Holding

The High Court was not justified in taking the will into account without formal admission, but it did not err jurisdictionally in overturning the Rent Controller’s order, which was not according to law.

Summary

The appellant, a tenant, occupied the first floor and barsati of a house in Defence Colony, New Delhi. The landlord, a doctor, sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, claiming a bona‑fide need for the premises for himself and his family. The Additional Rent Controller dismissed the eviction, holding the landlord's need was not bona‑fide, especially after the death of his wife and mother‑in‑law and the existence of an alternative house. The Delhi High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 25‑B(8), reversed that order, admitted a will of the landlord’s deceased wife (without formal evidence) and ordered eviction. The tenant appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court erred in taking the will into account and in reversing factual findings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in considering the will without formal admission, but it did not commit a jurisdictional error in setting aside the Rent Controller’s order, which was not "according to law". Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the tenant was given six months to vacate.

Issues considered

The High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25‑B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, may consider documents not formally admitted as evidence and without giving parties an opportunity to rebut.
Whether the High Court committed a jurisdictional error in reversing the factual findings of the Additional Rent Controller.
The proper interpretation of "bona‑fide requirement" under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
The relevance of the existence of alternative accommodation to the landlord’s claim of bona‑fide need.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14(1)(e), s. 25-B(8)

Subjects

bona fide requirementevictionDelhi Rent Control Actrevisional jurisdictionevidence admissibilityalternative accommodationlandlord's needSection 14(1)(e)Section 25-B(8)rent control

Judgment

A SHIV SARUP GUP.TA
v.

DR. MAHESH CHAND GUPTA

, · AUGUST 30, 1999
B
[V.N. KHARE AND R.C. LAHOTI, JJ.]

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-Section 14 (1) (e)-Bonafide
requirement-Landlord requiring premises for the professional needs of his
C son and himself, who are doctors and because of growing family-Rent
<;ontroller di~missed application as wife and mother-in-law of landlord died
and deceased wife of landlord owned another house in same city-High
Court held, house owned by deceased wife already mutated in favour offour
sons as per· .her will so alternative accommodation not available with
D landlord-On appeal held, High Court did not cummit jurisdictional error
in upholding claim for eviction-Bonafide requirement of landlord
substantiated-High Court not justified in considering contents of the will
find other documents without formally admitting them in evidence, and giving
the parties opportunity to prove and disprove them.

E Section 25-B (8)-Scope-Revisional jurisdiction of High Court-Not
as limited as under Section 115 C.P.C. nor as wide as that of an appellate
Court-,-High Court can.not appreciate or reappreciate evidence merely .-
because it takes a different view of the facts-High Court shall test the order
on the touch stone of "whether it is according to law"-For this limited
purpose may reappreciate evidence.
F
Bonafide requirement-Alternate accommodation available to
landlord-Choice of accommodation available-Court shall apply objective
standards to as-certain need for premises or additional premises-Court
would not impose own wisdom as regards such choice.

G .Words and Phrases- "bona fide or genuine need", "genuinely requires",
"requires bonajide"-Meaning of in context of Section 14 (J)(e)-Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1953.

Appellant is the tenant occupying first floor and Barsati in the suit
premises. Respondent landlord is a doctor by profession occupying the ground
If 1260
S.S. GUPTA v. DR. MC. GUPTA 1261
•• ~4 floor along with his family. The respondent landlord filed a suit for evictio.n A
before the Additional Rent Controller on the ground of bona fide requirement
under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The averments in the suit were that
. the accommodations on the ground floor was insufficient to meet the needs
of his family and that his son, who was staying along with him, was also a
doctor and patients often visited their residence when the clinic was closed. :ij
The Rent Controller dismissed the application on the ground that the wife
and mother-in-law of the respondent had died and therefore his need was no
more pressing and also that his deceased wife owned another house in the
same city.

