Holding

The Act does not deprive civil courts of jurisdiction to decide suits instituted before the expiry of the exemption nor does it bar execution of decrees passed thereafter.

Summary

The appellants were tenants of shops in a building completed in 1977. Their tenancies were terminated by notice and the landlords filed suits for possession in 1983. Decrees granting possession were passed in December 1988, after the ten‑year exemption period under Section 1(3) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 had expired. The appellants argued that the Act barred the civil courts from passing or executing such decrees, claiming the court lost jurisdiction after the exemption period. The Supreme Court held that the Act contains no provision removing a civil court’s jurisdiction to decide a suit validly instituted before the expiry of the exemption, nor does it prevent execution of a decree thereafter. The exemption is intended to encourage new construction and applies only to suits instituted within the ten‑year period. Consequently, the decrees were valid and enforceable. The appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973, does its Section 1(3) exemption and Section 13(1) bar civil courts from passing or executing possession decrees when the decree is rendered after the ten‑year exemption period?
Does the expiry of the exemption period during the pendency of a suit defeat the landlord’s right to obtain possession?

Legislation cited

Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973s. 1(3), s. 13(1)
Transfer of Property Acts. 106

Subjects

rent controlevictionexemption clausecivil court jurisdictionexecution of decreeHaryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) ActSection 1(3)Section 13statutory interpretationlandlord-tenant

Judgment

A SHRJ KJSHAN @ KRISHAN KUMAR ETC. ETC.
v.
MANOJ KUMAR ETC. ETC.

FEBRUARY 12, 1998

B [M.M. PUN.CHI, CJ., K.T. THOMAS AND M. SRINIVASAN, JJ.]

Haryan9 Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 : Sections I
(3) & 13 (/)-Tenanted premises-The Act not to apply to the buildings
C construction of which completed on or after the commencement of the Act for
a period of ten years from the date of its completion-Suit for possession filed
before the end of the ten years moratorium period provided in the Act-Suit
decreed after the completion of ten years-The tenant in occupation will
automatically not have the protection afforded by the Act-The decree will
remain enforceable and the Civil Court will not lose its jurisdiction in the
D absence of any specific provision in the Act.
Interpretation of Statutes : Exemption clause-Not be applied
mechanically-Effect to be given to the object having regard to the language
used.

E The appellants had been inducted as tenants in two shops in the year
1997. The respondents in both the cases terminated the tenancies by legal
notices. The notices, after the expiry of no~ice period, were followed by suits
for possession. The suits were decreed in the year 1988. First appeals
preferred by the appellants were dismissed by the Additional District Judge
in 1989. Second appeals were dismissed by the High Court in limine. Hence
F this appeal.

The question involved related to debarring of courts below by the
provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 from
passing decrees directing the appellants to deliver possession of the
G properties scheduled in the suits to the respondents.

It was contended that the Act came into force on April 25, 1973 while
the decree in the instant cases were passed in 1988. The construction of the
building in the present cases was completed in 1977; therefore, in view of
Section I (3) of the Act, the Court lost its jurisdiction as the decrees were
H passed after the moratorium period of ten years came to an end.
830'
KISHAN@ KRISHAN KUMAR v. MANOJ KUMAR 831

On behalf of the respondent it was contended that as the suit was A
instituted to enforce a legal right which had already accmed to the plaintiff,
the court would not lose its jurisdiction in the absence of any specific
provision in the Act to deprive it of its .iurisdiction.

Dismissing the appeals, this Com1
B
HELD 1. There is no provision in the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent
& Eviction) Act, 1973 taking away the julisdiction of a civil court to dispose
of a suit validly instituted. There is also no provision preventing the execution
of a decree passed in such a suit. Section 13 (1) does not expressly refer
to execution of a decree for possession. Had the Legislature inter.ded to take
away the .iurisdiction of the civil court to decided a suit which had been C
validly instituted, it would have been worded differently. [835-D-E]

2. The purpose for which the exemption is granted statutorily under
Section 1 (3) is to encourage constmction of new buildings. That purpose
would be defeated if the owner of the building is dcplived of his right to get
..<.... possession of the building unless he gets a decree within a period of ten D
years from the date of its completion. It is common knowledge that a proceeding
in a civil court for recovery of an immovable 11roperty could be dragged on
by the defendant easily for a period of ten years more and thereby any tenant
whose tenancy had been terminated validly before the suit would successfully
make the proceeding infmctuous by prolonging the litigation. (835-F-H]
E
3. When a suit is nlidly im1itutcd am! the right of parties which had
crystallized on the date of the suit arc determined by a decree in that suit
the execution thereof cannot be stopped by_ the provisions of Section 13 of
the Act. [841-C-D]

