SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNIversusY.P. EDUCATION SOCIETY AND ORS.

                        [2013] 6 S.C.R. 1124


A                   SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNI
                                  v.
              Y.P. EDUCATION SOCIETY AND ORS.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 3935 of 2013)
                          APRIL 26, 2013
B
        [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
                  IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]

        Service Law - Departmental enquiry - Punishment
C imposed upon delinquent employee set aside by the Court/
  Tribunal as the enquiry stood vitiated for technical reasons -
  Entitlement of employer to hold enquiry afresh from the point
  it stood vitiated - Held: Once the Court set asides an order
  of punishment on the ground, that the enquiry was not properly
D conducted, the Court should not severely preclude the
  employer from holding the enquiry in accordance with law -
  It must remit the concerned case to the disciplinary authority,
  to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated, and
  to conclude the same in accordance with law - However,
E resorting to such a course depends upon the gravity of
  delinquency involved.

        Service Law - Departmental enquiry - Enquiry at belated
  stage - If can be quashed on the ground of delay - Held: The
  court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental
F enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in
  initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is de
  hors the limitation of judicial review - The essence of the
  matter is that the court must take into consideration all
  relevant facts, and balance and weigh the same, so as to
G determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest
  administration, that the said proceedings are allowed to be
  terminated, only on the ground of a delay in their conclusion.

        Service Law - Departmental enquiry - Enquiry on vague
H                                1124
    SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNI v. Y.P. EDUCATION               1125
                    SOCIETY

and unspecified charges - Permissibility - Held: Nowhere            A
should a delinquent be served a chargesheet, without
providing to him, a clear, specific and definite description of
the charge against him - When statement of a/legations are
not served with the chargesheet, the enquiry stands vitiated,
as having been conducted in violation of the principles of          B
natural justice - There must be fair-play in action, particularly
in respect of an order involving adverse or penal
consequences.

      Service Law - Departmental enquiry - Enquiry against
retired employee - Circumstances when such enquiry can be           C
conducted - Held: The relevant rules governing the service
conditions of an employee are the determining factors as to
whether and in what manner the domestic enquiry can be held
against an employee who stood retired after reaching the age
of superannuation - General/y, if the enquiry has been              D
initiated while the delinquent employee was in service, it would
continue even after his retirement, but nature of punishment
would change - The punishment of dismissal/removal from
service would not be imposed.
                                                                    E
     Service Law - Departmental enquiry - For misconduct
- Termination of appelfant-employee - Chalfenge to -
Meanwhile, appellant stood retired upon reaching the age of
superannuation - Tribunal held that none of the charges
levelled against the appelfant stood proved, and that the           F
enquiry had not been conducted according to the 1981 Rules
- Termination order accordingly quashed - Writ Petition -
Single Judge of High Court upheld the judgment of Tribunal,
and found the enquiry to be entirely defective and thus, illegal
- Division Bench too, upheld the judgment of the Single
                                                                    G
Judge, as well as that of the Tribunal, but simultaneously also
held, that the respondents were at liberty to proceed with the
enquiry afresh, as regards the said charges - On appeal, held:
Division Bench committed error by giving liberty to the
respondents to hold a fresh enquiry - Charges /eve/led
                                                                    H
    1126    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2013] 6 S.C.R.


A against the appellant were entirely vague, irrelevant and
  unspecific - Question of holding any fresh enquiry on such
  vague charges, therefore, unwarranted and uncalled for -
  Procedure prescribed under rr.36, 37 and 57 of the 1981
  Rules were violated - Moreover, appellant had already retired
B - No rule brought to notice that may confer any statutory
  power on the respondent-management to hold fresh enquiry
  after retirement of an employee - In absence of any such
  authority, the Division Bench erred in creating a post-
  retirement forum that may not be permissible under law -
C Further, departmental enquiry can be quashed on the ground
  of delay provided the charges are not very grave - It was not
  necessary for the Division Bench to permit the respondents
  to hold a fresh enquiry on the .said charges and that too, after
  more than a decade of the rettrement of the appellant -
  Maharashtra Employees of Private School Rules, 1981 -
0 rr.36, 37 & 57.

      The appellant was the Head Master in a school. The
  respondents-management issued show-cause notice to
  the appellant, under Rule 28 of the Maharashtra
E Employees of Private School Rules, 1981, seeking an
  explanation as to why disciplinary proceedings should
  not be initiated against him, for his alleged misconduct.

      The appellant submitted his reply. Subsequently, the
F Management Committee took a decision to hold
  disciplinary proceedings against the appellant as per the
  provisions of Rule 36 of the Rules 1981, and in pursuance
  thereof, a chargesheet containing 12 charges of
  misconduct, was served upon the appellant. The
G charges related to accounts and to the discharge of his
  functions as the Headmaster of the school. An Enquiry
  Committee submitted its report, making a
  recommendation that the appellant be dismissed from
  service. The enquiry report was accepted by the
  Management Committee, and the services of the
H
   SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNI v. Y.P. EDUCATION          1127
                   SOCIETY

appellant terminated. Aggrieved, the appellant challenged    A
the termination order by filing appeal before the School
Tribunal. Meanwhile, upon reaching the age of
superannuation, the appellant stood retired. The Tribunal
held, that none of the charges levelled against the
appellant stood proved, and that the enquiry had not         8
been conducted according to the Rules 1981. Thus, the
termination order against the appellant was quashed.
Aggrieved, the respondents-management filed Writ
Petition. A Single Judge of the High Court upheld the
judgment of the Tribunal. The Division Bench too, upheld     C
the judgment of the Single Judge, as ·well as that of the
Tribunal, but simultaneously also held, that the
respondents were at liberty to proceed with the enquiry
afresh, as regards the said charges, and therefore the
present appeal.
                                                             D
     In the instant appeal, the following questions of law
arose for consideration: (i) In case the punishment
imposed upon the delinquent employee is set aside by
the Court/Tribunal as the enquiry stood vitiated for
technical reasons, whether the employer is entitled to       E
hold the enquiry afresh from the point it stood vitiated;
(ii) Whether the enquiry can be quashed on the ground
of delay; (iii) Whether the enquiry can be permitted to be
held on vague and unspecified charges; and (iv) Under
what circumstances enquiry can be conducted against          F
the delinquent employee who has retired on reaching the
age of superannuation.

