Supreme Court of India
SHIROMANI GURUDWARAPRABANDHAK COMMITTEE, AMRITSARversusSHRI SOM NATH DASS AND ORS
- Citation
- 2000 INSC 166
- Decided
- 29 March 2000
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- M JAGANNADHA RAO
Holding
Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person, making the mutation in its name valid and the property belongs to the gurdwara.
Summary
The case concerned a piece of land and a building that had been gifted in 1920 as a charitable endowment for a Sikh gurdwara and recorded in the revenue records in the name of "Guru Granth Sahib" in 1928. The respondents, who were the descendants of the original trustees, later claimed that the mutation was void because Guru Granth Sahib, being a sacred book, was not a juristic person. The appellant, the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, argued that the Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person and therefore can hold property. The Supreme Court held that a juristic person can be any entity recognised by society, including a religious text that functions as the living Guru of Sikhs, and that the absence of a manager does not negate its juridical status. Consequently, the mutation was valid, the property belongs to the gurdwara, and the respondents' claim failed. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court’s decision and upholding the Tribunal’s order.
Issues considered
- The Guru Granth Sahib can be treated as a juristic person under Indian law.
- Whether a mutation of land in the name of the Guru Granth Sahib is valid.
- Whether an endowment to a juristic person is irrevocable and does not revert to the donor.
- Whether the absence of a manager defeats the existence of a juristic person.
- Whether a gurdwara and the Guru Granth Sahib constitute two separate juristic persons.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedures. 92
- Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925s. 10, s. 7(1), s. 8
Subjects
juristic personGuru Granth Sahibendowmentgurdwaramutation of landSikh Gurdwaras Actreligious propertytrustmanagerreligious institution
Judgment
SHIROMANI GURUDWARAPRABANDHAK COMMITTEE, AMRITSAR A
v.
SHRI SOM NATH DASS AND ORS.
MARCH 29, 2000
[M. JAGANNADHARAO AND A.P. MISRA, JJ.] B
Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925-Sections 7( 1), 8 & 10-Endowed Prop-
erty-Claiming it to be declared as Gurdwara-Mutation in revenue records
in the name of Guru Granth Sahib in 1928 in presence of ancestors of
respondents-The property was given in trust to the ancestors of respondents C
who did not perform their ob.ligation-Entry in revenue records challenged for
the first time before High Court-Plea that entry in the revenue records were
void since 'Guru Granth Sahib' was not a juristic person-Held, claim of
respondents not maintainable, since Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person
and on endowment never reverts even to the donor.
D
Juristic Person-When donor endows for any institution, it necessitates
the creation of a juristic person-When there is endowment of charitable
purpost;, it can create institutions like a church, hospital gurdwara etc.-But it
gains the status ofjuristic person when it is recognised by the society as such-
Whether 'Guru Granth Sahib' is a juristic person-Held, Yes: E
Status of juristic person-In absence of manager-Mere absence of
manager would not negate the existence of juristic person-It may be proper
and advisable to appoint a manager while making any endowment, but in its
absence, it may be done either by the trustees or the courts in accordance with
F
law.
The property in dispute was gifted to the ancestors of the respond-
ents, the Mahants, in charity by some villagers in the name of 'Gurugranth
Sahib Barajman Dharamshala Deb'. The Mahants sopped performing
their duties as Mahants and got the land mutated in their names. At the G
instance of one 'R' and others and in compliance with a 'Farman-i-
Shahi', the property was mutated in the name of 'Guru Granth Sahib
Barajman Dbaramsbala Deb' and the names of the ancestors of the
respondents was removed from the revenue records vide Exbts. P 8 & 9
of 1920AD and 1926AD. H
705
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 2 S.C.R.
A About 56 people of districtPatiala moved petition under Section 7(1)
of Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 for declaration that the property was a sikh
Gurdwara. The respondent, filed a composite petition under Sections 8 and
1() of the Act, challenging the petition u/s. 7(1), claiming therein that the
place being a Dera of Udasian was managed by them and their predeces-
sors. The petition was referred to the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal (Tribunal).
B
The appellant, SGPC, denied the place to be Dera of Udasi, claimed it to be
a Sikh Gurdwara, having been established by the Sikhs, where 'Guru
Granth Sahib' was the only object of worship. The appellant also chal-
lenged the Locus Standi of the respondents. In the cross-examination the
respondents admitted that they were neither performing any public wor-
c ship not managing the property. The Tribunal rejected the petition u/s. 8 on
the ground that they had no Locus Standi in view of their admission in the
cross-examination. The appeal against the same was also dismissed by the
High Court.
In petition u/s. 10 the appellant stated that the property was of
D 'Gurdwara Sahib Dharamshala Guru Granth Sahib' and the respondents
and their predecessors were only its managers and had no personal rights
in it. The Tribunal, in 1978, rejected the petition u/s. 10 holding that the
disputed property belonged to the appellants. The respondents filed appeal
before the High Court against the order of the Tribunal.
E
The appellant, filed a suit against the respondent for possession of the
building and the land, which was decreed in favour of the appellant Re-
spondent filed an appeal against the same.
Appeals filed by the respondents were heard together by the High
F Court. The respondents for the first time challenged the validity ofExbts. P
8 and 9, before the High Court, contending that the entry in the revenue
record was void as Guru Granth Sahib was not a juristic person. There was
difference of opinion between the two judges of the High Court, on this
point Justice 'T' was of the opinion that Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic
person and dismissed the FAOs upholding the judgment of the Tribunal.
G Justice 'P' dissented on the point, but did not decide the matter on merit.
The matter was referred to the third judge who agreed with the view of
Justice 'P'.
The FAOs against came before the same DB for final disposal on
H merits wherein Justice 'T' held the mutations to be valid and that respond-
SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMIITEE v. SOM NATH DASS 707
ents had to right on the property. Justice 'P' held the mutations to be A
invalid and that the property was the private property of the respondents.
Further holding that there cannot be a juristic person without appointment
of a manager; and that there cannot be two juristic persons i.e. the
'Gurdwara' and 'Guru Granth Sahib' in the same building; and that if
Guru Granth Sahib is juristic person every copy of it would be juristic
B
person; and that since Sikh religion does not accept idolatry Guru Granth
Sahib cannot be a juristic person. On reference, the third judge concurred
with the view of Justice 'P'.
In appeal, the respondents contended that courts have recognised an
idol as juristic person and not a temple. On this parity a Gurdwara cannot c
be a juristic person and Guru Granth Sahib is like any other sacred book
and the same cannot be equated with idol nor does Sikhism believe in idol
worshipping; and that the mutation in the name of 'Guru Granth Sahib
Birajman Dharamshala Deb, based on the Farman I Shahi is liable to be set
aside as the same did not direct the recording the name of 'Guru Granth D
Sahib'.
Allowing the appeal, this Court
HELD : 1.1. Juristic person may be any entity, living, inanimate,
objects or things. It may be a religious institution or any such useful unit E
which may impel the courts to recognise it. This recognition is for subserving
the needs and faith of the society. A juristic person like any other natural
person is in law, is also conferred with rights and obligations and is dealt
with in accordance with law. In other words the entity acts like a natural
person but only though a designated person, whose acts are ·processed F
within the ambit of law. [720-G-H; 721-A]
Roscoe Pound's Jurisprudence Part IV, (1959) Ed. pages 192-193;
Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. LXV, Page 40 and Volume VI Page 778;
Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edition, 305; Jurisprudence by Paton, 3rd
Edn., pages 349 & 350; Analytical and Historical Jurisprudence, 3rd Edition G
at page 357, referred to.
1.2. Where there is any endowment for charitable purpose it can
create institution like a church, hospital, gurudwara etc. The entrustment
of an endowed fund for a purpose can only be used by the person so H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 2 S.C.R.
