Holding

Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act requires a clear averment of readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms, and the plaint’s failure to expressly demonstrate this defeats specific performance.

Summary

The appellants filed a suit for specific performance of a land sale contract, which the trial court decreed in their favour. The first appellate court set aside the decree, holding that the plaint did not comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and the High Court dismissed the appellants' second appeal. The appellants contended that the plaint contained an averment that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, while the respondent argued that the addition of Khasra No. 866 later meant the readiness claim was irrelevant. The Supreme Court examined the requirement of Section 16(c), emphasizing that a plaintiff must clearly manifest blemishless conduct and a readiness and willingness to perform, but the language need not be verbatim; the essence must be evident from the whole plaint. Relying on several precedents, the Court held that the pleadings failed to demonstrate the requisite readiness and willingness concerning the disputed term, and therefore dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the plaint complied with the requirements of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, i.e., whether it averred that the plaintiff had performed or was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract.
Whether the absence of a specific phraseology, but an overall implication of readiness and willingness, suffices to satisfy Section 16(c).

Legislation cited

Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 16(c)

Subjects

Specific performanceSection 16(c)Specific Relief ActReadiness and willingnessPersonal barPleadingsContract saleKhasra

Judgment

A SITA RAM AND ORS. )....

v. '.
RADHEY SHYAM

OCTOBER 5, 2007
B
[DR. ARiill P ASAYAT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH P ANTA,JJ.]

1
Specific ReliefAct, 1963:

c s.16(c)-Claim for specific relief-Held: Not to be denied if
conduct ofplaintiffis blemishless.

The plaintiff-appellant filed suit for specific performance of
contract. The Trial Court decreed the suit. The First appellate Court
set aside the decree on the ground that pleadings were not in accordance
D
with provisions of s.16(c) of Specific Relief Act, 1963. The High Court
also dismissed the second appeal.

In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that in the plaint in
essence, specific statement had been made about the fact that the
E plaintiffs had mentioned to the defendant that they were ready and
willing to do such effort or act as would be necessary to be done by the
plaintiffs for performance of the contract and, therefore, the first
appellate court and the High Court were not justified in holding that the
_._
requirements of s. 16(c) of the Act were not met.
F
Respondent contended that the reading of the plaint indicated that
Khasra No. 866 was later on added and, therefore, the question of the
plaintiffs being ready and willing to perform the contract as originally
stood, docs not really arise. He also made specific reference to the
pleadings to the effect that though the documents were executed on
G ...,._
1.9.1977, the same was complete and on that basis the sale has been
concluded. It is submitted that if the sale was concluded as pleaded, the
question of filing the suit for specific contract does not arise.

Dismissing the appeal, the Com1
H 552
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I
SITA RAM v. RADHEY SHYAM [PASAYAT, J.] 553

HELD: 1. The basic principle behind s.16(c) ofSpecific ReliefAct, A
1963 read with Explanation (ii) is that any person seeking benefit of the
specific performance ofcontract must manifest that his conduct has been
blemishless throughout entitling him to the specific relief. The provision
imposes a personal bar. The Court is to grant relief on the basis of the
conduct of the person seeking relief. If the pleadings manifest that the B
conduct of the plaintiff entitles him to get the relief on perusal of the
plaint he should not be denied the relief. [Para 10]
2. There is no dispute that there was claim in respect of Khasra
866 which did not form part of the agreement. There was also an C
averment to the effect that the agreement related to a completed sale.
[Parallj
Aniglase Yohannan v. Ramlatha and Ors., [2005] 7 SCC 534, relied
on.
D
Ardeshir H Mamav. Flora Sassoon, AIR (1928) PC 208; Prem Raj
v. The D.L.F Housing and Construction (Private) Ltd and Anr., AIR
(1968) SC 1355; Syed Dastagirv. T.R Gopalakrishna Settty, [1999) 6 SCC
337; Motilal Jain v. Ramdasi Devi (Smt.) and Ors., [2000) 6 SCC 420;
and Lord Campbell in Corkv.Ambergate etc. and Railway Co., (1851) E
117ER1229, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4656 of
2007.
From the Judgment and final Order dated 24.10.2005 of the High F
Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in S.B. Civil
Second Appeal No. 535 of2005.
Ajay Choudhary and Vijay Pal Singh for the Appellants.
Sushil Kumar Jain Puneet Jain, Christi Jain, Piyush Jain and Pratibha G
Jain for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAVAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
H
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554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single
Judge of the Jaipur Bench ofRajasthan High Court dismissing the Second
Appeal filed by the plaintiffs-appellants. It is to be noted that the trial court .
decreed the suit, which was one for specific perfonnance of a contract
while the first appellate court set aside the decree. The appellate court
B dismissed the suit on the ground that the pleadings were not in accordance
with the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (in
short the 'Act'). Learned Single Judge dismissed the Second Appeal
holding that no substantial question oflaw was involved as essentially the
conclusions of the first appellate court were factual findings.
c 3. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellants
submitted that in the plaint, in essence, specific statement had been made
about the fact that the plaintiffs had mentioned to the defendant that they
were ready and willing to do such effort or act as would be necessary to
be done by the plaintiffs for perfonnance of the contnkt. It was, therefore,
D submitted that the first appellate court and the Hi~ourt were not justified
in holding that the requirements of Section 16(c) of the Act were not met.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the
bare reading of the plaint itself indicated that Khasra No. 866 was later
E on added and, therefore, the question of the plaintiffs being ready and
willing to perfonn the contract as originally stood, does not really arise.
Specific reference was made to the pleadings to the effect that though
the documents were executed on 1. 9.1977, the same was complete and
on that basis the sale has been i:oncluded. It is submitted that ifthe sale
F was concluded as pleaded, the question of filing the suit for specific
contract does not arise. Moreover, the plaintiffs themselves had stated
that Khasra No.866 was added later on.
5. In order to appreciate the rival submissions, Section 16(c) needs
G to be quoted along with the Explanations. The same reads as follows:
"16. Personal bars to relief:

