Holding

The first floor of the shop‑cum‑flat is part of a non‑residential building, so the eviction petition under Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) is not maintainable.

Summary

The appellant, Shabir Ahmad, was a tenant of the first floor of a "shop‑cum‑flat" premises in Chandigarh, which he used exclusively as a hair‑dressing salon. The landlords filed an eviction petition under Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974 (as amended 1982), claiming a bona‑fide residential requirement. The Rent Controller and lower courts held the premises to be a residential building and ordered eviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the definition of "residential building" in Section 2(g) and "non‑residential building" in Section 2(d) of the Act, and considered the documentary evidence – letter of allotment, deed of conveyance, and site plan – which showed the building was designated for commercial use with no bedrooms, kitchen or bathroom. The Court ruled that the expression "shop‑cum‑flat" must be interpreted in its contextual, popular sense, not by dictionary meaning of "flat", and concluded that the premises is part of a non‑residential building. Consequently, the eviction petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the premises occupied by the tenant qualifies as a 'residential building' under Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974.
How the expression 'shop‑cum‑flat' should be interpreted for the purpose of the Act.
Whether Section 11 of the Act, which prohibits conversion of a residential building into a non‑residential building, is applicable.

Subjects

rent controlevictionresidential buildingnon‑residential buildingstatutory interpretationshop‑cum‑flatEast Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Actbona fide requirement

Judgment

A SI- ABIR AHMAD
v. ..
SHAI\! LAL AND ANR.

FEBRUARY 8, 2002

B [SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.]

Rent Control and Evictio1' :

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension of Chandigarh) Act,
C 1974 (as amended in 1982)-Se.:tions I 3(3) (a) (i) (a), I I and 2(g) and (d)-
'Shop-cum-flat' premises-Ev1~tion petition on the ground of bondide
requirement for residential pur,,oses-Entitlement of-Premises solely used
for running a Hair Dressing Sa'oon-Recitals of letter of allotment, deed of
conveyance and site plan showing that the premises was a non-residential
D building-No provision in the dei ign plan/or bedrooms, bathroom or kitchen-
Held, the premises was not a ·esidential building but was part of a non-
residential building-Courts bdow were not justified in interpreting the
expression 'shop-cum-flat' havi 1g regard to the dictionary meaning of the
word 'flat '-Section I I of the Act prohibiting conversion of a residential
building into a non-residential b ii/ding, has no application-Eviction petition
E dismissed
Interpretation of Statutes

Expression 'shop-cum-flat'. --Interpretation of-Recourse to dictionaries-
•
Held. undoubtedly a useful guid. • provided appropriate meaning which fits in
F the context is chosen.

Words and Phrases:

Expression 'shop-cum-flat -Meaning of

G 'residential building'; 'nw-residential building'-Meaning of in the
context of Section 2(g) and (d) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Extension of Chandigarh) Act, 1974.

Appellant was a tenant o • a portion of first floor of 'shop-cum-Oat'
premises owned by respondents. Appellant had been using the premises solely
H 910
r

SHABIR AHMAD v. SHAM LAL 911

for the purpose of running a Hair Dressing Saloon from the very. inception A
of the tenancy. Respondent-landlords filed eviction petition on the ground of
bona fide requirement for residential purposes under Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) of
the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974
(as amended in 1982). Appellant contested the eviction petition inter alia on
the ground that the tenanted premises was a non-residential building and,
therefore, eviction could not be sought under the said provisions. However, B
Rent Controller passed an eviction order holding that the premises was part
ofa residential building and the bona fide requirement oflandlords had been
established. Appellant unsuccessfully filed an appeal and revision. Hence the
present appeal

l On behalf of the appellant-tenant it WllS contended that the letter of
allotment, the conveyance deed and the site plan clearly show that the building
wns a non-residential premises and thus, the courts below erred in holding
that 'shop-cum-flat' premises was a residential building.
c

Allowing the appeal, the Court D

HELD : 1.1. The first floor of 'shop-cum-flat' premises occupied by
appellant-tenant is a part of non-residential building. Thus, the eviction
petition filed by the respondent-landlords under Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) of the
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974, E
(as amended in 1982) is liable to be dismissed. [918-A, F)

1.2. On perusal of Section 2(g) and (d) of the Act it is clear that if a
building is being used solely for the purpose of business or trade, it is a non-
residential building and a building other than a non-residential building is a
residential building. In the instant case, the appellant-tenant has been using F
the premises solely for the purpose of running a Hair Dressing Saloon from
the inception of the tenancy. [915-CJ

1.3. It is evident from the recitals in the deed of conveyance. the letter
ofallotment, the site plan and from the agreement of tenancy, that the 'shop- G
cum-flat' is a non-residential building within the meaning of the Act The
recitals in the letter of allotment and the deed of conveyance shows that even
at the time of allotment of the site itself, it was shown as commercial Clause
18 of the letter of allotment puts an embargo on the use of the building for
residential purpose unless the plan supplied by the Government specified it
as a residenfoil building. The design plan of the first floor does not provide H
912 SUPREME CO\JRT REPORTS [2002] I S.C.R.