    Allowing the appeal, the Court

    HELD: 1. Once the Court set asides an order of           G
punishment on the ground, that the enquiry was not
properly conducted, the Court should not severely
preclude the employer from holding the inquiry in
accordance with law. It must remit the concerned case
                                                             H
    1128    SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A to the disciplinary authority, to conduct the enquiry from
  the point that it stood vitiated, and to conclude the same
  in accordance with law. However, resorting to such a
  course depends upon the gravity of delinquency
  involved. Thus, the court must examine the magnitude of
8 misconduct alleged against the delinquent employee. It
  is in view of this, that courts/tribunals, are not competent
  to quash the charge-sheet and related disciplinary
  proceedings, before the same are concluded, on the
  aforementioned grounds. [Para 7] [1139-C-E]

C      Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad etc.etc. v. 8.
  Karunakar etc.etc. ·AIR 1994 SC 1074: 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR
  576; Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya v. Secretary, S.M. School
  for Girls & Ors. (2002) 10 SCC 293; U.P. State Spinning C.
  Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey & Anr. (2005) 8 SCC 264: 2005 (3)
D Suppl. SCR 603; Union of India v. Y.S. Sandhu, Ex-Inspector
  AIR 2009 SC 161: 2008 (13) SCR 784 - relied on.

       2. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside
  the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the
E ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings,
  as such a power is de hors the limitation of judicial
  review. In the event that the court/tribunal exercises such
  power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very
  threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show cause
F notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings,
  cannot ordinarily be quashed by court. The same
  principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay
  in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and
  circumstances of the case in question, must be carefully
  examined, taking into consideration the gravity/
G magnitude of charges involved therein. The Court has to
  consider the seriousness and magnitude of the charges
  and while doing so the Court must weigh all the facts,
  both for and against the delinquent officers and come to
  the conclusion, which is just and proper considering the
H
    SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNI v. Y.P. EDUCATION           1129
                    SOCIETY
circumstances involved. The essence of the matter is that      A
the court must take into consideration all relevant facts,
and balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if
it is intact in the interest of clean and honest
administration, that the said proceedings are allowed to
be terminated, only on the ground of a delay in their          B
conclusion. [Para 8] [1140-A-D]

     State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma & Anr. AIR 1987 SC
943: 1987 (2) SCR 444; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani
Singh & Anr. AIR 1990 SC 1308: 1990 Suppl. SCC 738;
State of Punjab & Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal (1995) 2 SCC        c
570: 1995 (1) SCR 695; State of Andhra Pradesh v. N.
Radhakishan AIR 1998 SC 1833: 1998 (2) SCR 693; M. V.
Bijlani v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 2006 SC 3475: 2006 (3)
SCR 896; Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana
AIR 2007 SC 906: 2006 (9) Suppl. SCR 257; The Secretary,       D
Ministry of Defence & Ors. v. Prabash Chandra Mirdha AIR
2012 SC 2250: 2012 SCR 182; Chairman, UC of India &
Ors. v. A. Masilamani JT (2012) 11 SC 533 - relied on.

    3.1. Nowhere should a delinquent be served a               E
chargesheet, without providing to him, a clear, specific
and definite description of the charge against him. When
statement of allegations are not served with the
chargesheet, the enquiry stands vitiated, as having been
conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice.   F
Evidence adduced should not be perfunctory, even if the
delinquent does not take the defence of, or make a
protest with against that the charges are vague, that does
not save the enquiry from being vitiated, for the reason
that there must be fair-play in action, particularly in
                                                               G
respect of an order involving adverse or penal
consequences. What is required to be examined is
whether the delinquent knew the nature of accusation.
The charges should be specific, definite and giving
details of the incident which formed the basis of charges
                                                               H
   1130    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. [Para
  10) [1141-F-H; 1142-A]

       3.2. The purpose of holding an enquiry against any
  person is not only with a view to establish the charges
  levelled against him or to impose a penalty, but is also
8
  conducted with the object of such an enquiry recording
  the truth of the matter, and in that sense, the outcome of
  an enquiry may either result in establishing or vindicating
  his stand, and hence result in his exoneration. Therefore,
C fair action on the part of the authority concerned is a
  paramount necessity. [Para 11) [1142-C-D]

       Surath Chandra Chakravarty v. The State of West Bengal
  AIR 1971 SC 752: 1971 (3) SCR 1; State of Andhra Pradesh
  & Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao AIR 1963 SC 1723: 1964 SCR
D 25; Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1986 SC 995: 1986
  (2) SCR 957; U.P.S.R. T.C. & Ors. v. Ram Chandra Yadav
  AIR 2000 SC 3596: 2000 (9) SCC 327; Union of India &
  Ors. v. Gyan Chand Chattar (2009) 12 SCC 78: 2009 (10)
  SCR 124; Anil Gi/urker v. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetria Gramin
E Bank & Anr. (2011) 14 SCC 379 - relied on.

       4. The relevant rules governing the service
  conditions of an employee are the determining factors as
  to whether and in what manner the domestic enquiry can
  be held against an employee who stood retired after
F reaching the age of superannuation. Generally, if the
  enquiry has been initiated while the delinquent employee
  was in service, it would continue even after his retirement,
  but nature of punishment would change. The punishment
  of dismissal/removal from service would not be imposed.
G [Para 18) [1144-G-H; 1145-A]
      NO/DA Entrepreneurs Association v. NO/DA & Ors. AIR
  2011 SC 2112: 2011 (8) SCR 25; Kirti Bhusan Singh v. State
  of Bihar & Ors. AIR 1986 SC 2116: 1986 (3) SCR 230;
H Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. & Ors. AIR
   SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNI v. YP. EDUCATION              1131
                   SOCIETY
1999 SC 1841: 1999 (2) SCR 354; U.P. State Sugar                A
Corporation Ltd. & Ors. v. Kamal Swaroop Tandon (2008) 2
SCC 41: 2008 (1) SCR 887 - relied on.

