SHIJI @ PAPPU AND ORS.versusRADHIKA AND ANR.

              [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 135


               SHIJI @ PAPPU AND ORS.                         A
                             v.
                   RADHIKA AND ANR.
            (Criminal Appeal No.2094 of 2011)
                  NOVEMBER 14, 2011
                                                               B
       [CYRIAC JOSEPH AND T.S. THAKUR, JJ.]

     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 482 and 320 -
Criminal proceedings against appellants alleging commission
of offence punishable u/ss. 354 and 394 /PC - Compromise C
between the parties - Petition u/s. 482 for quashing the
criminal proceedings - Dismissed by High Court- On appeal
held: An offence punishable uls. 354 /PC is in terms of s. 320
compoundable at instance of the woman against whom the
offence is committed and as such the proceedings thereunder D
can be quashed - However, offence punishable u/s. 394 /PC
is not compoundable with or without the permission of the
court concerned but the High Court may quash the
prosecution even in such cases - High Court is to exercise
the power u/s. 482 with utmost care and caution - It must be E
for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where
refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the
process of law - The instant case has its origin in the civil
dispute between the parties, which has apparently been
resolved by them - It was not a case of broad day light robbery F
for gain - Complainant as also two alleged eye witnesses, who
are closely related to the complainant, are no longer
supporting the prosecution version - Thus, the continuance
of the proceedings is nothing but an empty formality - s. 482
could be justifiably invoked by the High Court to prevent G
abuse of the process of Jaw and thereby preventing a wasteful
exercise by the courts below - Order passed by the High Court
 is set aside and the prosecution pending before the
 Magistrate is quashed - Penal Code, 1850 - ss. 354 and 394.
                            135                                H
    136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A      Criminal proceedings were initiated against the
  appellants in the FIR alleging commission of offences
  punishable under Sections 354 and 394 IPC. During the
  pendency, it appears that the parties amicably settled the
  matter among themselves. A criminal petition under
B Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed before the High Court for
  quashing of the complaint pending before the Judicial
  Magistrate on basis of amicable settlement of civil and
  criminal disputes between the parties. It was alleged that
  there was a land dispute between the parties as a result
c altercation took place between the appellants, and the
  husband and brother of the respondent. The High Court
  dismissed the petition holding that the offences with
  which the appellants were charged, are not personal in
  nature. Therefore, the appellants filed the instant appeal.
b       Allowing the appeal, the Court

       HELD: 1.1 Section 320 Cr.P.C. enlists offences that
  are compoundable with the permission of the Court
  before whom the prosecution is pending and those that
E can be compounded even without such permission. An
  offence punishable under Section 354 IPC is in terms of
  Section 320(2) of the Code compoundable at the instance
  of the woman against whom the offence is committed. To
  that extent, therefore, there is no difficulty in either
F quashing the proceedings or compounding the offence
  under Section 354, of which the appellants are accused,
  having regard to the fact that the alleged victim of the
  offence settled the matter with the alleged assailants. An
  offence punishable under Section 394 IPC is not,
G however, compoundable with or without the permission
  of the Court concerned. [Para 5) [142-A-D]
        12. It is manifest that simply because an offence is
    not compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C is by itself
    no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its
H
 SHIJI @ PAPPU AND ORS. v. RADHIKA AND ANR.               137


power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. That power can be                 A
exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording
a conviction against the accused and .the entire exercise
of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is·
a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by
the parties before the trial court or in appeal on one hand       B
and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the
prosecution under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the other.
While a court trying an accused or hearing an appeal
against conviction, may not be competent to permit
compounding of an offence based on a settlement                   c
arrived at between the parties in cases where the
offences are not compoundable under Section 320, the
High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases
where the offences with which the accused stand
charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of              D
the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not for that
purpose controlled by Section 320 Cr.P.C. The· plenitude
of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by itself, makes
it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with
utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the
                                                                  E
power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only
in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be
recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the
prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the
process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper to
                                                                  F
enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power
under Section 482 may be justified. It can be said that the
exercise of power must be for securing the ends of
justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that
 power may result in the abuse of the process of Jaw. The
High Court may be justified in declining interference if it       G
is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot
 assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with
 a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Subject to the above,
 the High Court will have to consider the facts and
                                                                  H
    138   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a
  fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.
  [Para 13) [148-G-H; 149-A-F]

