Holding

A revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is maintainable against a District Judge’s order made under Section 50(2) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, and the earlier Full Bench decision in Krishnaji’s case remains binding.

Summary

Shyamaraju Hegde appealed to the Supreme Court against a Karnataka High Court order dismissing his revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. The High Court had relied on its own Full Bench decision in M.M. Yaragatti v. Vasant, which held that a second revision was not maintainable against a District Judge’s order made under Section 50(2) (deemed final). The Supreme Court examined whether the finality clause in Section 50(2) ousted the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction and whether the earlier Full Bench decision in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v. Gurupad Shivaram Kavalekar (1978) had been overruled by later Supreme Court judgments. It held that the earlier decision remained binding because it had not been expressly overruled, and that Section 115 CPC gives the High Court power to revise any order of a subordinate court, including a District Judge’s order under Section 50(2). Consequently, the revision petition was maintainable and the High Court’s dismissal was set aside.

Issues considered

Whether a revision petition under Section 115 CPC read with Section 50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act is maintainable when the District Judge has passed an order under Section 50(2) which declares the order final.
Whether the Full Bench decision in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v. Gurupad Shivaram Kavalekar (1978) has been overruled by later Supreme Court judgments (Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad and Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai).
Whether a High Court can overrule its own earlier Full Bench decision in the absence of a Supreme Court overruling.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
Constitution of Indias. Article 141
Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961s. 50(1), s. 50(2)
Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965s. 20

Subjects

revision jurisdictionKarnataka Rent Control ActSection 115 CPCfinality clauseSupreme Court binding precedentHigh Court overruleappellate jurisdiction

Judgment

SHYAMARAJU HEGDE
A
v.
U. VENKATESHA BHAT & ORS.

SEPTEMBER 25, 1987

Iii [RANGANATH MISRA AND MURARI MOHON DUTT, JJ.]

Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961: s. 50(1) & (2}/Code of Civil y"
Procedure, 1908: s. 115-Revision order made by District Judge under
s. 50(2)-Whether revisable under s. 50( 1) of the Act read withs. 115 of
the Code.
c Constitution of India, Art. 141-Judicial propriety warrants that
decisions of the Supreme Court must be taken as wholly binding on the
High Courts.
~
Sub-section (1) of s. 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961
D confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court In respect of orders
passed or proceedings taken by the Court of Small Causes or the Court
of Civil Judge under the Act while sub-s. (2) empowers the District Judge
to revise the orders passed or proceedings taken by the Court of Munsif
and makes his order final.

E A Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Krishnaji Venkatesh }
Shriodkar v. Gurupad Shivaram Kavalekar & Ors., (ILR 1978 Kar.
1585), following the decisions of this Court in Chhagan Lal v. The
Municipal Corporation. Indore, (1977] 2 SCR 871 and Krishnadas
Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachala Shetty, (SLP No. 913 of 1978 decided on
13th Feb., 1978) held that the fact that the order of the District Judge
-
F under s. 50(2) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 i.s made final,
does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court under s. US of the
)-~
Code of Civil Procedure to revise such orders of the District Judge, in
the absence of any express words in the statute taking away such
jurisdiction.

G Later this Court, in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, [1980] 3
SCR 32 while interpreting s. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts
Act, as amended by the U.P. Amendment Act, 1978, under which the
revisional jurisdiction was shared between the District Court and the )-
High Court, took the view that the High Court was not vested with
revisional jurisdiction under s. US CPC in respect of a revisional order
H made by the District Court under that section. A similar view was also
340
S. HEGDE v. U.V. BHAT 341

~ taken in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, AIR I987 SC 203 while
A
construing s. 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,
196~.

Relying on the aforesaid two decisimts a Full Bench of the High
Court of Karnataka in M.M. Yaragatti v. Vasant, (ILR 1987 Kar. 1286
took a contrary view to Krishnaji's case. B
y fhe appellant's revision petition having been dismissed by a
Sii!gle jud11e ot the High Court following the Full Bench decision in
Yaragatti's case, he preferred an appeal to this Court by special leave.
"'
Allowing the appeal,
c
) ltttf>: 1, A revision application is maintainable under s. 115 of
the Code of Civil Procedure read with s. 50(1) of the Karnataka Rent
Conttol Act• 1%1 when a District Judge has made an order in his
revlsi011al jurisdiction under s. 50(2) of the Act.
D
Chha!(an Lal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore, [1977) 2
SCR 871 and krtshnadas Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachala Shetty, (S.L.P.
No. 913 of 1918 decided on 13th of Febrnary, 1978, referred to.

