SHRI RANAJOY BOSEversusSHRI A.B. ROY AND ANR.
- Citation
- 2002 INSC 186
- Decided
- 5 April 2002
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- D P MOHAPATRA
Holding
Each District Health Officer is authorized to grant consent for prosecution under Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 within his respective district.
Summary
The appellant, Ranajoy Bose, was charged under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for selling adulterated tea leaves. The prosecution was launched after obtaining consent from the District Health Officer (IV) under Section 20(1) of the Act, as per a state notification. The appellant challenged the validity of that consent, arguing that only the Health Officer of the Calcutta Corporation was authorized to grant such consent. The Supreme Court examined the language of the notification, particularly the phrase "the area comprised in every District or areas added to the Calcutta Corporation," and held that it intended to delegate consent powers to each District Health Officer. Consequently, the Court overruled the earlier Calcutta High Court decision in Rasiklal Saxena v. State of West Bengal and affirmed that the District Health Officer was a competent authority. The appeal was dismissed, maintaining the earlier order dismissing the revision petition.
Issues considered
- Whether a District Health Officer is competent to grant consent for prosecution under Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 as per the relevant state notification.
- Interpretation of the phrase "the area comprised in every District or areas added to the Calcutta Corporation" in the notification issued under Section 20(1).
- Whether the earlier High Court decision in Rasiklal Saxena v. State of West Bengal remains good law.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedures. 245(2), s. 245(3), s. 482
- General Clauses Act, 1897s. 13(2)
- Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954s. 16(1)(a)(i), s. 20(1), s. 7
Subjects
Judgment
SHRJ RANAJOY BOSE A
v.
SHRJ A.B. ROY AND ANR.
APRIL 5, 2002
[D.P. MOHAPATRA AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.] B
Prevention ofFood Adulteration Act, 1954-Sections 7, 16(!) (a){i) and
20(1)-0jfence-Consent for prosecution-Person authorised by State
Government by a Notification under Section 20(1) for granting corisent- C
Consent granted by District Health Officer-Dispute as to competence of the
authority granting consent-District Health Officer held as competent authority,
after interpretation of the Notification-Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951.
In the instant case, consent under Section 20(1) of the Act for initiating
prosecution was granted by District Health Officer. D
The question for consideration in the instant appeal was with regard to
competence of the authority for granting consent for prosecution under
Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
The question arose as a result of criminal proceeding against the E
appellant-accused under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Act.
The appellant had applied for discharge which was dismissed by Magistrate
in proceedings under Section 245(2) and (3) Cr.P.C. and by High Court in
proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that the order granting F
consent for prosecution by District Health Officer was invalid because under
Notification issued by State Government under Section 20(1) of Food
Adulteration Act, Health Officer of Calcutta Corporation alone was
authorised for according such consent.
Corporation contended that in view of Column II of item 3 of G
Notification issued under Section 20(1) of Food Adulteration Act which reads
... "the area comprised in every district or areas added to the Calcutta
Corporation", every District Health Officer was authorised under Notification
to exercise power for granting such consent; !md that if the .intention of the
State Government were to authorise only Health Officer of Calcutta H
955
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.
A Corporation, the entry in Column II of item 3 would be redundant.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The interpretation that each District Health Officer is
authorised to exercise the power under Section 20(1) to accord consent under
B Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 in respect of
the respective District in his charge is more rational and in keeping with the
purpose of delegation of the power of the State Government (961-E, F)
1.2. If the intention of the authority was to vest the power to accord
consent for launching prosecution under Section 20(1) of the Food
C Adulteration Act, then it would have been so stated in column-II against item
No. 3 of the Notification, "the areas comprised in or areas added to the
Calcutta Corporation' instead of 'the areas comprised in every District of the
Calcutta Corporation'. If the entire Corporation was to be taken as one unit
for the purpose of vesting power under Section 20(1) of Food Adulteration
D Act then reference to every District was redundant. For ascertaining the
intention of the authority issuing the notification the entry should be read in
its entirety. Construing a portion of the notification which will result in
rendering the other portion redundant should be avoided. If the area of the
Corporation has been split up into different Districts for convenience of
administration, then it is reasonable to think that the State Government
E intended to delegate the power under Section 20(1) of the Food Adulteration
Act to the Health Onicers in-charge of the Districts. (961-B-D)
Rasiklal Saxena v. State of West Bengal Criminal Revision Nos., 1275-
1276of1982 Judgment dated 14.2.1983 of Calcutta High Court disapproved.
f CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
449 of 2002.
