. acquisition u/s. 48 - On appeal, held: While taking
-"" possession of a large area of land with a large number of D
owners, it is not possible for Collector or Revenue Official. to
enter each bigha or biswa and to take possession - Court is
to adopt a pragmatic approach - On facts, appellant did not
raise the question with regard to the presence of a wall, in the
objections uls. SA- Collector adopted a proper procedure and E
possession was taken over as per law - Land once having
vested in the Government by virtue of s. 16, re-entry by land
\
owner would not obliterate the consequences of vesting -
More so, ·/and owner always tried to frustrate the acquisition,
thus, deterrent action called for. F
The question which arose for consideration in these
appeals is whether the procedure adopted by the Naib
Tehsildar, Land Acquisition while taking possession of
the land was correct.
1loo ., G
Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1. The Land Acquisition Act provides a
machinery for the acquisition of the land. An acquisition
507 H
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
.:..

A is set in motion by a Notification u/s. 4 when it is
proposed to acquire any land for public purpose and s.
SA envisages the filing of objections with regard. to-the
proposed acquisition. After the objections u/s. SA have
been considered and been found without merit,· a
B declaration under Section 6 of the Act is published that
the land is indeed required for a public purpose. Section
9 of the Act provides that after all the proceedings and
certain other formalities have been completed the
Collector shall give public notice that the Government
c intends to take possession of the land and calling upon
the persons interested to file their claims for
compensation. The matter is then enquired into by the
Collector who renders his award u/s. 11 of the Act and
possession is taken by the Collector u/s. 16 on which the
0 land vests absolutely in the Government free from all
·encumbrances. [Para 7] [S18-B-F]

1.2. While taking possession of a large area of land
with a large number of owners, it would be impossible for
the Collector or the Revenue Official to enter each bigha
E or biswa and to take possession thereof and that a
pragmatic approach has to be adopted by the Court. It is
also clear that one of the methods of taking possession
and handing it over to the beneficiary department is the
recording of a Panchnama which can in itself constitute
F evidence of the fact that possession had been taken and
the land had vested absolutely in the Government. [Para
9] [S21-E-F]

1.3. The Award was rendered on the 19th June 1980.
As per the possession proceedings (Panchnama)
G recorded by Naib Tehsildar dated the 20th June 1980,
possession of 1933 bighas 2 biswas of land had been
,,. .
taken over and handed over to the Revenue Department
on the 21st June 1980, 23rd June 1980 and 24th June

H
SITA RAM BHANDAR SOCIETY, v. LT. GOVERNOR, 509
GOVT. OF N.C.T. DELHI

~ 1980. In the Panchnama it was also observed that the A
land had been demarcated and pillars had been affixed
and that the physical possession had further been
handed over to the Tehsildar, the representative of the
beneficiary department. Khasra No.157 was covered by
this document. It is recorded that the possession of the 8,
land under the built up area of 160 bighas 6 biswas could
not be handed over and the details of this land have also
been provided in the document. Khasra No.157 does not
-"' come in this category. Appellant, however, emphasized
that some material documents which show the c
possession had not been taken on 20th June, as alleged,
had been ignored by the Division Bench which he has
referred to the Khasra Girdwaris for the years 1980-81
and 1981-82 showing the existence of a Char Diwari. He
-:',,.
accordingly, submitted that the observations in the 0
! ~
award that the appellant's land was "Rosli" was incorrect
in the light of this record. There is absolutely no merit in
this plea. A Khasra Girdwari which is a mere crop
inspection report entered twice a year (Kharif and Rabi
crops) has no presumption of truth attached to it. Even
E;
otherwise the state of the land as on the date of the
Notification u/s. 4 of the Act (which is 13th November
.\ 1959) would be the relevant date as to the nature of the
-1
land. and a crop inspection report 20 years later cannot
be taken as proof of some facts said to exist in the year
1959. [Para 10] [521-G-H; 522-A-F] F

1.4. A reading of the extract from the award reveals
that wells and structures connected with wells, and
irrigation facilities have been referred to therein and an