Vishesh kumar v. Shanti Prasad, (1980) 3 SCR 32; Aundal Am-
---1
ma! v. Sadasivah Pillai, AIR 1987 SC 203; South Asia Industries Private E
Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh & Ors., [1965) 2 SCR 756 and National

-
Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., [1953) SCR
1028, dntinguished.

krishtzaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v. Gurupad Shiva ram Kavalekar &
Ors., ILR 1978 Kar. 1585 approved. F
--{
M.M. Yaragatti v. Vasant, ILR 1987 Kar. 1286 overruled.

2. The decision of a Full Bench of the High Court consisting of
three Judges rendered in Krishnaji' s Case was binding on a bench of
equal strength unless that decision had directly been overrnled by this G
Court or by necessary implication became unsustainable. There is no
such overruling of Krishnaji's decision by this Court. It cannot also be
-i said that by necessary implication the ratio therein supported by the
direct authority of this Court stood superseded. 1349B-C I

3. Judicial propriety warrants that decisions of the Supreme H
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

A Court must be taken wholly binding on the High Courts. That is the )«-
necessary outcome of the tier system. Article 141 of the Constitution
unequivocally states that the law declared by this Court shall be binding
on all courts within the territory of India. A coordinate Bench of the
High Court, therefore, should not have chosen to overrule an earlier
judgment of that Court based upon a decision of this Court. [349C·Fl
B
Broom v. Cassell & Co., [1972] 1AER801, referred to.

4. It is one of the essential requirements of the administration or
justice that judgments rendered by superior courts and partlcular}y
with the approval of the apex court should not be frequently changed so
C as to unsettle settled positions. The fact that the State Legislature has
not thought it necessary to amend the law and set at naught the
decisions in Krishnaji's case or Bhatija's caseis indicative of the posi·
lion that this Court had not taken a wrong view of the Legislative
intention. l349H; 350Al

D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: CIVIL APPEAL
No. 1324 of1987.

From the Judgment and Order dated 15.4.1987 of the Kamataka
High Court in C.R.P. No. 3030 of 1985.

E R.B. Datar and Ranjit Kumar for the Appellant.

B. Krishna Prasad and K.R. Nagaraja for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

f RANGANATH MISRA, J. This appeal by special leave is directed
against the order made by a learned Single Judge of the Kamataka )-
High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The High Court -
relied upon the ratio of its Full Bench decision in M.M. Yaragatti v.
Vasant, ILR (1987) Kar. 1286 and dismissed the revision petition as
not maintainable.
G
The short question for consideration in this appeal is as to
whether a revision application is maintainable under section 115 of
the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 50( 1) of the Karnataka !-
Rent Control Act, 1961 when a District Judge has made an order in his
revisional jurisdiction under section 50(2) of the Act. This very ques-
H lion had come up for consideration before a Full Bench of the
S. HEGDE v. U.V. BHAT [MISRA, J.] 343

Karnataka High Court in the case of Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v. A
Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar & Ors., ILR {1978) Kar. 1585. Venkata-
ramiah, J., as he then was, speaking for the Full Bench held:-

"The second for consideration is whether th!: declara-
tion made in section 50(2) that the order of the District
Judge shall be final takes away the jurisdiction of this Court B
to exercise its powers of revision under section 115 CPC. A
doubt about the above question arose in view of some
observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in
Diwakar Hegde v. Karkala Taluk Agriculture Produce Co-
operative Marketing Society Ltd., [1975] 2 Kar. L.J. 390 to
the effect that when a statute declares that the decision of C
an authority shall be final, it cannot be questioned either in
appeal or revision under the statute. The doubt however
stands resolved by the decision of the Supreme Court in
Chhagan Lal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore, [1977]
2 SCR 871. In that case section 149 of the Madhya Pradesh
Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 which provided that the D
decision of the district court in an appeal filed against an
order of the Municipal Commissioner was final came upfor
consideration. Rejecting the contention that the said provi-
sion debarred the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court
under section 115 CPC over the order of the district court
passed in appe~l, the Supreme Court observed- E

- 'The second contention is based on section 149
of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act,
1956. It provides that an appeal shall lie from the
decision of the Municipal Commissioner to the dis- F
trict court when any dispute arises as to the liability of
--{ any land or building to assessment. Sub-section (i) of
section 149 provides that the decision of the district
court shall be final. It was submitted that the decision
of the district court was therefore final and that the
High Court was in error in entertaining a revision G
petition. This plea cannot be accepted for, under sec-
tion 115 of the CPC the High Court has got power to
revise the order passed by courts subordinate to it. It
cannot be disputed that the district court is a subordi-
nate court and is liable to the revisional jurisdiction of
the High Court ....................... "'. H
•

344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) I S.C.R.