         1.3 In the instant case, the incident in question had
B   its genesis in a dispute relating to the access to the two
    plots which are adjacent to each other. It was not a case
    of broad day light robbery for gain. It was a case which
    has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties,
    which dispute has, it appears, been resolved by them.
    That being so, continuance of the prosecution where the
C   complainant is not ready to support the allegations which
    are now described by her as arising out of some
    "misunderstanding and misconception" would be a futile
    exercise that would serve no purpose. Also the two
    alleged eye witnesses, who are closely related to the
D   complainant, are also no longer supportive of the
    prosecution version. The continuance of the proceedings
    is thus, nothing but an empty formality. Section 482
    Cr.P.C. could, in such circumstances, be justifiably
    invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse of the
E   process of law and thereby preventing a wasteful
    exercise by the Courts below. The impugned order
    passed by the High Court is set aside and the
    prosecution pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate
    is quashed. [Paras 14 and 15] [149-G-H; 150-A-G]
F
      Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab (2008) 4 SCC
  582; Ram Lal and Anr. v. State of J & K (1999) 2 SCC 213;
  Y. Suresh Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh JT (1987) 2 SC
  361; Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan 1990 Supp. SCC
  681; Jshwar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 15
G SCC 667; State of Kamataka v. L. Muniswamy & Ors. (1977)
  2 SCC 699; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and Ors. v.
  Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and Ors. (1988) 1 SCC
  692; B. S Joshi and Ors. v. State of Haryana (2003) 4 SCC
H
 SHIJI @ PAPPU AND ORS. v. RADHIKA AND ANR.             139

675; Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SC      A
551; Nikhil Merchant v. CBI 2008(9) SCC 677; Manoj
Sharma v. State and Ors. (2008) 16 SCC 1 - referred to.
                    Case Law Reference:
    (2008) 4 sec 582         Referred to          Para 7       B
    (1999) 2 sec 213         Referred to          Para 7
    JT (1987) 2 SC 361       Referred to          Para 7
    1990 Supp. sec 681       Referred to          Para 7       c
    (2008) 15 sec 667        Referred to          Para 7
    (1977) 2 sec 699         Referred to          Para 7
    (1988) 1 sec 692         Referred to          Para 9
                                                               D
    (2003) 4 sec 675         Referred to          Para 10
    (1977) 4 SC 551          Referred to          Para 10
    2008(9) sec 677          Referred to          Para 12
     (2oos) 16 sec 1         Referred to          Para 12      E

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 2094 of 2011.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 28.09.2010 of the High
                                                               F
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Crl. M.C. No. 3715 of 2010.

     Dr. Suman! Bhardwaj, Sqahil Garg, Arti Sharma, Mridula
Ray Bharadwaj, P.A. Noor Muhamed, Giffara S. Ajith Krishnan,
Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, R. Anand padmanabhan, Prithvi Raj
B.N., Shashi Bhushan Kumar for the Appellants.                 G

    C.D. Singh, Sunny Chaudhary, Anitha Shenoy, Jogy
Scaria, P. Sureshan for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                               H
    140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A       T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted.
        2. This appeal arises out of an order passed by the High
  Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, whereby Criminal M.C. no. 3715
  of 2010 filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
  Procedure, 1973, with a prayer for quashing criminal
8
  proceedings in FIR No.6/2010 alleging commission of offences
  punishable under Sections 354 and 394 of the IPC, has been
  dismissed. The High Court has taken the view that the offences
  with which the appellants stand charged, are not 'personal in
  nature' so as to justify quashing the pending criminal
C proceedings on the basis of a compromise arrived at between
  the first informant-complainant and the appellants. The only
  question that, therefore, arises for consideration is whether the
  criminal proceedings in question could be quashed in the facts
  and circumstances of the case having regard to the settlement
D that the parties had arrived at.

       3. Respondent-Radhika filed an oral complaint in the
  Police Station at Nemom in the State of Kerala, stating that she
  had accompanied her husband to see a site which the latter
E had acquired at Punjakari. Upon arrival at the site, her husband
  and brother Rajesh went inside the plot while she waited for
  them near the car parked close by. Three youngsters at this
  stage appeared on a motorbike, one of whom snatched the
  purse and mobile phone from her hands while the other hit her
F on the cheek and hand. She raised an alarm that brought her
  husband and brother rushing to the car by which time the
  offenders escaped towards Karumam on a motorcycle. The
  complainant gave the registration number of the motorbike to
  the police and sought action against the appellants who were
  named by her in the statement made before the Additional
G Police Sub-Inspector attached to the Nemom Police Station.
  FIR No.6/2010 was, on the basis of that statement, registered
  in the police station and investigation started. A charge sheet
  was, in due course, filed against the appellants before the
H
 SHIJI@ PAPPU AND ORS. v. RADHIKA AND ANR.               141
              [T.S. THAKUR, J.)
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Neyyattinkara, eventually     A
numbered CC 183/2010.