- .. independent wall is not even remotely the subject matter.
Counsel for the appellant, however, seriously objected to
this explanation by submitting that no plea doubting the
G

accuracy of the document having been raised in the
counter affidavit, the respondents were now precluded
H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A from making this submission. However, in the light of the
context in which the entire matter has been dealt with in
the Award, there can be no doubt that the entry 'wall'
should be read as 'well' vis-a-vis Khasra No.157. No
question had ever been raised by the appellant with
B regard to the presence of a wall in the objections filed
under section SA or even in the responses filed to the
notices under section 9 of the Act and the only prayer
was that the land be exempted from acquisition. These
omissions become more significant as several other
c landowners had claimed compensation for the
.
......
I
superstructures that were existing on the acquired land. }-
It is also equally significant that no question had ever
been raised by the appellant with regard to the existence
of a wall or superstructure in any of the litigations prior
0 to the present set of writ petitions. Appellant referred to
the objections dated 15th November 1966 showing the
existence of a wall. These objections are meaningless as
they had not been filed in response to the notification
under section. 4 which had been published in the year
E 1959 and were filed after the declaration under section 6
had been made and are, therefore, an obvious after
thought. Despite the claim under this document, no plea
with regard to the existence of a wall had been raised at
any stage till the filing of the present petitions in the year 't
1995. [Para 11] [525-A.;H]
F
1.5. Appellant pointed out that from the affidavit dated
30th July 1996 sworn by the Under Secretary, Land and
Building Department, it was clear that the appellant
continued to remain in possession on account of the
G stay of dispossession granted by the High Court on .15th
July 1981 in writ petition and the confirmation of the said
order on 16th September 1982 and as such the stand of
the appellants that possession had been taken was not
correct. However, it is already observed that possession
H
SITA RAM BHAN DAR SOCIETY, v. LT. GOVERNOR, 511
GOVT. OF N.C.T. DELHI

_\, had been taken between 20th and 24th June 1980, and A
the acquired land thus stood vested in the State free from
all encumbrances under section 16 of the Act. It is also
relevant that the said writ petition was dismissed
meaning thereby that the said order should automatically
be vacated as well. Even assuming for a moment that the a
petitioner had re-possessed the acquired land at some
stage would be of no consequence in view of the
provisions of section 16. Therefore, even assuming that
the appellant had re-entered the land on account of the
various interim orders granted by the courts, or even c .,
otherwise, it would have no effect for two reasons, that
the suits/petitions were ultimately dismissed and that the
land once having vested in the Government by virtue of
section 16 of the Act, re-entry by the land owner would
... not obliterate the consequences of vesting. [Paras 12]
D
-1 [526-A-D; G-H; 527-A-B]
1.6. The petitioner has been able to frustrate the
acquisition and development of the land right from the
year 1980 onwards by taking recourse to one litigation
after the other. The record reveals that all the suits/writ E

. -.t
petitions etc. that had been filed had failed. Undoubtedly,
every citizen has a right to utilize all legal means which
are open to him in a bid to vindicate and protect his
rights, but if the court comes to the conclusion that the
pleas raised are frivolous and meant to frustrate and F
delay an acquisition which is in public interest, deterrent
action is called for. This is precisely the situation in the
instant matter [Para 13] [527-8-0]

Ba/want Narayan Bhagde vs. M.D. Bhagat & Ors. (1976)
~ 1 SCC 700; Om Prakash Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (1998)
G
'>

6 SCC 1; P.K. Kalburqi vs. State of Kamataka & Ors. (2005)
12 SCC 489; Tamil Nadu Housing Board vs. Viswam (0) by
Lrs. AIR 1996 SC 3377; Balmokand Khatri Educational and

H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
'

A Industrial Trust, Amritsar vs. State of Punjab & Ors. AIR 1996
~
SC 1239, referred to.

Case Law Reference:
(1976) 1 sec 100 Referred to Para 5
B
(1998) 6 sec 1, Referred to Para 5 t
(2005) 12 sec 489 Referred to Para 5
AIR 1996 SC 3377 Referred to Para 8
c AIR 1996 SC 1239 Referred to Para 8

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
4849-4850 of 2000.

From the Judgment..& Order dated 2.9.1998 of the Division ......
D Bench of the High Court of Delhi in Civil Writ Petition No. 1628 ,._
and 1629 of 1995.