The respondent preferred revision before the High Court contending C
that the house owned by his deceased wife had already been mutated in favour
of their four sons as per her will and therefore, the said alter-native
accommodation was not available to the respondent The High Court considered
some relevant documents and the will (which were placed before the High
Court along with an applications for admitting additional evidence) and
ordered eviction of the appellant. ,D

Aggrieved the appellant appealed to this Court contendin·g that the
High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction has committed a jurisdictional
error in reversing the finding of facts recorded by the Rent Controller and
that a serious jurisdictional irregularity had been committed by the High
Court by taking into consideration the document filed by the landlord for the E
first time before it without formally admitting the same in evidence and
without affording the tenant an opportunity of rebutting them.

The respondent contended that the documents placed before the High
Court merely intended to bring to notice a subsequent event and they were
of undoubted veracity; that th.e ultimate finding arrived at by the High Court F
would not be dislodged even if the said documents were not considered; and
that the finding arrived was the only finding that could have been reasonably
arrived at from the material available on record.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
G
HELD: 1.1. The High Court was not justified in taking into consideration
the contents of the will without formally admitting the same in evidence and
affording the parties opportunity of adducing evidence in proof and dis-proof
there of. [1274-E]

1.2. The High Court did not commit any jurisdictional error in H
1262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A reversing the order of the Rent Controller and upholding the respondent's ... ..•
~

claim for eviction. The order of the Rent Controller was not according to law
and was, therefore, rightly set aside. [1274-F]

2.1. Under Section 115 C.P.C. the exercise of revisional jurisdiction
of High Court is circumscribed by the subordinate court having committed
B one of the three errors, namely (i) having exercised jurisdiction not vested
in it by law (ii) having failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested (iii) having
exercised its jurisdiction with illegality or material irregularity. Under
proviso to Section 25-B, the expression governing the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction by the High Court is for the purpose of satisfying if an order
C made by the Controller is according to law. The revisional jurisdiction
exercisable by High Court under Section 25-B (8) is not so limited as is
under Section 115 C.P.C. nor so wide as that of an Appellate Court.
[1268-D-E]

2.2. High Court cannot enter into appreciation or re-appreciation of
D evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts
as if it were a court of facts. However it is obliged to test the order of the
Rent Controller on the touch stone of "Whether it is according to law" and
for that purpose it may enter into re-appraisal of evidence, calling for
interference under proviso to Section 25-B. [1268-F]

E Sar/a Ahuja v. United India Insurance company Ltd., [1998] 8 SCC 119
and Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani and ors., [1999]1 SCC 141, relied on.

3.1. Bona fide requirement is not defined in the Act The words "need"
and "require" both denote a certain degree of want with a thrust within
demanding fulfilment "Need" or "requirement" qualified by word "bonafide"
F or "genuine" preceding as an adjective-is an expression often used in Rent
Control Laws. "Bonafide or genuine need" of the landlord or that the landlord
"genuinely requires" or "requires bona fide" an accommodations for
occupation by or use for himself is an accepted ground for eviction and such
expression is often employed by Rent Control Legislation drafts man. The
G two expressions are interchangeable in practice and carry the same meaning.
The term bonafide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not
a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by "requires is much
more higher than in mere desire. The phrase "required bonafide" is
suggestive of legislative intend that a mere desire which is outcome of whim
or fancy is not taken note of by Rent Control Legislation. A requirement in
H the sense of felt need is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire in
S.S. GUPTA v. DR. MC. GUPTA 1263
. contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant. A
[1269-B-F]

3.2. Once the court is satisfied of the bonafide of the need for the
premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in
matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the
landlord his subjective choice will be respected by the court and its own B
wisdom would not be thrust upon the choice of the landlord. The concept of
bonafide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed
by realities of life and an approach either too liberal or too conservative or
pedantic must be guarded against. [1270-B-C]

Motilal v. Badrilal, ILR 1954 MBl, referred to Damodar Sharma v. C
Nandram Deviram, AIR (1960) MP 345, approved