A for bed-rooms etc. There is 10 provision for bathroom and no provision for
kitchen, on the contrary a r 1om is shown as 'office'. A perusal of clause 20
shows th11t the 'shop-cum-fl: tt' constructed on 11 site sold for general trade,
will be 11 shop for trodes anc prohibits cooking and use of fire nmong other
things, nlso suggests that res dential building was not contemplated.
[917-H, DJ
B
Chandigarh Housing 81 ard and Anr. v. Narinder Kaur Mako/, (21100) 6
sec 415, distinguished.
2. The appronch of 1:ourts below as well as the High Court in
C interpreting the expression ': :hop-cum-flat' having regard to the dictionary j·
meening of the word 'flat' is not proper. The expression 'flat' is not defmed
in the Act. It is not a technici 11 expression nod not 11 term of art; so it has to
be understood in its popular sense th11t is, 11s commonly understood. In that
s:nse it is capable of being understood both 11s 11 'residential' 11s well cs 11 'non-
residential' building. Therefore, the expression 'shop-cum-flat' does not 11lwllys
D meen th11t the ground floor of the building is mennt for shops 11nd the first
11nd the higher floors are residential 11ccommodation in the building. The
correct npprozch would be t•) refer to the context in which the expression
cppe11rs 11nd then construe it, Undoubtedly, dictionaries including l11w
dictionaries will be useful guides in the tlls!< of interpreting deeds and stctutes,
provided appropri11te meaning which fits in the context is chosen; otherwise
E it will be a fruitless exercise n.ay misleading course if a meaning de hors the
context in which it appears, were to be opted. [915-D; 916-8-C)

Commissioner ofIncome Tax, Orissa and Ors. v. Mis. N.C. Budharaja and
Company and Ors., [1994) Sup~1. 1 SCC 280; State Bank ofIndia v. Shri Sundra
F Money, [1976) 3 SCR 160; MG1·goo Singh v. The Election Tribunal, Bareilly and
Ors., [1958) SCR 418 and Ran, Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.,
AIR (1957) SC 18, relied on.

3. Section 11 of the Act prohibits conversion of a residential building
into 11 non-residential building In the instant case, a non-residential building
G is sought to be converted into 1 residential building, Section 11 has therefore,
no application. (918-E)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1605 of.
1999.

H From the Judgment and Crder dated 28.5.98 of the Punjab and Haryana
SHABIR AHMAD v. SHAM LAL (S.S.M. QUADRI, J.J 913

High Court in C.R. No. 872 of 1996. A
V.C. Mahajan and P.N. Puri for the Appellant.

Manoj Swarup and Manish Khandelwal for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, J. This appeal arises from
the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in Civil
Revision No. 872 of 1996 dated May 28, 1998. By that order the High Court
upheld the judgment of the Appellate Authority in R.A. No. 206 of 20.5.94
dated February 3, 1996 confirming the order of the learned Rent Controller C
dated April 6, 1994.

The appellant is the tenant ofa portion of the first floorof'shop-cum-
flat', S.C.F. No. 14, Sector 22, Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as 'the
premises') of which the respondents arc the landlords. The relationship between
the appellant and the respondents is governed by the provisions of the East D
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 which was extended to Chandigarh
• by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act,
1974 and subsequently amended by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restrjction
(Chandigarh Amendment) Act, 1982 (for short 'the Act').
E
The respondents filed a petition for eviction of the appellant on two
grounds but what survives for consideration is the ground of bona fide
requirement of the respondents for residential purposes, under Section
13(3)(a)(i)(a) of the Act. The appellant contested the eviction petition, inter
alia, on the ground that the premises let out to him is a non-residential
building and, therefore, his eviction cannot be sought under the said provision. F
The learned Rent Controller found the ground of bona fide requirement in
favour of the respondents and recorded the finding that the premises is a part
of a residential building. Accordingly, it ordered eviction of the appellant by
its order dated April 6, 1994. The appellant's appeal before the Appellate
Authority having been dismissed on February 3, 1996, he filed Civil Revision G
No. 872 of 1996 in the High Court which was also dismissed by an order
dated May 28, 1998 in terms of the judgment in Civil Revision No. I 085 of
1995. That order of the High Court is under challenge in this appeal.

Mr. V.C. Mahajan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant, has contended that the courts below recorded an erroneous finding H
914 SUPRE~ :E COURT REPORTS [2002] I S.C.R.

