SHIVANI TYAGIversusSTATE OF U.P. & ANR.

                  [2024] 5 S.C.R. 36 : 2024 INSC 343

                              Shivani Tyagi
                                    v.
                           State of U.P. & Anr.
                (Criminal Appeal Nos.1957-1961 of 2024)
                                05 April 2024
            [C. T. Ravikumar* and Rajesh Bindal,* JJ.]

                           Issue for Consideration
       Matter pertains to suspension of sentence of life imprisonment of
       the convicted persons, and their consequential enlargement on
       bail, in an acid attack case.

                                  Headnotes
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 389 – Suspension of
       sentence pending appeal, and releasing on bail – Acid attack on
       victim at the hands of the accused persons – Victim suffered
       30-40 percent burn injuries resulting in total disfigurement of
       her face – Conviction of the accused persons u/ss. 307/149
       and 326A/149 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment – High
       Court suspended the sentence and enlarged them on bail –
       Interference:
       Held: (per C. T. Ravikumar, J) Mere factum of sufferance of
       incarceration for a particular period and likelihood of delay in
       disposal of cases, in a case where life imprisonment is imposed,
       cannot be a reason for invocation of power u/s. 389 without
       referring to the relevant factors – Each case has to be examined
       on its own merits and based on the given parameters – Acid
       attack may completely strip off the victim of her basic human
       right to live a decent human life owing to permanent disfiguration
       – Impugned judgment reflects only non-application of mind and
       non-consideration of the relevant factors required for invocation
       of power u/s. 389 despite the fact that the case involved an acid
       attack on a young woman resulting into permanent disfiguration
       – High Court took into account the offer made on behalf of the
       convicts that they would give a payment of Rs. 25 lakhs, and that
       the evidence that the victim had incurred an amount of Rs. 21



* Authors
[2024] 5 S.C.R.                                                              37

                    Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr.


     lakhs for her treatment besides the period of incarceration and also
     the delay likely to occur in the consideration of appeal – Serious
     nature of the offence involved was not taken into account besides
     the other relevant parameters for the exercise of power u/s. 389
     – Thus, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and is set
     aside, and the bail granted to the accused is cancelled [Paras
     9-12] – Held: (per Rajesh Bindal,J) (Supplementing) One of the
     principles of sentencing, being proportionality, if the appropriate
     punishment is not awarded or if, after conviction for a heinous
     crime, the court directs the suspension of the sentence without
     valid reasons, the very purpose for which the criminal justice
     system exists would fail – High Court directed the suspension
     of the sentence of the accused on payment of ₹ 25 lakhs to the
     victim – Amount was not accepted by the victim and the convicts
     could not be released from the jail – Also despite spending ₹ 21
     lakhs on the treatment, victim still has not been cured – Infirmity
     of the court is evident from the fact that the High Court went on
     to modify the earlier order and noted that a Demand Draft having
     been handed over to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the accused
     be released on bail subject to Surety Bonds – Order passed in
     the Correction Application does not suggest that there was any
     consideration of the parameters laid down for grant of bail or
     suspension of sentence, instead, the High Court noticed and
     directed that the convicts have offered to pay compensation to
     the victim for grant of suspension of sentence, which when she
     refused to accept, was directed to be deposited in the court – It
     was in a way kind of “Blood Money” offered by the convicts to
     the victim for which there is no acceptability in the criminal justice
     system [Paras 6, 7, 13]

                              Case Law Cited


           In the judgment of C.T. Ravikumar, J.
           Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai & Ors. v. State of
           Gujarat [1999] 3 SCR 545 : (1999) 4 SCC 421;
           Kishori Lal v. Rupa & Ors. [2004] Supp. 4 SCR 628 :
           (2004) 7 SCC 638; Anwari Begum v. Sher Mohammad
           & Anr. [2005] Supp. 3 SCR 287 : (2005) 7 SCC
           326; Khilari v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [2009]
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           1 SCR 543 : (2009) 4 SCC 23; State of Haryana v.
           Hasmat [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 132 : (2004) 6 SCC
           175 – referred to.


