Supreme Court of India
SHRI BALAGANESAN METALSversusSHRI M.N. SHANMUGHAM CHETTY & ORS.
- Citation
- 1987 INSC 127
- Decided
- 23 April 1987
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- SABYASACHI MUKHERJI
Holding
A landlord occupying part of a building may, notwithstanding s.10(3)(a), invoke s.10(3)(c) to evict a tenant occupying the remaining part for either residential or non‑residential purposes, provided the landlord’s bona‑fide need for additional accommodation outweighs the tenant’s hardship.
Summary
The appellant, a tenant occupying the ground floor of a one‑storey building as a godown, was evicted under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 after the landlord’s legatees claimed bona‑fide need for additional residential accommodation. The appellant challenged the eviction on four grounds: (i) that the ground floor was a separate building and thus eviction could only be sought under Section 10(3)(a)(i); (ii) that Section 10(3)(c) permits eviction only when the landlord’s residential need matches a residential use by the tenant; (iii) that the comparative hardship favoured the tenant; and (iv) that the High Court erred in revising the Appellate Authority’s findings. The Supreme Court held that the ground floor does not constitute a distinct building, that a landlord occupying any part of a building may invoke Section 10(3)(c) for additional accommodation irrespective of the tenant’s use, and that the landlord’s bona‑fide need outweighed the tenant’s hardship. Consequently, the High Court’s revision was upheld and the appeal dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the ground floor constitutes a separate building under s.2(2) of the Act, limiting the landlord to eviction under s.10(3)(a)(i) and not s.10(3)(c).
- Whether s.10(3)(c) allows a landlord to seek eviction for residential accommodation only when the tenant’s occupation is residential, and similarly for non‑residential purposes.
- Whether the comparative hardship analysis favours the tenant over the landlord.
- Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the Appellate Authority’s factual findings under s.25 of the Act.
Legislation cited
- Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960s. 10(3)(a)(i), s. 10(3)(a)(iii), s. 10(3)(c), s. 2(2), s. 25
Subjects
evictionadditional accommodationbuilding definitioncomparative hardshipstatutory interpretationlandlord‑tenant lawTamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act
Judgment
SHRJ BALAGANESAN METALS A
v.
· SHRJ M.N. SHANMUGHAM CHE1TY & ORS.
'APRIL 23, 1987
!SABYASACHJ MUKHARJI AND S. NATARAJAN, JJ.] B
I', t ' ~•
Tamil Nadu Buildings (lease and Rent Control) Act, '1960: ss.
2(2) and 10(3)(a) & (c)-Eviction-Bona fide requirement'Jor addi-
-
tional accommodation-Comparative hardship-Consideration of-
'Building'-Whether includes part of a building.
;~
c
. Statutory Interpretation. · '
. ·,,. '
' .
Provisions of Statutes-Not to be interpreted so as to render any
'
~ other provision otiose. '
Words & Phrases: Expression 'as the case may be'-Connection D
of Word 'Any'-Meaning of. ' " " ""'.
'" Clause (c) ofslib-s. (3) ofs: lOofthe Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease
and Rent Control) Act, 1960, enables a landlord occupying only a part
a
of building, whether residential or non-residential, to seek eviction of
a tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the E
t. imilding, notwithstanding anything contained in cl. (a), for bona fide
requirement of additional accommodation. The first proviso thereto
enjoins the Rent Controller to reject the application of the landlord
under that clause even where the need is found to be genuine' if the
hardship caused to the tenant wouid outweigh the advantage to· the
landlord: Sub-clause (i) of cl. (a) Of s., 10(3) enables eviction· from resi- F
dential· building if the landlord or any member of his family is itot
occupying a residential building of his own in the city; while sub-cl. (iii)
enable eviction from non-residential building if the landlord or any
niember of his family is not occupying for purp'oses of a business a
non-residential building in the city. A 'building' is defined ins. 2(2) to
mean any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or -to be let G
separately for residential or non-residential purposes.
The respondent-legatees of the landlady, using the first floor of
the building for residence sought eviction of the appellant-tenant from
the ground floor used by him as a godown for storing his business wares
on the ground that they bona fide required additional accommodation H
1173
1174 SUPREME COURT REPORT~ (l987] 2 S.C.R.
A for their residential needs. The Rent Controller upheld their claim. The
Appellate Authority reversed the findings of the Rent CQntroller hut In \
revision the High Court restored the order of eviction paJSed by the
Rent Controller.