. Sunil Gupta, Sanjay Grover, K. V. Mohan and Veena
Bhatnagar for the Appellant.
E
Vishnu B. Saharya, (for Saharya & Co.), S. Wasim A.
Qadri, Vivek Singh, Anll Katiyar, D.S. Mahra (NP) Binu Tamta
(NP) for the Respondents. t ,_
'-.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J. 1. These appeals are directed
against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High
Court dated 2nd September 1998 dismissing the writ petitions.
The facts are as under:
G
2. On 13th November 1959, a Notification was issued by·
the Chief Commissioner of Delhi under 4 of the Land "'
....
(

Acquisition Act (hereinafter called the "Act") notifying the
Government's intention to acquire 34070 acres of land for the
"Planned Development of Delhi". This notification had, within
H
SITA RAM BHANDAR SOCIETY, v. LT. GOVERNOR, 513
GOVT. OF N.C.T. DELHI [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]

·~
its ambit, agricultural land belonging to the appellant society, A
bearing Khasra No. 157 in Village Lado Sarai, Tehsil Mehrauli,
Delhi measuring 8 -Bighas and 11 Biswas or 8620 sq. yards
equivalent to 1.8 acres. The appellant filed objections under
Section 5A of the Act on the 10th December 1959 submitting
that the land be exempted from the proposed acquisition. It B
pointed out that the appellant body was a registered trust and
a religious body managing three temples in Pilani, Rajasthan
and several gardens, water tanks etc.· having religious
..-. significance. The objections raised were apparently found
without merit whereafter the Chief Commissioner issued a c
declaration under Section 6 of the Act which was published on
. ~

16th May 1966 pertaining to 2153 Bighas 2 Biswas
corresponding to about 448 acres; The Collector, Land
·Acquisition also rendered his award on 19th June 1980
clarifying that it pertained only to 1996 Bighas 18 Biswas leaving D
..... out an area of 156 Bighas 4 Biswas for the time being as it
was built up and that the award for this area would be given
later. The appellant's property Khasra No.157 was, however,
included in the award of 19th June, 1980. It appears that
pursuant to the award possession of 1933 Bighas and 2
E
Biswas was taken by the Collector, Land Acquisition on the 20th
June 1980 and further handed over to the beneficiary
-+ department. It was, however, observed in the proceedings of
.-\. 20th June 1980 that the possession of the balance area of
about 61 Bighas would be taken after the removal of the
structures with the help of the demolition squad. On the 29th F
July 1980 a Notification under Section 22 ( 1) of the Delhi
Development Act, 1957 was issued by the Central Government,
placing the acquired Jand at the disposal of the Delhi
Development Authority for the planned development of Delhi.
At this stage, the appellant filed CWP No.1068 of 1980 in the G
" Delhi High Court challenging the validity of the Notification under
. Section 4 and Declaration under Section 6 of the Act. This
petition was dismissed in limine on the 18th August 1980. The
appellant thereupon preferred Special Leave Petition in this
Court and after leave was granted the appeal was registered H
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A as C.A. No. 1738of1981. While the appeal was still pending,
-f,
the appellant filed Writ Petition No.2220/1981 under Article 32
of the Constitution of India in the Supreme Court. It appears.
that an interim order was made by the Supreme Court in these
proceedings on 15th of July 1981 staying dispossession of the
B appellant from the property in dispute and the said order was
· confirmed on 16th September 1982. Both the Civil Appeal and
the Writ Petition aforementioned were, however, dismissed by
this Court on the 2oth July 1993. It also appears from the record
that while the aforementioned two matters were pending .in this ).

c Court, the appellant filed Suit No. 1226 of 1992 on the Original
Side of the Delhi High Court praying for an injunction against
the respondents, including the Delhi Development Authority, that
no structure be demolished and that no interference be made
with the plaintiffs possession and management. of the Suit land.
An interim injunction was also sought and obtained in· these
D
proceedings. It is the appellant's case that though the aforesaid ~ .
'
Suit was transferred to the District Court in Delhi on account
of the revision of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Delhi High
Court, the said interim injunction still continued to operate, but
despite the interim orders the Delhi Development Authority
E
continued to impinge on the appellant's property on which a
Contempt Petition was filed in the High Court, which in.its order
dated 19th May 1992, directed the respondent authorities to

F
ensure compliance with the High Court's order dated 2nd April
1992 made in the civil suit. It is further the case of the appellant
that some time later the Delhi Development Authority again
-ft-

--
tried to interfere .with the appellant's property on which .yet
another Contempt Petition No.36 of 1993 was filed and the
same is said to be pending. The appellant, h0wever, continued
to be persist in its efforts to save the acquired land and at this
G stage filed C.W.P.No.700 of 1994 in the Delhi High Court on
28th January 1994 challenging, inter-alia, the constitutional " "

validity of Section 22 of the Delhi Development Act,
whereunder the acquired land had been handed over to the
ODA, and also praying for the allotment of an alternative site
H in lieu of the acquired land. This writ .petition was dismissed
SITA RAM BHANDAR SOCIETY, v. LT. GOVERNOR, 515
GOVT. OF N.C.T. DELHI [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
t
" as withdrawn on September 8, 1995 the prayer of the counsel A
for the petitioner (the present appellant) in the following terms:

"Mr. Anand says, in view of the order dated 29.11.94,
he would not press this petition at this stage and would
apply for allotment of alternative land in the institutional B
area.