Sarvate T.B. v. Nami Chand, (1965) JLJ 973 (SC); MM Quasim v.
Manohar Lal Sharma, AIR (1981) SC 1113; Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander-
and Ors., AIR (1988) SC 1422; Sar/a Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co.
Ltd, [1998) 8 SCC 119 and Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T. V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 D
sec 353, relied on
4.1. There is nothing unreasonable in a family with two practising
doctors, a daughter in law and two grand children who are gradually growing
in age, as members thereof needing a room or two or a room with a varandah
to be used as a residential--clinic. A drawing room, a kitchen, a living room E
and a garage are bare necessities for a comfortable lhztng. The respandent
has been living in the suit premises for more than 35 yearS'and the tenanted
premises were let out as being an accommodation surplus with him, but it
has become a necessity for occupation by him and his family members with
the lapse of time. (1273-C]
F
4.2. The death of the wife and mother-in-law Of the respondent, are
events which have hardly any bearing on the case offelt need of the landlord,
which as pleaded and proved is undoubtedly natural, sincere and honest and
hence a bonafide need. [1273-D]

4.3. It will be most unreasonable to suggest that the respondent may G
continue to live on the ground floor of the Suit premises and some members
of the family may move to the said alternative accommodation which is situate
at a distant place in a different locality or that the entire family must shift
there. (1273-F]

5. On the date of the initiation of the proceedings the said alternative H
1264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.
\'.

A accommodations belonging to the wife of the respondent was in actual
occupation of a tenant. On her death, if any one of the two wills, one passing
the ownership to one son or the other passing joint ownership to all four

B
sons, which was subsequently filed before the High Court, was to be given
effect and considered then also the said property does not belong to the
respondent and is not available for his occupation. (1274-B]
-
Prativa Devi (Smt.J. v. TV. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4166 of
1999.

C From the Judgment and Order dated 9.10.98 of the Delhi Hig_h Court in
C.R.No. 898of1995.

Ms. Syamla Pappu, R. Krishnamoorthi, Ajay Agarwal and Dharam Bir
Vohra for the Appellant.

D Arnn Jaitley, Amir Singh Pasrich, Mahesh Prasad and Ms. Nandini Gore
for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R.C. LAHOTI, J. The appellant, a tenant in a residential accommodation
has sought for special leave to appeal feeling aggrieved by an order of the
E High Court of Delhi which has in exerc_ise of jurisdiction conferred by Section
25-B (8) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 allowed a Civil Revision and directed
the appellant to be ejected from the suit accommodation reversing an order
of Additional Rent Controller, Delhi dismissing the landlord's application for
recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground specified in clause
F (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958 (hereinafter the Act, for short).

Leave granted.

The suit premises are situated at D-219, Defence Colony, New Delhi.
G The building has two floors and a Barsati. The accommodation in each of the
two floors consists of two bathrooms, two bedrooms, a study room, a glazed
verandah, a drawing-cum-dining room and a kitchen. There is a garage on the
ground floor and a servant room on the Barsati floor. The landlord is occupying
the ground floor. In July, 1978 the first floor and the Barsati were let out by
the landlord to the tenant -appellant for residential purpose. There was some
H controversy whether one room of the suit premises had formed part of the
S.S. GUPTA v. DR. MC. GUPTA [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 1265
. tenancy or was ill'ega1ly encroached upon and taken possession of by the A
tenant. However, that' controversy is over and the parties before us have
proceeded on assumption that the .. premises in occupation of the tenant are
all included in the tenancy.

The landlord-respondent is a practising doctor presently about 78 years
of age. In January, 1988 when the proceedings for eviction were initiated, the B
family of the landlord consisted of himself, his wife, a son Munish (also a
practising doctor), daughter-in-law and a grand son. The landlord has three
other sons, namely, Dr. Sunil Gupta, Dr. Anil Gupta and Shri Deepak Gupta.
Dr. Anil Gupta and one more - two sons are non-resident Indians settled
abroad. The third one has his own business and is residing separately from C
the father. The need pleaded in the application for eviction was that the
accommodation on the ground floor in possession of the landlord was not
sufficient to meet his and his family's residential requirement. The landlord
had a mother-in-law, suffering from various ailments and was practically a
dependent on the son-in-law, a doctor by profession. The two doctors in the
family needed some accommodation as a part of their residential unit for D
attending to the patients who visited them either in emergency or with previous
appointment at timings other than the fixed hours of the clinic which was
being run at 2544, Sir Syed Ahmed Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi in a part of
a house belonging to Joint Hindu Family of the landlord which had many
other members as well. Undisputedly, the joint family house is a commercial E
property and the portions other than the one occupied by the landlord for
clinic are in possession of the tenants,