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2000 of the Kolkata High
Court in Crl. R. No. 1978 of 1995.
G Aloke Kr. Sengupta, Mrinal Kanti Manda!, Agnimitra Sinha and Parijat
Sinha for the Appellant.
Tap~ Chandra Ray and Bijan Kumar Ghosh for the Respondent No. l.
Atanu Saikia and Avjit Bhattacharjee for the Respondent No. 2.
H
RANAJOY BOSE v. A.B. ROY [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 957
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
D.P. MOHAPATRA, J. Leave granted.
This appeal filed by the accused is directed against the order passed by
the High Court at Calcutta dismissing the application filed by him under
Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure ('Crl. P.C.' for short) and B
confirming the order passed by the Senior Municipal Magistrate declining to
accept his prayer for discharge in Complaint Case No.44-D of 1978. The
application filed by the appellant under Sections 245(2) and 245(3) Cr. P.C.
for discharge was dismissed by the learned Magistrate.
A criminal case was instituted against the appellant and some others C
alleging the commission of the offence punishable under Section 16(1) (a) (i)
read with Section 7 of the Prevention ofFood Adulteration Act, 1954 ('P.F.A.
Act for short), on the allegation that he was selling adulterated tea leaves. The .
case of the prosecution was that the Food Inspector inspected the shop/godown/
factory of Mis Brook Bond India Ltd. on 5.4.1978 and collected.some samples D
of tea Grade PD- I. The said samples on analysis by the Public Analyst were
found not conforming to the prescribed standard in respect of crude fibre
content in the Tea and was found to be adulterated. The complaint was filed
against the appellant after obtaining consent from the District Health officer
IV (South West), Municipal Corporation of Calcutta. The Learned Magistrate
on perusal of the complaint and the materials produced by the complainant, E
took cognizance of the offence under section 16(1) (a) (i) read with section
7 of the P.F.A. Act and issued process against the accused persons in May,
1978.
On consideration of the application filed by the appellant and other
accused persons for discharge from prosecution, the learned Magistrate by the F
order passed on 25.08.1981 discharged the accused company M/s Brook Bond
India Limited and Shri P.K. Banerjee, the Manager of the company from the
prosecution but rejected the prayer of the appellant. The Revision Petition
filed by the appellant challenging the said order was dismissed by the High
Court by order dated 22.12.1986. The appellant filed special leave petition, G.
SLP(Crl.) 832/87 before this Court challenging the order of the High Court..
The said SLP was later withdrawn by the appellant.
Thereafter the appellant filed an application under Sections 245(2) and
245(3) Cr. P.C. on 2.2.95 seeking discharge from prosecution on the grounds
of delay in concluding the trial and want of a valid order giving consent for H
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.
A launching the prosecution against him. The learned Senior Municipal Magistrate
rejected the application by the order dated 23.6.1995. The appellant challenged
the order by filing the application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in the High
Court which was registered as C.R.R. No.1978 of 1995: The High Court by
the order dated l 4. l l.2000 dismissed the said petition with a direction for
B expeditious disposal of the case by the trial court. Hence this appeal.
On 19. l l .200 l when the case was taken up the learned counsel appearing
for the appellant submitted that he will not be pressing the question of delay
in trial of the case. In view of the said order the only question that remains
for consideration relates to the validity or otherwise of the order granting
C consent for the prosecution against the appellant.
The main thrust of the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant
was that Dr. K.B.S. Chakraborty, District Health Officer-IV, Local (Health)
Authority who had given consent for filing the complaint by the order dated
30.5.78 was not competent to accord such consent under the P.F.A. Act. He
D placed strong reliance on the judgment dated 14.2.1983, of the Calcutta High
Court in the Criminal Revision Nos. 1275-1276 of 1982 titled Rasikla/ Saxena
v. The State of West Bengal in which the High Court took the view that the
Health Officer Calcutta Corporation was the only person competent to give
consent for filing a complaint under the P.F.A. Act and that the District Health
Officer-II and District Health Officer - IV have no such authority for the
E purpose. Elucidating the point the learned counsel submitted that the Calcutta
Corporation is split up into different districts and ~he District Health Officers
are kept in-charge of each District. There is another officer who is designated
as Health Officer of Calcutta Corporation. According to the learned counse!
it is the latter officer who is authorised for according consent for prosecution
F under Section 20(1) of the P.F.A. Act. The District Health Officers in-charge
of different Districts are not authorised for the purpose.
