SHEORAJ SINGH AHLAWAT & ORS.versusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.

                       [2012] 10 S.C.R. 1034


A              SHEORAJ SINGH AHLAWAT & ORS.
                                 v.
              STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
               (Criminal Appeal No.1803 of 2012)

                       NOVEMBER 9, 2012
B
            rr.s. THAKUR AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
                    IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]

       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.239 - Ambit of -
C Approach to be adopted by the Court while exercising the
  powers vested in it u/s.239 CrPC - Discussed - Matrimonial
  case - Allegations of harassment for dowry and mental and
  physical torture by wife against husband (appellant no.3) and
  parents-in-law (appellant nos. 1 and 2) - Cognizance by Court
D uls.498A - Application by appellants for discharge u/s.239
  CrPC - Dismissed by trial Court - Justification of - Held:
  Justified - Whether or not the allegations were true is a matter
  which could not be determined at the stage of framing of
  charges - Any such determination can take place only at the
E conclusion of the trial - Nature of the a/legations against the
  appellants too specific to be ignored at least at the stage of
  framing of charges - Courts below therefore justified in
  refusing to discharge the appellants.

       Appellant No.3 is the husband and appellants No.1
F and 2 are the parents-in-law of respondent no.2.
  Respondent no.2 alleged that the appellants were
  harassing her for dowry and subjecting her to physical
  and mental torture. Respondent No.2's further case is that
  on 10th December, 2006 she was forced into a car by the
G appellants who then abandoned her at a deserted place
  on a lonely road at night and threatened to kill her if she
  returned to her matrimonial home. The jurisdictional
  police filed closure report to which respondent no.2 fifed
  a protest petition. On the basis of the protest petition, the
H                             1034
  SHEORAJ SINGH AHLAWAT & ORS. v. STATE OF 1035
           UTIAR PRADESH & ANR.
Judicial Magistrate took cognizance against the                    A
appellants under Section 498A IPC.
    The appellants thereafter filed application for
discharge under Section 239 CrPC contending that the
accusations of dowry harassment as also the alleged                8
incident of 10th December, 2006 were false. The
application for discharge was dismissed by the trial Court
holding that the grounds urged for discharge could be
considered only after evidence was adduced in the case.
Aggrieved, the appellants preferred Criminal Revision              C
which was dismissed by the High Court and therefore the
instant appeal.

     Dismissing the appeal, the Court

     HELD:1.1. The case at hand being a warrant case is            o
governed by Section 239 Cr.P.C. for purposes of
determining whether the accused or any one of them
deserved to be discharged. A plain reading of Section 239
CrPC would show that the Court trying the case can
direct discharge only for reasons to be recorded by it and
                                                                   E
only if it considers the charge against the accused to be
groundless. Section 240 CrPC provides for framing of a
charge if, upon consideration of the police report and the
documents sent therewith and making such examination,
if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary,
the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is ground for          F
presuming that the accused has committed an offence
triable under Chapter XIX, which such Magistrate is
competent to try and which can be adequately punished
by him. [Paras 10, 11] [1043-B-E-G]
                                                                   G
     1.2. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the
court is required to evaluate the material and documents
on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging
therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the
existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged          H
    1036   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012) 10 S.C.R.


A offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go
  deep into the probative value of the material on record.
  What needs to be considered is whether there is a
  ground for presuming that the offence has been
  committed and not a ground for convicting the accused
B has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion
  founded on material which leads the court to form a
  presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual
  ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify
  the framing of charge against the accused in respect of
c the commission of that offence. [Para 11] [1044-C-F]
       1.3. It is well-settled that at the stage of framing of
  charge the defence of the accused cannot be put forth.
  The submissions of the accused has to be confined to
  the material produced by the police. Clearly the law is that
D at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the
  accused has no right to. produce any material. [Para 14]
  [1046-B-G-H; 1047-A]