Admittedly, there is a house property situated at C-217, Sarvodya
Enclave, New Delhi. The house there stands on a plot belonging to the wife
of the landlord and had come up some time in the year 1986. Eversince the F
date of ' construction and also at the time of initiation of the present
proceedings it was in occupation of a tenant and hence not available to the
landlord or his wife for their residence. Before the Rent Controller, the plea
taken and sought to be substantiated byi some evidence by the landlord was
that the landlord's wife had executed a will whereby the Sarvodya Enclave G
property was proposed to be bequeathed to Dr. Anil Gupta, the NRI son and
it is he who had invested his own funds in constructing the property.

Durii:ig the pendency of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the
mother-in-law of the landlord expired. The wife of the landlord also died. So
far as the requirement of the landlord by reference to the need of the mother- H
1266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 3 S.C.R.

A in-law and of the wife as a member of the family, is concerned, has come to
an eqd.

The learned Additional Rent Controller held that the landlord was the
owner of the suit premises and that the purpose of the letting was residential
one. However, on the solitary ground for ejectment, he held the alleged need
B of the landlord to be not bonafide. He further held that consequent upon the
death of the mother-in-law and the wife of the landlord, the accommodation
in possession of the landlord was sufficient to satisfy his requirement and
therefore it cou1d not be held that the landlord was bonafidely in need of any
additional accommodation. The learned Additional Rent Controller was also
C impressed by an admission of the landlord-respondent made in his statement
that the Sarvodya Enclave property if available to the landlord would have
been sufficient to meet his requirement. The death of the landlord's wife in
whose name stood the property was a subsequent event having impact on
the availability of the said accommodation to the landlord for satisfying his
alleged need. In view of these findings the Additional Rent Controller has by
D order dated 24.8.1995, dismissed the application for eviction.

The landlord preferred a revision to the High Court. The landlord also
moved an app,lication styled as one under Order 41 Rule 27 read with section
j'
151 of the CPG inviting the attention of the High Court to the effect of the
E death of his wife Sushila Devi on 13th January, 1995 and annexing with the
application copy of a registered will dated 13th June, 1994 executed by late
Smt. Sushila Devi. By the said will Smt. Sushila Devi has bequeathed her
house property no. C-217, Sarvodya Enclave in favour of her four sons
subject to Dr. Anil Gupta being reimbursed by the sons for Rs. 2 lacs, the
amount spent by him on construction over the said property. The application
F proceeded to state that,it was a material evidence to decide the controversy
between t}le parties and so the e'1deni::e deserved to be taken on record and
the petition disposed of after t\lking the said evidence into consideration.
Apart from the copy of the registeied will, the copies of the lease deed dated
12.7.78 of the plot in favour of the deceased, and the letter-cum-order from
G the DDA dated 29 .8.1996 intimating mutation of plot/property number C-217,
Sarvodya Enclave in favour of the four sons in place of their deceased mother
late Sushila Devi were also filed. The application was opposed on behalf of
the tenant. It appears that the High Court heard the final arguments. By the
impugned order, the revision filed by the landlord has been allowed and
eviction of the tenant ordered recording a finding of the premises in occupation
H of the tenant being needed bonafide for the residence of the landlord and his
S.S. GUPTA v. DR. MC. GUPTA [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 1267