A entrusted for that purpose in as much as he receives it for that purpose
alone in trust. ·when the donor endows for an idol or a mosque or for any
institution, it necessitates the creation of a juristic person. The law also
circumscribes the rights of any person receiving such entrustment to use it
only for the purpose of such a juristic person. The endowment may be given
B for various purposes, may be for a church, idol or gurudwara or such other
things that the human faculty may conceive of, out of faith and conscience
but it gains the sfatus of juristic person when it is recognised by the society
as such. (721-C-D]
Sarangadeva Periya Matam & Am: v. Ramaswamy Goundar (dead) by
C legal representative, AIR (1966) SC 1603; Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak
Committee, Amritsar, AIR (1938) Lahore 369; Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar &
Ors., AIR (1957) SC 137; Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India & Am:, (1981)
1 SCC 449; Yogendra Nath Naskar v. Commissioner ofIncome Tax, Calcutta,
[1969) 1 SCC 555 and Manohar Ganesh v. Lakshmiram, JLR 12 Born. 247,
referred to.
D
Pritam Dass Mahant v. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee,
[1984) 2 sec 600, relied on.
1.3. Faith and belief cannot be judged through any judicial scrutiny.
E It is a fact accomplished and accepted by its followers. This faith necessi-
tated creation of a unit to be recognised as a 'Juristic Person'. All this
shows that 'Juristic Person' is not roped in any cirde. With the changing
thoughts, changing needs of the society, fresh juristic personalities were
created from time to time. [725-H; 726-A]
F 2.1. Itis not necessary for 'Guru Granth Sahib' to be declared as a
·juristic person that it should be equated with an idol. When belief and faith
of two different religions are different, there is no question of equating one
with the other. If 'Guru Granth Sahib' by itself could stan.d the test of its
being declared as such, it can be declared to be so. [726-C]
G 2.2 'Guru Granth Sahib' is a 'juristic person'. It cannot be equated
with an idol as idol worship is contrary to Sikhism. As a concept of
visionary for obeisance, the two religions are different. Yet, for its legal
recognition as a juristic person, the followers of both the religious give them
respectively the same reverential value. Thus the Guru Granth Sahib has
H all the qualities to be recognised as such. Holding otherwise would mean
SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITIEE v. SOM NATH DASS 709
giving too restrictive a meaning to a 'juristic person', and that would erase A
the very jurisprudence which gave birth to it. (728-D-E]
A History of Sikhs by Khushwant Singh, Vol. I, Page 307, referred to.
2.3. No endowment or a juristic person depends on the appointment
of a manager. It may be proper or advisable to appoint such a manager B
while making any endowment but in its absence, it may be done either by
the trustees or courts in accordance with law. Hno manager is appointed by
the founder, the ruler will give effect to the bounty. The property given in
trust becomes irrevocable and if none was appointed to manage, it will be
managed by the 'court as representing the sovereign'. This can be done by
court in several ways under section 92, CPC or by handing over manage- c
ment to any specific body recognised by law. But the trust will not be •
allowed by the court to fail. Endowment is when donor parts with his
property for it being used for a public purpose and its entrustment is to a
person or group of persons in trust for carrying out- the objective of such
entrustment. (728-G-H; 729-B-C] D
YogendraNathNaskarv. Commissioneroflncome Tax, Calcutta, (1969)
1 SCC 555 ; Manohar Ganesh v. Lakshmiram, ILR 12 Born. 247 and Vidyapurna
Tirtha Swami v. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami & Ors., ILR 27 Mad. 437, relied on.
2.4. Once endowment is made, it is final and it is irrevocable. It is the E
onerous duty of persons entrusted with such endowment, to carry out the
objectives of this entrustment. They may appoint a manager in the absence
of any indication in the trust or get it appointed through court. So, if
entrustment is to any juristic person, mere absence of manager would not
negate the existence of a juristic person. (729-D]
F
2.5. 'Gurdwara' and 'Guru Granth Sahib' are no two 'juristic per-
sons' at all. In fact both are so interwoven that they cannot be separated.
The installation of 'Guru Granth Sahib' is the nucleus or nectar of any
Gurdwara. If there is no Guru Granth Sahib in a Gurdwara it cannot be
termed as Gurdwara. When one refers a building to be ~ Gurdwara, he G
refers to it so only because 'Guru Granth Sahib' is installed therein. Even if
one holds a Gurdwara to be a juristic person, it is because it holds the
'Guru Granth Sahib'. (729-F-G]
Ram Jankijee Deities and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Others, (1999) 5
sec 50, relied on. H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A 2.6. Every 'Guru Granth Sahib' cannot be a juristic person unless it
takes juristic role through its installation in a Gurdwara or at such other
recognised public place. [730-D]
2.7. Though it i.s true that Guru Granth Sahib is a sacred book like
others but it cannot be equated with the other sacred books in that sense.
B Guru Granth Sahib is revered in Gurdwara, like a Guru which projects a
different perception. It is the very heart and spirit of the Gurdwara. The
reverence of Guru Granth on the one hand and other sacred books on the
other hand is based on different conceptual faith, belief, and application.
[730-E-F]
c 2.8. It is true that Sikh religion does not accept idolatry but, at the
same time when the tenth Guru declared that after him the Guru Granth
will be the Guru, that does not amount to idolatry. The Granth replaces the
Guru henceforward, after the tenth Guru. (730-G]
D 3.1. No error could be said to have been committed, when Ex.8 and
Ex.9, viz. Mutations were recorded. The mutation was not on account of
Farman-i-Shahi but was made because of the application made by 'R' and
others, and mutation was done only after a detailed enquiry, after examin-
ing witnesses and other evidence on the record, which resulted into Ex.8
and Ex.9. Farman-i-Shahi if at all may be said to have led to the enquiry but
E it was not the basis. (732-F]
3.2. Any claim to the disputed land by the respondents has no merit.
The mutation in the revenue papers in the name of Guru Granth Sahib was
made as far back as in the year 1928, in the presence of the ancestors of
respondents and no objection was raised by anybody till the filing of the
F
present objection by the respondents. This is after a long gap of forty years.
Further, this property was given in trust to the ancestors of the respondents
for a special purpose but they did not perform their obligation. It is also
settled that once an endowment, it never reverts even to the donor. Then no
part of these rights could be claimed or usurped· by the respondent's
G ancestors who in fact were trustees. {733-D-E]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3968 of 1987
Etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.4.85 of the Punjab and Haryana
H High Court in F.A.O. No. 449 of 1978.
SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMIITEll v. SOM NATH DASS [MISRA, J.] 711
M.S. Gujaral, Ujagar Singh, Harbans Lal, Hardev Singh, Ms. Madhu A
• Moolchandani, Ms. B.K. Brar, Ms. Shobha, S.K. Mehta, Ashok K. Mahajan,
A.V. Palli, Mrs. Rekha Palli, P.N. Puri, Atul Sharma, D.D. Sharma, Dhruv
Mehta, Aman Vachhar, D.P. Sharma, Narinder Singh and R.K. Aggarwal for
the appearing parties.
The Judgnient of the Court was delivered by B
-- MISRA, J. The question raised in this appeal is of far reaching
consequences and is of great significance to one of the major religious
followers of this country. The question is: whether "the Guru Granth Sahib"
could be treated as a juristic person or not? If it is, then it can hold and use c
--- the gifted properties given to it by its followers out of their love, in charity.
This is by creation of an endowment like others for public good, for enhancing
the religious fervour, including feeding the poor etc. Sikhism grew because of
... the vibrating divinity of Guru Nanakji and the 10 succeeding gurus, and the
wealth of all their teachings is contained in 'Guru Granth Sahib'. The last of
the living guru was Guru Gobind Singhji who recorded the sanctity of "Guru D
Granth Sahib" and gave it the recognition of a living Guru. Thereafter, it
remained not only a sacred book but is reckoned as a living guru. The deep
faith of every earnest follower, when his pure conscience meets the divine
under-current emanating from their Guru, produces a feeling of sacrifice and
surrender and impels him to part with or gift out his wealth to any charity may E
be for gurdwaras, dharamshalas etc. Such parting spiritualises such follower
for his spiritual upliftment, peace, tranquility and enlightens him with resultant
love and universalism. Such donors in the past, raised number of Gurdwaras.