In this Appeal by Sepcial Leave it was contended that since the
B ground floor constituted. a building by itself within the meaning ~.f
s. 2(2) of the Act, the respondents could seek eviction of the appeltant
only nuder s. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act and not under s. 10(3)(c), that even
if
the respondents were entitled to invokes. i0(3)(~).they.couliseek evi~
tion only if they required the ground floor f~r non·residential purposes
and not for. residential purposes, that the factors of relative hardship
. . between the parties weighed more in favour of the appellant than the
C respondents, and that the High Court was in error in interfering with
the findings of fact rendered by the Appellate Authority while e~ercis·
ing its revisional powers under s. 25 of the Act.
Dismissing the Appeal, the Court,
D ..
HELD: 1.1 The ground floor of the building in occupation of the
appellant did not constitute a distinct and separate unit. The respon-
dent-landlords .could, therefore seek eviction under s. 10(3)(c) of the
Act.
E 1.2 A 'building' has been defined ins. 2(2) of the Act as not only a
building or hut but also part of a building or hut, let separately for
residential or non-residential purposes, which could only means that a
part of a building that has been let out or that has to be let out sepa·
rately can also be construed as a separate and independent building
without reference to the other portion or portions of the building where ~
F it is not necessary to treat the entire building as one whole and insepar· ~
· able unit. A limitation has thereby been placed by the Legislature itself,
by providing that the. application of the definition is subject to the 'r-
contextual position. It follows therefrom that where the context war·
rants, the entire building being construed as one il!tegr11I unit, it would
be inappropriate to view the. building as consisting of several disin·
G '. tegrated units and not as one integrated structure •
.~ -, " '
, ~ 1.3 In enacting s. 10(3)(c) the Legislature has intended .that the
'--,... ei.tire buildi~g, ·irrespective of one portion being occupied by the land-.
1
lord and the other portion or portions being occupied by a tenant or
tenants should be viewed as one whole and integrated unit and not as
H different entities.
BALAGANESAN v. M.N.S CHE1TY 1175
1.4 There is vast difference between the words "residential build- A
ing" and "non-residential bnilding" nsed in s. 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) on
lhe one hand and s. 10(3)(c) on the other. While s. 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii)
refer to a building only as residential or non-residential, s. 10(3)(c)
refers to a landlord occupying a part of a building, whether residential
or non-residential. Furthermore, s. 10(3)(c) states that a landlord may
apply to the Controller for an order of eviction being passed against the B
tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the
building.
1.5 To import the expansive definition of the word "building" in
s. 2(2) into s. 10(3)(c) would result in rendering meaningless the words
"part of a building" occupied by. the landlord and a tenant "occupying c
the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building", leaving
no scope for snch a landlord to seek eviction.
1.6 The provisions of an Act should be interpreted in such a
manner as 1>01 to render any of its provisions otiose unless there are
compelling reasons for the Court to resort to the extreme contingency. D
If a portion of a building let out to a tenant is to be treated in all
situations as a separate and independent building thens. 10(3)(c) will be
rendered otiose because the landlord can never tben ask for additional
accommodation since s. 10(3)(a) does not provide for eviction of tenants
on the ground of additional accommodation for the landlord either for
residential or non-residential purposes. E
Saraswathi Sriraman v. P.C.R. Chetty's Charities, [1972] 2
M.L.J. 515; Mohammedlaffarv. Palaniappa Chettiar, [1964] 1 M.L.J.
112 and Chellammal v. Accommodation Controller, [1967] 2 M.L.J.
453, approved.
F
2.1 It cannot be said that a landlord can seek adliitional accom-
modation for residence only if the building is a residential one and
likewise be can seek additional accommodation for business purposes
only if the building is a non-residential one.
2.2 Section 10(3)(c) provides for both situations, viz. a landlord G
occupying a part of a building which is residential or non-residuential.
The words used in it are "any tenant" and not "a tenant" who can be
called upon to vacate the portion in his occupation. Unless the legisla-
ture bad intended that both classes of tenant i.e. residential or 11on-
residential, can be asked to vacate by the Rent Controller for providing
landlord the additional accommodation it would not have nsed the H
I
1176
I SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1987) 2 S.C.R.
A words "any" instead of using the letter "a" to denote a tenant.
Further, the words "as the case may be" in cl. (o) only mean
"whichever the case may be", i.e. either residential or non-residential.
. They do not restrict the landlord's right to secure additional accommo-
.dation for residential purposes only in respect of a residential building
and in the case of additional accommodation for business purposes only ·
B to ·a non-residential building •
. 2.3 Section 10(3)(c) stands on a different footing from s. 10(3)(a)
(i) ands. 10(3)(a)(iii). The non-obstante clause has been added to cl. (c)
to give it an overriding ·effect over both the restrictions placed by els.