       Onkar Nath Mishra and Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi) and
E Anr. (2008) 2 sec 561: 2007 (13) SCR 716; State of
  Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy 1977 eri.LJ 1125; State of
  Maharashtra & Ors. v. Som Nath Thapa and Ors. 1996 Cri.LJ
  2448; State of M.P. v. Mohan/al Soni 2000 Cri.LJ 3504; State
  of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Pandhi (2005) 1 sec 568: 2004
F (6) Suppl. SCR 460; Smt. Rumi Dhar v. State of West Bengal
  & Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 364: 2009 (5) SCR 553 and Union of
  India v. Prafu!la Kumar Sama/ and Anr. v. (1979) 3 SCC 4:
    1979 (2) SCR 229 - relied on.
      Preeti Gupta and Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (2010)
G 7 SCC 667: 2010 (9) SCR 1168; Sajjan Kumar v. Central
  Bureau of Investigation (2010) 9 SCC 368: 2010 (11) SCR
  669; Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kera/a and Anr. (2009)
  14 sec 466 - cited.

H       2. In the case at hand, the allegations made are
  SHEORAJ SINGH AHLAWAT & ORS. v. STATE OF 1037
           UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
  specific not only against the husband-appellant no.3 but      A
  also against the parents-in-law (appellant nos. 1 and 2)
  of the complainant-wife. Whether or not those allegations
  are true is a matter which cannot be determined at the
  stage of framing of charges. Any such determination can
  take place only at the conclusion of the trial. This may at   B
  times put an innocent party, falsely accused of
  commission of an offence to avoidable harassment but
  so long as the legal requirement and the settled
  principles do not permit a discharge the Court would find
  it difficult to do much, conceding that legal process at      c
  times is abused by unscrupulous litigants especially in
  matrimonial cases where the tendency has been to
  involve as many members of the family of the opposite
  party as possible. While such tendency needs to be
  curbed, the Court will not be able to speculate whether       0
  the allegations made against the accused are true or false
  at the preliminary stage to be able to direct a discharge.
  Two of the appellants in this case happen to be parents-
  i n-law of the complainant who are senior citizens.
  Appellant No.1 who happens to be the father-in-law of the
  complainant-wife has been a Major General, by all means,
                                                                E
· a respectable position in the Army. But the nature of the
  allegations made against the couple and those against
  the husband, appear to be much too specific to be
  ignored at least at the stage of framing of charges. The
  Courts below, therefore, did not commit any mistake in        F
  refusing a discharge. [Para 17] [1048-F-H; 1049-A-C]

     3. Keeping, however, in view the facts and
circumstances of the case, it is directed that appellant
Nos. 1 and 2 shall stand exempted from personal                 G
appearance before the trial Court except when the trial
Court considers it necessary to direct their presence. The
said appellants shall, however, make sure that they are
duly represented by a counsel on all dates of hearing and
that they cooperate with the progress of the case failing       H
    1038    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 10 S.C.R.


A which the trial Court shall be free to direct their personal
  appearance. (Para 18] (1049-D-E]

                         Case Law Reference:

      2010 (9) SCR 1168             cited            Para 8
B
      2010 (11) SCR 669             cited            Para 8
      2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 460       relied on        Paras 8, 14

      2007 (13) SCR 716             relied on        Paras 8, 11
c     (2009) 14 sec 466             cited            Para 8

      2009 (5) SCR 553              relied on        Paras 8, 15

      1979 (2) SCR 229              relied on        Paras 9, 16

D     1977 Cri.LJ 1125              relied on        Para 12
      1996 Cri.LJ 2448              relied on        Para 12

      2000 Cri.LJ 3504              relied on        Para 12, 13

        CRIMINAL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
E
    No. 1803 of 2012.

         From the Judgment & Order dated 06.05.2010 of the High
    Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 1241
    of 2010.
F
        Geeta Luthra, Sridhar Potaraju, Sudhanshu Pandey,
    Gaichangpou Gangmei, Abhishek R. Shukla for the Appellant.

       Pramod Swarup, Alok Shukla, Sweta Rani, Adrash
    Upadhayay, Abisth Kumar for the Respondent.
G
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted.