family. The will dated 30th June, 1994 executed by late Sushila Devi filed A
before the High Court along with the application for additional evidence by
the landlord has been taken into consideration by the High Court though the
application does not appear to have been formally allowed and the documents
annexed therewith were not formally taken on record and admitted - muchless
proved - in evidence.
B
Before this Court, Ms. Syamla Pappu, the learned senior counsel for the
tenant-appellant has submitted that the High Court has committed a
jurisdictional error in reversing the findings of facts recorded by the Additional
Rent Controller. The jurisdiction so exercised by the High Court is not one
vested in it by sub-section (8) of Section 258 of the Act. The learned senior C
counsel further submitted that the findings of act arrived at by the learned
Additional Rent Controller were based on evidence and reasonably arrived at;
there was no occasion to interfere with and reverse the same. The teamed'
senior counsel also submitted that the High Court has committed a serious
jurisdictional irregularity by taking into consideration th<: documents filed for
the first time by the landlord before the High Court without formally admitting D
the same in evidence and without affording the tenant appellant an opportunity
of rebutting the additional evidence.

- Shri Arun Jaitley, the learned senior counsel for the landlord-respondent
has supported the order of the High Court. He submitted that the documents E
placed before the High court by the landlord along with his application merely
intended a subsequent event to be brought to the notice of the High Court.
The documents were of undoubted veracity. He further submitted that the
ultimate finding arrived at by the High Court would not be dislodged even
if the documents accompanying the application were excluded from
consideration. At the end submitted Shri Jaitley that the finding arrived at by F
the High Court was the only finding that could have been reasonably arrived .
at from the material available on record and hence the conclusion arrived at
by the Additional Rent Controller being not one 'according to Jaw' within the
meaning of Section 25-B (8) was rightly set aside by the High court, in any
case the present one was not a fit case for the exercise of jurisdiction under G
Article 136 of the Constitution, persuasively appealed the learned senior
counsel.

Section 25-B of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 finding its place in Chapter
III-A of the Act was inserted into the body of the main Act by Act No .18
of 1976 with effect from 1.12.1975. It provides for a special procedure to be H
1268 SUPREMp COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A followed for the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona
fide need. Obviously, this ground for eviction of the tenant has been treated
on a footing different from the one on which other grounds for eviction of
the tenant stand. Section 25-B is a self-contained provision in the sense that
remedy against an order passed by the Rent Controller thereunder is also
B provided by that provision itself. Sub-section (8) provides that no appeal or
second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any
premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified
in Section 25-B, provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying
itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to
law (or not), call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect
C thereto as it thinks fit. The phraseology of the provision as reproduced
hereinbefore provides an interesting reading placed in juxtaposition with the
phraseology employed by the Legislature in drafting Section 115 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. Under the latter provision the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court is circumscribed by the subordinate court
having committed one of the three errors, namely (i) having exercised
D jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (ii) having failed to exercise a jurisdiction
so vested, or (iii) having exercised its jurisdiction with illegality or material
irregularity. Under the proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 25-B, the expression
governing the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court is 'for the
purpose of satisfying if an order made by the Controller is according to law'.
E The revisional jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Section 25-B
(8) is not so limited as is under Section 115 C.P.C nor so wide as that of an
Appellate Court. The High Court cannot enter into appreciation or re-
appreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view
of the facts as if it were a court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged
to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of "whether it is
F according to law'. For that limited purpose it may enter into re-appraisal of
evidence, that is, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion
arrived at by the Rent Controller is wholly unreasonable or is one that no
reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached that conclusion
on the material available. Ignoring the weight of evidence, proceeding on
G wrong premise of law or deriving such conclusion from the established facts
as betray the lack of reason and/or objectivity would render the finding of
the Controller 'not according to law' calling for an interference under proviso
to sub-Section (8) of Section 25-B of the Act. A judgment leading to miscarriage
of justice is not a judgment according to law. [See; Sar/a Ahuja v. United
India Insurance Co .Ltd., [ 1998] 8 SCC 119 and Ram Narain Arora v. Asha
H Rani and Ors., [ 1999] I SCC 141.
S.S. GUPTA v. DR. MC. GUPTA [R.C. LAHOTl, J.) 1269