           In the judgment of Rajesh Bindal, J.
           Parivartan Kendra v. Union of India and Others [2015]
           12 SCR 607 : (2016) 3 SCC 571 : 2015 INSC 893;
           Suresh Chandra Jana v. State of West Bengal and
           Others [2017] 13 SCR 1 : (2017) 16 SCC 466 : 2017
           INSC 1296; State of Himachal Pradesh and Another
           v. Vijay Kumar alias Pappu and Another (2019) 5
           SCC 373 : 2019 INSC 377; Deepak Yadav v. State of
           Uttar Pradesh and Another [2022] 4 SCR 1 : (2022)
           8 SCC 559 : 2022 INSC 610; Gian Singh v. State of
           Punjab and Another [2012] 8 SCR 753 : (2012) 10
           SCC 303 : 2012 INSC 419; The State of Jharkhand
           v. Md. Sufiyan SLP (Crl) No. 1960 of 2022 decided
           on 16.01.2024; Sahab Alam alias Guddu v. State of
           Jharkhand and another (2022) SCC Online SC 1874
           – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
      Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.

                              List of Keywords
      Acid attack case; Suspension of sentence; Life imprisonment;
      Enlargement on bail; Disfigurement of face; Sufferance of
      incarceration; Delay; Public interest and social security; Permanent
      disfiguration of young woman; Principles of sentencing; Criminal
      law; Proportionality; Criminal justice system; Compensation; Blood
      Money.

                             Case Arising From
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1957-
      1961 of 2024
      From the Judgment and Order dated 12.12.2023 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Allahabad in CRLA Nos.2467, 996, 801, 1155 and
      467 of 2021
[2024] 5 S.C.R.                                                             39

                         Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr.


                                Appearances for Parties
      Niranjan Sahu, Adv. for the Appellant.
      Vinay Navare, Sr. Adv., Rajat Singh, Divyanshu Sahay, Sarthak
      Chandra, Akhand Pratap Singh Chauhan, Anil Verma, Tungesh,
      Nagendra Kasana, Rajesh Rathod, Ms. Palak Munjal, Aditya Sharma,
      Arun Kumar Arunachal, Advs. for the Respondents.
                     Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                           Order
      C. T. Ravikumar, J.
      Leave granted.
1.    In these quintuplet appeals the victim of an acid attack assails the
      suspension of sentence of life imprisonment of the convicted persons,
      the private respondents and their consequential enlargement on bail.
2.    Heard learned counsel appearing for the self-same appellant-
      victim in the captioned appeal, learned counsel appearing for the
      common first respondent-State of Uttar Pradesh and learned counsel
      appearing for the private respondents.
3.    Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the “Cr.
      PC”) deals with the suspension of execution of sentence pending the
      appeal against conviction and release of appellant(s) on bail. The
      said provision mandates for recording of reasons in writing leading
      to the conclusion that the convicts are entitled to get suspension of
      sentence and consequential release on bail. The said requirement
      thus indicates the legislative intention that the appellate Court invoking
      the power under Section 389, Cr. PC, should assess the matter
      objectively and that such assessment should reflect in the order.
4.    We will briefly refer to some of the relevant decisions dealing with
      Section 389, Cr. PC. In the case of short-term imprisonment for
      conviction of an offence, suspension of sentence is the normal rule
      and its rejection is the exception. (See the decision in Bhagwan
      Rama Shinde Gosai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat1). However, we


1    [1999] 3 SCR 545 : (1999) 4 SCC 421
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       are of the considered view that the position should be vice-versa
       in the case of conviction for serious offences when invocation of
       power under Section 389 is invited. This Court, in the decision in
       Kishori Lal v. Rupa & Ors.2, held in paragraphs 4 and 5 thus:-
              “4. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of
              execution of sentence pending the appeal and release
              of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between
              bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential
              ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the
              appellate Court to record reasons in writing for ordering
              suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed
              against. If he is in confinement, the said Court can
              direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond.
              The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly
              indicates that there has to be careful consideration of
              the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension
              of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as
              a matter of routine.
              5. The appellate Court is duty-bound to objectively assess
              the matter and to record reasons for the conclusion that
              the case warrants suspension of execution of sentence
              and grant of bail. In the instant case, the only factor which
              seems to have weighed with the High Court for directing
              suspension of sentence and grant of bail is the absence
              of allegation of misuse of liberty during the earlier period
              when the accused-respondents were on bail.”
5.     In the decision in Anwari Begum v. Sher Mohammad & Anr.3 this
       Court in paragraphs 7 and 8 held thus:-
              “7. Even on a cursory perusal the High Court’s order shows
              complete non-application of mind. Though a detailed
              examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation
              of the merits of the case is to be avoided by the Court
              while passing orders on bail applications, yet a Court