Nand Kishore Marwah & Ors. v. Samundri Devi, [1987) 4 SCC 382; f
Atma Ram Milla/ v. Jshwar Singh Punia, (1988) 4 SCC 284; Kesho Ram &
Co. & Ors. v. Union ofIndia & Ors., (1989) 2 SCR 1005; Suresh Chand v.
Gu/am Chisti, (1990) 1 SCC 595; Ramesh Chandra v.111 Additional District
Judge & Ors., [1992) 1 SCC 751; Bhola Nath Varshney v. Mu/k Raj Madan,
[1995) 2 SCC 127 and Parripati Chandrasekharrao & Sons v. Alapti Jaliah, G
(1995) 3 sec 709, referred to.
Vineet Kumar v. Mangat Sain IVadhera, (1984] 3 SCC 353, held
inapplicable.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 356of1991
Etc. H
I. -

832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A From the Judgment and Order dated 17.7.90 of the Punjab & Haryana
High Court.in R.S.A. No. 2380of1983. ·)..~

G.L. Sanghi, S.K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta, Fazlin Anam and Ms. Shobha
for the Appellant in C.A. No. 356/91.

B Mahabir Singh for the Appellant in C.A. No. 357/91.

Pankaj Kalra and B.K. Sharma for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :

C SRINIVASAN, J. The only question to be considered in these two
appeals is whether the Court below were barred by the provisions of the
Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act 1973 from passing decrees
directing the appellants to deliver possession of the properties scheduled in
the suits to the respondents.

D 2. The facts in both the cases are almost the same with some difference
in dates. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 356 of 1991 was inducted as a
tenant in one shop on 1.11.1977. The building was constructed a few months
before the commencement of the tenancy. The tenancy was terminated by a
notice issued on August JO, 1983 by the respondent. The suit for possession
was filed on 26.9.83. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 357 of 1991 became
E a tenant of another shop on 1.8.1977. The construction of the shop had been
completed only a short time before the commencement of the tenancy. The
tenancy ·was terminated by the respondent in that appeal by notice dated
3.11.1981. The suit for possession was filed on 24.9.83.

3. Both suits were tried along with other suits against tenants of other
F shops on similar facts by the Senior Sub Judge, Sonepat. In all the suits, the
defendants/tenants raised several contentions including challenge to the title
of the plaintiffs and the quantum of rent. All the issues were answered in
favour of the plaintiffs and decrees were passed on 8.12.88. Appeals in the
Court of Additional District Judge suffered dismissal on 26.10.89. Second
G appeals were dismissed in limine by the High Court with 'one word orders'.
It is only these two appellants who have come to this Court. An attempt has
been made to canvass all the findings of Courts below but as they are factual
and supported by evidence on record we have no difficulty in rejecting the
same.
H 4. The only question which has been argued at length and survives for
KISHAN@ KRISHAN KUMAR v. MANOJ KUMAR (SRINIVASAN, J.] 833

our consideration is the one set out in the beginning. The Haryana Urban A
~ (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, hereinafter referred to as 'The Act' came
into force on April 25,1973. It is an Act to control the increase of rent of
certain buildings and rented land situated within the limits of urban areas, and
the eviction of tenants therefrom. Section 1 (3) of the Act reads thus:

.. 1(3) "Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building the construction B
~ of which is completed on or after the commencement of this Act for
a period of ten years from the date of its completion."

There is no doubt that when the suits in these cases were filed by the
respondents, the Act was not applicable in view of the said section. But
before the trial concluded, the moratorium period of ten years came to an end c
and the decrees were passed only thereafter. The appellants contend that the
Court lost its jurisdiction on the expiry of the ten-years period and the decree
passed of t11ereafter is a nullity. For raising this contention the appellants
invoke in their aid the provisions of Section 13(1) oft11e Act which is an the
following terms :
D
13 (1) "A tenant in possession of a building or a rented land shall not
be evicted therefrom except in accordance with the provisions of this
Section."

It is argued tliat a special forum has been created and a specific procedure
has been prescribed in tl1e Act without resort to which a tenant cannot be E
evicted from the demised premises.