A perusal of Section 14 of the Act shows that the law has imposed A
· · restrictions on the recovery of possession. of any premises by landlord from
a tenant notwithstanding any law or contract to the contrary. However, an
;
order for recovery of possession is permissible on one or more of the specified
ground. One such ground is the premises let.for residential purposes being
required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or
for any member of his family dependent on him. What is a boftafide requirement B
is not defined in the Act. The words 'need' and 'require' both denote a
certain degree of want with a thrust within demanding fulfilment. 'Need' or
'requirement' qualified by word 'bonafide' or 'genuine' preceding as an
adjective - is an expression often used in Rent Control Laws. 'Bonafide or
genuine need' of the landlord or that the landlord 'genuinely requires' or C
"requires bonafide" an accommodation for occupation by or use for himself
is an accepted ground for eviction and such expression is often employed by
Rent Control legislation draftsman. The two expressions are interchangeable
in practise and carry the same meaning.

Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bonafide to mean 'in good D
faith : genuine'. The word 'genuine' means 'natural; not spurious; real: pure:
sincere'. In Law Dictionary, Mozley and Whitley define bonafide to mean
'good faith, without fraud or deceit'. Thus the term bonafide or genuinely
refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of
intensity contemplated by 'requires' is much more higher than in mere desire. E
The phrase 'required bonafide' is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere
desire which is outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the Rent
Control Legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an
outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contra-distinction with a mere pretence
or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy
the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to F
seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the
facts and circumstances protruding the need of landlord and its bonafides
would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective
determination by the Court. The Judge of facts should place himself in the
arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether in the G
given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises
can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive,
the need is bonafide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate
the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by
the tenant enabling the court drawing an inference that the reality was to the
contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or H
1270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court
certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the court is
satisfied of the bonafides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional
premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out ..
of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective
choice shall be respected by the court. The court would permit the landlord
B to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord
feels would be most suited .for the purpose; the court would not in such a
case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that
not one. but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to
satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of boaafide need or genuine
c requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life. An
approach either too liberal or two conservative or pedantic must be guarded
against.

The availability of an alternate accommodation with the landlord i.e. an
lo-
accommodation other than the one in occupation of the tenant wherefrom he
D is sought to be evicted has a dual relevancy. Firstly, the availability of another
accommodation, suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit
accommodation, may have an adverse bearing on the· finding as to bonafides
of the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises
to satisfy his alleged need. Availability of such circumstance would enable
E the Court drawing an inference that the need of the landlord was not a felt ,_
need or the state of mind of the landlord was not honest, sincere, and natural.
Secondly, another principal ingredient of c1ause (e) of sub-section (t) of
Section t 4, which speaks of non-availability of any other reasonably suitable
residential accommodation to the landlord, would not be satisfied. Wherever
another residential accommodation is shown to exist as available than t9e
F court has to ask the landlord why he is not occupying such other available
accommodation to satisfy his need. The landlord may convince the court that
the alternate residential accommodation though available is still of no
consequence as the same is not reasonably suitable to satisfy the felt need
which the landlord has succeeded in demonstrating objectively to exist.
Needless to say that an alternate accommodation, to entail denial of the daim
G
of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with
the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction.
Convenience and safety of the landlord and his family members would be ·
relevant factors. While considering the totality of the circ!lmstances, the court L

may keep in view the profession or vocation of the landlord and his family J
H members, their style of living, their habits and the background wherefrom they '
S.S. GUPTA v. DR. MC. GUPTA [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 1271

come. A
A few decided cases apposite to the poin~ may be referred. A Division
Bench of Madhya Bharat High Court in Motilal v. Badrilal, ILR (1954) MB
I. interpreted clause (g) of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan Samvat,
2006 where-under a landlord was entitled to eject a tenant if he "really needs
a house for himself and he possesses no other accommodation belonging to B
him elsewhere". It was held that the landlord was made the sole arbiter of his
own requirements but he must prove that he in fact wants and genuinely
intended to occupy-the premises. His claim would no doubt fail if the Court
came to the conclusion that the evidence of "want" was unreliable and that
the landlord did not genuinely intend to occupy the premises. As to alternative C
accommodation disentitling the landlord to the relief of possession it was held
that it must be reasonably equivalent as regards suitability in respect to the
accommodation he was claiming. This statement of law was cited with approval
before a Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Damodar
Sharma & Anr. v. Nandram Deviram, AIR (I 960) MP 345. Pandey, J. recording
the majority opinion emphasised the distinction between the expressions D
'genuinely requires' and 'reasonably requires' and said:-