       4. During the pendency of the criminal proceedings
aforementioned, the parties appear to have amicably settled
the matter among themselves. Criminal M.C. No.3715 of 2010 8
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was on that basis filed before the
High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam for quashing of the complaint
pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class,
 Neyyattinkara. That prayer was made primarily on the premise
that appellant No.1 Shiji @ Pappu who also owns a parcel of C
 land adjacent to the property purchased by the respondent-
 Radhika, had some dispute in regard to the road leading to the
two properties. An altercation had in that connection taken place
 between the appellants on the one hand and the husband and
 brother of the respondent on the other, culminating in the
 registration of the FIR mentioned above. The petition further D
 stated that all disputes civil and criminal between the parties
 had been settled amicably and that the respondent had no
 grievance against the appellants in relation to the access to the
 plots in question and that the respondent had no objection to
 the criminal proceedings against the appellants being quashed E
 by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482
 Cr.P .C. The petition further stated that the disputes between
  the parties being personal in nature the same could be taken
 as settled and the proceedings put to an end relying upon the
 decision of this Court in Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of F
 Punjab (2008) 4 SCC 582. An affidavit sworn by the
  respondent stating that the matter stood settled between the
  parties was also filed by the appellants before the High Court.
  The High Court has upon consideration declined the prayer
  made by the appellants holding that the offences committed by G
  the appellants were not of a personal nature so as to justify
  quashing of the proceedings in exercise of its extra-ordinary
  jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

     5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and       H
     142    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R


A perused the impugned order. Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. enlists
   offences that are compoundable with the permission of the
  Court before whom the prosecution is pending and those that
  can be compounded even without such permission. An offence
  punishable under Section 354 of the IPC is in terms of Section
B 320(2) of the Code compoundable at the instance of the woman
  against whom the offence is committed. To that extent,
  therefore, there is no difficulty in either quashing the
  proceedings or compounding the offence under Section 354,
  of which the appellants are accused, having regard to the fact ·
c that the alleged victim of the offence has settled the matter with
  the alleged assailants. An offence punishable under Section
  394 IPC is not, however, compoundable with or without the
  permission of the Court concerned. The question is whether the
  High Court could and ought to have exercised its power under
  Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the prosecution under the
0
  said provision in the light of the compromise that the parties
  have arrived at.

          6. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the
   first informant-complainant had, in the affidavit filed before this
E Court, clearly admitted that the complaint in question was
   lodged by her on account of a misunderstanding and
  misconception about the facts and that the offences of which
  the appellants stand accused are purely personal in nature
  arising out of personal disputes between the parties. It was also
F evident that the complainant was no longer supporting the
  version on which the prosecution rested its case against the
  appellants. According to the learned counsel there was no
  question of the Trial Court recording a conviction against the
  appellants in the light of what the complainant had stated on
G affidavit. That was all the more so, when the other two
  prosecution witnesses were none other than the husband and
  the brother of the complainant who too were not supporting the
  charges against the appellants. Such being the case,
  continuance of criminal trial against the appellants was nothing
H but an abuse of the process of law and waste of valuable time
 SHIJI @ PAPPU AND ORS. v. RADHIKA AND ANR. 143
               [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
of the Courts below. Exercise of power by the High Court under      A
Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent such abuse is perfectly justified,
contended the learned counsel. Reliance in support was placed
by the learned counsel upon the decision of this Court in Madan
Mohan Abbot's case (supra).
                                                                 B
     7. This Court has, in several decisions, declared that
offences under Section 320 Cr.P.C. which are not
compoundable with or without the permission of the Court
cannot be allowed to be compounded. In Ram Lal and Anr. v.
State of J & K (1999) 2 SCC 213, this Court referred to Section C
320(9) of the Cr.P.C. to declare that such offences as are made
compoundable under Section 320 can alone be compounded
and none else. This Court declared two earlier decisions
rendered in Y. Suresh Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, JT
(1987) 2 SC 361 and Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan,
1990 Supp. SCC 681, to be per incuriam in as much as the D
same permitted composition of offences not otherwise
compoundable under Section 320 of the Cr.P .C. What is
important, however, is that in Ram La/'s case (supra) the
parties had settled the dispute among themselves after the
appellants stood convicted under Section 326 IPC. The mutual E
settlement was then sought to be made a basis for
compounding of the offence in appeal arising out of the order
of conviction and sentence imposed upon the accused. This
Court observed that since the offence was non-compoundable,
the court could not permit the same to be compounded, in the F
teeth of Section 320. Even so, the compromise was taken as
an extenuating circumstance which the court took into
consideration to reduce the punishment awarded to the
appellant to the period already undergone. To the same effect
is the decision of this Court in /shwar Singh v. State of Madhya G
Pradesh (2008) 15 SCC 667; where this Court said:
     "14. In our considered opinion, it would not be appropriate
     to order compounding of an offence not compoundable
     under the Code ignoring and keeping aside statutory            H
    144     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A         provisions. In our judgment, however, limited submission
          of the learned counsel for the appellant deserves
          consideration that while imposing substantive sentence, the
          factum of compromise between the parties is indeed a
          relevant circumstance which the Court may keep in mind."
B
        8. There is another line of decisions in which this Court has
  taken note of the compromise arrived at between the parties
  and quashed the prosecution in exercise of powers vested in
  the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In State of Karnataka
C v. L. Muniswamy & Ors. (1977) 2 SCC 699 this Court held that
  the High Court was entitled to quash the proceedings if it came
  to the conclusion that the ends of justice so required. This Court
  observed:

          "..... Section 482 of the new Code, which corresponds to
D         Section 561-A o the Code of 1898, provides that:

                "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit, or
                affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make
                such orders as may be necessary to give effect to
E               any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of
                the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the
                ends of justice."

         In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court
         is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the
F       conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would
        be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends
        of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.
        The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in
        civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve a salutary
G       public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not
        to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of
        harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled
        object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the
        material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and
H       the like would justify the High Court in quashing the
 SHIJI @ PAPPU AND ORS. v. RADHIKA AND ANR. 145
               [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
    proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice       A
    are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has
    got to be administered according to laws made by the
    legislature. The compelling necessity for making these
    observations is that without a proper realisation of the
    object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save          B
    the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between
    the State and its subjects it would be impossible to
    appreciate the width and contours of that salient
    jurisdiction."

     9. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and Ors. v.                   C
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and Ors. (1988) 1 SCC 692,
this Court held that the High Court should take into account any
special features which appear in a particular case to consider
whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a
prosecution to continue or quash the prosecution where in its        D
opinion the chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak. This
Court observed:

     "7. The legal position is well settled that when a
    prosecution at the initial stage is .asked to be quashed, E
    the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the
    uncontroverted a/legations as made prima facie establish
    the offence. It is also for the court to take into
    consideration any special features which appear in a
    particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in F
    the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue.
    This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised
    for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the
    court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and,
    therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by G
    allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may
    while taking into consideration the special facts of a case
    a/so quash the proceeding even though it may be at a
    preliminary stage."

     10. In 8.S Joshi and Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4         H
    146     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A SCC 675, the question that fell for consideration before this
  Court was whether the inherent powers vested in the High
  Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised to quash
  non-compoundable offences. The High Court had, in that case
  relying upon the decision of this Court in Madhu Limaye v. The
B State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SC 551, held that since
  offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC were not
  compoundable, it was not permissible in law to quash the FIR
  on the ground that there has been a settlement between the
  parties. This Court declared that the decisions in Madhu
c Limaye's case (supra) had been misread and misapplied by
  the High Court and that the judgment of this Court in Madhu
  Limaye's case (supra) clearly supported the view that nothing
  contained in Section 320(2) can limit or affect the exercise of
  inherent power of the High Court if interference by the High
  Court was considered necessary for the parties to secure the
0
  ends of justice. This Court observed:

          "8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye case (1977) 4 SC
          551 does not lay down any general proposition limiting
          power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or
E         complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or
          extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution
          of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the
          purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR
          becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to
F         the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a
          different matter depending upon the facts and
          circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not
          such a power..