Dismissed as withdrawn. However, we will make it
clear that allotment of the alternative land be made to the
petitioner as per policy."
c
' J
3. Still dissatisfied, the appellant filed W.P. No. 623 of
1995 in the Delhi High Court challenging some facets of the
alleged violation of the Master Plan of 2001 which had statedly
made the entire proceedings for the planned development of
.... Delhi incohate and which had rendered the acquisition without D
any authority of law . This matter came up before the Delhi High
Court after notice on 20th February 1995 on which the High
Court observed that the petitioner was seeking two distinct
prayers in the Writ Petition, (1) that the land which had been
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act should be released
E
from acquisition and (2) that the ODA should not be permitted
.. to use the aforesaid land for a purpose other than that
postulated in the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan
and as the two prayers were mutually distinct and pertained to
different causes of action, one writ petition was not
F
maintainable. On this, the learned senior counsel for the
appellant, Mr. R.K. Anand stated that he would file two separate
writ petitions for which liberty was granted and the papers of
CWP No. 623 of 1995 were accordingly returned to the counsel.
The appellant thereupon moved two writ petitions i.e. W. P. Nos.
)..
1628/1995 praying that the respondent DOA be restrained G
from taking over possession of the land and Writ Petition No.
1629/1995 seeking to challenge the land acquisition
proceedings which had been initiated by the Notification under
Section 4 and Declaration under Section 6 of the Act in the year
1959 and 1966 respectively and also pleading that as the H
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
'
'
-1- /
A possession had not been taken, the land be released under
Section 48 of the Act. The Division Bench while dealing with
the question of possession held that the writ petitioner had only
relied on two stray entries in two Khasra GirCJawaris for the
period 13th October 1980 to 11th March 1981 which had
B recorded the land to be "Gair Mumkin Kotha Pukhta and Char
Diwari" and that this entry was meaningless in the light of the
fact that the land had been described as "Rosli" (agricultural)
and not a built up property in the award No.36/80-81 dated
_19.6.1980 and that in any case the plea appeared to be an after
c thought as it had not been taken by the petitioner though it was
available at the time when Writ Petition No. 1068/1980 (in the ~ '

Delhi High Court) and Writ Petition No.2220/1981 had been
directly filed in this Court. The Court further held that it was clear
from the proceedings recorded by Shri Lal Singh Naib
-#
Tehsildar,-Land Acquisition, on 20th June 1980 in the presence ~·
D
of a large number of Revenue Officials that possession had
indeed been taken over on that day after demarcation had
been made with respect to 1933 bighas 2 biswas, including
the land belonging to the appellant, and that boundary pillars
had been affixed round the demarcated land and that the
E possession had further been handed over to Shri N.N. Seth,
Tehsildar on 20th, 21st, 23rd and 24th of June 1980. The Court
also noted that the proceedings aforementioned were
.
witnessed as to their authenticity by Shri N.N.Seth, and the two
ODA Officials, Shri Raj Bahadur and Shri Guiab Singh. The
F Division Bench in this background observed that possession
had, in fact, been taken over after appropriate proceedings. The
two writ petitions were accordingly dismissed by the Division
Bench of the Delhi High Court vide the impugned judgment
leading to the present appeals as a consequence.
G ~

4. At the very outset, Mr. Sunil Gupta, the learned senior
counsel for the appellant has candidly stated at the Bar that the
appellant was no longer challenging the acquisition and the
relief claimed in W.P. 1629/1995 was, therefore, not being
pursued in this appeal. He has, however, prayed with the
1-1
SITA RAM BHANDAR SOCIETY, v. LT. GOVERNOR, 517
GOVT. OF N.C.T. DELHI [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
greatest emphasis, that in so far as the claim arising out of W.P. A
No.1628/1995 was concerned it was clear from the record that
possession of the appellant's land i.e. 1 acre 8 Biswas
continued to remain with the appellant despite the findings to
the contrary recorded by the High Court, and as such it was
open to the Government to withdraw from the acquisition if it 8
so desired, under Section 48 of the Act.