5. It is argued that the Act is intended to be beneficial to the tenants

--
,

~
·,,..
and special protection is afforded to them. According to the learned counsel
for tlie purpose of the Act tlie expression 'tenant' includes a tenant continuing F
in possession after tlie termination of his tenancy and at the expiry of period
of ten years set out in Section I (3) of the Act, tlie 'building' comes within
the fold of the Act and the tenant in occupation will automatically have the
protection afforded by the Act. Emphasis is laid on the wording of Section
13 (1) which prevents eviction of a tenant in possession except in accordance
with the provisions of the Section. According to the learned counsel the G
f- moment, the Act becomes applicable to the building in question, the suit in
relation thereto has to abate and the remedy of the landlord is to approach
the Controller with an application for eviction on any of the grounds set out
in the Section. According to him even if a decree is passed by tlle civil court
it will not be enforceable and the tenant cannot be evicted from the building H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A pursuant t~ the decree as the bar in Section 13 (1) is absolute. In support of
this contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on some of the rulings ,.____,,.
of thi~ Court which will be adverted to a little later.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has placed
before us the following proposition:
B
(a) On the date when tl1e suit was instituted it was to enforce a legal •.
right which had already accrued to the plaintiff and stood crystallized
under the law applicable to tl1e building at tllat time. In tlle absence
of any specific provision in tl1e Act to deprive the Court of its
jurisdiction to detern1ine tlie issue pertaining to tl1at right, it cannot
c be contended tliat by efflux of ten year period mentioned in Section
1 (3) tl1e Court would lose its jurisdiction.

(b) The maxim uhi jus uhi remedium can be excluded only by a
substantive legislation expressly extinguishing the said right. The Act
does not contain any such provision to bring to an end the right of
D the plaintiff which had already accrued and put in issue in the suit.
A judicial vacuum cannot be created by preventing the Court from
deciding an issue which has arisen before it unless tl1e right which
had accrued in favour of one party is taken away by tlie Legislation.

(c) The principle of maxim actus curiae neminem gravahit would
E apply and because tl1e Court had taken a long time to dispose of fue
matter before it, the party which had approached it cannot be made
to suffer.

(d) The provisions of Section 1 (3) and Section 13 (1) should be so
construed as to advance the legislative intention and if the contention
F of the appellants is accepted it would defeat the purp~se of tl1e
moratorium and make it futile.

In support of the above contentions learned counsel has referred to
several rulings of this Court and submitted tliat the consistent view taken by
G this Court is in his favour.

7. Before referring to the decisions cited before us it is necessary to
advert to tl1e provisions of the Act. We have already quoted Sections 1 (3)
and 13(1). Apart from tlle legislative exemption contained in Section 1(3) tliere
is a provision in Section 3 of tlle Act enabling the State Government to
H exclude any building or any class of buildings from the purview of th~ Act.
KISHAN@ KRJSHAN KUMAR v. MANOJ KUMAR ISRINIVASAN, J.] 835

Sections 4 to 8 deal with fair rent, deposit ofrent etc. Sections 9 to 10 refer A
to the amenities to be provided to the tenant. Section 11 prevents conversion
of a residential building into a non-residential building except with the
permission in writing of the Controller. Section 12 deals with the situation
where a landlord fails to make the necessary repairs. Section 13 sets out the
grounds on which eviction can be sought by a landlord. Section J3A prescribes
special procedure for disposal of the application by a landlord in certain cases B
such as members of the Armed Forces, Government employees etc. Section
14 prevents re-opening of decisions which have become final. Section 15
prescribes appellate and the revisional authorities. Section 16 provides that
an authority exercising powers under the Act shall have the same powers of
summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the C
production of evidence as are vested in a Court under the Civil Procedure
Code. Sections 17 to 23 deal with orders as to costs, execution, power to
transfer proceedings, penalties etc. Section 24 repeals the East Punjab Urban
Rent Restriction Act 1949 (East Punjab Act No.3 of 1949).