The Full Bench also relied upon a brief decision of this Court in Krish- )<.-
A nadas Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachala Shetty (dead) by Lrs., (Special
Leave Petition No. 913 of 1978 dated 13th of February, 1978) where
referring to the very provision, this Court observed:-
"The petitioner contends that the order of the High
Court. is without jurisdiction because under section 50 of
B the Kamataka Rent Control Act, 1961, a revision does not
lie to the High Court. We do not agree. Section 115 CPC
gives powers to the High Court to revise any order from the
district court, subject of course to the limitations set out
therein. The narrow point then is as to whether the District
Judge can be equated with a district court. The High Court,
c following its own earlier decisions, has held so. We agree
that in the scheme of Karnataka Rent Control Act, the
District Judge and the district court are interchangeable
expressions and nothing turns on the mere fact that the
section uses the expression 'District Judge'. Section 115
CPC therefore applies and the revisional jurisdiction is ves-
D ted in the High Court."
The Full Bench thereafter stated:-
" In view of the above decision of the Supreme Court
it has to be held that the fact that the order of the District
Judge under section 50(2) is made final, does not affect the
E jurisdiction of this Court under section 115 of the CPC to

-
revise the orders of the District Judge made under section
50(2) in the absence of any express words in the statute
taking away such jurisdiction."

As we have mentioned earlier the learned Single Judge has relied
F upon a later Full Bench decision of the High Court in the case of M.M. \ -·
Yaragatti (supra). Two questions had been referred to the Full Bench f
for opinion, namely:-

( 1) Whether a revision under section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure lies to the High Court from a revisional order
G made by a District Judge under sub-section (2) of section 50 of
the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1967, as substituted by Kama-
taka Act 31 of 1975? and ~

(2) Whether the ruling of the Full Bench of that Court in
Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v. Gurupad Shivaram Kavelekar,
H (supra) requires reconsideration in view of the ruling of the
S. HEGDE v. U.Y. BHAT [MISRA, J.] 345

Supreme Court in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad?, AIR 1987 SC
A
203.

The learned Chief Justice of the High Court who spoke for the Full
Bench noticed the decision in Krishnaji's case as also the view expres-
sed by this Court while disposing of the special leave petition and
stated:- B

"If the matter had rested here, there would not have
been any controversy, but after the decision of the Full
Bench in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar's case, two deci-
sions of the Supreme Court have been rendered, i.e., one
in Vishesh Kumar's case and the other in Aundal Ammal v.
Sadasivan Pillai, AIR 1987 SC 203. It was on the basis of
c
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vishesh Kumar's
case that the questions posed by the Division Bench had to
be referred for decision to a larger Bench. After the refer-
ence, the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in Aundal
Ammal's case has also been rendered. It is in the wake of D
these two judgments that we are required to decide
whether the Jaw laid down in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirod-
kar's case still survives".

The Full Bench on the authority of those two decisions came to the
conclusion that the decision in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar' s case E
(supra) did not survive and a second revision to the High Court was
not maintainable.

A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Vishesh Kumar's case was
considering whether the High Court possessed revisional jurisdiction
under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an order of F
-{ the District Court under Section 115 disposing of a revision petition
and whether the High Court possessed revisional jurisdiction under
Section 115 against an order of District Court under Section 25 of the
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act as amended by the Uttar Pradesh
Amendment Act 1978. The amendment shows that the District Court
had also revisional jurisdiction under Section ll5 and the revisional G
jurisdiction under that Section was shared between the High Court and
the District Court by providing that the High Court has exclusive
revisional jurisdiction in cases arising out of original suits or other
proceedings of the value of Rs.20,000 and above and the District Court
alone had such jurisdiction in any other case. This Court after discus-
sing this provision and some authorities of the Allahabad High Court H
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

reached tbe conclusion that the High Court was not vested with revi-
A
sional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in
respect of a revisional order may by the District Court under that
Section..