        2. This appeal is directed against a judgement and order
H
  SHEORAJ SINGH AHLAWAT & ORS. v. STATE OF 1039
    UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

dated 6th May, 2010, passed by the High Court of Judicature        A
at Allahabad whereby Criminal Revision No.1241 of 2010 filed
by the appellants has been dismissed and order dated 9th
March, 2010 passed by the Additional Judicial Magistrate,
Bulandshahar dismissing an application for discharge affirmed.
The factual backdrop in which the matter arises may be             B
summarised as under:

      3. Appellant No.3-Naveen Ahlawat and respondent no.2-
Smt. Renu Ahlawat tied the matrimonial knot on 28th
September, 1998. Appellant No.3 was, at that time, serving in C
Indian Army as a Captain. The couple were blessed with a
daughter three years after marriage. According to the wife-Smt.
Renu Ahlawat, the addition to the family did not make much of
a difference in terms of cordiality of her relations with her
husband Captain Naveen Ahlawat and appellants No.1 and 2
who happen to be her parents in-law as they kept harassing D
her for dowry ever since the marriage was solemnised. These
demands, according to her, continued even after her father had
paid a sum of rupees four lakhs to the appellants. Physical and
mental torture of respondent No.2-Renu Ahlawat, it is alleged,
also did not stop even after the said payment, for the sake of E
a luxury car as an additional item of dowry. Respondent No.2-
Smt. Renu Ahlawat's further case is that on 10th December,
2006 she was forced into a car by the appellants who then
abandoned her at a deserted place on a lonely road near Sihi
village at around 8 p.m. and threatened to kill her if she returned F
to her matrimonial home. When Jitendar Singh and-Brijvir Singh
two villagers saw respondent No.2-Renu Ahlawat weeping by
the side of the road, besides the car they tried to confront the
appellants whereupon appellant No.3-Naveen is alleged to have
pulled out a revolver and threatened to shoot them.                 G

     4. A complaint about the incident was lodged on 13th
December, 2006, by respondent No.2-Renu Ahlawat with SSP,
Bulandshahar in which she gave details regarding her marriage
with the appellant No.3-Naveen Ahlawat and the mental and          H
    1040    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 10 S.C.R.


A   physical harassment faced by her at their hands as also
    repeated demands for dowry. She also accused her sisters-
    in-law, Neena and Meghna for indulging in such harassment
    along with the appellants.

       5. The jurisdictional police started investigation into the
8
  incident, in the course whereof complainant-Smt. Renu Ahlawat
  came to know about her husband-Naveen Ahlawat having
  obtained an ex parte decree for divorce against her. A copy of
  the said judgment and decree was collected by Smt. Renu
  Ahlawat on 28th November, 2006 and steps taken to have the
C same set aside. The decree was eventually set aside by the
  Court concerned.

          6. The police, in the meantime, filed a closure report to
    which Renu Ahlawat filed a protest petition. It was on the basis
D   of the protest petition that Judicial Magistrate, Bulandshahar,
    took cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 498-
    A of the l.P.C. against the appellants as also against Neena
    and Meghna sisters-in-law of the complainant. By an order
    dated 13th February, 2009 Neena and Meghna were
E   discharged by the High Court of Allahabad on the ground that
    no specific allegations were made against them. The appellants
    then filed an application for discharge under Section 239 of the
    Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before learned Additional
    Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bulandshahar in which they alleged
F   that the accusations of dowry harassment levelled against them
    were false and so was the incident alleged to have taken place
    on 10th December, 2006 on which date both appellants No.1
    and his son appellant No.3 claimed to be otherwise engaged
    which according to them belied Renu Ahlawat's story of their
G   having abandoned her on a deserted road as alleged by her.
    The application for discharge was, however, dismissed by the
    Court by order dated 9th March, 2010 holding that the grounds
    urged for discharge could be considered only after evidence
    was adduced in the case and that appellant No.2 could not be
    discharged on the basis of minor contradictions in the
H   depositions recorded in the course of the investigation.
  SHEORAJ SINGH AHLAWAT & ORS. v. STATE OF 1041
    UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

     7. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Trial Court the    A
appellants preferred Criminal Revision No.1241 of 2010 which
was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the same
did not make out a case for quashing of the proceedings
against the appellants. The present appeal assails the
correctness of the said order of dismissal.                     B