,..,\
5. In this background, Mr. Gupta, has raised three
arguments before us during the course of hearing. He has first
pointed out that it was the positive case of the appellant that
the land in dispute was encircled by a boundary wall and as
c
_)

such possession thereof could be taken only after entering the
land and not by any symbolic or paper possession. As a
corollary, it has been submitted, that there was no material on
record to show that the actual physical possession had been
taken as would preclude the withdrawal of the acquisition under D
Section 48 of the Act. In this connection, the learned counsel
has placed reliance on Ba/want Narayan Bhagde vs. M.D.
Bhagat & Ors. (1976) 1 SCC 700 and Om Prakash & Anr.
vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (1998) 6 SCC 1 which had been
subsequently followed in P.K.Kalburqi vs. State of Kamataka E
& Ors. (2005) 12 SCC 489. It has finally been submitted that
... th_ere was ample evidence on record to show that the property
in dispute was, in fact, surrounded by a wall and had some other
structures as well, and in view of the positive stand taken by
the Land Acquisition Collector in his award dated 19th June F
1980 that the possession of the area covered by structures
would be the subject matter of a supplementary award, the very
basis of the judgment of the High Court that the possession
~
had been taken on the 20th June 1980 was erroneous.
~- G
6. Mr. Saharya and Mr. Wasim Quadri, the learned counsel
appearing for the DOA and the Delhi Government respectively
have controverted the submissions and have pointed out that
the appellant had, for almost 30 years, been able to scuttle the
development of the area by taking piecemeal stands in the writ
H
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A petitions and civil suits from the year 1980 onwards and though ·~

the aforesaid matters had been rejected with positive findings :·
that possession had been taken, and that there was no wall or '"'
structure on the land in question. It has also been submitted that
the proper procedure had been adopted by the Naib Tehsildar
B and that the possession had been taken over as per law on the
20th June 1980 and there was ample evidence to this effect
which had been considered by the Division Bench.

7. We have heard the learned counsel for the par;ties very
carefully. The Act provides a machinery for the acquisition .of
c the land. An acquisition is set in motion by a Notification under
Section 4 when it is proposed to acquire any land for public (_ .
purpose and Section 5A envisages the filing of objections with
regard to the proposed acquisition. After the objections under
Section 5A have been considered and been found without
D merit, a declaration under Section 6 of the Act is published that t
the land is indeed required for a public purpose. Section 9 of
the Act provides that after all the proceedings and certain other
formalities have been completed the Collector shall give public
notice that the Government intends to take possession of the
E land and calling upon the ·persons interested to file their claims
for compensation. The matter is then enquired into by the
Collector who renders his award under Section 11 of the. Act ~
and possession is taken by the Collector under Section 16 on "
which the land vests absolutely in the Government free from all
F encumbrances. It is the case of the respondent that all the
procedures had been followed and that possession had been
taken under Section 16 on the 20th June 1980, and as such,
the question of its release under Section 48 of the Act did not
arise, as this provision gives "liberty to withdraw from the
G acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken".
The question raised by Mr. Gupta is that as the area in question .:
was very extensive i.e. about 1933 bigas and the land belonging
to the appellant was surrounded by a boundary wall, symbolic
possession was meaningless and some more positive action
was called for. To support this view he has relied on the three·
H
SITA RAM BHANDAR SOCIETY, v. LT. GOVERNOR, 519
GOVT. OF N.C.T. DELHI [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]

judgments cited earlier. We find, however, that the aforesaid A
judgments, in fact, help the case of the respondent rather than
the other way around. In Narayan Bhagde's case, which was
heard by three Hon'ble Judges of this Court one of the Hon'ble
Judges (Untwalia,J.) held that the principles underlying Order
21, Rules 35, 36, 95 and 96 of the CPC prescribing the modes B
of delivery of possession including symbolic and actual could
be applied to proceedings under the Act but the other two
Hc:1n'ble Judges (Bhagwati and Gupta,JJ.) held that the said
provisions could not be applied to proceedings under the Act
and that actual possession thereof was required to be taken. c
In this background, the two Hon'ble Judges observed as
under:-

"We think it is enough to state that when the
Government proceeds to take possession of the land .
acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it must D
take actual possession of the land, since all interests in
the land are sought to acquired by it. There can be no
question of taking 'symbolical' possession in the sense
understood by judicial decision under the Code of Civil
Procedure. Nor would possession merely on paper be E
enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary
condition of vesting of the land in the Government is the
taking of actual possession of the land. How such
possession may be taken would depend on the nature
of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as F
the nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard
and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient to
constitute taking of possession of land. There cannot be
an absolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the
spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or G
otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of
possession of land in every case. But here, in our opinion,
since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on.
it at the material time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on
the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of H
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 14 (ADDL.} S.C.R.