This conclusion was obviously reached-and in our view very
rightly-on account of the fact that the power under Section 115 of the
Code bad clearly indicated the revisional jurisdiction of the District
Court and the High Court and vested that jurisdiction exclusively in
either the District Court or the High Court depending upon the
pecuniary valuation of the dispute.

This Court then proceeded in Vishesh Kumar's case to examine
c the second question. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts
Act vested revisional jurisdiction in the High Court and that provision .. {_·
was amended in its application of Uttar Pradesh from time to time. By
amendment it vested revisional jurisdiction in the District Judge and
by a later amendment provided that in relation to any case decided by
a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising jurisdiction of
a Judge of Small Causes, the power of revision under Section 25 would
vest in the High Court. In that case the District Judge had exercised
revisional power under Section 25 and the question arose as to whether
the High Court could entertain a further revision under Section 115 of ·
the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court took the view by analysing
Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act that it was a
self-contained Code and Section 25 provided the whole revisional
jurisdiction and, therefore, the question of invoking the revisional
jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not
at alt arise. The answer to the second question was in the. negative. The
two conclusions reached in Vishesh Kumar's case on the facts thereof
F were certainly correct but we are concerned with a different set of facts
and law. The ratio of the decision in Vishesh Kumar's case is not
directly applicable to the present facts.

The other case of this Court upon which reliance has been placed
by the Full Bench is that of Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai,
(supra). A two-Judge Bench in that case was considering the tenability
of a second revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
by the High Court in view of the provision of,Section 20 of the Kerala
B•1ild.ings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (2 of 1965). That Section
provides:

"(1) In cases where the appellate authority empowered
S. }IEGDE v. U.V. BHAT [MISRA, J.) 347

under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, District Court, A
and in other cases the High Court may, at any time, on the
application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the
records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken
under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfy-
ing itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such
order in reference thereto as it thinks fit .............. " B

·--y With reference to that provision a Full Bench of the Kerala High
Court had held that a second revision lay. This Court stated in its
judgment:

"It was contended by Shri Poti, learned counsel for the
appellant, that no revision lay to the High Court. He sub-
c
_) milted that Section 185 read with Section 20 of the Act
has completely ousted the High Court's jurisdiction to
interfere in this matter under Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure."
D
That contention was examined by this Court. It may be relevant
to briefly refer Section 18 which provided for appeal against the order
of the Rent Control Court. Sub-section (5) thereof provides:-

"The decision of the appellate authority, and subject to
-i such decisioQ, an onjer of the Rent Control Court shall be E
final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any

- Court of law, except as provided in Section 20."

In construing the meaning and effect of the word [ma/, reliance
was placed on the judgment of this Court in South Asia Industries
Private Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh & Ors., [1965] 2 SCR 756. In that case F
·~ the question arose as to whether in view of the provision in Section 43
of the Delhi Rent Control Act attaching finality to the judgment in
Second Appeal by the High Court, a Letters Patent Appeal could be
entertained. Several authorities were referred to and the conclusion in
National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd.,
[ 1953] SCR 1028 was approved. Relying upon that decision as also the G
decisioR in Vishesh Kumar's case, this Court held that jurisdiction of
the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was
~ excluded.

On the analysis presented above, the two cases upon which the
Full Bench has placed reliance are really not direct authorities on the H
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

,... point. We have already noticed that in Krishnaj;'s case the earlier Full
Bench had relied upon the decision of thiS Court in Chhagan Lal's case.
A three-Judge Bench in that case broadly dealt with a similar conten-
"'""
tion as arising here. At page 875 of the Reports it is stated that:

"The second contention is based on Section 149 of the
B Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. It pro-
vides that any appeal shall lie from the decision of the
Municipal Commissioner to the District Court, when any y
dispute arises as to the liability of any land or building to
assessment. Sub-section ( 1) of Section 149 provides that
the decision of the District Court shall be final. It was
submitted that the decision of the District Court was there-
c fore final and that the High Court was in error in entertain-
ing a Revision Petition. This plea cannot be accepted for, .{._
under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code the High
Court has got a power to revise the order passed by courts
subordinate to it. It cannot be disputed that the District
D Court is a subordinate court and is liable to the revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court ................ "