      8. On behalf of the appellant it was argued on the authority
of the decisions of this Court in Preeti Gupta and Anr. v. State
of Jharkhand & Anr. (2010) 7 SCC 667, Union of India v.
Praful/a Kumar Sama/ and Anr. (1979) 3 SCC 4, Sajjan C
Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2010) 9 SCC 368,
State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Pandhi (2005) 1 SCC 568,
Onkar Nath Mishra and Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr.
(2008) 2 SCC 561, Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kera/a and
Anr. (2009) 14 SCC 466, and Rumi Dhar (Smt.) v. State of
West Bengal and Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 364, that while D
considering an application for discharge the Court can examine
the evidence on record and discharge the accused persons if
there is no possibility of the accused being found guilty on the
basis of such evidence specially in cases where the accused
produces unimpeachable evidence in support of his defence. E
It was also contended that while examining whether the Court
should or should not discharge the accused, it must be
remembered, that Section 498-A of the IPC is a much abused
provision and that exaggerated versions of small incidents are
often presented to falsely implicate, harass and humiliate the F
husband and his relatives. Applying the principles set out in the
above decisions the appellants were, according to Ms. Geeta
Luthra, learned counsel appearing for them, entitled to a
discharge not only because there was an inordinate delay in
the filing of the complaint by respondent No.1 but also because G
the statements made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. by the
witnesses who were either planted or merely chance witnesses
were contradictory in nature. It was argued that two Investigating
Officers having investigated the matter and found the allegations
to be false, there was no reason for the Court to believe the H
    1042     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 10 S.C.R.


A story set up by the wife who had suffered a decree for divorce
  in regard to which she had written to the Army Authorities a
  letter dated 2nd October, 2006 stating that she was not
  pursuing the matter in any Court. Appellant No.3-Naveen
  Ahlawat having got re-married on 30th October, 2006 the
B incident referred in the complaint was a fabrication which
  aspect the Courts below had failed to consider thus failing to
  protect the appellants against harassment and the ignominy of
  a criminal trial.

         9. On behalf of respondent No.2, it was per contra argued
C   that her husband had filed a divorce· petition against her in the
    Family Court, Meerut showing respondent No.2 to be residing
    with her parents at 327, Prabhat Nagar, Mee rut, whereas she
    was actually residing with the appellants along with her
    daughter at No. 9, Tigris Road, Delhi Gantt, Delhi. It was further
D   argued that appellant No.3 had obtained an ex parte decree
    order of divorce by fraudulent means and by forging signatures
    of respondent No.2, acknowledging receipt of the notice which
    she had never received from the concerned Court. This was
    conclusively established by the fact that the ex parte decree
E   dated 31st May, 2006 had been eventually set aside by the
    Court in terms of order dated 28th July, 2007. Allegations
    regarding physical torture of respondent No.2 and her being
    abandoned on the road on the date of incident in question as
    also the allegation about dowry harassment were factually
F   correct and made out a clear case for prosecuting the
    appellants. Appellant No.3 had, according to the counsel for the
    respondent, married one Aditi on 30th October, 2006. It was
    also argued that letter referred to by appellant No.3 as also letter
    dated 2nd November, 2006 allegedly written by respondent
G   No.2 were forgeries committed by the appellants. The trial Court
    was, in the light of the available material, justified in refusing to
    discharge the accused persons and that the grounds for
    discharge set up by the appellants could be examined only after
    the case had gone through full-fledged trial. Reliance was
H
 SHEORAJ SINGH AHLAWAT & ORS. v. STATE OF 1043
   UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

placed upon a decision of this Court in Union of India v.          A
Prafulla Kumar Sama/a and Anr. (1979) 3 SCC 5.

     10. The case at hand being a warrant case is governed
by Section 239 of the Cr.P.C. for purposes of determining
whether the accused or any one of them deserved to be              B
discharged. Section 239 is as under:

    "239. When accused shall be discharged.

    If, upon considering the police report and the documents
    sent with it under section 173 and making such                 c
    examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate
    thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the
    accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate
    considers the charge against the accused to be
    groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record         0
    his reasons for so doing."