A determining what part was waste and arable and should,
therefore, be taken possession of and determining its
extent, was sufficient to constitute taking on possession."

8. In Om Prakash's case (supra) the basic issue was as
to whether the land which was the subject matter of acquisition
8
could be acquired in view of the State policy that Abadi land
· . was not to be acquired. It is in this connection, the Court
observed that there appeared to be no conclusive evidence that
possession had been taken from the land owner, and the matter
was left open for the land owner to approach the State
C Government under Section 48 of the Act to have land released.
In P.K.Kalburqi's case (supra}, a reference was made to the
judgment in Narayan Bhagde's case (supra) and it was once
again reiterated that the procedure for taking possession would
depend upon the nature of the land and the extent thereof. A
D cumulative reading of the aforesaid judgments would reveal that
while taking possession symbolic and notional possession is
perhaps not envisaged under the Act but the manner in which
possession is taken must of necessity depend upon the facts
of each case. Keepiny this broad principal in mind, this Court
E in Tamil Nadu Housing Board vs. Viswam (D) by Lrs. AIR 1996
SC 3377 after considering the judgment in Narayan Bhagde's
case, observed that while taking possession of a large area of -I /
'
land (in this case 339 acres) a pragmatic and realistic approach
·had to be taken. This Court then examined the context under
F which the judgment in Narayan Bhagde's case had been
rendered and held as under:

"It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court
that one of the accepted modes of taking possession of
the acquired land is recording of a memorandum or
G Panchanama by the LAO in the presence of witnesses
signed by him/them and that would constitute taking
possession of the land as it would be impossible to take
physical possession of the acquired land. It is common
knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person
H
...., SITA RAM BHANDAR SOCIETY, v. LT. GOVERNOR,
GOVT. OF N.C.T. DELHI [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
521

~ A
may not cooperative in taking possession of the land."
In Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust,
Amritsar vs. State of Punjab & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1239 yet
again the question was as to the taking over of the possession
of agricultural land and it was observed thus: B
"It is seen that the entire gamut of the acquisition
proceedings stood completed by April 17, 1976 by which
date possession of the land had been taken. No doubt,
Shri Parekh has contended that the appellant still retained
their possession. It is now well-settled legal position that c
it is difficult to take physical possession of the land under
compulsory acquisition. The normal mode of taking
possession is drafting the Panchnama in the presence of
Panchas and taking possession and giving delivery to the
-~ beneficiaries is the accepted mode of taking possession D
of the land. Subsequent thereto, the retention of
possession would tantamount only to illegal or un lawful
possession."
9. It would, thus, be seen from a cumulative reading of the E
aforesaid judgments,· that while taking possession of a large
~ area of land with a large number of owners, it would be
• "I
impossible for the Collector or the Revenue Official to enter
each bigha or biswas and to take possession thereof and that
a pragmatic approach has to be adopted by the Court. It is also
clear that one of the methods of taking possession and handing
i=
it over to the beneficiary department is the recording of a
Panchnama which can in itself constitute evidence of the fact
that possession had been taken and the land had vested
absolutely in the Government.
) G
10. The question arises as to whether in the face of the
above observations, the procedure adopted by the Naib
Tehsildar, Land Acquisition Shri Lal Singh was the correct one.
The Award was rendered in the present matter on the 19th June
1980. As per the possession proceedings (Panchnama) H
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A recorded by Shri Lal Singh dated the 20th June 1980,
possession of 1933 bighas 2 biswas of land had been taken
over and handed over to the Revenue Department on the 21st
June 1980, 23rd June 1980 and 24th June 1980. In the
Panchnama it was also observed that the land had been
B demarcated and pillars had been affixed and that the physical
possession had further been handed over to Shri N.N. Seth,
Tehsildar, the representative of the beneficiary department.
Admittedly, Khasra No.157 was covered by this document. It
is recorded that the possession of the land under the built up
c area of 160 bighas 6 biswas could not be handed over and
the details of this land have also been provided in the aforesaid
document. Khasra No.157 does not come in this category.
Mr.Gupta has, however, emphasized that some material
documents which show the possession had not been taken on
0 20th June, as alleged, had been ignored by the Division Bench
which he has referred us to the Khasra Girdwaris for the years
1980-81 and 1981-82 'showing the existence of a Char Diwari.
He has, accordingly, submitted that the ob::1ervations in the
award that the appellant·~ !~~1 was "Roslin was incorrect in the
E light of this record. We find absolutely no merit in this plea. A
Khasra Girdwari which is a mere crop inspection report entered
twice a year (Kharif and Rabi crops) has no presumption of truth
attached to it. Even otherwise the state of the land as on the
date of the Notification under Section 4 of the Act (which is 13th
November 1959) would be the relevant date as to the nature
F of the land and a crop inspection report 20 years later cannot
be taken as proof of some facts said to exist in the year 1959.
Mr. Gupta has also stressed that from the Award itself it was
clear that the wall standing on Khasra No.157 had been
assessed to a compensation of Rs.420/- and as such the
G observations in the award that land was agricultural was
erroneous. Mr. Saharya has, however, pointed out that the part
of the Award to which reference has been made by Mr. Gupta
is captioned as "Wells and Structures' and that a reference to
a wall in the body is typographical error:--Wf? reproduce the
H relevant portion of the award herein under: :~
SITA RAM BHANDAR SOCIETY, v. LT. GOVERNOR, 523
GOVT. OF N.C.T. DELHI [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
Wells and Structures A