     B.J. She/at v. State of Gujarat & Ors. AIR 1978 SC 1109:
1978 (3) SCR 553; Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. Punjab
National Bank & Anr. (2007) 9 SCC 15: 2007 (7) SCR 585;         B
UCO Bank & Anr. v. Rajinder Lal Capoor AIR 2008 SC 1831:
2008 (5) SCR 775; State of Assam & Ors. v. Padma Ram
Borah AIR 1965 SC 473; R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of
State AIR 1937 PC 27; State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram AIR
1970 SC 214: 1970 (2) SCR 657 - referred to.                    C

      5.1. In the instant case, the Tribunal, as well as the
Single Judge of the High Court have recorded a
categorical finding of fact to the effect that initiation of
departmental enquiry against the appellant had been             o
done with malafide intention to harass him. The charges
were not specific and precise; in fact, they were vague
and unspecific. Furthermore, the Management committee
had failed to observe the procedure prescribed in Rules
36 & 37 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private School          E
Rules, 1981. The said Rules 36 & 37, prescribe a complete
procedure for the purpose of holding an inquiry, wherein
it is clearly stated that an inquiry committee should have
minimum three members, one representative from the
Management committee, one to be nominated by the
                                                                F
employees from amongst themselves, and one to be
chosen by the Chief Executive Officer, from amongst a
panel of teachers who have been awarded National/State
awards. In the instant case, there was only a two member
committee. The procedure prescribed under the Rules is
based on the Principles of Natural Justice and fair play,       G
to ensure that an employee of a private school, may not
be condemned unheard. [Para 21] [1149-C-F]

    5.2. The Tribunal, as well as the Single Judge have
both made it clear that the inquiry had not been                H
    1132    SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A conducted in accordance with the provisions of Rules 36
  and 37 of the Rules 1981. However, they themselves have
  dealt with each and every charge, and have recorded
  their findings on merit. The Management committee failed
  to prove even a single charge against the appellant. The
8 present case is certainly not one where a punishment
  has been set aside only on a technical ground, that the
  inquiry stood vitiated for want of a particular requirement.
  Thus, in light of such a fact situation, the Division Bench
  has committed an error by giving liberty to the
C respondents to hold a fresh enquiry. [Paras 21, 22] [1149-
  F-H; 1150-A]

      5.3. The conclusion reached by the Division Bench
  that the Tribunal and the Single Judge had found that
  there was a defect in the manner in which the enquiry
D was held, and therefore there was no question of it
  recording a finding on merit to the effect that charges
  levelled against the appellant were not proved, is also not
  sustainable in law. It is always open for the Court in such
  a case, to examine the case on merits as well, and in case
E the Court comes to the conclusion that there was intact,
  no substance in the allegations, it may not permit the
  employer to hold a fresh enquiry. Such a course may be
  necessary to save the employee from harassment and
  humiliation. [Para 24] [1150-F-H]
F
       5.4. In the instant case, there is no allegation of
  misappropriation/ embezzlement or any charge which
  may cast a doubt upon the integrity of the appellant, or
  further, anything which may indicate even the slightest
  moral turpitude on the part of the appellant. The charges
G relate to accounts and to the discharge of his functions
  as the Headmaster of the school. The appellant has
  provided satisfactory explanation for each of the
  allegations levelled against him. Moreover, he has retired
  in the year 2002. The question of holding any fresh
H
   SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNI v. Y.P. EDUCATION           1133
                   SOCIETY

enquiry on such vague charges is therefore, unwarranted       A
and uncalled for. [Para 25) [1151-A-B]

     5.5. Rules 36 and 37 of the Rules 1981, which
prescribe the procedure of holding an enquiry were
violated. The charges levelled against the appellant were     8
entirely vague, irrelevant and unspecific. As per statutory
rules, the appellant was not allowed to be represented by
another employee. Thus, the procedure prescribed under
Rule 57(1) of the Rules 1981 stood violated. No
chargesheet containing the statement of allegations was       C
ever served. A summary of the proceedings, alongwith
the statements of witnesses, as is required under Rule
37(4) of the Rules 1981, was never forwarded to the
appellant. He was not given an opportunity to explain
himself, and no charge was proved with the aid of any
documentary evidence. There existed no charge against         D
the appellant regarding his integrity, embezzlement or
mis-appropriation. The Single Judge has also agreed with
the same. However, the Division Bench, though also in
agreement, has given liberty to the respondents to hold
a fresh enquiry. The court has not been apprised of any       E
rule that may confer any statutory power on the
management to hold a fresh enquiry after the retirement
of an employee. In the absence of any such authority, the
Division Bench has erred in creating a post-retirement
forum that may not be permissible under law. [Paras 26,       F
27) [1151-E-H; 1152-A-B]

    5.6. In light of the facts and circumstances of the
case, none of the charges are specific and precise. The
charges have not been accompanied by any statement            G
of allegations,or any details thereof. It is not therefore
permissible, for the respondents to hold an enquiry on
such charges. Moreover, it is a settled legal proposition
that a departmental enquiry can be quashed on the
ground of delay provided the charges are not very grave.
                                                              H
    1134    SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A   [Para 28] [1152-C-D]