A that the premises which is a par, of 'shop-cum-flat', is a residential building.
He argued that the letter of a lotnient, the, conveyance deed and the plan
would clearly show that the bu !ding w~ a1nqti-residential building, as such
0

the eviction petition ought to have been dismissed by all the courts. Mr.
Manoj Swarup, the learned cou 1sel appearing for the respondents, relying on
the same dgcuments has submi ted that the first floor of the 'shop-cum-flat'
B is a residential building and th s is evident from the fact that it is termed as
shop-cum-flat; the learned Rer t Controller, the Appellate Authority as well
as the High Court rightly hek the premises to be a residential building.

The short question tha arises for consideration is : whether the
C respondents are entitled to s :ek eviction of the appellant under Section
13(3XaXi)(a) of the Act. Ina: much as the respondents' petition was filed
under Section 13(3XaXiXa) cf the Act it would be appropriate to quote it
here:

"13. Eviction of tenants -
D (3Xa). A landlord ma:' apply to the Controller for an order directing
the tenant to put the andlord in possession -

(i) in the case of a residential c· • ·1 building if -
(a) he requires it for his own occupation;
E
(b) to (d) *** •• • *** ...

Proviso ••• ••• ••• *** ."

A plain reading of the provision shows that a landlord is enabled to
apply to the Rent Controlle • for an order directing the tenant to put the
F landlord in possession in cas• •of a residential building if he requires it for his
own occupation. It is mani est that the aforementioned provision can be
invoked only in case of a r1 sidential building The controversy in this case
centers round the question, whether the premises is a residential building.
The ground floor is admitte• ily a shop portion. The dispute is about the first
G floor. If the first floor of ,he 'shop-cum-flat' is held to be a residential
building, the answer to the o Jestion must be in the affirmative but if it is held
to be non-residential buildil 1g, the answer should be in the negative. It will
be useful to refer to the def nition of the expression "residential building" in \
clause (g) of Section 2 of ' he Act which reads :

H "2(g). "residential t uilding" means any building which is not a non-
SHABIR AHMAD v. SHAM LAL [S.S.M. QUADRI, J.] 915

...._ residential building." A
.(.. This definition is somewhat circular. It defines the said expression in terms
of 'non-residential building' which is defined in clause (d) as follows :

"2(d). "non-residential building" means a building being used solely
for the purpose of business or trade." B
It is thus clear that if a building is being used solely for the purpose of
business or trade, it is a non-residential building and a building other than a
non-residential building is a residential building. In this case the appellant
has been using the premises solely for the purpose of running a Hair Dressing
Saloon from the inception of the tenancy, from July 22, 1974. This should, c
if nothing more is required to be considered, answer the question in the
negative. But we have to ascertain the import of the expression 'shop-cum-
flat' on the facts of this case.

The courts below as well as the High Court having regard to the meaning
. of the word 'flat' in that expression treated the ground floor as a shop and
the first floor as a flat and on that basis held that the premises is a residential
D

building. In our view, the approach in interpreting the expression 'shop-cum-
flat' having regard to the dictionary meaning of the word 'flat' is not proper.

The Courts ought not to be unmindful of the consequence of too much
reliance on the dictionaries and Lexicons lest they go astray in interpreting E
recitals in a deed or document or provisions in a Statute. In Commissioner of

.. Income Tax, Orissa and Ors. v. Mis. N. C. Budharaja and Company and Ors.,
(1994] Supp. 1 SCC 280, this Court observed :

"The words are : "construction, manufacture or production of any
one or more of the articles and things ..... " and "construction,
F
manufacture or production of any articles and things ......" respectively.
It is equally evident that in these sub-clauses as well as in the IXth
Schedule and Xlth Schedule, the words 'articles' and 'things' are
, used inter-changeably. In the scheme and context of the provision, it
would not be right to isolate the word "thing", ascertain its meaning G
with reference to Law Lexicons and attach to it a meaning which it
"'
was never intended to bear. A statute cannot always be construed
with the dictionary in one hand and the statute in the other. Regard
must also be had to the scheme, context and - as in this case - to
the legislative history of the provision."
H·
916 SUPR iME COURT REPORTS (2002] I S.C.R.
j
A
~
[See also : State Ban~ of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money, [1976] 3
SCR 160.]
i
The said expression i , not defined in the Act. It is not a technical I
expression and not a tenn <f art; so it has to be understood in its popular
sense, that is, as commonly understood. In that sense it is capable of being
B understood both as a 'resi< ential' as well as a 'non-residential' building.
Therefore, the expression ';hop-cum-flat' does not always mean that the
ground floor of the buildin1 is meant for shops and the first and the higher
floors are residential accoll' modation in the building. The correct approach
would be to refer to the cc ntext in which the expression appears and then
C construe it. Undoubtedly, di1 tionaries including law dictionaries will be useful
guides in the task of inteq: ~etation deeds and statutes provided appropriate
meaning which fits in the 1 ontext is chosen; otherwise it will be a fruitless
exercise nay misleading co irse if a meaning de hors the context in which it
appears, were to be opted. See : Mangoo Singh v. The Election Tribunal,
Bareilly and Ors., [1958] : ,CR 418.
D
In Ram Narain v. Th, State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., AIR ( 1957) SC
18, a Constitution Bench 1 f this Court laid down that the meanings of the
words and phrases in an A1 t must take their colour from the context in which
they appear. The learned :ounsel for the parties relied upon the following
recitals in the letter of all1 tment and the deed of conveyance in support of.
E their respective contention. - Mr. Mahajan to dislodge the conclusion arrived
at and Mr. Swamp to su~ ~ort the impugned order of the High Court. The
letter of allotment provid( s :