They gave their wealth in trust for its management to the trustees to subserve
their desire. They expected trustees to faithfully implement the objectives for
F
-. which the wealth was entrusted. When selfishness invades any trustee, the core
of trust starts leaking out. To stop such leakage, legislature and courts step in.
This is what was happening in the absence of any organised management of
Gurudwaras, when trustees were either mismanaging or attempting to usurp
such trusts. The Sikh Gurdwaras and Shrines Act 1922 (VI of 1922) was
enacted to meet the situation. It seems, even this failed to satisfy the G
aspirations of the Sikhs. The main reason being that it did not establish any
permanent committee of management for Sikh gurdwaras and did not provide
. for the speedy confirmation by judicial sanction of changes already introduced
by the reforming party in the management of places of worship. This was
replaced by the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 (Punjab Act No. 8of1925) under H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A which the present case arises. This Act provided a legal procedure through
which gurdwaras and shrines regarded by Sikhs as essential places of Sikh • ,
worship to be effectively and permanently brought under Sikh control and
management, so as to make it consistent with the religious followings of this
community.
B About 56 persons of villages Bilaspur, Ghodani, Dhamot, Lapran and
Buani situated in the Village Bilaspur, District Patiala moved petition under
Section 7(1) of the said Act for declaration that the disputed property is a Sikh
Gurdwara. The State Government through Notification No. 1702 - G.P. dated
14th September, 1962 published the aforesaid petition in the Gazette including
c the boundaries of the said gurdwaras which were to be declared as Sikh
Gurdwaras. Thereafter, a composite petition under Sections 8 and IO of the
said Act was filed by Som Dass son of Bhagat Ram, Sant Ram son of Narain
Dass and Anant Ram son of Sham Dass of Village Bilaspur, District Patiala,
challenging the same. They claimed it to be a dharamshala and Dera of
Udasian being owned and managed by the petitioners and their predecessors
D
since the time of their forefathers and that they being the holders of the same,
received the said Dera in succession, in accordance with their ancestral share.
They also claimed to be in possession of the land attached to the said Dera.
They denied it to be a Sikh Gurdwara. This petition was forwarded by the
Government to the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal, hereinafter referred to as "the
E Tribunal". In reply to the notice, the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak
Committee, hereinafter referred to as "the SGPC" (appellant), claimed it to be
a Sikh Gurdwara, having been established by the Sikhs for their worship,
wherein "Guru Granth Sahib" was the only object of worship and it was the
sole owner of the gurdwara property. It dertied this institution to be an Udasi
F Dera. However, appellant Committee challenged the locus standi of the
respondent to file this objection to the notification. The appellant's case was
under Section 8 and objection could only be filed by any hereditary office-
holders or by 20 or more worshippers of the gurdwara, which they were not.
The Tribunal held that the petitioners before it (respondents here), admitted in
their cross-examination that the disputed premises was being used by them as
G their residential house that there was no object of worship in the premises,
neither they were performing any public worship nor they were managing it.
So it held they were not hereditary office holders, as they neither managed it
nor performed any public worship. Thus, their petition under Section 8 was
rejected on 9th February, 1965 by holding that they have no locus standi.
H Aggrieved by this they filed first appeal being FAO No. 40 of 1965 which was
SHJROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITI'EE v. SOM NATii DASS [MISRA, J.] 713
---...... also dismissed by the High Court on 24th March, 1976, which became final.
Thereafter, the Tribunal took the petition under Section 10 in which tJie stand
of SGPC was that the land and the buildings were the properties of 'Gufdwara
A
Sahib Dharamshala Guru Granth Sahib' at Bilaspur. The responden~s and their
- predecessors along with their family members had alf along been its managers
and they had no personal rights in it. The Tribunal framed two issues:
B
"(1) What right, title or interest have the petitioners in the property
in dispute?
(2) What right, title or interest has the notified Sikh Gurdwara in the
property in dispute."
c
The Tribunal decided both issue No. 1 and issue No. 2 in favour of
•
present appellants and held that the disputed property belonged to the SGPC.
Thus respondents' petition under Section 10 was also rejected on 4th Septem-
ber 1978. Tribunal's conclusion is reproduced hereinbelow:
"The above discussion shows that the respondent-Committee has
D
been successful in bringing its case rightly in Clauses l8 (l)(a) and
18(1)(d) of the Act and has been successful in discharging its onus
as regards issue no. 2 and the issue is, therefore, decided in favour
of the respondent-Committee and against the petitioners.
E
For the reasons given above, it is held that the petitioners have
--/
failed to prove that they have got any right, title or interest in the
property in dispute and issue no. 1 is decided against them and this
petition is dismissed with costs. However, it is declared that the
institution in dispute, namely, Gurdwara Sahib Dharamshala Guru
Granth Sahib, situated in the revenue estate of Balapsur, Tehsil F
- Sirhind, District Patiala is the owner of the property in dispute
consisting of Gurdwara building, the plan of which is given in the
Notification No. 1702 G.P. dated 14.9.68 at page 2527 and the
agricultural land measuring 115 Bighas 12 Biswas the detail of which
are given in the copy of Jamabandi for the year 1955-56 A.D. attached G
to the above-said Notification at page 2529 and is comprised of
Khasra Nos. 456 min, 457, 451, 644 and 452 bearing Khawat No. 276
--
Khatauni nos. 524 to 527."
Aggrieved by this, respondents filed first appeal being FAO No. 449 of
1978. During its pendency, the SGPC on the basis of final order passed by the H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A High Court in FAO No. 40of1965·~gainst the order of the Tribunal rejecting
Section 8 application, filed suit No. 94 of 1979 against the respondents under
Section 25-A of the Act for the possession of the building and the land. The
.
respondents contested the suit by raising objection about mis-description of
B
the property in the plaint and also raising an issue about jurisdiction since the
income from the gurdwara was more than Rs. 3,000 per annum for which a
committee w_as_to be constituted before any suit could be filed. On contest, the
-
said suit of SGPC was decreed and respondents' objections were rejected,
'against which the respondents filed FAO No. 2of1980. The High Court vide
i.ts order dated 11th February, 1980 directed this FAO No. 2 of 1980 to be
iisted for hearing along with FAO No. 449of1978. It is also relevant to refer
c to, which was also stated by the respondents in their petition before the
Tribunal, that a notification under Section 9 of the Act was published d<!£laring
the disputed gurdwara to be a Sikh Gurdwara.
It is necessary to give some more facts to appreciate the contentions
raised by the respective parties. lnjamabandi Ex. P-1of1961-62 BK, (which
D
would be 1904 AD) Mangal Dass and Sunder Dass,. Bhagat Ram sons of Gopi
Ram Faqir Udasi were mentioned as owners in possession of the land. They
had also mortgaged part of this land to some other persons. This village
Bilaspur where the disputed gurdwara exists formed part of the erstwhile
Patiala Estate. The then ruler of the Patiala Estate issued Farman-e-Shahi dated
E 18th April, 1921. Its contents are quoted hereunder:
"In future, instructions be issued that so long the appointment of
a Mahant is not approved by ljlas-1-khas through Deori Mulla, until
the time, the Mahant is entitled to receive turban, shawl or Bandhan
or Muafi etc. from the Government, no property or Muafi shall be
F entered in his name in the revenue papers.
It should also be mentioned that the land which pertains to any
Dera should not be considered as the property of any Mahant, nor the
same should be shown in the revenue papers as the property of the
'\
Mahant, but these should be entered as belonging to the Dera under
G
the management of the Mahant and that the Mahants shall not be
entitled to sell or mortgage the land of the Dera. Revenue Department
be also informed about it and the order be gazetted."
On Maghar 10, 1985 BK (1920 AD) at the instance of Rulia Singh and
H others the patwari made a report in compliance with the aforesaid Farman-e-
SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITTEE v. SOM NATH DASS [MISRA, I.] 715
Shahi for the change of the entries in favour of "Guru Granth Sahib Barajman A
Dharamshala Deh". This was based on the enquiry and evidence produced
before him. In this mutation proceeding which led to the mutation viz., Ex.