(a) ........ .

(b) ........ .
H
SITA RAM v. RADHEY SHYAM [PASAYAT, J.] 555

(c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always A
been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which
are to be performed by him, other than terms of the performance of which
has been prevented or waived by the defendant.
Explanation- For the purpose of clause (c)-
B
(i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential
for the plaintiff to actually tehder to the defendant or to deposit in Court
any money except when so directed by the Court;

(ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness C
to perform, the contract accordingly to its true construction."
6. InArdeshir H Mama v. Flora Sassoon, AIR (1928) PC 208,
the Privy Council observed that where the injured party sued at law for
a breach, going to the root of the contract, he thereby elected to treat
the contract as at an end himself and as discharged from the obligations. D
r No further performance by him was either contemplated or had to be
tendered. In a suit for specific performance on the other hand, he treated
and was required by the Court to treat the contract as still subsisting. He
had in that suit to allege, and if the fact was traversed, he was required
to prove a continuous readiness and willingness from the date of the E
contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part.
Failure to make good that averment brings with it and leads to the
inevitable dismissal of the suit. The observations were cited with approval
in Prem Raj v. The D.L.F. Housing and Construction (Private) Ltd.
and Anr., AIR (1968) SC 1355. F

7. While examining the requirement of Section 16(c) this Court in
Syed Dastagir v. TR. Gopalakrishna Settty, [1999] 6 SCC 337 noted
as follows:
"So the whole gamut of the issue raised is, how to construe a plea G
specially with reference to Section 16(c) and what are the
obligations which the plaintiff has to comply with in reference to
his plea and whether the plea of the plaintiff could not be construed
to conform to the requirement of the aforesaid section, or does
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\

''
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A this section require specific words to be pleaded that he has
performed or has always been ready and is willing to perform his
part of the contract. In construing a plea in any pleading, courts
must keep in mind that a plea is not an expression of art and
science but an expression through words to place fact and law of
B one's case for a relief. Such an expression may be pointed, precise,
sometimes vague but still it could be gathered what he wants to
convey through only by reading the whole pleading, depending on
the person drafting a plea. In India most of the pleas are drafted
by counsel hence the aforesaid difference of pleas which inevitably
c differ from one to the other. Thus, to gather true spirit behind a
plea it should be read as a whole. This does not distract one from
performing his obligations as required under a statute. But to test
whether he has performed his obligations, one has to see the pith
and substance of a plea. Where a statute requires any fact to be
D pleaded then that has to be pleaded may be in any form. The same
plea~may be stated by different persons through different words;
then how could it be constricted to be only in any particular
nomenclature or word. Unless a statute specifically requires a plea
to be in any particular form, it can be in any form. No specific
E phraseology or language is required to take such a plea. The
language in Section 16(c) does not require any specific phraseology
but only that the plaintiff must aver that he has performed or has
always been and is willing to·perform his part of the contract. So
the compliance of "readiness and willingness" has to be in spirit
F and substance and not in letter and form. So to insist for a
mechanical production of the exact words of a statute is to insist
for the form rather than the essence. So the absence of form cannot
dissolve an essence if already pleaded."
G 8. Again in Motilal Jain v. Ramdasi Devi (Smt.) and Ors., [2000]
6 sec 420 it was noted as follows:
"7. The other contention which found favour with the High
Court, is that plaint averments do not show that the plaintiff was
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and at any
H rate there is no evidence on record to prove it. Mr. Choudhary
SITARAMv. RADHEYSHYAM [PASAYAT,J.] 557