"It is wrong to say that "genuinely requires" is the same as "reasonably
requires". There is a distinction between the two phrases. The former
phrase refers to a state of mind; the latter to an objective standard.
"Genuine requirement" would vary according to the idiosyncrasy of E
the· individual and the time and circumstances in which he lives and
thinks. Reasonable requirement belongs to the "knowledge of the
law" and means reasonable not in the mind of the person requiring
the accommodation but reasonable according to the actual facts. In
my opinion, in this part of Sec.4(g), the landlord is made the sole F
.arbiter of his own requirements but he must prove that he, in fact,
wants and genuinely intends to occupy the premises. His claim would
no doubt fail if the Court came to the conclusion that the evidence
of "want" was unreliable and that the landlord did not genuinely
intend to occupy the premises".
G

-- As to impact of availability of another vacant accommodation with the
landlord it was held in Damodar 's case (supra) that it must satisfy the test
of suitability for satisfying the need of the landlord.

-.J The above said Full Bench decision of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh was cited with approval before this Court in Saryate T.B.. v. Nemi H
1272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A Chand, ( 1965) JLJ 973 (SC).
In M M Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma, AIR (1981) SC 1113, this
Court has held (vide para 18) that the landlord does not have an unfettered
right to choose the premises but merely showing that the landlord has some
other vacant premises in his possession may not be sufficient to negative the
B landlord's claim if the vacant premises were not suitable for the purpose for
which he required the premises. This Court cautioned that the Court must
understand and appreciate the relationship between the legal rules and
necessities of life.

C In Ram Pass v. lshwar Chander and Ors., AIR (1988) SC 1422 this Court
has held that:-

"the need of the landlord should be genuine and honest, conceived
in good faith; and that, further, the court must also consider it
reasonable to gratify that need. Landlord's desire for possession,
however honest it might otherwise be, has inevitably a subjective
D
element in it and that, that desire to become a "requirement" in law
must have the objective element of a "need". It must also be such that
the court considers it reasonable and, therefore, eligible to be gratified.
In doing so, the court must take all relevant circumstances into
consideration so that the protection afforded by law to the tenant is
E not rendered merely illusory or whittled down".

In Sar/a Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. ltd, [1998] 8 SCC 119 this
Court has held that the Rent Controller should not proceed on the assumption
that the landlord's requirement is not bonafide. When the landlord shows a
F primafacie case a presumption that the require~ent of the landlord is bonafide
t
'
is available to be drawn. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord
as to how else he can adjust himself without giving possession of the
tenanted premises. While deciding the question ofbonafides of the requirement
of the landlo'rd, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else
the landlord could have adjusted himself.
G
In Prativa Devi (Smt) v. T. V. Krishnan, [1996] 5 SCC 353, this court has
held that in considering the availability of alternative accommodation, not
availability merely but also whether the landlord has the legal right to such
accommodation has to be considered.
-
H Reverting back to the case at hand, the landlord has been living on the
T