(a)(i) and (a)(iii), vif·• landlord seeking eviction of a tenant should not .
C be occupying a building of his own and secondly the nature of user of
· the leased property by the tenant must correspond to the nature of the
requirement of the landlord. Thus, tlie requirement of additional
accommodation under cl. (c) is not a case of a landlord not occupying a
residential or non-residential building of his own but a case of a land-
lord occupying a part of a residential or ·non-residential building of his
D own and putting it to such user as deemed fit by him. If it was the
intention of the legislature that only a tenant occupying a residential
portion of a building can be asked to vacate for. providing additional
residential accommodation to the landlord and correspondingly a
tenant occupying a portion of a building for non-residential purposes
alone being asked to vacate for the non-residential requirements of the
E landlord, it would have provided specific stipulation to that effect in
cl. (c).. -. ·
· · In the instant case, the requirement of additional accommodation
pertains to the need of the landlord and the manner of user of the ·
portion of the building already in bis occupation and consequently the
F ·-bona rides of his requirement will outweigh all the restrictions imposed
bys. 10(3)(a) •
. _._ K. Parasuramaiah v. Lakshmamma, (AIR 1965: 220), approved.
. ,.
/ Thirupathi v. Kanta Rao, ([1981) Vol. 1 ILR· Madras 128), .
G overruled.
--.__ 3. Once a landlord is able to satisfy the Controller that he is bona
fide in need of. additional accommodation for residential or non-
. residential purposes and that the advantage derived by him by an order
of eviction will outweigh the hardship caused to the tenant, then he
H is ·~ntitled to an order of eviction irrespective or any other consi·
deration.
----------
BALAGANESAN v.. M.N.S CHETIY (NATARAJAN ,JI .1177
4. The Rent Controller. ha5 gone into the question of comparative A
hardship and rendtred a finding in favour of the respondents. The ·.
Appellate Authority's f"mdings have beeti vitiated because of its non- .
. . advertance to the evidence and application of wrong tests in assessing
the comparative hardship between the ·parties. The High Court, was.
therefore, entitled to allow the revision. ·
B
J . CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1314
of 1980. · · ·
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.9.1978 of the Madras
High Court
. in Civil Revision Petition .No. 782. of 1977.
'
c
A.T.M. Samp~thfor ;he Appellant. ·
.··.
. · S. Padnia~abhan a~d M. Raghuram~n for the Respondents:
·' ,. .. ' .' .
> The: Judgment of th~ Court \'Yasdelivered by ·
· · ·.. · I .· ·; ·· :. · : · : . :: · .. · . D
. .<NATARAJAN, J. This appeal by special leave is by a tenant
· .·against .whom an order of eviction passed under Section 10(3)(c) of the
Tamil.Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, herein-
. after referred to as the ''Act'.',' by the Rent Controller was restored by
the High Court of Madras after setting aside the dismissal of the evic-
tion petition by the Appellate Authority. · · · E
-' .. ~· ·''
. .,. · ::,Tbefactsare n.ot·in controversy and.may briefly be set out as
under. A one-storeyed building in Wall Tax Road, Madras was origi-
. nallf ~wped by one Urinamalai Ammal. She was using the first floor
\._.·.<. for her reside!ice·and badleased,outthe ground floor to the appellant
herein fo be used as a god()wri:for. storing bis. business ware. It is F
i.. common ground the'a'ppeliant:s"shop is situate in an adjoining build-
ing. The lease was for a peri<id of.to years with an option for renewal for
.· . . . a further penod,'of·S'years. ·Urinamalai Ammal however refused to
· .. · · :. renew the lease and filed a suitagairist the appellant for eviction on the
_c_.......~:.ground..shel>Qnlj_fide requiied t!ie grourid[loor also for her residential
use,'. The. suii did. iiiif" meet V.ith success. Unnamalai Ammal G
..• beque~thed the prop~rty to her son-in-law and grand son who are the
4 ·· - respondents hereiri. As legatees of the premises the respondents filed
. . a petition under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act praying for eviction of the
appellant on the ground they bona fide required additional accommo-
dation for their.residential needs. The Rent Controller upheld their
claim, after finding the rekvant factors of bona fide need and .com- H
1178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1987] 2 S.C.R.
parative hardship in their favour and ordered eviction. On appeal by
A
the appellant, the Appellant Authority reversed the findings of the
Rent Controller and further held that the respondent were not entitled
)or ..