P8, Narain Dass, Bhagat Ram and Atma Ram Sadh appeared before the
Revenue Officer and stated that their ancestors got this land which was gift
in charity (Punnarth) by the then proprietors of the village. This land was
B
given to the ancestors of the respondent for the purpose that they should
provide food and comfort to the travellers passing through this village. In the
same proceeding Kapur Singh, lnder Singh Lambardars and other .right-
holders of the said village also stated that their fore-fathers had given this land
in the name of "Guru Granth Sahib Barajman Dharamshala Deh" under the
charge of these persons for providing food and comfort to the travellers. But c
Atma Ram and others, ancestors of respondents were not performing their
duties. This default was for a purpose, which is revealed through the last
settlement that they got this land entered in their personal names, in the
revenue records against which a matter was pending before Deori Mualla in
the mutation proceedings. Based on the evidence, the Revenue Officer after D
enquiry recorded the finding that Atma Ram and others admitted that this land
had been given to them without any compensation for providing food and
shelter to the travellers which they were not performing. He further held that
Atma Ram and others could not controvert the aforesaid assertion made by the
villagers. So, based on this enquiry and evidence on record, he ordered the
E
mutation, in the name of "Guru Granth Sahib Barajman Dharamshala Deh" by
deleting the name of Atma Ram and others from the column of ownership of
the land. He further observed, so far as the question of appoinment of Manager
or Mohatmim was concerned that it was to be decided by the Deori Mualla
as the case about this was pending before the Deori Mualla. Similarly, in the
other mutation No. 693 which is Ex. 9 in 27th Maghar 198'3 (1926 AD) also, F
mutation was ordered by removal of the name uf Narain Dass, Bhagat Ram
sons of Gopi Ram in favour of "Guru Granth Sahib Barajman Dharamshala
Deh". Since that date till the filing of the petitions by the respondents under
Sections 8 and 10 of the Act entries in the ownership column of the land
continued in the name of "Guru Granth Sahib Barajman Dharamshala Deh" G
and no objection was filed either by the ancestors of respondents or respund-
ents themselves.
It was for the first time objection was raised by respondents through
their counsel before the High Court in FAO No. 449 of 1978 regarding validity
of Ex. P 8-9 contending that the entry in the revenue records in the name of H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A Guru Granth Sahib was void as Guru Granth Sahib was not a juristic person.
The case of the respondents was that the Guru Granth Sahib was only a sacred
book of the Sikhs and it would not fall within the scope of the word, 'juristic
person'. On the other hand, with vehemence and force learned counsel for the
appellant, SGPC submits that Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person and hence ·
it can hold property, can sue and be sued. On this question, whether Guru
B
Granth Sahib is a juristic person, a difference arose between the two learned
judges of the Bench of the High Court. Mr. Justice Tiwana held, it to be a
juristic person and dismissed both the FAQs, namely, FAQ No. 449 of 1978
and 2 of 1980 upholding the judgment of the Tribunal. On the other hand Mr.
Justice Punchhi, (as he then was) recorded dissent and held, the Guru Granth
c Sahib not to be a juristic person, but did not decide the issue on merits. The
case was then referred to a third judge, namely, Mr. Justice Tiwatia who agreed
with the view of Mr. Justice Punchhi and held the Guru Granth Sahib not to
be a juristic person. After recording this fmding the learned judge directed that
the FAQ may be placed before the Division Bench for fmal disposal of the
D appeal on merits.
The question, whether Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person is the
main point which is argued in the present appeal to which we are called upon
to -adjudicate. It is relevant to mention here that after adjudication of the
question whether the Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person, the matter again
E went back to the same Bench which again gave rise to another conflict
between Justice Tiwana and Mr. Justice Punchhi. Justice Tiwana held on
merits that .mutations were valid and respondents had no right to this
property. But Mr. Justice Punchhi held to the contraiy that the mutation was
invalid and this property was the private property of the respondents.
F Thereafter, the said FAQ No. 449 of 1978 and FAO No. 2 of 1980 were
placed before the third judge, namely, Justice J.B.Gupta, who concun-ed with
the view taken by Mr. Justice Punchhi, as he then was. He recorded the
following conclusion:
" ... in view of the findings that Guru Granth Sahib is not a juristic
G person, and that the notification issued under section 9 was not
conclusive, in view of the Full Bench Judgment of this Court in
Mahant Lachhman Dass Chela Mahant Moti Ram's case (supra), the
fmdings of the Tribunal are liable to be set aside. The Tribunal mainly
based its findings on the mutations, Exhibits P.8 and P.9, which are
H in the name of Guru Granth Sahib, since Guru Granth Sahib is not
SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITIEE v. SOM NATI! DASS [MISRA, J.] 717
a juristic person, any mutation a sanctioned in its name in the present A
case was of no consequence. There is no other cogent evidence except
the said mutations relied upon by the Tribunal in that behalf. Similar
was the position as regards the building. In that behalf, the Tribunal
relied upon the notification issued earlier. The same being not
conclusive, there was not other reliable evidence to conclude that the B
building formed part of the Sikh Gurdwara, notified under Section.
In these circumstanc_es, I concur with the view taken by M.M.Punchhi,
J. in the order dated December 16, 1986."
The foundation of his decision on merits is based on the finding that
Guru Granth Sahib is not a juristic person and hence Exs. P8 and P9, the C
mutations in its name were not sustainable. The present appellants preferred
Special Leave Petition No. 7803 of 1988 in this Court, which was dismissed
in default on 16th November, 1995 and its restoration application was also
dismissed on 19th August, 1996. In this petition it was specifically stated that
the present Civil Appeal No. 3968 of 1987 is pending in this Court. However, D
it is significant as we have said above, the judgment of Mr. Justice Gupta
concurring the judgment of Mr. Justice Punchhi, as he then was, was mainly
on the basis that the mutation in the name in favour of "Guru Granth Sahib
Barajman Dharamshala Deh" was void in as much as Guru Granth Sahib was
not a juristic person. Thus the foundation of that decision rests on the question
which we are considering.
The crux of the litigation now rests on the question, whether Guru
Granth Sahib is a juristic person or not. Now, we proceed to consider this
issue.
F
The very words "Juristic Person" connote recognition of an entity to be
in law a person which otherwise it is not. In other words, it is not an individual
natural person but an artificially created person which is to be recognised to
be in law as such. When a person is ordinarily understood to be a natural
person, it only means a human person. Essentially, every human person is a
person. If we trace the history of a "Person" in the various countries we find G
surprisingly it has projected differently at different times. In some countries
even human beings were not treated to be as persons in law. Under the Roman
Law a "Slave" was not a person. He had no right to a family. He was treated
like an animal or chattel. In French Colonies also, before slavery was
abolished, the slaves were not treated to be legal persons. They were later H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 2 S.C.R.
A given recognition as legal persons only through a statute. Similarly, in the U.S.
the African-Americans bad no legal rights though they were not treated as
chattel.
In Roscoe Pound's Jurisprudence Part IV, 1959 Ed. at pages 192-193,
it is stated as follows:-
B
"In civilized lands even in the modem world it has happened that all
human beings were not legal persons. In Roman law down to the
constitution of Antoninus Pius the slave was not a person. "He
enjoyed neither rights of family nor rights of patrimony. He was a
c thing, and as such, like animals, could be the object of rights of
property." ....In the French colonies, before slavery was there abol-
ished, slaves were "put in the class of legal persons by the statute of
April 23, 1833" and obtained a "somewhat extended juridical capac-
ity" by a statute of 1845. In the United States down to the Civil War,
D the free negroes in many of the states were free human beings with
no legal rights."
With the development of society, where an individual's interaction fell
short, to upsurge social developments, cooperation of a larger circle of
individuals was necessitated. Thus, institutions like corporations and compa-
E nies were created, to help the society in achieving the desired result. The very
constitution of State, municipal corporation, company etc. are all creations of
the law and these "Juristic Persons" arose out of necessities in the human
development. In other words, they were dressed in a cloak to be recognised
in law to be a legal unit.