2     [2004] Supp. 4 SCR 628 : (2004) 7 SCC 638
3     [2005] Supp. 3 SCR 287 : (2005) 7 SCC 326
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                          Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr.


             dealing with the bail application should be satisfied as
             to whether there is a prima facie case, but exhaustive
             exploration of the merits of the case is not necessary.
             The Court dealing with the application for bail is required
             to exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not
             as a matter of course.
             8. There is a need to indicate in the order reasons for prima
             facie concluding why bail was being granted, particularly
             where an accused was charged of having committed a
             serious offence. It is necessary for the Courts dealing with
             application for bail to consider among other circumstances,
             the following factors also before granting bail, they are:
                     1.     The nature of accusation and the severity of
                            punishment in case of conviction and the nature
                            of supporting evidence;
                     2.     Reasonable apprehension of tampering with
                            the witness or apprehension of threat to the
                            complainant;
                     3.     Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support
                            of the charge.
             Any order dehors of such reasons suffers from non-
             application of mind as was noted by this Court in Ram
             Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3 SCC
             598, Puran v. Rambilas (2001) 6 SCC 338 and in Kalyan
             Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2004) 7 SCC 528.”
6.    After referring to the aforesaid paragraphs in the decisions in
      Kishori Las’s case (supra) and Anwari Begum’s case (supra),
      this Court in the decision in Khilari v. State of Uttar Pradesh
      & Ors.4 interfered with an order suspending the sentence and
      granting bail for non-application of mind and non-consideration of
      the relevant aspects.
7.    Applying the principles and parameters for invocation of the
      power under Section 389. Cr. PC, revealed from the decisions,


4    [2009] 1 SCR 543 : (2009) 4 SCC 23
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       as above, we will have to consider the sustainability of the
       challenge against the impugned orders by the appellant victim. In
       that regard a succinct narration of the facts involved in the case,
       strictly confining to the requirement for consideration of these
       appeals, is required. The private respondents in the appeals, five
       in numbers, were convicted finding guilty of offences, including
       under Sections 307/149 and 326A/149, IPC. The appellant-victim
       was then aged about 31 years and, in the incident, she suffered
       attack with sulfuric acid and her body was burnt 30 to 40 percent.
       PW-6, Dr. Uttam Jain with Ext.A5, would reveal that she suffered
       deep burn on the face, chest and both hands and injuries on her
       were grievous in nature.
8.     We may hasten to add that regarding the merits of the appeals
       by the party respondents against their conviction, we shall not be
       understood to have held or made any observation as it is a matter
       to be considered on its own merits in the pending appeals.
9.     We have already referred to the mandate under Section 389 Cr.PC
       that the order passed invoking the said provision should reflect the
       reason for coming to the conclusion that the convicts are entitled
       to get suspended their sentence and consequential release on
       bail. In the decision in State of Haryana v. Hasmat5, this Court
       held that in an appeal against conviction involving serious offence
       like murder punishable under Section 302, IPC the prayer for
       suspension of sentence and grant of bail should be considered with
       reference to the relevant factors mentioned thereunder, though not
       exhaustively. On its perusal, we are of the opinion that factors like
       nature of the offence held to have committed, the manner of their
       commission, the gravity of the offence, and also the desirability of
       releasing the convict on bail are to be considered objectively and
       such consideration should reflect in the consequential order passed
       under Section 389, Cr.PC. It is also relevant to state that the mere
       factum of sufferance of incarceration for a particular period, in a
       case where life imprisonment is imposed, cannot be a reason for
       invocation of power under Section 389 Cr.PC without referring
       to the relevant factors. We say so because there cannot be any


5     [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 132 : (2004) 6 SCC 175
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                    Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr.