to recover possession of non-residential premises for their residential
requirements and dismissed the petition for eviction. On further revi-
sion to the High Court by the respondents Remaprasada Rao, C.J. set
B aside the order of the Appellant Authority and resorted the order of
eviction passed by the ~ent Controller. The aggrieved tenant has pre-
ferred this appeal. ~·
The judgment under appeal is assailed by the appellant on four
grounds viz. (!) Since the ground floor constitutes a building by itself
within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, the respondents can
..... -
c seek eviction of the appellant only under Section !0(3){a)(i) of the Act
and not under Section 10(3){c);
>
(2) Even if the respondents are entitled to invoke Section
10{3){c) they can seek eviction only if they require the ground floor for
D non-residential purposes and not for residential purposes;
(3) In any event the factors of relative hardship between the
parties weigh more in favour of the appellant than the respondent; and
~·
(4) The High Court was in error in interfering with the findings
E of fact rendered by the Appellate Authority w~.ile exercising its revi- ""
~
~
sional powers under Section 25 of the Act.
Before proceeding to examine the merits of the contentions, it
will be relevant to state a few facts. The ground floor, though used as a "'""
godown, is of a residential pattern and consists of two rooms and a ball
F besides a kitchen and toilet rooms. The first floor is being used as their y
residence by the respondents, the other members of the family being
the wife and daughter of the second respondent. The first floor con-
sists of only two rooms and it is the case of the respondents that the
accommodation in the first floor has become inadequate for their
growing residential needs. It is also their case that the first respondent
G who is over 65 years of age finds it difficult to climb the stairs on
account of bis old age and frail health. Their further plea is that the
water supply to the first floor is in2dequate iii spite ~f the electric
+
motor and pump set installed in the ground floor to pump up water. In
contrast the appellant is said to have a spacious three-storeyed build-
ing in Door No. 39 adjoining the leased premises and also to have
H another godown close by.
BALAGANESAN v. M.N.S CHE1TY INATARAJAN ,J] 1179
One of the contentions of the appellant was that the eviction A
proceedings were a continuation of the unsuccessful attempt by
Unnamalai Ammal herself to get the tenant evicted and, therefore, the
eviction petition Jacked bona fides. The High Court has rejected his
contention and in our opinion, rightly too, because the respondents
who are the legatees of the building cannot be attributed mala fides
because of the earlier eviction suit filed by their predecessor in title. B
We may also dispose of another contention of the appellant at this
juncture itself which had found favour with the Appellate Authority.
The contention was that with the death of Unnamalai Ammal the
family had become smaller and hence there was no need for additional
accommodation. This argument overlooks the fact that additional
accommodation is sought for because of the difficulty experienced by c
the first respondent in climbing the stairs in his old age and the need
for the second respondent's daughter, growing in years, to have a
room all for herself for keeping her books and reading at home.
We will now proceed to consider the legal contentions of the
appellant in seriatim. The first and foremost contention was that under D
the Act the ground floor constitutes a separate building and as such the
respondents can seek recovery of possession of the ground floor only
under Section 10(3)(a)(i) and not under Section 10(3)(c). For dealing
with this contention, the relevant provisions of the Act need setting
out.
E
Section 2 which is the definition Section reads as under:-
"Definitions:- In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires-
(2) "building" means any building or hut or part of a F
building or hut, Jet or to be let separately for residential or
non-residential purpose and includes-
(a)
(b) G
Section 10 sets out the grounds on which the eviction of a
tenant can be ordered. For our purpose it is enough to refer
to the following provisions alone:-
"Section 10(3)(a):- A landlord may, subject to the H
!180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987) 2 S.t.R.
provisions of clause (d), apply to the Conttollet for an
A order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession
of the building-
(i) in case it is a residential building, if the landlord
requires it for his own occupation or for the otrupation of
B any member of his family and if he or any member of his
family is not occupying a residential building of his own in
the city, town or village concerned;
(ii) ommitted
••
(iii) in case it is any other non·resldential building \f the
landlord or any member of his family is not oecupying for
..... -
c purposes of a business whkh he tlf any rnetnber of his
family is carrying on, non-residential buildihg iii the city,
town or village concerned which is his own: )-.
(b) ommitted.
D .
(c) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building,
whether residential or non-residefilial, may, notwithstand-
ing anything contained In clause (a), apply to the Control-
ler for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or
any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the
E landlord in possession thereof, it he requires additional -+
accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of
a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be. -
Provided that, in the case of an application under clause
(c), the Controller, shall reject the application ifhe is satis-
F fied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by
granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord: ,..