       5.7. As the Tribunal as well as the Single Judge have
  examined all the charges on merit and also found that the
  enquiry has not been conducted as per the Rules 1981,
  it was not the cause of the Management Committee which
8
  had been prejudiced, rather it had been the other way
  around. In such a fact-situation, it was not necessary for
  the Division Bench to permit the respondents to hold a
  fresh enquiry on the said charges and that too, after more
  than a decade of the retirement of the appellant. The
C appellant shall be entitled to recover all his salary and
  retirement dues, if not paid already. [Paras 29, 30] [1152-
  E-G]
                         Case Law Reference
D
        1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 576 relied on           Para 7
        c2002) 10 sec 293        relied on          Para 7
        2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 603 relied on           Para 7
E       2008 (13) SCR 784        relied on          Para 7
        1987 (2) SCR 444         relied on          Para 8
        1990 Suppl. sec 738      relied on          Para 8

F       1995 (1) SCR 695         relied on          Para 8
        1998 (2) SCR 693         relied on          Para 8
        2006 (3) SCR 896         relied on          Para 8
        2006 (9) Suppl. SCR 257 relied on           Para 8
G
        2012 SCR 182             relied on          Para 8
        JT (2012) 11 SC 533      relied on           Para 8
        1971 (3) SCR 1           relied on           Para 9
H
   SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNI v. YP. EDUCATION            1135
                   SOCIETY                               /   .....
    1964 SCR 25               relied on           Para 11            A
    1986 (2) SCR 957          relied on           Para 11
    2000 (9) sec 327          relied on           Para 11
    2009 (10) SCR 124         relied on           Para 11
                                                                     B
    (2011) 14 sec 379         relied on           Para 11
    2011 (8) SCR 25           relied on           Para 12
    1978 (3) SCR 553           referred to        Para 12
                                                                     c
    2007 (7) SCR 585           referred to        Para 12
    2008 (5) SCR 775           referred to        Para 12
    AIR 1965 SC 473            referred to        Para 13
    AIR 1937 PC 27             referred to        Para 13            D

    1970 (2) SCR 657           referred to        Para 14
    1986 (3) SCR 230           relied on          Para 15
    1999 (2) SCR 354           relied on          Para 16            E
    2008 (1) SCR 887           relied on          Para 17
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
3935 of 2013.
                                                                     F
     From the Judgment & Order dated 04.10.2011 of the High
Court of Judicature of Bombay in Letters Patent Appeal No.
171 of 2011 in Writ Petition No. 1849 of 2003.

    C.U. Singh, Prity Kunwar, Shivaji M. Jadhav for the
Appellant.                                                           G

     Braj Kishore Mishra, Vijay Kumar, M.D. Adkar, Aparna
Jha, Siddhartha Arya Vishwajit Singh for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                     H
    1136        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A      DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred
  against the impugned judgment and order dated 4.10.2011 of
  the High Court of Judicature of Bombay in Letters Patent
  Appeal No.171 of 2011 arising out of Writ Petition No. 1849
  of 2003, by way of which the Division Bench of the High Court
B upheld the judgment of the learned Single Judge, as well as
  that of the School Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the
  'Tribunal'), quashing the enquiry against the appellant, while
  giving liberty to respondent Nos.1 and 2 to hold a fresh enquiry
  on the charges levelled against the appellant.
c           2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are
    that:

      A. The appellant was appointed as Assistant Teacher in
  the school run by the respondents on 7.6.1965, and was
D promoted as the Head Master of the said school on 21.6.1979.

      B. A new Management Committee came into power in the
  year 2000, and began to raise allegations of misconduct
  against the appellant, as the appellant had certain
E apprehensions with respect to the eligibility of certain office
  bearers of the Management Committee.

        C. The respondents-management issued show-cause
  notice dated 21.2.2001 to the appellant, under Rule 28 of the
  Maharashtra Employees of Private School Rules, 1981
F (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules 1981'), seeking an
  explanation as to why disciplinary proceedings should not be
  initiated against him, for his alleged misconduct. The appellant
  submitted his reply on 3.3.2001, and also challenged the
  eligibility of some of the elected members of the Management
G Committee.

       D. The Management Committee, vide resolution dated
  4.3.2001 took a decision to hold disciplinary proceedings
  against the appellant as per the provisions of Rule 36 of the
H Rules 1981, and in pursuance thereof, a chargeshoet dated
    SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNI v. YP. EDUCATION                 1137
         SOCIETY [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
17.5.2001 containing 12 charges of misconduct, was served            A
upon the appellant. The appellant vide letter dated 1.7.2001,
submitted his clarifications with respect to the said charges that
had been levelled against him.

     E. An Enquiry Committee consisting of two members               8
instead of three, as per the Rules 1981, conducted the enquiry
and submitted its enquiry report on 20.5.2002, making a
recommendation that the appellant be dismissed from service.
The said enquiry report was accepted by the Management
Committee, and the services of the appellant were terminated         C
vide order dated 24.5.2002 w.e.f. 31.5.2002.

    F. Aggrieved, the appellant challenged the said termination
order by filing Appeal No.65 of 2002, before the Tribunal. The
respondents contested the appeal. However, upon reaching the
age of superannuation, the appellant stood retired on                D
30.9.2002.

     G. The Tribunal vide judgment and order dated 19.10.2002
held, that none of the charges levelled ·against the appellant
stood proved, and that the enquiry had not been conducted            E
according to the Rules 1981. Thus, the termination order
against the appellant was quashed.

     H. Aggrieved, the respondents-management filed Writ
Petition No.1849 of 2003 before the High Court, and the
learned Single Judge decided the said writ petition vide             F
judgment and order dated 20.4.2011, upholding the judgment
of the Tribunal, and found the enquiry to be entirely defective
and thus, illegal.

      I. The respondents-management filed Letters Patent             G
Appeal No.171 of 2011, and the Division Bench too, upheld
the judgment of the learned Single Judge, as well as that of the
Tribunal, but simultaneously also held, that the respondents were
at liberty to proceed with the enquiry afresh, as regards the said
charges.
                                                                     H
    1138     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A       Hence, this appeal.