      11. A plain reading of the above would show that the Court
trying the case can direct discharge only for reasons to be
recorded by it and only if it considers the charge against the
accused to be groundless. Section 240 of the Code provides         E
for framing of a charge if, upon consideration of the police
report and the documents sent therewith and making such
examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks
necessary, the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is ground
for presuming that the accused has committed an offence            F
triable under Chapter XIX, which such Magistrate is competent
to try and which can be adequately punished by him. The ambit
of Section 239 Cr.P.C. and the approach to be adopted by the
Court while exercising the powers vested in it under the said
provision fell for consideration of this Court in Onkar Nath       G
Mishra and Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr. (2008) 2
sec 561. That too was a case in which a complaint under
Sections 498-A and 406 read with Section 34 of the l.P.C. was
filed against the husband and parents-in-law of the
complainant-wife. The Magistrate had in that case discharged       H
    1044    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2012) 10 S.C.R.


A the accused under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C, holding that the
  charge was groundless. The complainant questioned that order
  before the Revisional Court which directed the trial Court to
  frame charges against the accused persons. The High Court
  having affirmed that order, the matter was brought up to this
8 Court. This Court partly allowed the appeal qua the parents-in-
  law while dismissing the same qua the husband. This Court
  explained the legal position and the approach to be adopted
  by the Court at the stage of framing of charges or directing
  discharge in the following words:
c       "11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the
        court is required to evaluate the material and documents
        on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging
        therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the
        existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged
D       offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep
        into the probative value of the material on record. What
        needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for
        presuming that the offence has been committed and not
        a ground for convicting the accused has been made out.
E       At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material
        which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as
        to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the
        offence alleged would justify the framing of charge
        against the accused in respect of the commission of that
F       offence."

                                              (emphasis supplied)

       12. Support for the above view was drawn by this Court
  from earlier decisions rendered in State of Karnataka v. L.
G Muniswamy 1977 Cri.LJ 1125, State of Maharashtra & Ors.
  v. Som Nath Thapa and Ors. 1996 Cri.LJ 2448 and State of
  M.P. v. Mohan/al Soni 2000 Cri.LJ 3504. In Som Nath's case
  (supra) the legal position was summed up as under:

H       "if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come
  SHEORAJ SINGH AHLAWAT & ORS. v. STATE OF 1045
    UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. [T..S. THAKUR, J.]

    to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a            A
    probable consequence, a case for framing of charge
    exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that
    the accused might have committed the offence it can
    frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion
    is required to be that the accused has committed the             B
    offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a
    charge, pr~bative value of the materials on record cannot
    be gone into; the materials brought on record by the
    prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage.•

                                           (emphasis supplied}
                                                                     c
      13. So also in Mohanlal's case (supra) this Court referred
to several previous decisions and held that the judicial opinion
regarding the approach to be adopted for framing of charge is
that such charges should be framed if the Court prima facie          D
finds that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence as
if to determine whether the material produced was sufficient to
convict the accused. The following passage from the decision
in Mohanlal's case (supra) is in this regard apposite:               E

    "8. The crystallized judicial view is that at the stage of
    framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider
    whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
    the accused. The court is not required to appreciate
                                                                     F
    evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are
    sufficient or not for convicting the accused.•

     14. In State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Pandhi (2005) 1
sec 568, this Court was considering whether the trial Court
can at the time of framing of charges consider material filed G
by the accused. The question was answered in the negative
by this Court in the following words:·

    "18. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention.
    The reliance on Articles 14 and 21 is misplaced... Further,
                                                                     H
    1046   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012) 10 S.C.R.

A      at the stage of framing of charge roving and fishing
       inquiry is impermissible. If the contention of the accused
       is accepted, there would be a mini trial at the stage of
       framing of charge. That would defeat the object of the
       Code. It is we/I-settled that at the stage of framing of
B      charge the defence of tile accused cannot be put forlh.
       The acceptance of the contention of the learned counsel
       for the accused would mean permitting the accused to
       adduce his defence at the stage of framing of charge and
       for examination thereof at that stage which is against the
c      criminal jurisprudence. Bv way of illustration. if may be
       noted that the plea of alibi taken bv the accused may
       have to be examined at the stage of framing of charge if
       the contention of the accused is accepted despite the well
       settled proposition that it is for the accused to lead
       evidence at the trial to sustain such a plea. The accused
D
       would be entitled to produce materials and documents
       in proof of such a plea at the stage of framing of the
       charge, in case we accept the contention put forth on
       behalf of the accused. That has never been the intention
       of the law well settled for over one hundred years now. It
E      is in this light that the provision about hearing the
       submissions of the accused as postulated by Section
       227 is to be understood. It only means hearing the
       submissions of the accused on the record of the case as
       filed by the prosecution and documents submitted
F      therewith and nothing more. The expression 'hearing the
       submissions of the accused' cannot mean opportunity to
       file material to be granted to the accused and thereby
       changing the settled law. At the state of framing of charge
       hearing the submissions of the accused has to be
G      confined to the material produced by the police...