F
Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. LXV, page 40 says: .
"Natural person. A natural person is a human being; a man, woman,
or child, as opposed to a corporation, which has a certain personality
impressed on it by law and is called an artificial person. In the C.J.S.
G definition Person it is stated that the word "ferson," in its primary
sense, means natural person, but that the generally accepted meaning
of the word as used in law includes natural persons and artificial,
conventional, or juristic persons."
H Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. VI, page 778 says:
SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITTEE v. SOM NATI! DASS [MISRA, J.] 719
"Artificial persons. Such as are created and devised by human laws A
for the purposes of society and government, which are called corpo-
rations or bodies politic."
Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., 305 says:
"A legal person is any subject-matter other than a human being to B
which the law attributes personality. This extension, for good and
sufficient reasons, of the conception of personality beyond the class
of human beings is one of the most noteworthy feats of the legal
imagination....
c
Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be
of as many kinds as the law pleases. Those which are actually
recognised by our own system, however, are of comparatively few
types. Corporations are undoubtedly legal persons, and the better
view is that registered trade unions and friendly societies are also
legal persons though not verbally regarded as corporations ..... If, D
however, we take account of other systems than our own, we find that
the conception oflegal personality is not so limited in its application,
and that there are several distinct varieties, of which three may be
selected for special mention....
E
1. The first class of legal persons consists of corporations, as
already defined, namely, those which are constituted by the personi-
fication of groups or series of individuals. The dividuals who thus
form the corpus of the legal person are termed its members ...
2. The second class is that in which the corpus, or object selected F
for personification, is not a group or series of persons, but an
institution. The law may, if it pleases, regard a church or a hospital,
or a university, or a library, as a person. That is to say, it may attribute
- personality, not to any group of persons connected with the institu-
tion, but to the institution itself....
3. The third kind of legal person is that in which the corpus is
G
some fund or estate devoted to special uses - a charitable fund, for
example or a trust estate ... ".
Jurisprudence by Paton, 3rd Edn., page 349 and 350 says: H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A "It has already been asserted that legal personality is an artificial
creation of the law. Legal persons are all entities capable of being
right-and-duty- bearing units-all entities recognised by the law as
..
capable of being parties to a legal relationship. Salmond said: 'So far
as legal lieory is concerned, a person is any being whom the law
regards,"!;~ capable of rights and duties ....
B
...Legal personality may be granted to entities other than individual
human beings, e.g. a group of human beings, a fund, an idol. Twenty
men may form a corporation which may sue and be sued in the
corporate name. An idol may be regarded as a legal persona in itself,
c or a particular fund may be incorporated. It is clear that neither the
idol nor the fund can carry out the activities incidental to litigation
or other activities incidental to the carrying on of legal relationships,
e.g., the signing of a contract; and, of necessity, the law recognises
certain human agents as representative.s of the idol or of the fund. The
D acts of such a.gents, however (within limits set by the law and when
they are acting as such), are imputed to the legal persona of the idol
and are not the juristic acts of the human agents themselves. This is
no mere academic distinction, for it is the legal persona of the idol
that is bound to the legal relationships created, not that of the agent.
Legal personality then refers to the particular device by which the law
E
creates or recognizes units to which it ascribes certain powers and
capacities."
Analytical and Historical Jurisprudence, 3rd Edn. At page 357 describes
"person":
F
"We may, therefore, define a person for the purpose of jurisprudence
as any entity (not necessarily a human being) to which rights or duties
G
may be attributed."
Thus, it is well settled and confirmed by the authorities on jurisprudence
and courts of various countries that for a bigger thrust of socio-political-
-
scientific development evolution of a fictional personality to be a juristic
person became inevitable. This may be any entity, living, inanimate, objects
or things. It may be a religious institution or any such useful unit which may
impel the courts to recognise it. This recognition is for subserving the needs
H and faith of the society. A juristic person, like any other natural person is in
SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITIEE v. SOM NA1H DASS [MISRA, J.] 721
law also conferred with rights and obligations and is dealt with in accordance A
with law. In other words, the entity acts like a natural person but only through
a designated person, whose acts arc processed within the ambit of law. When
an idol was recognised as a juristic person, it was known it could not act by
itself. As in the case of minor a guardian is appointed, so in the case of idol,
a Shebait or manager is appointed to act on its behalf. In that sense, relation
B
between an idol and Shebait is akin to that of a minor and a guardian. As a
minor cannot express himself, so the idol, but like a guardian, the Shebait and
manager have limitations under which they have to act. Similarly, where there
is any endowment for charitable purpose it can create institutions like a
church, hospital, gurudwara etc. The entrustment of an endowed fund for a
purpose can only be used by the person so entrusted for that purpose in as c
much as he receives it for that purpose alone in trust. When the donor endows
for an idol or for a mosque or for any institution, it necessitates the creation
of a juristic person. The law also circumscribes the rights of any person
receiving such entrustment to use it only for the purpose of such a juristic
person. The endowment may be given for various purposes, may be for a D
church, idol, gurdwara or such other things that the human faculty may
conceive of, out of faith and conscience but it gains the status of juristic person
when it is recognised by the society as such.
In this background, we find that this Court in Sarangadeva Periya
Matam & Am: v. Ramaswami Goundar (dead) by Legal Representatives, AIR E
(1966) SC 1603, held that a 'Mutt' was the owner of the endowed property
and that like an idol the Mutt was a juristic person and thus could own, acquire
or possess any property. In Masjid Shahid Gan} & Ors. v. Shiromani
Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR (1938) Lahore 369, a Full
Bench of that High Court held that a mosque was a juristic person. This F
decision was taken in appeal to the Privy Council which confirmed the said
judgment. Sir George Rankin observed:
"In none of these cases was a mosque party to the suit, and in none
except perhaps the last is the fictitious personality attributed to the
mosque as a matter of decision. But so far as they go these cases
G.
support the recognition as a fictitious person of a mosque as an
institution-apparently hypostatizing an abstration. This, as the learned
Chief Justice in the present case bas pointed out, is very different from
conferring personality upon a building so as to deprive it of its
character as immovable property." H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 2 S.C.R.
A There may be an endowment for a pious or religious purpose. It may
be for~ idol, mosque, church etc .. Such endowed property has to be used
for that purpose. The installation and adoration of an idol or any image by a
Hindu denoting any god is merely a mode through which his faith and belief
is satisfied. This has led to the recognition of an idol as a juristic person.
B In Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar & Ors, AIR (1957) SC 137, this Court
held:
" .. .In Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Maitra, ILR 37 Cal 128
(F), it was held on a consideration of these and other text that a gift
to an idol was not to be judged by the rules applicable to a transfer
c
to a 'sentient being,' and that dedication of properties to an idol
consisted in the abandonment by the owner of his demoinion over
them for the purpose of their being appropriated for the purposes
which he intends. Thus, it was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J.
at p. 138 that "the pious purpose is still the legatee, the establishment
D of the image is merely the mode in which the pious purpose is to be
effected" and that "the dedication to a deity" may be "a compendious
expression of the pious purposes for which the deciation is designed".
Vide also the observations of Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee at p. 155. In
Hindu Relgious Endowments Board v. Veeraraghavacharlu, AIR
E (1937) Mad 750 (G), Varadachariar J. dealing with this question,
referred to the decision in ILR 37 Cal 128 (F), and observed:
'As explained in the case, that purpose of making a gift to a temple
is not to confer a benefit on God but to confer a benefit on those who
worship in that temple, by making it possible for them to have the
F worship conducted in a proper and impressive manner. This is the
sense in which a temple and its endowments are regarded as a public
trust."'
In Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India & Am:, (1981] 1 SCC 449, this
Court held that 'a legal person' is any entity other than a human being to which
G
the law attributes personality. It was stated:
" ... Let us be clear that the jurisprudence bearing on corporations is
not myth but reality. What we mean is that corporate personality is
a reality and not an illusion or fictitious construction of the law. It is
H a legal person. Indeed, 'a legal person' is any subject-matter other
Sl'!IROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITI'EE v. SOM NATI! DASS [MISRA, J.) 723
than a human being to which the law attributes personality. "This A
extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the conception of
personality.. .is one of the most noteworthy feats of the legal imagi-
nation." Corporations are one species of legal persons invented by the
law and invested with a variety of attributes so as to achieve certain
purposes sanctioned by the law."
B
This Court in Yogendra Nath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income Tax,
Calcutta, [1969] 1SCC555, held that the consecrated idol in a Hindu temple
is a juristic person and approved the observation of West J. in the following
passage made in Manohar Ganesh v. Lakshmiram, ILR 12 Born 247;
c
"The Hindu Law, like the Roman Law and those dervied from it,
recognises not only incorporate bodies with rights of property vested
in the Corporation apart from its individual members but also juridical
persons called foundations. A Hindu who wishes to establish a
religious or charitable institution may according to his law express his D
purpose and endow it and the ruler will give effect to the bounty or
at least, protect it so far at any rate as is consistent with his own
Dharma or conception or morality. A trust is not required for the
purpose; the necessity of a trust in such a case is indeed a peculiarity
and a modem peculiarity of the English Law. In early law a gift placed
as it was expressed on the altar of God, sufficed it to convey to the E
Church the lands thus dedicated. It is consistent with the grants having
been made to the juridical person symbolised or personified in the
idol."
(Emphasis supplied) F
Thus, a trust is not necessary in Hindu Law though it may be required
under English Law.
In fact, there is a direct mling of this Court on the crucial point. In
Pritam Dass Mahant v. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, [1984]
G
2 SCC 600, with reference to a case under Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925 this Court
held that the central body of worship in a Gurdwara is Guru Granth Sahib,
the holy book, is a Juristic entity. It was held:
"From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the sine qua non for H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A an institution being a Sikh gurdwara is that there should be established
Guru Granth Sahib and the worship of the same by the congregation,
and a Nishan Sahib as indicated in the earlier part of the judgment.
There may be other rooms of the institution meant for other purposes
but the crucial test is the existence of Guru Granth Sahib and the
worship thereof by the congregation and Nishan Sahib."
B
Tracing the ten Sikh gurus it records:
" ... They were ten in number each remaining faithful to the teachings
of Guru Nanak, the first Guru and when their line was ended by a
c conscious decision of Guru Gobind Singh, the last Guru, succession
was invested in a collection of teachings which was given the title of
Guru Granth Sahib. This is now the Guru of the Sikhs.
xx xx
D The holiest book of the Sikhs is Guru Granth Sahib compiled
by the Fifth Master, Guru Arjan. It is the Bible of Sikhs. After
giving his followers a central. place of worship, Hari-Mandir, he
wanted to give them a holy book. So he collected the hymns of the
first four Gurus and to these he added his own. Now this Sri Guru
Granth Sahib is a living Guru of the Sikhs. Guru means the guide.
E
Guru Grdllth Sahib gives light and shows the path to the suffering
humanity. Where a believer in Sikhism is in trouble or is depressed
he reads hymns from the Granth.
When Guru Gobind Singh felt that his wordly sojown was near,
F he made the fact known to his disciples. The disciples asked him
as to who would be their Guru in future. The Guru immediately
placed five pies and a coconut before the holy Granth, bowed his
head before it and said:
The Eternal Father Willed, and I raised the Panth.
G All my Sikhs are ordained to believe the Granth as their
preceptor.
Have faith in the holy Granth as your Master and consider it.
The visible manifestation of the Gurus.
He who hath a pure heart will seek guidance from its holy
H words.
SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMJITEE v. SOM NATH DASS [MISRA, J.] 725
The Guru repeated these words and told the disciple not to grieve at A
his departure. It was true that they would not see his body in its
physical manifestation but he would be ever present among the
Khalsas. Whenever the Sikhs needed guidance or counsel, they
should assemble before the Granth in all sincerity and decide their
future line of action in the light of teachings of the Master, as B
embodied in the Granth. The noble ideas embodied in the Granth
would live for ever and show people the path to bliss and happiness."
(Emphasis supplied)
The aforesaid conspectus visualises how "Juristic Person" was coined
c
·to subserve to the needs of the society. With the passage of time and the
changes in the socio-political scenario, collective working instead of individu-
alised working became inevitable for the growth of the organised society. This
gave manifestation to the concept of Juristic Person as an unit in various forms
and for various purposes and this is now a well recognised phenomena. This D
coUective working, for a greater thrust and unity gave birth to cooperative
societies, for the success and implementation of public endowment it gave rise
to public trusts and for purpose of commercial enterprises the juristic person
of companies were created, so on and so forth. Such creations and many others
were either statutory or through recognition by the courts. Different religions E
of the world have different nuclei and different institutitonalised places for
/
adoration, with varying conceptual beliefs and faith but all with the same end.
Each may have differences in the perceptive conceptual recognition of god but
each religion highlights love, compassion, tolerance, sacrifice as a hallmark
for attaining divinity. When one reaches this divine empire, he is beholden,
through a feeling of universal brotherhood and love which impels him to F
sacrifice his wealth and belongings, both for his own bliss and for its being
useful to a large section of the society. This sprouts charity, for public
endowment. It is really the religious faith that leads to the installation of an
idol in a temple. Once installed, it is recognised as a juristic person. The idol
may be revered in homes but its juristic personality is only when it is installed G
in a public temple.
Faith and belief cannot be judged through any judicial scrutiny. It is a
fact accomplished and accepted by its followers. This faith necessitated the
creation of a unit to be recognised as a "Juristic Person". All this shows that H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A a "Juristic Person" is not roped in any defined circle. With the changing
thoughts, changing needs of the society, fresh juristic personalities were
created from time to time.
It is submitted for the respondent that decisions of courts recognised an
idol to be a as juristic person but they did not recognise a temple to be so. So,
B
on the same parity, a gurdwara cannot be a juristic person and Guru Granili
Sahib can only a sacred book. It cannot be equated wiili an idol nor does
Sikhism believe in worshiping any idol. Hence Guru Granili Sahib cannot be
treated as a juristic person. This submission in our view is based on a
misconception. It is not necessary for 'Guru Granili Sahib' to be declared as
c a juristic person iliat it should be equated wiili an idol. When belief and faiili.
of two different religions are different, iliere is no question of equating one
wiili the oilier. If 'Guru Granili Sahib' by itself could stand ilie test of its being
declared as such, it can be declared to be so.
An idol is a "Juristic Person" because it is adored after its consecration,
D
in a temple. The offerings are made to an idol. The followers recognise an
idol to be symbol for God. Wiiliout ilie idol, ilie temple is only a building
of mortar, cement and bricks which has no sacredness or sanctity for
adoration. Once recognised as a "Juristic Person", ilie idol can hold property
and gainfully enlarge its coffers to maintain itself and use it for ilie benefit
E of its followers. On ilie oilier hand in ilie case of mosque iliere can be no
idol or any images of worship, yet ilie mosque itself is conferred with ilie
same sacredness as temples wiili idol, based on faiili and belief of its
followers. Thus ilie case of a temple wiiliout idol may be only brick, mortar
and cement but not the mosque. Similar is the case wiili ilie Chruch. As we
F have said, each religion have different nuclei, as per-ilieir faiili and belief
for treating any entity as a unit.