8. There is no provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction of a civil D
court to dispose of a suit validly _instituted. There is also no provision
preventing the execution of a decree passed in such a suit. Section 13 (1) does
not expressly refer to execution of a decree for possession. On a reading of
all the provisions of the Act, it is evident that it has not prevented a civil
court from adjudicating the rights accrued and the liabilities incurred prior to E
the date on which t11e Act became applicable to the building in question. If
t11e Legislature had intended to take away the jurisdiction of the civil court
to decide a suit which had b een validly instituted, it would have been worded·
differently. The purpose for which the exemption is granted statutorily under
Section l (3) is to encourage construction of new buildings. That purpose
would be defeated if tl1e owner of the building is deprived of his right to get F
possession of the building unless he gets a decree within a period of ten
years from the date of its completion. In fact the logical consequence of tl1e
argument of ilie appellants if accepted would be that even if a decree is
obtained by the landlord within ten years from its completion it camiot be
executed after tlle expiry of ilie said period of ten years as such execution
would not be in accordance wiili ilie provisions of the~Act." It is common G
knowledge tl1at a proceeding in a civil courtY'9i:,,re1:6very of immovable
property could be dragged on by the defendant ~asily for a period of ten
years or more any thereby and tenant whose tenancy had been terminated
validly before the suit would successfully make ilie proceedthg infructuous
by prolonging ilie litigation. The argument of the appellants cannot be accepted H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A as otherwise the purpose of exemption would get defeated.
9. The earliest case brought to our notice is Firms Amar Nath Basheshar
Dass v. Tek Chand, [1972].3 SCR 922. The c~nstruction of the building in that
case was completed in March 1960 and a suit for ejectment was filed on
14.1.63. The decree was passed on 14.8.69. The executing court dismissed the
B petition for execution on the ground that the conditions prescribed in the
Notification of the Government of Punjab under Section 13 of Punjab Urban
Rent Restriction Act 1949 dated 30.7.65 exempting such decrees from Section
13 of the Act were not complied with. An appeal against tl1e judgment was
unsuccessful but on second appeal the High Court held that tl1e decree was
C exempted under the Notification and it was executable. This Court confirmed
the decision of the High Court. The Court took note of the fact that it became
necessary for each of tl1e State Governments not only to undertake building
schemes itself but also to encourage persons who had means to build by
exempting newly constructed buildings which were let out to tenants from
rent control restrictions for a particular period. In that case the State Government
D in exercise of the power conferred on it by Section 3 of the Act referred to
above was notifying exemption from time to time during a period of twenty
years. The relevant Notification dated 30 .7 .65 imposed two conditions in
respect of decrees for ejectment of tenants for being outside the provisions
of Section 13 of the Act. The first condition was that buildings should have
E been constructed during the years 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963 and they
are exempted for five years from the date of completion. The second condition
was that suits for enjectment of tenants in possession should be instituted
in civil courts during the aforesai:d period of exemption and decrees of
ejectment were passed. On a construction of tlle Notification this Court held
that under the second condition a suit must end in a decree though that
F decree may be passed subsequent to the expiry of five years during which
exemption form the application of the Section had been granted.

10. In Shri RamSaroop Rai v. Smt. Lilavati, [1980) 3 SCC 452 while
dealing with a case under the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent
and Eviction) Act 1972, Justice Krishna Iyer referred to tlle object of exemption
G from tl1e applicability of the Act in the following words:
" ... Chronic scarcity of accommodation in almost every part of tlle
country has made 'eviction' litigation explosively considerable, and
tlle strict protection against ejectment, save upon restricted grounds,
had become tlle policy of tlle State. Rent control legislation to give
H effect to this policy exists everywhere and we are concerned witll one
I

"{-
KISHAN@ KRISHAN KUMAR v. MANOJ KUMAR [SRINIVASAN, J.] 837

such in the State ofU.P (U.P Act 13of1972). The legislature found A
that rent control law has a chilling effect on new building constructions,
and so, to encourage more building operations, amended the statute
to release from the shaekles of legislative restriction, new
constructions for a period of ten years. So much so, a landlord who
has let out his new building could recover possession without
impediment if he instituted such proceeding within ten years of B
completion"

The aforesaid obseJVations would apply in the present case too.

11. Jn Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, (1984] 3 SCC 353 on
which strong reliance is placed by the appellants, the suit for ejectment was C
filed during the period of exemption granted to new buildings under Section
2 (2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act
1972. During the pendency of the suit the period of exemption came to an end
and the defendant resisted the same on the ground tl1at he was entitled to
get the benefits of the Act. That plea of the defendant was upheld by a Bench D
of Two Judges of tllis Court. The Bench relied upon the judgment in Pasupuleti
Venkateswarulu v. Mnotors and General Traders, [1975] 1 S.C.C. 770 wherein
it was held that events and developments subsequent to the institution of
proceedings must be taken into consideration in appropriate cases to promote
substantial justice. On that premise the Court opined that the subsequent
event of the Act becoming applicable to the building on tlle expiry of tlle E
period of exemption could be taken advantage of by the tenant.