Provided further that the Controller may give the tenant a
reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of
the ~ilding and may extend such time so as not to exceed
G three months in the aggregate."
It is no doubt true that under Section 2(2) a building has been +
defined as not building or hut but also part of a building or hut let
separately for resi1ential or non·residential purpose. That would,
however, only mean that a part of a building which has been let out or
H which is to be let out separately can also be construed as a separate and
BALAGANESAN v. M.N.S CHETI'Y (NATARAJAN ,JI 1181
independent building without reference to the other portion or por-
A
-... tions of the building where it is not necessary to treat the entire build-
" ing as one whole and inseparable unit. A limitation on the definition
has been placed by the Legislature itself by providing that the applica-
tion of the definition is subject to the contextual position. Therefore, it
follows that where the context warrants the entire building being con-
strued as one integral unit, it would be inappropriate to view the B
building as consisting of several disintegerated units and not as one
-t integerated structure. Secondly there is vast difference between the
words "residential building" and "non-residential building" used in
- f-- Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) on the one hand and Section 10(3)(c) on
the other. While Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) refer to a building only as
residential or non-residential Section 10(3)(c) refers to a landlord
occupying a part.of a building, whether residential or non-residential. c
(Emphasis supplied). Further-more, Section !0(3)(c) states that a
~ landlord may apply to the Controller for an order of eviction being
passed against the tenant "occupying the whole or any portion of the
remaining part of the building" (Emphasis supplied). If as contended
by the appellant each portion of a building let out separately should D
always be construed as an independent unit by itself then there is no
scope for a landlord occupying "a part of a building" seeking eviction
of a tenant "occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part
of the building". It is, therefore, obvious that in so far as Section
-+ 10(3)(c) is concerned the Legislature has intended that the entire
building, irrespective of one portion being occupied by the landlord E
-~ and the other portion or portions being occupied by a tenant or tenants
should be viewed as one whole and integrated unit and not as different
~.
entities. To import the expansive definition of the word "building" in
Section 2(2) into section 10(3)(c) would result in rendering meaning-
less the words "part of a building" occupied by the landlord and a
tenant "occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of F
'1 the building". The third factor militating against the contention of the
appellant is that if a portion of a building let out to a tenant is to be
treated in all situations as a separate and independent building then
Section 10(3)(c) will be rendered otiose because the landlord can
never then ask for additional accommodation since Section 10(3)(a)
does not provide for eviction of tenants on the ground of additional G
+ accommodation for the landlord either for residential or non-resi-
dential purposes. It is a well settled rule of interpretation of statutes
that the provisions of the Act should be interpreted in such a manner
as not to render any of its provisions otiose unless there are compelling
reasons for the Court to resort to that extreme contingency.
H
1182 SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS (1987] 2 S.C.R.
Yet another noteworthy feature to be borne in mint! is that Sec'
A tion 10(3)(c) is governed by two provisos which is not the ~fi!le when
eviction orders are made under any of the sub•dauses of Section
10(3)(a). The first proviso enjoins the Controller to reject the appli-
cation of a landlord under Section 10(3)(c) for additional 11cem111no-
dation, even where the need of the landlord is fouhd to be genuine, if
B the hardship caused to the tenant by an order of eviction will outweigh
the advantage to the landlord by the said order. The second proviso
empowers the Controller to give the tenant a reasonable time not +-
exceeding three months in the aggregate to vacate the porlloll iii his
occupation and put the landlord in possessio11 thereof. Obviously ihe -1 -
second proviso has been made to facilitate the tenant to find alternate
residential or non-residential accommodatioll elsewhere, sinoe the
C landlord who is already in possession of a portion gf the building tiih
put up with the hardship of inadequate nc~ommtidation fof ii jlHitJd bf ).
three months at the most.
The above analytical consideration of the releV1tttl prnv!§itihs
D bring out clearly the fallacy contained In alld th~ Ulll@liabiiity of the
contention that the ground floor occuplijd by the appellant is a distinct
and separate unit and as such the respondents cannot seek his eviction
under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act.
This aspect of the matter has been consldetetl ill varying tlegtees
E in the following decisions and interpreted in accordance with our con-
clusion: vide Saraswathi Sriraman v. P.C.R. Chetty'• Ghatities, [19121
2 M.L.J. 515; Mohammed Jaffar v. Pt1la11iappa Chettiar, [1964] 1
M.L.J. 112 and Chellammal v, Aetvmmodati/Jli Controller, [1967] 2
M.L.J. 453. Even the Division Bench ruling relied on by Mr. Sampath
concedes this position and has observed as follows!