Now returning to ilie question, wheilier Guru Granili Sahib could be a
"Juristic Person" or not, or whether it could be placed on ilie same pedestal,
we may first have a glance at ilie Sikh religion. To comprehend any religion
G
fully may indeed be beyond· ilie comprehension of any one and also beyond
any judicial scrutiny for it has its own limitations. But its silver lining could
easily be picked up. In ilie Sikh religion, Guru is revered as ilie highest
reverential person. The first of such most revered Gurus was Guru Nanak Dev,
followed by succeeding Gurus, ilie Tenili being ilie last living, viz., Guru
H Gobind Singh Ji. It is said iliat Adi Granili or Guru Granili Sahib was compiled
SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMIITEE ''·SOM NATI-I DASS (MISRA, J.) 727
~
- . by the Fifth Guru Arjun and it is this book that is worshiped in all the
gurudwaras. While it is being read, people go down their knees to make
reverential obeisance and place their offerings of cash and kind on it, as it is
A
treated and equated to a living Guru. In the Book "A History of the Sikhs by
Kushwant Singh, Vol. I, page 307:
"The compositions of the gurus were always considered sacred B
by their followers. Guru Nanak said that in his hymns "the true Guru
manifested Himself, because they were composed at His orders and
heard by Him" (Var Asa). 1be fourth guru, Ram Das said: 'Look upon
the words of the True Guru as the supreme truth, for God and the
Creator hath made him utter the words: (Var Gauri). When Arjun c
formally installed the Granth in the Harimandir, he ordered his
followers to treat it with the same reverence as they treated their
gurus. By the time of Guru Gobind Singh, copies of the Granth had
been installed in most Gurdwaras. Quite naturally, when he declared
the line of succession of gurus ended, he asked his followers to turn D
to the Granth for guidance and look upon it as the symbolic.
representation of the ten gurus.
The Granth Sahib is the central object of worship in all Gurdwaras.
It is usually draped in silks and placed on a cot. It has an E
awning over it and, while it is being read, one of the congregations
stands behind and waves a flywhisk made of Yak's hair. Worship-
pers go down on their knees to make obeisance and place offerings
of cash or kind before it as they would before a king: for the Granth
is to them what the gurus were to their ancestors - the Saca Padsah
(the true Emperor)."
F
The very first verse of the Guru Granth Sahib reveals the infinite
wisdom and wealth that it contains, as to its legitimacy for being revered as
guru:-
G
"The First verse states:
"The creator of all is One, the only One. Truth is his name. He
is doer of everything. He is without fear and without enmity. His f01m
is immortal. He is unborn and self-illumined. He is realized by Guru's
grace." H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A The last living guru, Guru Gobind Singh, expressed in no uncertain
terms that henceforth there would not be any living guru. The Guru Granth . --...
-
Sahib would be the vibrating Guru. He declared that "henceforth it would be
your Guru from which you will get all your guidance and answer". It is with
this faith that it is worshipped like a living guru. It is with this faith and
B conviction, when it is installed in any gurudwara it becomes a sacred place of
worship. Sacredness of Gurudwara is only because of placement of Guru
Granth Sahib in it. This reverential recognition of Guru Granth Sahib also
opens the hearts of its followers to pour their money and wealth for it. It is
not that it needs it, but when it is installed, it grows for its followers, who
through their obeisance to it, sanctify themselves and also for running the
c langer which is an inherent part of a Gurdwara.
In this background. and on over all considerations, we have no hesita-
tion to hold that 'Guru Granth Sahib' is a "Juristic Person". It cannot be
equated with an 'Idol' as idol worship is contrary to Sikhism. As a concept
D or a visionary for obeisance, the two religions are different. Yet. for its legal
recognition as a juristic person, the followers of both the religions give them
respectively the same reverential value. Thus the Guru Granth Sahib it has all
-
the qualities to be recognised as such. Holding otherwise would mean giving
too restrictive a meaning of a 'juristic person', and that would erase the very
E jurisprudence which gave birth to it.
Now, we proceed to examine the judgment of the High Court which had
held to the contrary. TI1ere was difference of opinion between the two Judges
and finally the third Judge agreed with one of the differing Judges, who held
Guru Granth Sahib to be not a "Juristic Person". Now, we proceed to examine
F the reasonings for their holding so. They first erred, in holding that such an
endowment is void as there could not be such a juristic person without
appointment of a Manager. In other words, they held that a juristic person
--
could only act through some one, a human agency and as in the case of an
Idol, the Guru Granth Sahib also could not act without a manager. In our view,
G no endowment or a juristic person depends on the appointment of a Manager.
It may be proper or advisable to appoint such a manager while making any
endowment but in its absence, it may be done either by the trustees or courts
in accordance with law. Mere absence of a manager negative the existence of
a juristic person. As pointed out in Manohar Ganesh v. Lakshmiram, ILR 12
H Born 247, (approved in Yogendra Nath Naskar's case, 1969 (1) SCC 555)
SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITIEE v. SOM NATI! DASS [MISRA, J.) 729
referred to above, if no manager is appointed by the founder, the ruler would A
give effect to the bounty. As pointed in Vidyapuma Tirtha Swami v. Vidyanidhi
Tirtha Swami & Ors., ILR 27 Mad. 435 (at 457), by Bhashyam Ayyangar, J.
(approved in Yogendra Nath Naskar's case, [1969] 1 SCC 555 the property
given in trust becomes irrevocable and if none was appointed to manage, it
will be managed by the "court as representing the sovereign". This can be B
done by the Court in several ways under Section 92, CPC or by handing over
management to any specific body recognised by law. But the trust will not be
allowed by the Court to fail. Endowment is when donor parts with his property
for it being used for a public purpose and its entrustment is to a person or
.group of person in trust for carrying out the objective of such entrustment.
Once endowment is made, it is final and it is irrevocable. It is the onerous duty c
of the persons entrusted with such endowment, to carry out the objectives of
this entrustment. They may appoint a manager in the absence of any indication
in the trust or get it appointed through Court. So, if entrustment is to any
juristic person, mere absence of manager would not negate the existence a
juristic person. We, therefore, disagree with the High Court on this crucial D
aspect.
In "Words and Phrases" Permanent Edition, Vol. 14A, at page 167:-
'.'Endowment" means property or pecuniary means bestowed as
a permanent fund, as endowment of a college, hospital or library,
and is understood in common acceptance as a fund yielding income
for support of an institution."
The further difficulty the learned Judges of the High Court felt was
that there could not be two "Juristic Persons" in the same building. This they
considered would lead to two juristic persons in one place viz., 'gurudwara' F
and 'Guru Grant Sahib'. This again, in our opinion, is a misconceived
notion. They are no two "Juristic Persons" at all. In fact both are so
interwoven that they cannot be separated as pointed by Tiwana, J. in his
separate judgment. The installation of 'Guru Granth Sahib' is the nucleus or
nectar of any gurudwara. If there is no Guru Granth Sahib in a Gurdwara G
it cannot be termed as gurudwara. When one refers a building to be a
gurudwara, he refers it so only because Guru Granth Sahib is installed
therein. Even if one holds a Gurdwara to be a juristic person, it is because
it holds the 'Guru Granth Sahib'. So, there do not exist two separate juristic
persons, they are one integrated whole. Even otherwise in Ram Jankijee H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A Deities and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., [1999] 5 SCC 50, this Court
while considering two separate deities, of Ram Jankijee and Thakur Raja
they were held to be separate "Juristic Persons". So, in the same precincts,
as a matter of law, existence of two separate juristic persons were held to
be valid.
B
Next it was the reason of the learned Judges that, if Guru Granth Sahib
is a "Juristic Person" then every copy of Guru Granth Sahib would be a
"Juristic Person". This again in our considered opinion is based on erroneous
approach. On this reasoning it could be argued that every idol at private
places, or carrying it with one self each would become a "Juristic Person".
c This is a misconception. An 'idol' becomes a juristic person only when it
is consecrated and installed at a public place for public at large. Every 'idol'
is not a juristic person. So every Guru Granth Sahib cannot be a juristic
person unless it takes juristic role through its installation in a gurudwara or
at such other recognised public place.
D
Next submission for the respondent is that 'Guru Granth Sahib' is like
any other sacred book, like Bible for Christians, Bhagwat Geeta and Ramayana
for Hindus and Quran for Islamic followers and cannot be a "Juristic Person".