     doubt with respect to the position that disposal of appeals against
     conviction, (especially in cases where life imprisonment is imposed
     for serious offences), within a short span of time may not be possible
     in view of the number of pending cases. In such circumstances if it
     is said that disregarding the other relevant factors and parameters
     for the exercise of power under Section 389, Cr. PC, likelihood of
     delay and incarceration for a particular period can be taken as a
     ground for suspension of sentence and to enlarge a convict on
     bail, then, in almost every such case, favourable invocation of
     said power would become inevitable. That certainly cannot be the
     legislative intention as can be seen from the phraseology in Section
     389 Cr.PC. Such an interpretation would also go against public
     interest and social security. In such cases giving preference over
     appeals where sentence is suspended, in the matter of hearing
     or adopting such other methods making an early hearing possible
     could be resorted. We shall not be understood to have held that
     irrespective of inordinate delay in consideration of appeal and long
     incarceration undergone the power under the said provision cannot
     be invoked. In short, we are of the view that each case has to be
     examined on its own merits and based on the parameters, to find
     out whether the sentence imposed on the appellant(s) concerned
     should be suspended during the pendency of the appeal and the
     appellant(s) should be released on bail.
10. Having observed and held as above, we are deeply peeved on
    perusing the impugned judgment, for the same reflects only non-
    application of mind and non-consideration of the relevant factors
    despite the fact that the case involved an acid attack on a young
    woman resulting into permanent disfiguration. In the case on hand,
    a scanning of the impugned order would reveal that what mainly
    weighed with the Court is the offer made on behalf of the convicts
    that they would give a payment of Rs. 25 lakhs through demand
    drafts, taking into account the evidence that the victim had incurred
    an amount of Rs. 21 lakhs for her treatment. Paragraph 10 of the
    impugned order would reveal that taking note of the said offer
    besides the period of incarceration and also the delay likely to occur
    in the consideration of appeal, sentence imposed was suspended
    and the private respondents were enlarged on bail. Paragraph 10
    of the order would reveal this position and it reads thus:-
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          “10. After hearing counsel for the parties and considering
          the voluntarily offer made by the appellants, which is
          without prejudice to the right of defence as well as right
          of the prosecution to be decided at the time of final
          adjudication and having no bearing on the merit of the
          case, over and above, the amount of compensation being
          paid by the District Legal Services Authority, Meerut, the
          appellants have offered to pay an amount of Rs. 25 lacs
          to the victim for her medical treatment and also in view
          of the long custody as well as the antecedents of the
          appellants and also considering the fact that the appeals
          pertain to the year 2021 and are not likely to be listed for
          final argument in near future, we deem it appropriate to
          grant suspension of sentence of the appellants.”
11. We have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order is infected
    with non-application of mind and non-consideration of the relevant
    factors required for invocation of power under Section 389 in the light
    of the settled position of law. An acid attack may completely strip
    off the victim of her basic human right to live a decent human life
    owing to permanent disfiguration. We have no hesitation to hold that
    in appeals involving such serious offence(s), serious consideration
    of all parameters should be made. Even a cursory glance of the
    impugned order would reveal the consideration thereunder was
    made ineptly. The serious nature of the offence involved was not
    taken into account besides the other relevant parameters for the
    exercise of power under Section 389, Cr. PC.
12. In such circumstances, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.
    The upshot of the discussion is that the order suspending the
    sentence of the private respondents and enlarging them on bail,
    invite interference. Consequently, the impugned order is set aside
    and consequently the bail granted to the private respondent in all
    these appeals stands cancelled. Consequently, the appellants shall
    surrender before the trial Court for the purpose of their committal to
    judicial custody. This shall be done within a period of four days. In
    case of their failure to surrender as ordered, the private respondents
    who are convicts shall be re-arrested and committed to custody.
13. The Appeals are allowed as above.
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                    Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr.