          15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High
G
          Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal
          proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the
          Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482
          of the Code."
H         11. That brings to the decision of this Court in Madan
SHIJI@ PAPPU AND ORS. v. RADHIKA AND ANR.                    147
             [TS. THAKUR, J.]
Mohan Abbot' case (supra) whereby the High Court had A
declined the prayer for quashing of the prosecution for offences
punishable under Sections 379, 406, 409, 418, 506/34 IPC
despite a compromise entered into between the complainant
and the accused. The High Court had taken the view that since
the offence punishable under Section 406 was not B
compoundable the settlement between the parties could not be
recognized nor the pending proceedings quashed. This Court
summed up the approach to be adopted in such cases in the
following words:

    "6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that C
    in disputes where the question involved is of a purely
    personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the
    terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as
    keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in
    favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, D
    grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that
    the time so saved can be utilised iri deciding more effective
    and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense
    approach to the matter based on ground of realities and
    bereft of the technicalities of the law.                      E

     7. We see from the impugned order that the learned Judge
     has confused compounding of an offence with the
     quashing of proceedings. The outer limit of Rs 250 which
     has led to the dismissal of the application is an irrelevant     F
     factor in the later case. We, accordingly, allow the appeal
     and in the peculiar facts of the case direct that FIR No. 155
   · dated 17-11-2001 PS Kotwali, Amritsar and all
     proceedings connected therewith shall be deemed to be
     quashed."                                                        G

     12. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Nikhil
Merchant v. CBI 2008(9) SCC 677 where relying upon the
decision in 8. S. Joshi (supra), this Court took note of the
settlement arrived at between the parties and quashed the
criminal proceedings for offences punishable under Sections           H
    148     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-8 of IPC and
    held that since the criminal proceedings had the overtone of a
    civil dispute which had been amicably settled between the
    parties·it was a fit case where technicality should not be allowed
    to stand in the way of quashing of the criminal proceedings
s since the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived
  . at between the parties would be a futile exercise. We may also
    at this stage refer to the decision of this Court in Manoj Sharma
    v. State and Ors. (2008) 16 SCC 1. This court observed:

          "8. In our view, the High Court's refusal to exercise its
c         jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for
          quashing the criminal proceedings cannot be supported.
          The first information report, which had been lodged by the
          complainant indicates a dispute between the complainant
          and the accused which is of a private nature. It is no doubt
D         true that the first information report was the basis of the
          investigation by the police authorities, but the dispute
          between the parties remained one of a personal nature.
          Once the complainant decided not to pursue the matter
          further, the High Court could have taken a more pragmatic
E         view of the matter. xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

          9. As we have indicated hereinbefore. the exercise of
          power under Section 482 CrPC of Article 226 of the
          Constitution is discretionary to be exercised in the facts
          of each case. In the facts of this case we are of the view
F
          that continuing with the criminal proceedings would be an
          exercise in futility ..... "

        13. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not
  compoundable under Section 320 IPC is by itself no reason
G for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section
  482 Cr.P.C. That power can in our opinion be exercised in
  cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction
  agairist the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined
  to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between
H compounding of offences by the parties before the trial Court
 SHIJI @ PAPPU AND ORS. v. RADHIKA AND ANR.                 149
               [T.S. THAKUR J.]

or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High A
Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on
the other. While a Court trying an a.ccused or hearing an appeal
against conviction, may not be competent to permit
compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at
between the parties in cases where the offences are not B
compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash
the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which
the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The
 inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 Cr.P.C.          c
 Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the
 power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by itself, makes it obligatory
for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and
 caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands
 that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High D
 Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that
 continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse
 of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us
 to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power
 under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is E
 that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of
 justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power
 may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High court
 may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to
 appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an
 appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 F
 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High
 Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each
 case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent
 powers may l:Je invoked.
                                                                    G
     14. Coming to the case at hand we are of the view that
the incident in question had its genesis in a dispute relating to
the access to the two plots which are adjacent to each other. It
was not a case of broad day light robbery for gain. It was a case
which has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties,      H
    150   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A which dispute has, it appears, been resolved by them. That
  being so, continuance of the prosecution where the complainant
  is not ready to support the allegations which are now described
  by her as arising out of some "misunderstanding and
  misconception" will be a futile exercise that will serve no
B purpose. It is noteworthy that the two alleged eye witnesses,
  who are closely related to the complainant, are also no longer
  supportive of the prosecution version. The continuance of the
  proceedings is thus nothing but an empty formality. Section 482
  Cr.P.C. could, in such circumstances, be justifiably invoked by
c the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and
  thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the Courts below.

      15. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the
  impugned order passed by the High Court and quash the
  prosecution in CC 183/2010 pending in the Court of Judicial
D Magistrate, First Class, Neyyattinkara.

   N.J.                                         Appeal allowed.