developed that contention placing reliance on the decision in A
Varghese case [1969] 2 SCC 539. In that case, the plaintiff
pleaded an oral contract for sale of the suit property. The defendant
denied the alleged oral agreement and pleaded a different
agreement in regard to which the plaintiff neither amended his plaint
nor filed subsequent pleading and it was in that context that this B
Court pointed out that the pleading in specific performance should
conform to Forms 47 and 48 of the First Schedule of the Code
of Civil Procedure. That view was followed in Abdul Khader case
[1989] 4 sec 313 : AIR (1990) SC 682.
8. However, a different note was struck by this Court in Chandiok
c
case [1970] 3 SCC 140: AIR (1971) SC 1238. In that case 'A'
agreed to purchase from 'R' a leasehold plot. 'R' was not having
lease of the land in his favour from the Government nor was he in
possession of the same. 'R', however, received earnest money D
pursuant to the agreement for sale which provided that the balance
of consideration would be paid within a month at the time of the
execution of the registered sale deed. Under the agreement 'R' was
under obligation to obtain permission and sanction from the
Government before the transfer of leasehold plot. 'R' did not take E
any steps to apply for the sanction from the Government. 'A' filed
the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. One of
the contentions of 'R' was that 'A' was not ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract. This Court observed that readiness
and willingness could not be treated as a straitjacket formula and F
that had to be determiped from the entirety of facts and
circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party
concerned. It was held that in the absence of any material to show
that 'A' at any stage was not ready and willing to perform his part
of the contract or that he did not have the necessary funds for G
payment when the sale deed would be executed after the sanction
was obtained, 'A' was entitled to a decree for specific performance
of contract.
9. That decision was relied upon by a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Syed Dastagir case [1999] 6 SCC 337 wherein it was H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A held that in construing a plea in any pleading, courts must keep in
mind that a plea is not an expression of art and science but an
expression through words to place fact and law of one's case for
a relief It is pointed oui that in India most of the pleas are drafted
by counsel and hence they inevitably differ from one to the other;
B thus, to gather the true spirit behind a plea it should be read as a
whole and to test whether the plaintiffhas performed his obligations,
one has to see the pith and substance of the plea It was observed:
'"'
· "Unless a statute specifically requires a plea to be in any
c particular form, it can be in any form. No specific phraseology
or language is required to take such a plea. The language in
Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 does not require
any specific phraseology but only that the plaintiff must aver
that he has performed or has always been and is willing to
D perform his part of the contract. So the compliance of
'readiness and willingness' has to be in spirit and substance and
not in letter and form."
It is thus clear that an averment of readiness and willingness in the
plaint is not a mathematical formula which should only be in specific
E words. If the averments in the plaint as a whole do clearly indicate
the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to fulfil his part of the
obligations under the contract which is the subject-matter of the
suit, the fact that they are differently worded will not militate against
the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff in a suit for specific
F performance of contract for sale."
9. Lord Campbell in Cork v. Ambergate etc. and Railway Co.,
(1851) 117 ER 1229 observed that in common sense the meaning of such
an averment of readiness and willingness must be that the non-completion
G of the contract was not the fault of the plaintiffs, and that they were
disposed and able to complete it had it not been renounced by the
defendant.
10. The basic principle behind Section 16(c) read with Explanation
(ii) is that any person seeking benefit of the specific performance of
H
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t
SITARAMv. RADHEYSHYAM(PASAYAT,J.] 559

contract must manifest that his conduct has been blemishless throughout A
entitling him to the specific relief. The provision imposes a personal bar.
The Court is to grant relief on the basis of the conduct of the person seeking
relief If the pleadings manifest that the conduct of the plaintiff entitles him
to get the relief on perusal of the plaint he should not be denied the relief.
(See Aniglase Yohannan v. Ramlatha and Ors., [2005] 7 SCC 534). B
11. That being so, considering the background facts vested on the
anvil of the principles of law formulated above, the inevitable conclusion
is that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. There is no dispute that there
was claim in respect of Khasra 866 which did not form part of the C
agreement. There was also an averment to the effect that the agreement
related to a completed sale. There shall be no orders as to costs.
D.G. Appeal dismissed.

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