S.S. GUPTA v. DR. MC. GUPTA [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 1273
-. ground floor of the Defence .Colony house. It was conceded at the Bar that A
as on the day the family of the landlord consists of the landlord himself (a
practising doctor), his son (again a practising doctor), the daughter-in-law
and two grand children who are gradually growing in their age. Looking at
·- the size of the family, availability of three bed rooms in the premises in which
the landlord may live, is a requirement which is natural and consistent with
the sense of decency - not to talk of comfort and convenience. There is B
nothing unreasonable in· a family with two practising doctors as members
thereof needing a room or two or a room with a veranda to be used as a
residential clinic divided into a consultation room and a waiting place for the
patients. A drawing room, a kitchen, a living room and a garage are bare
necessities for a comfortable living. The landlord has been living in Defence
\ c
Colony locality for more than 35 years. The first floor which was let out to
the tenant in the year 1978 as being an accommodation surplus with the
landlord has with the lapse of time become a necessity for occupation by the
~ .;,..
landlord and his family members. More than ten years by now have been lost
in litigation. The death of the wife of the landlord, and the death of the
landlord's mother-in-law, are events which have hardly any bearing on the n
case of felt need of the landlord. The need as pleaded and proved by the
landlord is undoubtedly natural,. sincere and honest and hence a bonafide
need. There is no material available on record to doubt the genuineness of
such need. It continues to subsist in spite of the two deaths. It is not the
case of the tenant - appellant that while seeking eviction of the tenant the E
landlord is moved by any ulterior motive or is guided by some other thing
in his mind. It will be most unreasonable to suggest that the landlord may
continue to live on the ground floor of the Defence Colony house and some
members of the family,may move to Sarvodaya Enclave House ifthe whole
family cannot be conveniently and comfortably accommodated as one unit in
the Defence Colony house. It would be equally unreasonable to suggest that F
the entire family must shift to Sarvodaya Enclave house which is admittedly
situated at a distance of about 7-8 kilometers from Defence Colony. The
landlord and his family are used to living in Defence Colony where they have
developed friends and acquaintances, also familiarity with the neighbourhood-

- and .the environment. The patients usually visiting or likely to visit the G
residential clinic know where their doctor would be available. Shri Arun
Jaitley, learned senior counsel for the respondent, has very rightly submitted
that it could not have been the intendment of the Rent Control Law to compel
the landlord in such facts and circumstances to shift to a different house and
locality so as to permit the tenant to continue to live in the tenanted premises.
If the landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does H
1274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 3 S.C.,R.
\
A not command or compel him to squeeze himself tightly into lesser pr~,rnises
protecting the tenant's occupancy. In addition, we find that on the date of
the initiation of the proceedings, Sarvodaya Enclave property was belonging
to the wife of the landlord or to one of his sons resident abroad and was in
actual occupation of a tenant. On the death of the wife of the landlord if any
B one of the two wills (one which was in existence at the time of initiation of
the proceedings or the one, which appears to have been subsequently executed
by the landlords' wife and filed before the High Court) was to be given effect
to then the ownership in the property has passed on to one son or jointly
to four sons of the landlord. If the will itself is excluded from consideration
as not proved then also the ownership in the property has passed on to the
C four sons jointly. Sarvodaya Enclave property does not belopg to the landlord
and is not available for his occupation as an owner. To these facts the
applicability of law laid down in Prativa Devi's case (Supra) is squarely
attracted. In our opinion, the availability of Sarvodaya Enclave property is not
of any relevance or germane to determining the need and the bonafides of
the need of the landlord. We are not therefore inclined to attach any weight
'D to the application for additional evidence filed by the landlord before the High
Court though we agree with the learned counsel for the tenant - appellant that
the High Court w~s not justified in taking into consideration the contents of
the will without formally admitting the same in evidence and affording the
parties opportunity of adducing evidence in proof and dis-proof thereof.
E
For the forgoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the High Court did
not commit any jurisdictional error in reversing the order ofthe Rent Controller
and upholding the landlord's claim for eviction. Inspite of excluding frorn
consideration, the documents' which were proposed to be filed by the landlord
on the record of the High Court, the ultimate finding of the High Court is liable
F to be upheld. On the material available on record, the only conclusion which
could have been drawn is the one drawn by the \,High Court. The order of the
Rent Controller was not according to law and w~s, therefore, rightly set aside.

The appeal is dismissed. The tenant appellant is however granted six
...
months time to vacate the premises subject to filing usual undertaking within
G a period of one month on the affidavit of the appellant to deliver vacant and
peaceful possession over the premises to the landlord at the end of the
extended time and in between regularly paying the rent. Costs as incurred.
-·--
A.Q. Appeal dismissed.