       3. Shri C.U. Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for
  the appellant, has submitted that the charges have been found
  to be vague, and that the enquiry was conducted in violation of
  the statutory Rules 1981, and further that none of the charges
8
  reflected embezzlement or mis-appropriation, and cast no
  doubt upon the integrity of the appellant whatsoever. As the
  appellant stood retired on 30.9.2002, the question of holding
  a fresh enquiry in 2011 could not arise. The court does not lack
  competence to decide the case on merits even if it comes to
C the conclusion that there has been violation of statutory rules,
  principles of natural justice or the order also stood vitiated on
  some other technical ground. There is no statutory rule
  permitting the Management Committee to hold an enquiry
  against a person who has retired a decade ago, particularly
D when the school is a government-aided school, and the
  appellant-employee receives pension from the State. Thus, the
  appeal deserves to be allowed.

        4. Per contra, Shri Braj Kishore Mishra, learned counsel
E appearing for the respondents, has submitted that a person
  cannot be allowed to go scot-free simply because he has
  retired. An enquiry can be conducted against him, and he can
  be punished by withholding either full or part of his pension. No
  fault can be found with the impugned judgment and thus, the
F appeal is liable to be dismissed.

         5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
    learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

       6. The appeal raises the following substantial questions of
G law:-

        (i) In case the punishment is set aside by the Court/Tribunal
        as the enquiry stood vitiated for technical reasons, whether
        the employer is entitled to hold the enquiry afresh from the
        point it stood vitiated;
H
    SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNI v. Y.P. EDUCATION                 1139
          SOCIETY [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

     (ii) Whether the enquiry can be quashed on the ground of         A
     delay;

     (iii) Whether the enquiry can be permitted to be held on
     vague and unspecified charges; and

     (iv) Under what circumstances enquiry can be conducted           B
     against the delinquent employee who has retired on
     reaching the age of superannuation.

     In case the punishment is set aside:

      7. It is a settled legal proposition that, once the Court set   C
asides an order of punishment on the ground, that the enquiry
was not properly conducted, the Court should not severely
preclude the employer from holding the inquiry in accordance
with law. It must remit the concerned case to the disciplinary
authority, to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood        D
vitiated, and to conclude the same in accordance with law.
However, resorting to such a course depends upon the gravity
of delinquency involved. Thus, the court must examine the
magnitude of misconduct alleged against the delinquent
employee. It is in view of this, that courts/tribunals, are not       E
competent to quash the charge-sheet and related disciplinary
proceedings, before the same are concluded, on the
aforementioned grounds.

    (Vide: Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad etc.etc. v. 8.          F
Karunakar etc.etc. AIR 1994 SC 1074; Hiran Mayee
Bhattacharyya v. Secretary, S.M. School for Girls & Ors.,
(2002) 10 SCC 293; UP. State Spinning C. Ltd. v. R.S.
Pandey & Anr., (2005) 8 SCC 264; and Union of India v. Y.S.
Sandhu, Ex-Inspector AIR 2009 SC 161).
                                                                      G
Enquiry at belated stage:

    8. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the
departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of
delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power      H
    1140     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A is de hors the limitation of judicial review. In the event that the
  court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of
  judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet
  or show cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary
  proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by court. The same
8 principle  is applicable in relation to there being a delay in
  conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and
  circumstances of the case in question, must be carefully
  examined, taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of
  charges involved therein. The Court has to consider the
C seriousness and magnitude of the charges and while doing so
  the Court must weigh all the facts, both for and against the
  delinquent officers and come to the conclusion, which is just and
  proper considering the circumstances involved. The essence
   of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all
   relevant facts, and balance and weigh the same, so as to
D determine, if it is intact in the interest of clean and honest
  administration, that the said proceedings are allowed to be
  terminated, only on the ground of a delay in their conclusion.
   (Vide: State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma & Anr., AIR 1987
   SC 943; ·State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Anr., AIR
E 1990 SC 1308; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal,
   (1995) 2 SCC 570; State of Andhra Pradesh v. N.
   Radhakishan, AIR 1998 SC 1833; M. V. Bijlani v. Union of
   India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3475; Union of India & Anr. v.
   Kunisetty Satyanarayana, AIR 2007 SC 906; The Secretary,
F Ministry of Defence & Ors. v. Prabash Chandra Mirdha, AIR
   2012 SC 2250; and Chairman, LIC of India &'Ors. v. A.
   Masilamani, JT (2012) 11 SC 533).

    Enquiry - on vague charges :
G        9. In Surath Chandra Chakravarty v. The State of West
    Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 752 this Court held, that it is not
    permissible to hold an enquiry on vague charges, as the same
    do not give a clear picture to the delinquent to make out an
    effective defence as he will be unaware of the exact nature of
H
   SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNI v. Y.P. EDUCATION               1141
        SOCIETY [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

the allegations against him, and what kind of defence he should   A
put up for rebuttal thereof. The Court observed as under:-

    "The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have
    to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges
    which have to be communicated to the person charged           8
    together with a statement of the a/legations on which each
    charge is based and any other circumstance which it is
    proposed to be taken into consideration in passing
    orders has to be stated. This rule embodies a principle
    which is one of the specific contents of a reasonable or      C
    adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person
    is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are
    on which the charges preferred against him are founded,
    he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination,
    discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in
    the contemplation of the authorities to be established        D
    against him." (Emphasis added)

      10. Where the chargesheet is accompanied by the
statement of facts and the allegations are not specific in the
chargesheet, but are crystal clear from the statement of facts, E
in such a situation, as both constitute the same document, it
cannot be held that as the charges were not specific, definite
and clear, the enquiry stood vitiated. Thus, nowhere should a
delinquent be served a chargesheet, without providing to him,
a clear, specific and definite description of the charge against · F
him. When statement of allegations are not served with the
chargesheet, the enquiry stands vitiated, as having been
conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice.
Evidence adduced should not be perfunctory, even if the
delinquent does not take the defence of, or make a protest with
                                                                   G
against that the charges are vague, that does not save the
enquiry from being vitiated, for the reason that there must be
fair-play in action, particularly in respect of an order involving
adverse or penal consequences. What is required to be
examined is whether the delinquent knew the nature of
                                                                   H
    1142     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A   accusation. The charges should be specific, definite and giving
    details of the incident which formed the basis of charges and
    no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges.