Per contra learned counsel appearing for the Corporation contended that
on a fair reading of the relevant provisions of the P.F.A. Act the Calcutta
Municipal Act, 1951 and the notifications issued under Section 20(1) of the
G P.F.A. Act it is clear that the District Health Officers of the Calcutta Corporation
are authorised to give consent for filing complaints within their respective
areas. Referring to column-II of the notification No.Pil/213/3F-l5/76 dated
25. 1. 1978 the learned counsel contended that the Health Officer-in-charge of
every District of the Calcutta Corporation is authorised under the notification
H to exercise the power of granting consent for prosecution unde1' Section 20( l)
1
RANAJOY BOSE v. A.B. ROY [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 959
. He further contended that if it was the intention of the State Government that A
only the Health Officer of the Calcutta Corporation should exercise the power
of granting consent under Section 20(1) then the entry in column-II of Item
No.3 of the notification which reads "the area comprised in every District or
l areas added to the Calcutta Corporation" will be redundant. Regarding the
expression "Health Officer" in column-I of item No.3 of the notification, B
learned counsel contended that the words in singular includes the plural and
vice versa as provided in Section 13(2) of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
It will be convenient to notice some statutory provisions relevant for
appreciating the point raised in the case before dealing with the merit of the
case. c
In Section 2(vii) of the P.F.A. Act "local area" means any area, whether
urban or rural, declared by the Central Government or the State Government
by notification in the Official Gazette, to be a local area for the purposes of
this Act. Under Section 2(viii) "local authority" means, a local area which is
(a) a municipality, the municipal board or municipal corporation. In Section D
2(viiia) the expression "Local (Health) Authority" in relation to a local area
is defined to mean the Officer appointed by the Central Government or the
State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to be in-charge of
Health administration in such area with such designation as may be specified
therein.
E
In Section 20 PFA Act provision is made regarding cognizance and trial
of offences which reads as follows:
"(!)No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence
under Section 14 or Sectien 14-A shall be instituted except by, or with F
the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government
or a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order, by the
Central Government or the State Government :
Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be
instituted by a purchaser (or recognized consumer association) referred G
to in Section 12, (if he or it produces) in Court a copy of the report
of the public analyst along with the complaint."
In Section 76 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 (West Bengal Act
XXXIII of 1951) (CM Act for short) it is laid down that the State Government
shall appoint a person to be the Finance Officer and the Chief Accountant of H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 2 S.C.R.
A the Corporation and the Corporation shall appoint proper persons to be the
Chief Engineer, Health Officer and the Secretary and may appoint one or
more Deputy Commissioners. It is relevant to state here that in the C.M. Act
neither the expression "Health Officer" nor "District Health Officer" is defined.
The Government of West Bengal issued three notifications on 25.1.1978
B which are relevant for the purpose' ,of the present case. By the Notification
No.PIV211/3F-15/76 dated 25.1.1978 issued in exercise of the powers conferred
by clause (vii) of Section 2 of the P.F.A. Act and in supersession of ~II
previous notifications on the subject, the Governor has been pleased to declare
certain areas as local areas as mentioned in the Schedule for the purposes of
C the P.F.A. Act. In clause - 3 of the said notification, it is stated that the area
comprised in every district or the area added to, the Calcutta Corporation will
be a local area as described in Schedule I to the C.M. Act.