                                   Order
     Rajesh Bindal, J.
1.   I have gone through the detailed reasons recorded by brother C.T.
     Ravikumar, J. Elaborate discussion has been made on the aspect of
     suspension of sentence in heinous crimes as it is a case where the
     High Court had directed suspension of sentence of the respondents
     in an acid attack case, which will haunt the victim throughout her
     life. The disfigurement of the face of the victim, as is evident from
     the photographs placed on record, could not even be seen.
2.   It is a case in which after hearing the arguments raised by the
     appellant and going through the paper book our conscience was
     shocked. By a short order we granted the leave in the matters and
     allowed the appeals, for the reasons to follow. The respondents were
     directed to surrender before the Trial Court on or before 09.04.2024.
     The same is extracted below:
           “Leave granted.
           Appeals are allowed. Reasons to follow.
           The respondents-life convicts shall surrender on or before
           9.4.2024 before the concerned Trial Court. In case of their
           failure to surrender, they shall be taken into custody and
           produced before the Trial Court.”
     2.1 I fully subscribe to the views expressed, but wish to add some
         more reasons.
3.   The main ground on which the High Court ordered suspension
     of sentence of the respondents, who have been awarded life
     imprisonment is that the counsel for the accused submitted that in
     the evidence it had come on record that about ₹ 21 lakhs (Rupees
     Twenty-One Lakhs only) have been spent on her treatment as she
     suffered disfigurement of her face. It was further argued that the Trial
     Court in its judgment of conviction had directed that the victim be
     granted adequate compensation for her treatment under the Victim
     Compensation Scheme. Then, it was collectively argued by the
     learned counsel for the accused that without prejudice to their right
     of defence the accused collectively and voluntarily offered to pay a
     sum of ₹ 25 lakhs (Rupees Twenty Five Lakhs only) which may be
     given to the victim for her medical treatment. It was objected to by
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       the learned counsel for the State. Taking note of the offer made by
       the counsel for the private respondents, who are the convicts, the
       High Court accepted the offer made by them and directed that, over
       and above, the amount of compensation paid by the District Legal
       Services Authority to the victim, the private respondents have offered
       to pay a sum of ₹ 25 lakhs (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhs only) for her
       treatment. The sentence awarded to them was suspended. It was
       further noticed that the hearing of appeal is likely to take some time.
       Relevant paragraph 10 of the impugned order is extracted below:
               “10. After hearing counsel for the parties and considering
               the voluntarily offer made by the appellants, which is without
               prejudice to the right of defence as well as right of the
               prosecution to be decided at the time of final adjudication
               and having no bearing on the merit of the case, over and
               above, the amount of compensation being paid by the
               District Legal Services Authority, Meerut, the appellants
               have offered to pay an amount of ₹ 25 lakhs to the victim
               for her medical treatment and also in view of the long
               custody as well as the antecedents of the appellants and
               also considering the fact that the appeals pertain to the
               year 2021 and are not likely to be listed for final argument
               in near future, we deem it appropriate to grant suspension
               of sentence of the appellants.”
4.     As the victim may also be in shock and not interested in receiving the
       amount as offered by the private respondents, the respondents moved
       a Correction Application1 before the High Court. On the aforesaid
       application, the High Court, while noticing that offer made by the private
       respondents was not acceptable to the victim, directed the respondents
       to deposit the amount with the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut. The
       relevant part of the order dated 21.02.2024 is reproduced hereinunder:
               “Correction in the order dated 12.12.2023, is sought to the
               extent that the applicants have already handed over the
               demand drafts in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate,
               Meerut, as the victim has not come forward to accept
               the drafts, the appellants, who are granted bail, are still
               languishing in judicial custody.


1     Criminal Misc. Correction Application No. 12 of 2024
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                    Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr.