       xx xx xx xx
       23. As a result of aforesaid discussion, in our view, clearly
       the law is that at the time of framing charge or taking
H
 SHEORAJ SINGH AHLAWAT & ORS. v. STATE OF 1047
   UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

    cognizance the accused has no right to produce any               A
    material..."

                                            (emphasis supplied)

     15. Even in Smt. Rumi Dhar v. State of West Bengal &
Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 364, reliance whereupon was placed by              B
counsel for the appellants the tests to be applied at the stage
of discharge of the accused person under Section 239 of the
Cr.P.C., were found to be no different. Far from readily
encouraging discharge, the Court held that even a strong
suspicion in regard to the commission of the offence would be        C
sufficient to justify framing of charges. The Court observed:

    "... While considering an application for discharge filed in
    terms of Section 239 of the Code, it was for the learned
    Judge to go into the details of the a/legations made             0
    against each of the accused persons so as to form an
    opinion as to whether any case at all has been made out
    or not as a strong suspicion in regard thereto shall
    subserve the requirements of law...

     16. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Union   E
of India v. Prafulla Kumar Sama/ and Anr. v. (1979) 3 SCC
4, where this Court was examining a similar question in the
context of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The
legal position was summed up as under:
                                                                     F
     "10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned
     above, the following principles emerge :

    (1) That the Judge while considering the question of
    framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has
    the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for           G
    the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima
    facie case against the accused has been made out:

    (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose
    grave suspicion against the accused which has not been           H
    1048    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 10 S.C.R.


A       properly explained the Court wifl be fully justified in
        framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

        (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
        naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is
        difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and
B
        large however if two views are equally possible and the
        Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him
        while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave
        suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his
        right to discharge the accused.
c
        (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of
        the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a
        senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a
        Post Office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has
D       to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total
        effect of the evidence and the documents produced
        before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the
        case and so on. This however does not mean that the
        Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and
E       cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
        conducting a trial."

         17. Coming then to the case at hand, the allegations made
  against the appellants are specific not only against the husband
  but also against the parents-in-law of the complainant-wife.
F Whether or not those allegations are true is a matter which
  cannot be determined at the stage of framing of charges. Any
  such determination can take place only at the conclusion of the
  trial. This may at times put an innocent party, falsely accused
  of commission of an offence to avoidable harassment but so
G long as the legal requirement and the settled principles do not
  permit a discharge the Court would find it difficult to do much,
  conceding that legal process at times is abused by
  unscrupulous litigants especially in matrimonial cases where the
  tendency has been to involve as many members of the family
H of the opposite party as possible. While such tendency needs
  SHEORAJ SINGH AHLAWAT & ORS. v. STATE OF 1049
    UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

 to be curbed, the Court will not be able to speculate whether       A
 the allegations made against the accused are true or false at
 the preliminary stage to be able to direct a discharge. Two of
 the appellants in this case happen to be parents-in-law of the
 complainant who are senior citizens. Appellant No.1 who
 happens to be the father-in-law of the complainant-wife has         B
 been a Major General, by all means, a respectable position in
 the Army. But the nature of the allegations made against the
 couple and those against the husband, appear to be much too
 specific to be ignored at least at the stage of framing of
 charges. The Courts below, therefore, did not commit any            c
·{histake in refusing a discharge.

     18. In the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
Keeping, however, in view the facts and circumstances of the
case, we direct that appellant Nos. 1 and 2 shall stand
exempted from personal appearance before the trial Court             D
except when the trial Court considers it necessary to direct their
presence. The said appellants shall, however, make sure that
they are duly represented by a counsel on all dates of hearing
and that they cooperate with the progress of the case failing
which the trial Court shall be free to direct their personal         E
appearance. No costs.

8.8.B.                                       Appeal dismissed.