F
"Therefore, if the context in a particular provision requires
that the word building should not be understood as defined
in Section 22, certainly it is open to the Court to give the
normal, natural and ordinary meaning which it is capable
of, and for that purpose, it is not necessary to rely upon any
G decision. (vide page 153 of the report)."
+
Taking up now for consideration the second contention, there
were conflicting decisions in the Madras High Court and this led to a
reference of the case in Thirupathi v. Kania Rao, [1981] Vol. 1 !LR ·
Madras 128 to a Division Bench. While the Division Bench has taken
H one view. a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has
BALAGANESAN v. M.N.S CHETIY (NATARAJAN ,JI 1183
taken a contrary view on the identical issue. It is pertinent to state here
that the provisions of tile Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and A
""' Eviction Col\\rol) Act are in pari metria with the provisions of the
Madra& A~t in so far as Sections 10(3)(a) and (c) are concerned. The
cgnfligt was with reference to the interpretation of Section 10(3)(c)
v\~. whether a landlord occupying a part of a building for residential
purposes is entitled to seek eviction of a tenant occupying the whole or B
any portion of the remaining part of the building for non-residential
~
purposes for his (landlord's) residential use and vice versa. While it
was held in Govindan v. R,ajagopal Nadar, (1968) 2 M.L.J. 315 that a
~
1--, landlord can seek eviction of a tenant under Section 10(3)(c) for addi-
tional residential purposes only if the tenant also is putting the building
to residential use and likewise a landlord can seek additional accom-
modation for business purposes only if the tenant is also putting the c
~. building to non-residential use, it was held to the contrary in Prem-
chand Motichand v. Hameed Sultan, (1958) 1 M.L.J. 32 (S.N.); P./.
Kurian v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 85 L.W. 364 and Saraswathi
Sriraman v. P.C.R. Chetty's Charities (supra). The latter view was
taken by Ismail, J., also, as he then was, in an unreported case viz. D
Rangaswami Reddiar v. Minor N. Jayaraj (C.R.P. No. 2380 of 1977).
Subsequently in the referred case, the Division Bench consisting of
Ismail, C.J. and Rathnam, J. rendered judgment in Thirupathi v. Kanta
t Rao. (supra). (Ismail, C.J., changing his earlier view) holding that a
landlord will be entitled under Section 10(3)(c) to seek additional
accommodation for residential purposes only if it is a residential build- E
--- ing in the occupation of a tenant and likewise a landlord can seek
additional accommodation for non-residential purposes only if the
~. building is a non-residential one.
The Division Bench has further taken the view that the non
obstante clause is only to entitle a landlord to seek eviction even when F
he is in possession of a portion of a building belonging to him and
nothing more.
In a later decision G.N. Rajaram v. Mukunthu N. Venkatarama
Iyer, MLJ 1985(2) 173 the Division Bench ruling has been followed
and eviction was ·ordered of a tenant occupying a room in the ground G
+ floor of a residential building for his business purposes. On the other
hand a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K.
Parasuramaiah v. Lakshmamma, AIR 1965 220 has held that if a land-
lord satisfies the Controller that he wants additional accommodation
in the same building for his residential or non-residential requirements
then notwithstanding the user to which the tenant was putting the H
1184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1987] 2 S.C.R.
leased portion. the landord is entitled to an order of eviction so that he
A
can re-adjust the additional accommodation in the manner convenient
to him and it is not necessary that the additional accommodation
sought for should be used by the landlord for the same purpose for
which the tenant sought to be evicted was using it. In the words of the
Division Bench:-
B
"Clause (c) makes it twice clear that a landlord who
occupies a part of a building, whether residential or non-
residential can ask for eviction of a tenant occupying
another portion whatever may be his requirements,
whether residential or non-residential".
C For holding so, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the words
""notwithstanding anything in clause (a)" as having over riding effect
over both the conditions laid down in Section 10(3)(a) and (iii) viz. a
landlord (l) not having a building of his own for residential or non-
residential purposes; and (2) seeking the eviction of a tenant from
· D residential premises only for residential purposes; and (3) seeking
eviction of a tenant from non-residential premises only for non-
residential purposes.