           It is further submitted that appellants have performed their
           part of liability by depositing the demand draft before the
           CJM, Meerut, thus they may be released on bail.
           In paragraph No. 11 of the order dated 12.12.2023, we
           modify to the extent that the appellants may be released
           on bail, even prior to handing over the demand drafts to
           the victims as ordered earlier.
           Notice of the application has been sent by registered post
           to Sri P.K. Rai, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2
           by Sri P.K. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellants on
           04.01.2024, but none appeared on behalf of respondent
           No. 2. Learned AGA has no objection to the prayer made
           by counsel for the appellants.
           The bail order dated 12.12.2023 was passed in other
           connected Criminal Appeal No. 996 of 2021, Criminal
           Appeal No. 801 of 201, Criminal Appeal No. 1155 of 2021
           and Criminal Appeal No. 467 of 2021.
           Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it
           is undisputed that the demand drafts have been handed
           over to the CJM, Meerut, the appellants be released on
           bail subject to furnishing of surety bond.
           The appellants will tender an undertaking before the Court
           that in case the victim appears subsequently and applies
           for release of money and in the meantime if the validity of
           the drafts have lapsed, they will revalidate the draft and
           hand over the same to the Court of CJM, Meerut.
           With the aforesaid observations, the order dated 12.12.2023
           is modified accordingly.”
5.   Detailed discussions have been made in the opinion expressed by
     my brother C.T. Ravikumar, J. with reference to the suspension of
     sentence in case of heinous offences. I would like to touch upon
     the issue of offer of money to the victim for suspension of sentence
     in a heinous crime of acid attack, where the victim suffered burn
     injuries to the extent of 30 to 40% resulting in total disfigurement
     of her face. As is evident from the record, despite spending ₹ 21
     lakhs (Rupees Twenty-One Lakhs only) on the treatment, she still
     has not been cured.
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6.     One of the principles of sentencing in criminal law is proportionality.
       If the appropriate punishment is not awarded or if, after conviction
       for a heinous crime, the court directs the suspension of the sentence
       without valid reasons, the very purpose for which the criminal justice
       system exists will fail.
7.     After passing of the order dated 12.12.2023 vide which the High Court
       directed the suspension of the sentence of the private respondents
       on payment of ₹ 25 lakhs (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhs only) to the
       victim, the amount was not accepted by the victim and the convicts
       could not be released from the jail. An application for correction2 of
       the impugned order was filed by the private respondents. The infirmity
       of the court is evident from the fact that despite this development,
       the High Court went on to modify the earlier order dated 12.12.2023
       and noted that a Demand Draft having been handed over to the
       Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut the private respondents be
       released on bail subject to Surety Bonds. It was recorded that, in
       case subsequently the victim appears in court for release of amount
       and the validity of the Demand Draft lapses, the private respondents
       shall get the same revalidated.
8.     From the facts it can safely be noticed that there is no question of
       acceptance of money by the victim as she has challenged the order
       of suspension of sentence of the private respondents.
9.     This court had been taking the offence of acid attacks, which are on
       increase, seriously. It is even to the extent of regulating the sale of
       the acid with stringent action so that the same is not easily available
       to the people with perverse mind. Observations made by this court in
       paragraph 13 of Parivartan Kendra vs Union of India and Others3
       being appropriate is extracted below:
               “13. We have come across many instances of acid attacks
               across the country. These attacks have been rampant
               for the simple reason that there has been no proper
               implementation of the regulations or control for the supply
               and distribution of acid. There have been many cases
               where the victims of acid attack are made to sit at home



2     Criminal Misc. Correction Application No. 12 of 2024
3     [2015] 12 SCR 607 : (2016) 3 SCC 571: 2015 INSC 893
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                       Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr.


            owing to their difficulty to work. These instances unveil that
            the State has failed to check the distribution of acid falling
            into the wrong hands even after giving many directions by
            this Court in this regard. Henceforth, stringent action be
            taken against those erring persons supplying acid without
            proper authorisation and also the authorities concerned
            be made responsible for failure to keep a check on the
            distribution of the acid.”
10. In Suresh Chandra Jana vs State of West Bengal and Others4,
    while rejecting the acquittal of an accused as ordered by the High
    Court in an acid attack case, this Court observed that the acid
    attack has transformed itself to a gender-based violence, which
    causes immense psychological trauma resulting in hurdle in overall
    development of the victim. Paragraph 30 thereof is extracted below:
            “30. At the outset, certain aspects on the acid attack
            need to be observed. Usually vitriolage or acid attack has
            transformed itself as a gender based violence. Acid attacks
            not only cause damage to the physical appearance of its
            victims but also cause immense psychological trauma
            thereby becoming a hurdle in their overall development.
            Although we have acknowledged the seriousness of the
            acid attack when we amended our laws in 2013 [ The
            Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013).] , yet
            the number of acid attacks are on the rise. Moreover,
            this Court has been passing various orders to restrict the
            availability of corrosive substance in the market which is an
            effort to nip this social evil in the bud. [Parivartan Kendra
            v. Union of India, (2016) 3 SCC 571 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri)
            143] It must be recognised that having stringent laws and
            enforcement agencies may not be sufficient unless deep-
            rooted gender bias is removed from the society.”
11. In another case reported as State of Himachal Pradesh and Another
    vs Vijay Kumar alias Pappu and Another5 regarding acid attack on
    a young girl of 19 years, in which this Court observed in paragraph
    13 thereof, that the victim had suffered 16% burn injuries and that