In the notification No.PII/212/3F-15/76 dated 25.1.78 the Governor of
West ~engal in exercise of power conferred by clause (viii-a) of Section 2 of
D the_ P.F.A.Act has appointed officers as mentioned in column I of the Schedule
as the Local (Health) Authority in relation to the Local Areas declared in
notification No.PII/211/3F-15/76 dated 25.1.78 each in column II of Uie said
schedule to be in charge of the Health Administration in such areas as noted
in column II of the said schedule. Against item No.3(1) (v) therein it is stated
E that the Health Officer, District No.IV of the Corporation of Calcutta shall be
the Local (Health) Authority in-charge of the areas comprised within District
No.IV of the Calcutta Corporation.
In another notification issued on 25.1. 78 PII/213/3F-15/76 the Governor ~
in exercise of power conferred under sub-section (I) of Section 20 of the
F P.F.A. Act and in supersession of the Department's notification dated 2nd
July, 1976 appointed the authorised officers specified in column I of the
schedule in respect of the Local Area specified in column II of the said
schedule as the authority for the purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 20.
Against item No.3 therein it has been stated "Health Officer of the Corporation
of Calcutta" in relation to the areas comprised in every District of, or areas
G added to, the Calcutta Corporation.
The question formulated earlier is to be considered in the light of the
statutory provisions and the notifications applicable to the matter. As noted
earlier, the main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that ·
under the notification issued by the Governor of West Bengal on 25.1.78 the
H Health Officer of the Corporation of Calcutta is the only person authorised to-
RANAJOY BOSE v. A.B. ROY [D.P. MOHAPATRA. J] 961
grant consent for launching prosecution under Section 20(1) of the P.F.A. Act. A
Considering the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing
for the parties, we are of the view that the contention raised by the learned
counsel for the Corporation is to be accepted. While issuing the notifications
if the intention of the authority was to vest the power to accord consent for
launching prosecution under Section 20(1) of the P.F.A. Act, then it would B
have been so stated in column-II against item No.3 of the notification, 'the
areas comprised in or areas added to, the Calcutta Corporation' instead of 'the
areas comprised in every District of the Calcutta Corporation'. If the entire
Corporation was to be taken as one unit for the purpose of vesting power
under Section 20(1) P.F.A. Act then reference to every District was redundant. C
For ascertaining the intention of the authority issuing the notification the entry
should be read in its entirety. Construing a portion of the notification which
will result in rendering the other portion redundant should be avoided.
The matter can also be viewed from another angle. If the area of the
Corporation has been split up into different Districts for convenience of D
administration, then it is reasonable to think that the State Government intended
to delegate the power under Section 20(1) of the PfA Act to the Health
Officers in-charge of the Districts. The necessity to deal with matters relating
to accord of consent under Section 20(1) for launching prosecution against
persons allegedly involved in offences under the P.F.A. Act is important keeping
in view the menace of food adulteration in society. Every effort should be E
made to eradicate such a menace for the sake of a healthy society. Therefore,
the interpretation that each District Health Officer is authorised to exercise the
power under Section 20(1) to accord consent under Section 20(1) P.F.A. Act
in respect of the respective District in his charge appears to us to be more
• rational and in keeping with the purp~se of delegation of the power of the p
State Government.
Coming to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Rasiklal Saxena
v. The State of West Bengal (supra) on which strong reliance was placed by
learned counsel for the appellant, we find that the High Court has not properly
. ·considered the notification No.Pil/2 l 3/3F-15/76 dated 25.1.78 while holding G
that the District Health Officers have no authority to grant consent for launching
prosecution under Section 20(1) of the P.F.A. Act. The decision is erroneous
and it is declared as no longer good law.
The High Court in tho order under challenge did not disturb the view
taken in the earlier decision in Rasiklal Saxena v. The State of West Bengal. H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.
A (supra) and decided the case against the appellant and in favour of the
Corporation applying the 'de facto doctrine'. It was fairly stated by the learned
counsel appearing for the Corporation that the said doctrin.e has no application
to this case. If the authority who granted consent for launching prosecution in
the case had not vested with such power under the statute then question of
applying the· 'de facto doctrine' to the order passed by such incorporated
B authority does not arise. However, since we have not accepted the contentions
raised on behalf of the appellant on merits of the case and have taken the view
that the District Health Officer is competent to pass the order granting consent
for prosecution, the order of dismissal of the Revision Petition filed by the
appellant is to be maintained.
c Therefore, the appeal is dismissed though for reasons different from
those given in the impugned order.
K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.
0
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