This submission also has no merit. Though it is true Guru Granth Sahib is a
E sacred book like others but it cannot be equated with these other sacred books
in that sense. As we have said above, Guru Granth Sahib is revered in
gurudwara, like a 'Guru' which projects a different perception. It is the very
heart and spirit of gurudwara. The reverence of Guru Granth on the one hand
and other sacred books on the other hand is based on different conceptual
faith, belief and application.
F
One other reason given by the High Court is that Sikh religion does not
accept idolatry and hence Guru Granth Sahib cannot be a juristic person. It
is true that the Sikh religion does not accept idolatry but. at the same time
when the tenth guru declared that after him, the Guru Granth will be the Guru,
G that does not amount to idolatry. The Granth replaces the guru henceforward,
after the tenth Guru.
H
For all these reasons, we do not find any strength in the reasoning of
High Court in recording a finding that the 'Guru Granth Sahib' not a "Juristic
Person". The said finding is not sustainable both on fact and law.
--
SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITTEE v. SOM NATI! DASS [MISRA, J.) 731
Thus, we unhesitantly hold 'Guru Granth Sahib' to be a "Juristic A
Person".
Next challenge is that the basis for mutating· of the name of "Gurn
Granth Sahib Birajman Dharamshala Deh", by deleting the name of the
ancestors of the respondents, based on Faraman-I-shahi issued by the then
ruler of the Patiala State dated 18.4.1921 is liable to be set aside, as tliis B
Faraman.:'i-Shahi did not direct the recording of the name of 'Guru Granth
Sahib'. For ready reference the said Faraman-i-Shahi is again quoted hereun-
der:-
"In future, instructions be issued that so long the appointment of a C
Mahant is not approved by Ijlas-I-Khas through Deori Mualla, until
the time, the Mahant is entitled to receive turban, shawl or Bandhan
or Muafi etc. from the Government, no property or Muafi shall be
entered in his name in the revenue papers.
It should also be mentioned that the land which pertains to any D
Dera should not be considered as the property of any Mahant, nor the
same should be shown in tl1e revenue papers as the property of the
Mahant, but these should be entered as belonging to the Dera under
the management of the Mahant and that the Mahants shall not be
entitled to sell or mortgage the land of the Dera. Revenue Department E
be also informed about it and the order be gazetted."
It was also submitted that it was not known whether this Faraman-i-
Shahi was administrative in nature or was issued as a sovereign. If it was
administrative it could not have the same force of law.
F
We have examined this Faraman-i-Shahi. It does not direct the autl1ori-
ties to mutate the name of 'Guru Granth Sahib'. It merely directed, the revenue
authority that till Mahants' appointment is approved by Deor's Mulla, no
property or Muafi received by a Mahant should be entered in his name, in the
revenue papers. Further the land of any Dera should not be considered to be
that of Mahant. This was only a directive which is protective in nature. In other G
words it only directed that they should be done Mter ascertaining the fact and
if the land was of the Dera it should not be put in the name of Mahant. In other
words, it stated - enquire, find out the facts and do the needful. The mutation
in the case before us was not on account of this Farman-I-Shahi but was made
because of the application made by one Rulia Singh and others of village H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 2 S.C.R.
A Bilaspur to the Patwari, and mutation was done only after a detailed enquiry,
after examining witnesses and other evidence on the record. which resulted
into Ex.8 and Ex. 9. In the said proceedings number of witnesses appeared
before the Revenue Officer and stated that their ancestors gifted this disputed
land for charity (Punnarth) for the benefit of public, who were the proprietors
B and was merely entrusted to the ancestors of the respondents for management.
The claimants had no rights over it. Admittedly they did not receive this land
for any payment nor for any service rendered by them to such donors. Their
statement was that this land was given to them with clear direction that they
should use it for providing food and comfort to the travellers (Musafran)
passing through the village. They further gave evidence that their forefathers
c gave it in the name of 'Guru Granth Sahib' "Birajman Dharamshala Deb". In
spite of this, Atma Ram and others and their predecessors did not perform their
obligations. On the contrary, with oblique motives they got this disputed land
entered in their name in the revenue records which was an attempt to usurp
the property. The Revenue Officer after enquiry held that Atma Ram and other
D ancestors of respondents admitted that this land was given without making any
payment and was specifically meant for providing food and shelter to the
travellers which function they were not performing. It was only after such an
enquiry, he ordered' the mutation by ordering deleting of the name of Atma
Ram and others. With reference to the question of appointment of a manager,
E he recorded that this had to be decided by Deori Mualla, where such a case
about this was pending. Similar was the position in the other mutation
proceedings about which an application was also made to the Revenue Officer,
-~
where the names of Narain Dass, Bhagat Ram sons of Gopi Ram were deleted
and aforesaid name was mutated resulting into Ex. 9. So, the mutation of name
was not because of direction issued by the Farman-I-Shahi. So no en-or could
F be said to have been committed, when Ex.8 and Ex.9, viz., mutations w~re
recorded. Faraman-I-Shahi if at all may be said to have led to the enquiry but
it was not the basis.
This takes us to the last point for our consideration. After the said
G difference of opinion between two learned Judges, Mr. Justice M.M. Punchhi
did not decide the case on merits though the other Judge Mr. Justice Tiwana,
held on merits in favour of the appellants, i.e., that the property belonged to
Gurdwara. When the case again returned to the same bench for decision on
merits there was again difference of opinion. It was again referred to the third
H judge who concurred with Mr. Justice Punchhi. Against this the appellants
SH!ROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMM!TIEE v. SOM NATH DASS [MISRA, J.] 733
r filed special leave petition in this court which was dismissed for default as
aforesaid. However, we find that the third Judge who concurred with Mr.
Justice Punchhi based his finding on the ground that 'Guru Granth Sahib' was
A
not a juristic person hence entry Ex. 8 and 9 was invalid. But once the very
foundation falls, and Guru Granth Sahib is held to be a juristic person, the said
finding cannot stand. Thus, in our considered opinion there would not be any B
useful purpose to remand the case. That apart since this litigation stood for a
long time, we think it proper to examine it ourself.
Learned senior counsel for the respondents who argued with ability and
fairness said that in fact the only question which arises in this case is whether
Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person. Examining the merits we find that the c
mutation in the revenue papers in the name of Guru Granth Sahib was made
as far back as in the year 1928, in the presence of the ancestors of respondents
and no objection was nused by anybody till the filing of the present objection
by the respondents as aforesaid under Section 8/10 of the 1925 Act. This is
after a long gap of about forty years. Further, this property was given in trust D
to the ancestors of respondents for a specified purpose but they did not
perform their obligation. It is also settled, once an endowment, it never reverts
even to the donor. Then no part of these rights could be claimed or usurped
by the respondent's ancestors who in fact were trustees. Hence for these
reasons and for the reasons recorded by Mr. Justice Tiwana, even on merits, E
any claim to the disputed land by the respondents has no merit. Thus any,
claim over this disputed property by the respondents fails and is hereby
rejected. We uphold the findings and orders passed by the Tribunal against
which and Suit No. 94 of 1979 and FAO No. 2 of 1980 was filed.
For tl1e aforesaid reasons and in view of the findings which we have F
recorded, we hold that High Court committed a serious mistake of law in
holding that tl1e Guru Granth Sahib was not a juristic person and in allowing
the claim over this prope1ty in favour of respondents. Accordingly, this appeal
is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the High Court dated 19-
4-1985 and 28.1.1988 in PAO No. 449 of 1978 and PAO No. 2 of 1980 are G
hereby set aside. We uphold the orders passed by the Tribunal both under
Section 10 of ilie said Act in Suit No. 94 of 1979. Appeal is, accordingly,
allowed. Costs on ilie parties.
S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 2735-36 of 1989: H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 2 S.C.R.
A The main question raised in these special leave petitions is the same as
has been raised in Civil Appeal No.3968 of 1987, which we have disposed of
today. In view of this, the point raised by the petitioners in this petition is
unsustainable for the same reasons and is therefore dismissed.
K.K.T. Appeal allowed and
B Petitions dismissed.
...
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "juristic person"Sign in to search