\\ e will now examine for ourselves the interpretation to be given
to Section !0(3)(c). In so doing we will first see the legislative intent
E behind Section 10(3)(c) before considering the thrust given by non-
obstante clause in it. Since Section 10(3)(c) provides for both situa-
tions viz. a landlord occupying a part of a building which is residential
or non-residential, the sub-clause can be read separately so as to have
reference exclusively to a residential building or a non-residential
building. In Thirupathy v. Kanta Rao, (supra) the learned Judges have
F noticed this position and set out Section 10(3 )( c) distinctively. But in
so doing they have restricted the relief of additional accommodation to
the landlord for residential purposes to residential buildings alone and
the relief of additional accommodation for business purposes to non-
residential buildings alone and therein the error has crept in. In our
view, this restriction is not envisaged by Section 10(3)(c). The proper
G way of distinctively viewing the Section should be as under:-
"A landlord who is occupying only a part of a residential
building may notwithstanding anything contained in clause
(a). apply to the Controller for an order directing any ten-
ant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining
H part pf the building to put the landlord in possession
BALAGANESAN v. M.N.S CHEITY [NATARAJAN ,JI 1185
thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for resi-
'1 A
dential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is
carrying on, as the case may be."
"A landlord who is occupying only a part of a non-resi-
dential building may notwithstanding anything contained in
clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing B
i any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the
- ~-
remaining part of the building to put the landlord in posses-
sion thereof, if he requires additional accommodation fo1
residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he
is carrying on, as the case may be."
If clause (3) is construed in this manner there can be no scope for
c
_..( a contention that a landlord can seek additional accommodation for
residence only if the building is a residential one and likewise he can
seek additional accommodation for business purposes only if the build-
ing is a non-residential one.
D
There are several reasons which persuade us to take this view. In
the first place it has to be noted that Section 10(3)(c) stands on a
different footing from Section 10(3)(a)(i) and Section 10(3)(a)(iii). It
-t is not a case of a landlord not occupying a residential or non-resi-
... dential building of his own but a case of a landlord occupying a part of
a residential or non-residential building of his own and putting it to E
such user as deemed fit by him. Since the requirement of additional
accommodation by the landlord is with reference to the manner of his
-~ user of that part of the building which is in his occupation it is the
nature of that requirement that should prevail over the manner of user
of the tenant of the portion leased out to him. In other words, the
'-1 additional accommodation is for extending the user of the building by F
the landlord to the leased portion for the same purpose for which the
portion not leased out is being put to. Such being the case which the
landlord is genuinely in need of additional accommodation for residen-
tial or non-residential requirements, as the case may be, he can be
given relief only it the tenant occupying the other portion of the build-
+ ing is asked to vacate. If it is to be held that Section 10(3)(c) can be
invoked only if the nature of the requirement of the landlord and the
G
nature of user of the leased portion by the tenant coalesce then the
landlord will be left without any remedy when the nature of his need
and the nature of the user of the leased portion by the tenant do not
tally. Take for example, a case where a landlord has got grown-up sons
~nd daughters or there is a married son and growing daughters or there H
1186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1987] 2 S.C.R.
are old parents who cannot climb stairs etc. If the landlord is to be
A
refused additional accommodation for residential purposes merely
because the tenant is making use of the leased portion for non-
residential purposes the landlord would be pla~ed in an awful predica-
ment. Similarly. if a landlord bona fide requires additional accommo-
dation for his business and his business would suffer serious detriment
B if he cannot secure additional accommodation, it would cause great
hardship and gave injustice to the landlord if he is to be denied accom-
modation merely because the tenant is making use of the leased por-
tion for residential purposes. It is, therefore, that the Legislature has
provided Section J0(3)(c) in its present form so that a landlord bona
fide requiring additional accommodation is not confronted with a per-
-
manently irremediable situation. In its anxiety that Section !0(3)(c)
c should fully serve the purpose for which it has been enacted the Legis-
lature has also added the non obstante clause. Having regard to the
object of Section J0(3)(c) and the terms in which it is worded there is
warrant and justification for holding that the non obstante clause has
been provided to have overriding effect over both the restrictions
D placed by Section J0(3)(a)(i) and (iii) viz. landlord seeking eviction of
a tenant should not be occupying a building of his own and secondly
the nature of user of the leased property by the tenant must corres-
pond to the nature of the requirement of the landlord.
In construing Section J0(3)(c) it is pertinent to note that the
E words used are "any tenant"' and not "a tenant" who can be called
upon to vacate the portion in his occupation. The word "any" has the
following meaning:-
--
"Some; one out of many; an indefinite number. One indis-
criminately of whatever kind or quantity."
F
\\ord "any" has a diversity of meaning and may be emp-
loyed to indicate "all" or "every" as well as "some" or
"one" and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the
context and the subject matter of the statute.
G It is often synonymous with "either", "every" or
"all"'. Its generality may be restricted by context; (Black's
Law Dictionary: Fifth Edition).