4   [2017] 13 SCR 1 : (2017) 16 SCC 466 : 2017 INSC 1296
5   (2019) 5 SCC 373 : 2019 INSC 377
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       such a victim cannot be compensated by grant of any compensation.
       Paragraph 13 is thereof extracted below:
              “13. Indeed, it cannot be ruled out that in the present
              case the victim had suffered an uncivilised and heartless
              crime committed by the respondents and there is no
              room for leniency which can be conceived. A crime of
              this nature does not deserve any kind of clemency. This
              Court cannot be oblivious of the situation that the victim
              must have suffered an emotional distress which cannot
              be compensated either by sentencing the accused or by
              grant of any compensation.”
12. The circumstances under which a bail granted by the court below
    can be cancelled, having been summarised by this Court in Deepak
    Yadav vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Another6. Relevant paragraphs
    31 to 35 are extracted below:
              “C. Cancellation of bail
              31. This Court has reiterated in several instances that bail
              once granted, should not be cancelled in a mechanical
              manner without considering whether any supervening
              circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to
              a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by
              enjoying the concession of bail during trial. Having said
              that, in case of cancellation of bail, very cogent and
              overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order
              directing cancellation of bail (which was already granted).
              32. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Dolat Ram v.
              State of Haryana [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995)
              1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237] laid down the grounds
              for cancellation of bail which are:
                      (i)    interference or attempt to interfere with the due
                             course of administration of justice;
                      (ii)   evasion or attempt to evade the due course of
                             justice;



6     [2022] 4 SCR 1 : (2022) 8 SCC 559 : 2022 INSC 610
[2024] 5 S.C.R.                                                           51

                      Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr.


                (iii) abuse of the concession granted to the accused
                      in any manner;
                (iv) possibility of the accused absconding;
                (v)     likelihood of/actual misuse of bail;
                (vi) likelihood of the accused tampering with the
                     evidence or threatening witnesses.
           33. It is no doubt true that cancellation of bail cannot be
           limited to the occurrence of supervening circumstances.
           This Court certainly has the inherent powers and discretion
           to cancel the bail of an accused even in the absence of
           supervening circumstances. Following are the illustrative
           circumstances where the bail can be cancelled:
           33.1. Where the court granting bail takes into account
           irrelevant material of substantial nature and not trivial
           nature while ignoring relevant material on record.
           33.2. Where the court granting bail overlooks the influential
           position of the accused in comparison to the victim of
           abuse or the witnesses especially when there is prima
           facie misuse of position and power over the victim.
           33.3. Where the past criminal record and conduct of the
           accused is completely ignored while granting bail.
           33.4. Where bail has been granted on untenable grounds.
           33.5. Where serious discrepancies are found in the order
           granting bail thereby causing prejudice to justice.
           33.6. Where the grant of bail was not appropriate in the
           first place given the very serious nature of the charges
           against the accused which disentitles him for bail and thus
           cannot be justified.
           33.7. When the order granting bail is apparently whimsical,
           capricious and perverse in the facts of the given case.
           34. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State
           of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] ,
           the accused was granted bail by the High Court. In an
           appeal against the order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P.,
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      2014 SCC OnLine All 16031] of the High Court, a two-
      Judge Bench of this Court examined the precedents on
      the principles that guide grant of bail and observed as
      under : (SCC p. 513, para 12)
           “12. … It is well settled in law that cancellation of
           bail after it is granted because the accused has
           misconducted himself or of some supervening
           circumstances warranting such cancellation have
           occurred is in a different compartment altogether
           than an order granting bail which is unjustified,
           illegal and perverse. If in a case, the relevant factors
           which should have been taken into consideration
           while dealing with the application for bail have not
           been taken note of or it is founded on irrelevant
           considerations, indisputably the superior court can set
           aside the order of such a grant of bail. Such a case
           belongs to a different category and is in a separate
           realm. While dealing with a case of second nature, the
           court does not dwell upon the violation of conditions
           by the accused or the supervening circumstances
           that have happened subsequently. It, on the contrary,
           delves into the justifiability and the soundness of the
           order passed by the court.”
      35. This Court in Mahipal [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020)
      2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] held that : (SCC p.
      126, para 17)
           “17. Where a court considering an application for bail
           fails to consider relevant factors, an appellate court
           may justifiably set aside the order granting bail. An
           appellate court is thus required to consider whether
           the order granting bail suffers from a non-application
           of mind or is not borne out from a prima facie view of
           the evidence on record. It is thus necessary for this
           Court to assess whether, on the basis of the evidentiary
           record, there existed a prima facie or reasonable
           ground to believe that the accused had committed the
           crime, also taking into account the seriousness of the
           crime and the severity of the punishment.”
[2024] 5 S.C.R.                                                            53

                       Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr.