It is this observation in that judgment which had been followed
in Krishnaji's case. We may point that the judgment of the Full Bench
in Krishnaji's case was delivered by our learned Brother Venkata-
~
E ramiah, J. as a member of the Full Bench then and incidentally he was
one of the members of the two-Judge Bench in Aundal Ammal's case
wl:tere a contrary view has been taken. If this Court really intended to
reverse the effect of the Full Bench decision in Krishnaji's case to
whjch our learned Brother was a party, one would have expected
...
ref~rence to Chhagan Lal as also Krishnaji.
F
As against the two authorities of this Court, namely, the cases of )--
Vishesh Kumar and Aundal Ammal dealing with provisions of diffe-
rent statutes, there is a direct decision of this Court in the case of
Krishnadas Bhatija which has already been quoted. This Court was
dealing with the very provision after its amendment in 1975 and the
G very question which now falls for consideration was before this Court.
In Krishnaji' s case the decision of thls Court had been relied upon as a
binding authority and it was concluded that the High Court has powers
to entertain a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Proce- ~
dure against the revisional order of a District Court. It is conceded that
the impugned provision which was being considered by this Court in
H Krishnadas Bhatija's case continues to be the same. Though the deci-
S. HEGDE v. U.V. BHAT [MISRA, J.I 349

sion rendered in IJhatij<l's case {supra) by this Court is not a detailed
one, the qmclusion on the point is clear and admits of no ambiguity.
The Full Bench in the impu~ned judgment clearly went wrong in hold-
ing that the two-Jud&e Bench of this Court referred to by it had
brought about a total change in the position and on the basis of those
two judgments. Krishnaji's case would be no more good law. The
decision of a Full Bench consisting of three Judges rendered in Krish- B
naji's case was binding on a bench of equal strength unless that
decision had directly been overruled by this Court or by necessary
implication became unsustainable. Admittedly there is no overruling
of Krishnaji's decision by this Court and on the analysis indicated
above it cannot also be said that by necessary implication the ratio
therein supported by the direct authority of this Coµrt stoocj superse- C
<led. Judicial propriety warrants that decisions of this Co11rt must be
taken as wholly binding on the High Co11rts. That is the l)ecessary
outcome of the tier system. We may briefly refer to the observations of
the Lord Chancellor in /Jroom v. Cqssel/ ~ Co., [1972] 1 AER 80L
where the Lord Chancellor administered a warning by saying: "I hope
it will never be necessary to say so again, that in the hierarchical D
system of courts which exists in this country, it is necessary for each
lower tier, including the Court of Appeal, to accept loyally the deci-
sions of the higher tiers". This has been approved by this Court on
more than one occasion. Added to the above is the provision of Article
141 of the Constitution which unequivocally states that the law
declared by this Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory E
of India. In tiJe facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court

.. should not have tali;en into itself, tiJe responsibility of saying that its
earlier Full Bench judgment base<l qpon a decision of this Court in the
circumstances indicated above had lost its binding authority in view of
two other judgments rendered in different situations and setting. We
are really not in a position to appreciate the manner in which a coordi- F
nate Bench of the High Court has chosen to overrule an earlier judg-
ment of that Court.

On the view we have taken, it must follow that we too are bound
by the decision taken by this Court in Krishnadas Bhatijll's case. Krish-
naji's case was rendered under the Karnataka Rent Control (Amend- G
ment) Act, 1975 and has held the field for over a decade. No justifica-
tion has been pointed out by the High Court why that should be
discarded. It is one of the essential requirements of the administrati011
of justice that judgments rendered by superior courts and particularly
with the approval of the apex court should not be frequently changed
so as to unsettle settled positions. The fact that the State Legislature H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) 1 S.C.R.

A has not thought it necessary to amend the law and set at naught Krish-
naji or Bhatija is indicative of the position that this !=ourt had not
taken a wrong view of the legislative intention. In these circumstances
we feel advised not to enter into an analysis of the provisions of the
Act for a fresh look at the matter and prefer to follow Bhatija. We
B make it clear that we have not felt it necessary to examine whether the
ratio of Aundal Ammal is binding or requires reconsideration in the
presence of Bhatija in the field as a direct authority.

For the reasons we have indicated above, we allow the appeal,
set aside the judgment of the Karnataka High Court and declare that
the earlier Full Bench decision in Krishnaji's case holds the field. This
C appeal became necessary on account of the wrong view taken by the
High Court. We do not think it is proper to saddle the respondent with
costs of the appeal.

P.S.S. Appeal allowed.

-