         (Vide: State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. S. Sree Rama
    Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723; Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan,
8
    AIR 1986 SC 995; U.P.S.R. T.C. & Ors. v. Ram Chandra
    Yadav, AIR 2000 SC 3596; Union of India & Ors. v. Gyan
    Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78; and Ani/ Gilurker v.
    Bi/aspur Raipur Kshetria Gramin Bank & Anr., (2011) 14 SCC
c   379).

       11. The purpose of holding an enquiry against any person
  is not only with a view to establish the charges levelled against
  him or to impose a penalty, but is also conducted with the object
  of such an enquiry recording the truth of the matter, and in that
D sense, the outcome of an enquiry may either result in
  establishing or vindicating his stand, and hence result in his
  exoneration. Therefore, fair action on the part of the authority
  concerned is a paramount necessity.

E Enquiry against a retired employee:

       12. This Court in NO/DA Entrepreneurs Association v.
  NO/DA & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 2112, examined the issue, and
  held that the competence of an authority to hold an enquiry
  against an employee who has retired, depends upon the
F statutory rules which govern the terms and conditions of his
  service, and while deciding the said case, reliance was placed
  on various earlier judgments of this Court including B.J. She/at
  v. State of Gujarat & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1109; Ramesh
  Chandra Sharma v. Punjab National Bank & Anr., (2007) 9
G SCC 15; and UCO Bank & Anr. v. Rajinder Lal Capoor, AIR
  2008 SC 1831.

        13. In State of Assam & Ors. v. Padma Ram Borah, AIR
    1965 SC 4 73, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that it is
H
   SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNI v. Y.P. EDUCATION                1143
        SOCIETY [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

not possible for the employer to continue with the enquiry after    A
the delinquent employee stands retired. The Court observed:-

    "According to the earlier order of the State Government
    itself, the service of the respondent had come to an end
    on March 31, 1961. The State Government could not by            8
    unilateral action create a fresh contract of service to take
    effect from April 1, 1961. If the State Government wished
    to continue the service of the respondent for a further
    period, the State Government should have issued a
    notification before March 31, 1961."
                                                                    c
                                             (Emphasis added)

     While deciding the said issue, the Court placed reliance
on the judgment in R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State, AIR
1937 PC 27.                                                         D

     14. In State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram, AIR 1970 SC 214,
this court observed:

     "There can be no doubt that if disciplinary action is sought
     to be taken against a government servant it must be done       E
     before he retires as provided by the said rule. If a
     disciplinary enquiry cannot be concluded before the date
     of such retirement, the course open to the Government
     is to pass an order of suspension and refuse to permit
     the concerned public servant to retire and retain him in       F
     service till such enquiry is completed and a final order
     is passed therein."

    15. In Kirti Bhusan Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR
1986 SC 2116, this Court held as under:
                                                                    G
    ".... We are of the view that in the absence of such a
    provision which entitled the State Government to revoke
    an order of retirement ....... which had become effective
    and final, the order passed by the State Government
    revoking the order of retirement should be held as having       H
    1144     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A       been passed without the authority of law and is liable to
        be set aside. It, therefore, follows that the order of
        dismissal passed thereafter was also a nullity."

        16. In Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. &
    Ors., AIR 1999 SC 1841, this Court observed:
8
        • ... There is also no provision for conducting a
        disciplinary enquiry after retirement of the appellant and
        nor any provision stating that in case misconduct is
        established, a deduction could be made from retiral
C       benefits. Once the appellant had retired from service on
        30-6-1995, there was no authority vested in the
        Corporation for continuing the departmental enquiry even
        for the purpose of imposing any reduction in the retiral
        benefits payable to the appellant. In the absence of such
D       an authority, it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed
        and the appellant was entitled to full retiral benefits on
        retirement. "

        17. In U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. & Ors. v. Kamal
E Swaroop Tandon, (2008) 2 SCC 41, this Court dealt with a
  case wherein statutory corporation had initiated proceedings
  for recovery of the financial loss from an employee after his
  retirement from service. This Court approved such a course
  observing that in the case of retirement, master and servant
  relationship continue for grant of retrial benefits. The
F proceedings for recovery of financial loss from an employee is
  permissible even after his retirement and the same can also
  be recovered from the retrial benefits of the said employee.

        18. Thus, it is evident from the above, that the relevant rules
G governing the service conditions of an employee are the
  determining factors as to whether and in what manner the
  domestic enquiry can be held against an employee who stood
  retired after reaching the age of superannuation. Generally, if
  the enquiry has been initiated while the delinquent employee
H was in service, it would continue even after his retirement, but
   SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNI v. Y.P. EDUCATION              1145
        SOCIETY [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

nature of punishment would change. The punishment of             A
dismissal/removal from service would not be imposed.

     19. The case requires to be examined in the light of the
aforesaid legal propositions.

    The following charges were framed against the appellant:     B

     (a)   Charge No.1 :-The first respondent did not submit
           dead stock verification report in spite of several
           letters.

     (b)   Charge No.2:-The first respondent did not submit
                                                                 c
           the documents such as cash books, ledgers and
           voucher files in spite of demands made by the
           management.

     (c)    Charge No.3:- relates to not calling School          D
           Committee meeting and causing loss of Rs.48851/
           - as no timely approval was obtained for that
           expenditure from the school committee.
     (d)   Charge No.4:- The first respondent did not send       E
           appointment proposal dated 4.9.2000 of Mr.
           Ghadge for approval to the Education Officer
           (Secondary) Z.P. Solapur and salary of the said
           teacher could not be paid .