"The following c011mercial site is hereby allotted to you on the
F conditions mentioned hen under :

Sector Seri 11 No. Approximate Price Remarks
of s te dimensions

22-D 14 33.70 26,000
G
S.C F. 256 .667
sq. yards

This shows that even at t 1e time of allotment of the site itself, it was shown
as commercial. A readin ~ of clause 18 of the letter of allotment would be
H apposite.
SHABIR AHMAD v. SHAM LAL [S.S.M. QUADRI, J.] 917
"18. The site is classed as 'commercial' and the building to be erected A
on it shall not be used for the residential purpose unless otherwise specifiec!
in the plans supplied by the Government."
(emphasis supplied)

This clause places the position beyond any doubt. It puts an embargo
on the use of the building for residential purpose unless the plan supplied by B
the Government specified it as a residential building. Clause 6 directs that the
building shall have to be constructed in accordance with the design which
will be supplied by the Government after the building plans have been
sanctioned. We have also perused the plan of the first floor (Annexure P-5).
The design of the plan does not provide for bed-rooms etc. We find no C
provision for bathroom and no provision for kitchen, on the contrary a room
is shown as 'office'. There is nothing in the plan which indicates that a
residential accommodation is specified therein.

A perusal of Clause 20 which says that the shop-cum-flat constructed
on a site sold for general trade, will be a shop for trades (except those D
excluded therein) and prohibits cooking and use offire among other things,
also suggests that residential building was not contemplated.

Our attention was invited to the following recitals in the deed of
conveyance (Ex.P-6) :
E
"DEED OF CONVEYANCE of a site at Chandigarh sold by auction
to be used as a site for commercial purpose in the New Capital of
Punjab at Chandigarh."
·•
(emphasis added)

They also emphasise the commercial aspect of the building.
F

"And whereas the Punjab Government has sanctioned the sale of
the site to the transferee in consideration of the sum of Rs. 26,000
(Rupees Twenty six thousand only) for the purpose of building shop-
• cum-flat and using the same exclusively for general trade (or restaurant G
i.e. shop portions)."
(emphasis added)

From these recitals, in the deed of conveynace, the letter of allotment
of the site, the plan and the agreement of tenancy it is evident that 'shop-
cum-flat' is a non-residential building within the meaning of the Act and we H
918 SUPRE \1E COURT REPORTS [2002) 1 S.C.R.

A have absolutely no doubt tha the premises is a part of a non-residential
building and in view of the ~mbargo, noticed above, cannot be used for d
residential purposes. The High Court was, therefore, not correct to construe
the word 'flat' in the expressio11 'shop-cum-flat' out of context with reference
to the dictionary meaning of 11e word.

B Mr. Swarup relied on the 1udgment of this Court in Chandigarh Housing
Board and Anr. v. Narinder K iur Mako/, [2000) 6 SCC 415 to show that in
the expression 'shop-cum-flat', the first floor is meant for residential purposes.
In the light of the above disc :ssion, it is too broad a proposition to merit
acceptance. In that- case, the building was in a different sector and the
C requirement of the Chief Arch tect and the Secretary of the Board was that
the ground floor should be th1 shop and the first and second floors should
be constructed as residential lats, therefore, the said judgment is clearly
distinguishable on the facts of hat case. In the instant case, we have already
held, the first floor is meant for non-residential purposes and cannot be
treated as residential building.
D
Mr. Swamp relied on S1 ction 11 of the Act to contend that the first
floor cannot be allowed to be 1onverted into a non-residential building. It is
recorded to be rejected. Secti 1n 11 of the Act prohibits conversion of a
residential building into a nor -residential building. In the case on hand, a
non-residential building is soui .ht to be converted into a residential building,
E Section 11 has, therefore, no • pplication.

For the above reasons, he order of the High Court under challenge
cannot be sustained; it is accor lingly set aside. The eviction petition filed by
the respondents is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, we allow the appeal
F and dismiss the application of the respondents for eviction of the appellant.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.

S.V.K. Appeal allowed.

•