"The land under acquisition has number of wells,
water channel and ·'Structures. The Assistant Engineer
(Valuation) has made the rate assessment of each of these
items to which I agree and award accordingly subject to
8
the verification at the time of possession as per details
given as under: -

Kh.No. Item Value Assessed

Well, Drain, Water c
555/2/2 tank Rs.6920/-
254 Well Structure Rs.2490/-
577/430 -do- Rs.2130/-
217 Well Structure Rs.2730/-
100 Structure Rs.260/- D
670127 -do- Rs.3320/-
Well
15 Structure/Room Rs.4030/-
Well, Water tank,
29 Room & Structures Rs.3490/- E
Well, Structures,
Water tank, rooms
139 & drains 4600/-
Well Structures,
60 F
room & drain Rs.2750/-
394 Well Structures Rs.4690/-
399 -do- Rs.2380/-
242 Structure Rs.540/-
149 -do- Rs.260/- G
580/148 Wall Rs.1264/-
157 -do- Rs.420
Well, Water Tank,
172 drain Structure Rs.7960/-
298 -do- Rs.4890/- H
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 333 wells, Structure Rs.5350/-
Structure &
20 Compound wall Rs.3300/-
Well, Water drains,
195/2 Water tank & room Rs.7530/-
B 321 -do- Rs.7250/-
Well, Water tank
478 drains & rooms Rs.6665/".'
Room, water tank,
321 drain Rs.1125/-
c 478 Drain Rs.360/-
Well, water tank,
92 drain, Khurli, rooms Rs.7260/-
Well, water tank,
drain khurli, rooms,
D
155 verandah Rs.6720/-
Well, Water tank,
5971202/264 Room Rs.2700/-
Well, Water tank,
Water Channel
E
455 room Rs.2790/-
Well, Water tank,
86 drains, rooms Rs.3320/-
514 Well Rs.1720/-
F 464 -do- Rs.2850/-
688/518/119/2 -do- Rs.2290/- ·
189 -do- Rs.1820/-
436 Well, structures Rs.1020/-
210 Well Rs.2060/-
G 453 -do- Rs.5650/-

Total: Rs.1,21, 189-00

There are water channels running through Kh. Nos.
H 228, 635/251, 254, 253, 255, 250, 263, 597/262, 261, 269,
SITA RAM BHANDAR SOCIETY, v. LT. GOVERNOR, 525
GOVT. OF N.C.T. DELHI [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
-----1
-I
434, 435, 440, 442, 443, 444, 445 & 446. The Naib- A
~
Tehsildar has made a detailed valuation to which I agre~
and award Rs.2870/- as compensation as these channels."