12. In Mohinder Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and another,
[1985] 4 S.C.C. 221 a Bench of Three Judges considered a case arising under
the Haryana Act, the same as in the present case. The validity of the amending
Act 16of1978 which introduced Section 1 (3) in the present form was upheld. F
The Court considered the object of the legislation and in particular the
provision for exemption from the operation of the legislation. TI1e Court said:
" ... As in view of the rigours of Rent Control Legislation, persons witll
means may not be inclined to invest in construction of new houses,
the Legislature to attract investment in construction of new houses G
may consider it reasonable to provide for adequate. incentives so that
new constructions may come up. It is an elementary law of economics
that anybody who wants to invest his money in any venture will
expect a fair return on the investment made. As acute scarcity of
accommodation is to an extent responsible for the landlord and tenant H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] l S.C.R.

A problem, the measure adopted by the Legislature for seeking to meet
the situation by encouraging the construction of new buildings for
t11e pmpose of mitigating the hardship of tenants must be considered
to be a step in t11e right direction. The provision for exemption from
the operation of the Rent Control Legislation by way of incentive to
persons wit11 means to construct new houses has been made in
B Section 1 (3) of t11e Act by t11e Legislature in the legitimate hope that
construction of new buildings will ultimately result in mitigation of t11e
hardship of the tenants. Such incentive has a clear nexus with the
object to be achieved and cannot be considered to be unreasonable
or arbitrary. Any such incentive offered for the purpose of construction
c of new buildings with the object of easing t11e situation of scarcity of
accommodation for ameliorating the conditions in the tenants, cannot
be said to be unreasonable, provided the nature and character of the
incentive and the measure of exemption allowed are not otherwise
unreasonable and arbitrary. The exemption to be allowed must be for
a reasonable and definite period. An exemption for an indefinite period
D or a period which in the facts and circumstances of any particular case
may be considered to be unduly long, may be held to be arbitrary. The
exemption must necessarily be effective from a particular date and
must be with the object of promoting new constructions. With t11e
commencement of the Act, t11e provisions of the Rent Act with all the
restrictions and rigours became effective. Buildings which have been
E
constructed before the commencement of the Act were already there
and the question of any kind of impetus or incentive to such buildings
does not anse. The Legislature, therefore, very appropriately allowed
the benefit of the exemption to the buildings, the construction of
which commenced or was completed on or after the commencement
F of t11e Act. This exemption in respect of the buildings coming up or
to come up on or after the date of commencement of t11e Act is likely
to serve the purpose of encouraging new buildings to be constructed.
There is t11erefore not11ing arbitrary or unreasonable in fixing t11e date
of comII'encement of the Act from which the exemption is to be
G operative."
The Court also held that the period of ten years for exemption was quite
reasonable.
13. In Nand Kishore Marwah & Ors. v. Samundri Devi, [1987] 4 S.C.C.
382 a case arising under the U.P. Act, a Bench of Two Judges dissented from
H tl,le view ex-pressed in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, (supra). The
KISHAN@ KRISHAN KUMAR v. MAN OJ KUMAR {SRINIVASAN, I.] 839

Court held that the rights of the parties will be detennined on the basis of A
the rights available to them on the date of suit and upheld the eviction decree
passed in that case.

14. In Atma Ram A1ittal v. Jshwar Singh Punia, [1988] 4 S.C.C. 284 a
Bench of Two Judges held that Vineet Knmar (snpra) was impliedly overmled.
That was also a case arising nuder the present Act. The Bench pointed out B
that if the immunity from the operation of the Rent Act is made an depended
upon tlie ultimate disposal of the case within the period of exemption of ten
years which is in reality an impossibility, the immunity or exemption would
become illusory and provide no incentive to the landlords to build new
houses to solve problem of shortage of houses. The Conrt referred to tl1e C
maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit and held that once rights are crystallised,
the adjudication must be in accordance witl1 law. The Court also relied upon
the principle that purposive interpretation in a social amelior:itive legislation
is an imperative irrespective of anything else and while ascertaining the
legislative intent the Court should look into the true meaning of the words
-"-·. that the legislature has used. D
15. 1n Kesha Ram & Co & Ors. etc, v. Union ofIndia & Ors, [1989] 2
S.C.R. 1005 the suits were filed dnring the period of exemption of five years
under the Notification issued under East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act
1949. When the period of five years expired during the pendency of the suit,
the tenants raised objections on the ground that the snit could not be decreed E
in view of Section 13 of the Act. The contention was rejected by tlle Bench
of Three Judges. Referring to tl1e provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act and the Notification made thereunder the Court said:

" ... The emphasis is on tl1e institution of the suit within the period of

.. exemption of five years. Once the landlord institutes a suit before the F
expiry of the period of exemption, the decree even if passed after the
period of five years will not be subject to the provisions of Section
13 of the Act. This is tl1e true meaning of the Notificati011. The
Notification does not enlarge tl1e period of exemption instead it
safeguards the rights of the parties it safeguards the rights of tl1e G
parties which crystallise on tl1e date of institution of tl1e suit."
_}
The Court proceeded to trace the case law on the subject and rejected the
submission made on behalf of the tenants on the ground that the acceptance
thereof would result in reducing an Act to a dead letter or to defeat the object
and purpose of tl1e Statute. H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R

A 16. In Suresh Chandv. Gu/am Chisti, [1990] l S.C.C. 595 another Bench
;.._...,.
of Three Judges referred to the entire case law on the subject and held that
the expiry of the period of exemption during the pendency of the suit cannot
enable the tenant to claim the oenefits of the Act. Following the ruling in
Atma Ram Mittal' s case (supra) the Court said that tl1e inteIJJretation pleaded
by the tenant would encourage him to protract the litigation and if he succeeds
B in delaying the disposal of the si:.it till the expiry of the period, he would
secure the benefits of the Act and therefore it was not possible to uphold
that plea.

17. In Ramesh Chandra v. III Additional District Judge & Ors., [1992]
c 1 S.C.C 751 yet another Bench of Three Judges dealt with a case under the
U.P. Act and held that the law applicable on the date of the institution of the
suit would govern the suit since on the date of institution of the suit, the
building was exempted from the operation of the Act and the suit being one
preceded by notice under Section 106.of the Transfer of Property Act was
maintainable. The Court opined that the suit as instituted had to be disposed
D of without reference to the Act. The Court observed that Vineet Kumar
(supra) stood overruled.

18. In Bhola Nath Varshneyv. MulkRaj Madan, [1994] 2 S.C.C. 127, the
case was again under the U.P. Act. The Bench held that the law applicable
on the date of the institution alone would govern the suit.
E
19. In Parripati Chandrasekharrao & Sons v Alapati Ja/aiah, {1995]
3 S.C.C. 709 a Division Bench pointed out the distinction between the rights

F
of a landlord and the rights of a tenant. It was held that the theory of the
vested rights which may validly be pleaded to support the landlord's case is
not available to the tenant. 'I"
-)

.. r-
20. Thus it is seen that this Court has been consistently taking the view
that a suit instituted during the period of exemption could be continued and r-
a decree passed therein could be executed even though the period of exemption
came to an end during the pendency of the suit. The only discordant note
G was struck in Vineet Kumar v. Mange Lal Wadhera, [1984] 3 S.C.C. 353. We
have noticed that several decisions subsequent thereto have held that Vineet .(_

Kumar is not good law. We have already construed the relevant provisions
of the Act and pointed out that there is notlling in the Act which prevents
the civil court from continuing the suit and passing a decree which could be
H executed.
KJSHAN@KRISHAN KUMAR v. MANOI KUMAR (SRINIVASAN, J.) 841
21. Learned counsel for the appellants attempted to make a distinction A
,_.1._ between the provisions of the Section 20 of the U.P. Act and Section 13 of
the present Act. The wording in the former is as follows: . lm20

"Save as provided in sub-section (2), no suit shall be instituted for
the eviction of a tenant from a building, notwithstanding the
determination of his tenancy by eftlux of time or on the expiration of B
r- a notice to quit or in any other manner".

According to the learned counsel bar against the institution of a suit
would stand on a different footing from bar against eviction as such
which is contained in Section 13 of the Act. In our opinion the
difference in language does not help the appellants in any manner. We C
have already pointed out that Section 13 of the Act does not make
any reference to a decree passed in a civil suit. When a suit is validly
instituted and the rights of parties which had crystallised on the date
of the suit are determined by a decree on that suit the execution
thereof cannot be stopped by the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. D
Hence, we are unable to accept any of the contentions of the
appellants. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed. There will
be no order as to costs.

R.C.K. . Appeals dismissed .

.