     (e)   Charge No.5:- The Respondent prepared budget          F
           2001-2002 and forwarded to the management
           directly without obtaining sanction of the School
           Committee.

     (f)   Charge No.6:- The first respondent obstructed         G
           working of the management and the School
           Committee on the ground that he had challenged
           the election of the office bearers before the Joint
           Charity Commissioner, Latur even though there
           was no stay/injunction.                               H
    1146         SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A          (g)    Charge No.7:- The first respondent did not attend
                  any of the 11 meetings of the Managing Committee
                  in the capacity as a Head Master.

           (h)    Charge No.8:- The first respondent did not submit
                  explanation regarding his teaching workload though
B
                  asked for by the management as per letter No. SI
                  167 dated 11.12.2000.

           (i)    Charge No.9:- The first respondent did not give his
                  explanation about donation of Rs.4900/ - given by
c                 the Lioness Club of Barsi demanded by the
                  management as per letter No. S/174 dated
                  27.12.2000.

           Q)     Charge No.10:- The respondent did not reply letter
D                 no. S/131 dated 10.10.2000 in respect of Internet
                  connection.

           (k)    Charge No.II:- The first respondent did not explain
                  excessive telephone bills as stated by him in his
                  letter no.L/83 dated 26.10.2000.
E
           (1)    Charge No.12:-The first respondent did not submit
                  report as to his activities during two days on duty
                  leave in the office of Education Officer (Secondary)
                  Solapur and the Deputy Director of Education,
F                 Pune Region, Pune.

        The charges were found proved and punishment was
    imposed.

      20. The Tribunal examined all the issues involved, and
G recorded its specific findings as under:
       "The charge No.11 is in respect of excessive telephone
       bills. The telephone bill for the academic year 1999-2000
       is Rs.3931/-. According to Management this is excessive
       bill. The charge is vague. The explanation given by
H
SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNI v. Y.P. EDUCATION               1147
     SOCIETY [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.)
appellant that specifically no call was made for private        A
purpose. The objection regarding call at Chennai is
properly explained that this call was made to the Institute
of Brilliant Tutorials as it was required for the students of
Xth standard for guiding them for career for Engineering.
The Institute by names Brilliant Tutorials is famous well       B
known academy and some phone calls made to it are well
within the powers of Head Master. The total bill of
Rs.3931/- for a High School during a year cannot be
said to be excessive particularly when many of the calls
are made to Pune and Thane. These calls have properly           c
been explained that Writ petition was filed against the
school and these calls were made to the Advocate
concerned in connection with the Writ Petition. Calling
such an explanation on every call by the Management to
the Head Master is nothing but over victimizing or              D
interference of Management in day-to-day business of the
school.
xx            xx             xx                xx
      There is no evidence brought before the Inquiry
Committee to hold guilty for these charges. But the             E
members seem to have anxious to hold the guilty of the
charges to the appellant. They have based their conclusion
on some thread of evidence ignoring all other
circumstances and evidence in favour of appellant"
                                                                F
The Tribunal further stated as under:
(i) Charge No.1, is in respect of not submitting the
documents papers asked by the Management particularly
pertaining to dead stock.
(ii) Charge No.2 is regarding the Registers and journals        G
regarding school fees, voucher files etc. The accounts of
school are audited by the authorized auditor. Under these
circumstances, calling these record seems to be only for
finding loop holes. This is a sort of interference of the
Management in day-to-day work of the school, which is           H
    1148    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A      unwarranted. In spite of this, the explanation shows that
       there is sufficient compliance of direction and there is no
       insubordination.
       {iii) Charge No.3, is not calling meetings of school
       committee as per code .... and the explanation submitted
B      by appellant not calling the meetings is acceptable.
       {iv) Charge No.4, is in respect of not forwarding proposal
       of Shikshan Sevek to the Education Officer. The reasons
       explained by the appellant are acceptable.
C      {v) Charge No.5, is in respect of submitting the budget for
       the year 2001-2002 to the Management without approval
       of school committee. When the Management has
       accepted this budget this charge does not survive. As such
       when the Management has directly accepted the budget
D      and budget proposals, this charge ought not to have been
       framed at all.
       xx            xx              xx                xx
       {vii) Charge No.7, is in respect of not attending the
E      Management council meeting. This charge is also purely
       technical. The explanation of the appellant is that intimation
       of meeting was given by the Management at the 11th hour
       before few hours of the meeting without providing agenda
       of the meeting .... The explanation needs sympathetic
F      consideration and the allegations if at all considered,
       cannot be a ground for termination of appellant's service.
       {viii) Charge No.8, is in respect of workload of about six
       hours in a week to be discharged by the Head
       Master. ... Explanation given by the appellant is that the
G      hard subjects of science and mathematics were given to
       new comers as appellant was to retire in near future. He
       wanted that new man should be well prepared before
       appellant leaves the school. This explanation is reasonable
       and acceptable.
H
   SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNI v. Y.P. EDUCATION                 1149
         SOCIETY [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
           In the conclusion, I hold that the evidence on record     A
    is not sufficient to hold the appellant guilty of the charges.
    The net result of the scrutiny of the proceedings is that the
    inquiry seems to have been initiated on very technical flaws
    which lead to only conclusion that it was pre-determined
    and pre-judicial inquiry. As explained above, there is no        B
    sufficient proof on record to hold that the charges are
    proved."
      21. The Tribunal, as well as the learned Single Judge of
the High Co.urt have recorded a categorical finding of fact to
the effect that initiation of departmental enquiry against the C
appellant had been done with malafide intention to harass him.
The charges were not specific and precise; infact, they were
vague and unspecific. Furthermore, the Management
committee had failed to observe the procedure prescribed in
Rules 36 & 37 of Rules, 1981. The said Rules 36 & 37, D
prescribe a complete procedure for the purpose of holding an
inquiry, wherein it is clearly stated that an inquiry committee
should have minimum three members, one representative from
the Management committee, one to be nominated by the
employees from amongst themselves, and one to be chosen E
by the Chief Executive Officer, from amongst a panel of
teachers who have been awarded National/State awards. In the
instant case, there was only a two member committee. The
procedure prescribed under the Rules is based on the
Principles of Natural Justice and fair play, to ensure that an F
employee of a private school, may not be condemned unheard.
It is pertinent to note that the Management committee failed to
prove even a single charge against the appellant.
     22. Therefore the Tribunal, as well as the learned Single
Judge have both made it clear that the inquiry had not been          G
conducted in accordance with the provisions of Rules 36 and
37 of the Rules 1981. However, they themselves have dealt
with each and every charge, and have recorded their findings
on merit. The present case is certainly not one where a
punishment has been set aside only on a technical ground, that       H
    1150     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A the inquiry stood vitiated for want of a particular requirement.
  Thus, in light of such a fact situation, the Division Bench has
  committed an error by giving liberty to the respondents to hold
  a fresh enquiry.
      23. The Division Bench after examining the case, held as
B under:
        (i) If there was defect found in the manner in which the
        departmental enquiry was held, liberty should have been
        given to the management to hold a fresh enquiry if so
c       advised, and if the appellant was found guilty thereafter,
        punishment could have been imposed on him as
        permissible under law.
        (ii) Once the Tribunal and the learned Single judge have
        found that there was infact, a defect in the manner in which
D       the enquiry was held, there was no question of them
        recording findings on merit to the effect that the charges
        were not proved against the appellant.
        (iii) However, before taking any steps towards holding an
        enquiry, the management would have to make payment of
E       the full salary owed to the appellant, for the period between
        the date of termination of the appellant from service, till the
        date of his retirement.
        24. The conclusion reached by the Division Bench that the
F Tribunal and the learned Single Judge had found that there was
  a defect in the manner in which the enquiry was held, and
  therefore there was no question of it recording a finding on
  merit to the effect that charges levelled against the appellant
  were not proved, is also not sustainable in law. It is always open
G for the Court in such a case, to examine the case on merits as
  well, and in case the Court comes to the conclusion that there
  was infact, no substance in the allegations, it may not permit
  the employer to hold a fresh enquiry. Such a course may be
  necessary to save the employee from harassment and
  humiliation.
H
   SHRI ANANT R. KULKARNI v. Y.P. EDUCATION                1151
         SOCIETY [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.)