11. A reading of the above extract reveals that wells, and
--( structures connected with wells, and irrigation facilities have B
been referred to therein and an independent wall is not even
remotely the subject matter. Mr. Gupta has, however, seriously
objected to this explanation by submitting that no plea doubting
J, the accuracy of the document having been raised in the counter
J affidavit, the respondents were now precluded from making this
submission. We, however, feel that in the light of the context in
c
which the entire matter has been dealt with in the Award, there
can be no doubt that the entry 'wall' should be read as 'well'
vis-a-vis Khasra No.157. There is yet another circumstance,
, perhaps even more relevant. We find that no question had ever
...,_ been raised by the appellant with regard to the presence of a D
+
wall in the objections filed under Section SA or even in the
responses filed to the notices under Section 9 of the Act and
'(
the only prayer was that the land be exempted from acquisition
(Item no.36}. These omissions become more significant as
several other landowners had claimed compensation for the E
superstructures that were existing on the acquired land. It is
,,.. also equally significant, as pointed out by Mr. Saharya, that no
~ question had ever been raised by the appellant with regard to
the existence of a wall or superstructure in any of the litigations
prior to the present set of Writ Petitions. Mr. Gupta has, F
however, referred us to the objections dated 15th November
1966 showing the existence of a wall. These objections are, to
our mind, meaningless as they had not been filed in response
to the notification under Section 4 .which had been published
in the year 1959 and were filed a'tter the declaration under G
> Section 6 had been made and are, therefore, an obvious after
thought. It also bears notice that despite the claim under this
document, no plea with regard to the existence of a wall had
been raised at any stage till the filing of the present petitions
in the year 1995.
H
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
,;

A 12. Mr. Gupta has, with great emphasis, pointed out that J.
from the affidavit dated 30th July 1996 sworn by Mr. G.S.Meena, '·,

Under Secretary, Land and Building Department, it was clear . ~

that the appellant continued to remain in possession on account
of the stay of dispossession granted by the High Court on 15th r
B July 1981 in WP No. 2220/1981 and the confirmatiOfl of the
said order on 16th September 1982 and as such the stand of
the appellants that possession had been taken was not correct.
We have, however, already observed that possession had been
;._
taken between 20th and 24th June 1980, and the acquired land
t:11
c thus stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances under
Section 16 of the Act. It is also relevant that the afore-referred
writ petition was dismissed meaning thereby that the said order
should automatically be vacated as well. Even assuming for a
moment that the petitioner had re-possessed the acquired land .

+ .....
at some stage would be of no consequence in view of the
D
provisions of section 16 ibidem. In Narayan Bhagde's case
(supra) one of the arguments raised by the land owner was that
as per the communication of the Commissioner the land was
still with the land owner and possession thereof had not been
taken. The Bench observed that the letter was based on a
E misconception as the land owner had re-entered the acquired
land immediately after its possession. had been taken by the
government ignoring the scenario that he stood divested of the ~ .,__
possession, under Section 16 of the Act. This Court observed
as under:
F
"This was plainly erroneous view, for the legal
position is clear that even if the appellant entered upon the
land and resumed possession of it the very next moment
after the land was actually taken possession of and
G became vested in the Government, such act on the part
of the appellant did not have the effect of obliterating the
consequences of vesting."
To our mind, therefore, even assuming that the appellant had
re-entered the land on account of the various interim orders
H
SITA RAM BHANDAR SOCIETY, v. LT. GOVERNOR, 527
GOVT. OF N.C.T. DELHI [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]

granted by the courts, or even otherwise, it would have no effect A
for two reasons, (1) that the suits/petitions were ultimately
dismissed and (2) that the land once having vested in the
Government by virtue of Section 16 of the Act, re-entry by the
land owner
('
would not obliterate the consequences of vesting.
B
13. We must also observe that the petitioner has been able
to frustrate the acquisition and development of the land right
from the year 1980 onwards by taking recourse to one litigation
after the other. The record reveals that all the suits/writ petitions
etc. that had been filed had failed. Undoubtedly, every citizen C
has a right to utilize all legal means which are open to him in a
bid to vindicate and protect his rights, but if the court comes to
the conclusion that the pleas raised are frivolous and meant to
frustrate and delay an acquisition which is in public interest,
deterrent action is called for. This is precisely the situation in
the present matter. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed with D
costs which are determined at Rupees two lacs. The
respondents, shall, without further loss of time proceed against
the appellant.

N.J. Appeals dismissed. E