Unless the legislature had intended that both classes of tenants
can be asked to vacate by the Rent Controller for providing the land-
H lord additional accommodation, be it for residential or non-residential
I
_BALAGANESAN v. M.N.S CHETIY [NATARAJAN ,JI 1187
purposes. it would not have used the word "any" instead of using the
A
letter "a'' to denote a tenant.
Thirdly it is significant to note that there is no reference in clause
(c) to the nature of the user of the tenant occupying the leased portion
of the building viz. whether he is using it for residential or non-
residential purposes. If it was the intention of the legislature that only B
a tenant occupying a residential portion of a building can be asked to
i vacate for providing additional residential accommodation to the land-
- lord and correspondingly a tenant occupying a portion of a building for
non-residential purposes alone being asked to vacate for the non-
residential requirements of the landlord, the legislature would have
provided specific stipulations to that effect in clause (c), On that
ground also it must be construed that clause (c) has been provided in
c
order to enable a landlord to seek the eviction of any tenant occupying
the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building for
residential or non-residential purposes for satisfying the additional
needs of the landlord irrespective of whether the need is for residential
or business purposes. D
The words "as the case may be" in su» clause (c) have been
construed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court to mean
that they restrict the landlord's right to secure additional accommoda-
tion for residential purposes only in respect of a residential building
and in the case of additional accommodation for business purpose only E
to a non-residential building. \1-e are of the view that in the context of
sub-clause (c). the words "as the case may be" would only mean
"whichever the case may be" i.e. either residential or non-residential.
To sum up, the requirement of additional accommodation per-
tains to the need of the landlord and the manner of user of the portion F
of the building already in his occupation and consequently the bona
fides of his requirement will outweigh all the restrictions imposed by
Section 10(3 )(a) i.e. nature of the building, nature of user of the leased
portion by the tenant etc. Even so, the Legislature has taken care to
saf~guard the interests of the tenant by means of the provisos to the
sub-clause. The first proviso enjoins the Controller to balance the G
interests of the landlord and the tenant and to refuse eviction if the
hardship caused to the tenant will outweigh! the advantage to the
landlord by reason of the evicton. The second proviso empowers the
Controller to grant adequate time to the tenant upto a maximum of
three months to vacate the building and secure accommodation else-
where. It. therefore. follows that once a landlord is able to satisfy the H
1188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987]' 2 S.C.R.
Controller that he is bona fide in need of additional accommodation
A )o.•
for residential or non-residential purposes and that the advantage
derived by him by an order of eviction will outweigh the hardship
caused to the tenant, then he is entitled to an order of eviction
irrespective of any other consideration.
Iri the light of our conclusion we approve the ratio in K.
B
Prasuramaiah v. Lakshmamma. (supra) and disapprove the ratio in
Thirupathy v. Kanta Rao. (supra).
r-
The third and fourth question posed for consideration do not
present any difficulty. The Rent Controller has gone into the question
of comparative hardship and rendered a finding in favour of the
__,_
-
c respondents. The High Court has observed that the Appellate Autho·
rity. while reversing the order. has failed to take due note of relevant
materials placed by the respondents. The High Court has, therefore, >-
held that the Appellate Authority's findings have been vitiated because
of its non-advertance to the evidence and the apparent errors noticed
in its assessment of the comparative hardship between the parties. In
D so far as the High Court interfering with the findings of the Appellate
Authority is concerned, the High Court has justified its action by
pointing out that Appellate Authority had applied wrong tests and had
also failed to give effect to unchallenged findings of the Rent Control·
ler and hence the order of the Appellate Authority suffered from
manifest errors in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The High Court was,
+
_,,..
E therefore. entitled to allow the revision and consequently the third and
fourth contentions also fail.
In the result we find no merit in the appeal and accordingly it will A-
stand dismissed. Mr. Sampath, learned counsel for the appellant made
a request that in the event of the appeal being dismissed, the appellant
should be given sufficiently long time to secure another godown and )'
F shift his stock of goods to that place. Mr. Padmanabhan learned
counsel for the respondents very fairly stated that the respondents are
agreeable to give time to the appellant till 31.12.87 to vacate the leased
portion. Accordingly we order that in spite of the dismissal of the
appeal the appellant will have time till 3 l.12.87 to vacate the ground
floor premises in his occupation and deliver peaceful and vacant pos·
G session to the respondents subject however to the appellant filing an 4-
under-taking in the usual terms in this behalf within 4 weeks from
today failing which the respodents will be entitled to recover posses·
sion of the building forthwith. The parties will bear their respective
costs.
H P.S.S Appeal dismissed.
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