13. The impugned order passed by the High Court is perused. Specifically
    the order dated 21.02.2024 passed in the Correction Application.
    The order does not suggest that there was any consideration of the
    parameters laid down by this court for grant of bail or suspension
    of sentence. Instead, the High Court had noticed and directed that
    the convicts have offered to pay compensation to the victim for grant
    of suspension of sentence, which when she refused to accept, was
    directed to be deposited in the court. It was in a way kind of “Blood
    Money” offered by the convicts to the victim for which there is no
    acceptability in our criminal justice system.
14. This Court in Gian Singh vs State of Punjab and Another7 while
    dealing with an issue regarding quashing of criminal proceedings on
    the ground of settlement between the offender and victim, observed
    that even if settlement or payment of compensation is pleaded in a
    heinous crime, still the same should not be quashed as the crimes
    are acts which have harmful effect on the public and in general the
    well-being of the society. It is not safe to leave the crime-doer on
    the plea of settlement with victim. Relevant paragraph 58 thereof is
    extracted below:
            “58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding
            having regard to the fact that the dispute between the
            offender and the victim has been settled although the
            offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion,
            continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in
            futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute
            between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored;
            securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding
            factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect
            on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously
            endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and
            it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and
            the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the
            victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes
            have been made compoundable in law, with or without
            the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences
            like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental


7   [2012] 8 SCR 753 : (2012) 10 SCC 303 : 2012 INSC 419
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               depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under
               special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the
               offences committed by public servants while working in that
               capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim
               can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences
               which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour
               having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial,
               partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising
               out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the
               family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim
               and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes
               between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such
               offences have not been made compoundable, the High
               Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash
               the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it
               is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is
               hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and
               by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall
               be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The
               above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will
               depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category
               can be prescribed.”
15. In the State of Jharkhand vs. Md. Sufiyan8, the Jharkhand High
    Court directed the accused to deposit certain amount in court, as
    ad interim compensation to be paid to the victim as a condition for
    grant of anticipatory bail. It was a case for various crimes committed
    under IPC, POCSO Act and I.T. Act. The aforesaid direction of
    the High Court was deprecated by this Court. It was opined that
    the willingness of the accused to pay compensation to the victim
    cannot be a reason for grant of anticipatory bail. Para 6, thereof is
    extracted below:
               “6. The factors on which anticipatory bail could be granted
               are very well crystallized in a catena of judgments of this
               Court. Leave aside the discussion of such factors, not
               even a whisper as to on what grounds anticipatory bail
               was being allowed were considered by the High Court.


8     SLP (Crl) No. 1960 of 2022 decided on 16.01.2024
[2024] 5 S.C.R.                                                              55

                      Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr.


            Merely because the accused is willing to pay some amount
            as an interim compensation cannot be a ground for grant
            of anticipatory bail.”
16. Similar view was expressed by this Court in Sahab Alam alias Guddu
    vs. State of Jharkhand and another9. Paras 2 and 8 thereof are
    extracted below:
            “2. We have a batch of petitions before us, arising from
            different nature of offences from dowry to Section 420 IPC
            to Section 376, IPC and POCSO Act. The common aspect
            in all these cases is that one particular learned Judge of
            the High Court has granted bail on condition on deposit
            of substantive sums of money without consideration of the
            requirements of bail dependent on the nature of offences. It
            is trite to say that bail cannot per se be granted if a person
            can afford to deposit the money or his capacity to pay.
            That is what seems to have happened. Since there is no
            proper consideration, it is also difficult for us to analyse
            what weighed with the learned Judge while granting bail
            and it is certainly not the jurisdiction of this Court to be
            first or a second court of bail.
            8. We also clarify that in view of our judgment in Dharmesh
            v. State of Gujarat (2021) 7 SCC 198 there is no question
            of victim compensation, as there cannot be such a criteria
            at the stage of grant of bail.”


     Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain                       Result of the case:
                                                               Appeals allowed.




9   2022 SCC Online SC 1874