     25. In the instant case, there is no allegation of             A
misappropriation/embezzlement or any charge which may cast
a doubt upon the integrity of the appellant, or further, anything
which may indicate even the slightest moral turpitude on the part
of the appellant. The charges relate to accounts and to the
discharge of his functions as the Headmaster of the school. The     B
appellant has provided satisfactory explanation for each of the
allegations levelled against him. Moreover, he has retired in the
year 2002. The question of holding any fresh enquiry on such
vague charges is therefore, unwarranted and uncalled for.
      26. The Education Officer (Secondary), Zilla Parishad,        c
Solapur, had filed an affidavit before the High Court, wherein it
was stated that a dispute had arisen between the trustees, and
in view thereof, an enquiry was initiated against the appellant.
The respondents terminated the services of the appellant and
many other employees, as a large number of cases had been           D
filed against the Management Committee without impleading
the State of Maharashtra, though the same was a necessary
party, as the school was a government-aided school. Rules 36
and 37 of the Rules 1981, which prescribe the procedure of
holding an enquiry have been violated. The charges levelled         E
against the appellant were entirely vague, irrelevant and
unspecific. As per statutory rules, the appellant was not allowed
to be represented by another employee. Thus, the procedure
prescribed under Rule 57(1) of the Rules 1981 stood violated.
No chargesheet containing the statement of allegations was          F
ever served. A summary of the proceedings, alongwith the
statements of witnesses, as is required under Rule 37(4) of the
Rules 1981, was never forwarded to the appellant. He was not
given an opportunity to explain himself, and no charge was
proved with the aid of any documentary evidence. There existed      G
no charge against the appellant regarding his integrity,
embezzlement or mis-appropriation. Therefore, the question of
mis-appropriation of Rs.4,900/- in respect of a telephone bill
remained entirely irrelevant. Furthermore, the same was not a
charge of mis-appropriation. The learned Single Judge has
                                                                    H
    1152     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2013] 6 S.C.R.


A   also agreed with the same. The Division Bench though also in
    agreement, has given liberty to the respondents to hold a fresh
    enquiry.
       27. We may add that the court has not been apprised of
  any rule that may confer any statutory power on the management
B to hold a fresh enquiry after the retirement of an employee. In
  the absence of any such authority, the Division Bench has erred
  in creating a post-retirement forum that may not be permissible
  under law.
C      28. In light of the facts and circumstances of the case, none
  of the charges are specific and precise. The charges have not
  been accompanied by any statement of allegations, or any
  details thereof. It is not therefore permissible, for the
  respondents to hold an enquiry on such charges. Moreover, it
D is a settled legal proposition that a departmental enquiry can
  be quashed on the ground of delay provided the charges are
  not very grave.
        29. In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the
  Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge have examined
E all the charges on merit and also found that the enquiry has not
  been conducted as per the Rules 1981, it was not the cause
  of the Management Committee which had been prejudiced,
  rather it had been the other way around. In such a fact-situation,
  it was not necessary for the Division Bench to permit the
F respondents to hold a fresh enquiry on the said charges and
  that too, after more than a decade of the retirement of the
  appellant.
        30. In view of the above, appeal succeeds and is allowed.
  The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is modified
G to the extent referred to hereinabove. The appellant shall be
  entitled to recover all his salary and retirement dues, if not paid
  already. No costs.

    B.B.B.                                         Appeal allowed.
H