SHEILA SEBASTIANversusR. JAWAHARAJ & ANR. ETC.

                         [2018] 4 S.C.R. 439                            439


                      SHEILA SEBASTIAN                                  A
                                 v.
                  R. JAWAHARAJ & ANR. ETC.
              (Criminal Appeal Nos. 359-360 of 2010)
                           MAY 11, 2018                                 B
        [N. V. RAMANA AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.]
       Penal Code, 1860 – ss.420, 464, 465 – Allegation of forgery
– Prosecution case was that accused no.1, with the aid of imposter
impersonating as the owner of the property belonging to the
complainant, created a Power of Attorney (PoA) in his name as if        C
he was her agent and using the said PoA accused-respondent no.1
attempted to transfer the property by executing a mortgage deed in
favour of accused-respondent no.2 – Conviction by trial court,
upheld by Sessions court – High Court set aside concurrent finding
of courts below and ordered acquittal – On appeal, held: A charge       D
of forgery cannot be imposed on a person who is not the maker of
the forged document – Explanation 2 to s.464 states that, for
constituting an offence under s.464 it is imperative that the
accused person is the maker of the false document – In the instant
case, there is no finding recorded by trial Court that the accused-
respondents made any false document – It is the imposter who can        E
be said to have made the false document by committing forgery –
The prosecution could not prove the offence of forgery by
adducing reliable evidence – In such an event trial court as well as
appellate court misguided themselves by convicting the accused –
High Court rightly acquitted the accused.                               F
       Investigation – Botched up investigation – Miscarriage of
justice – This case on hand is a classic example of poor
prosecution and shabby investigation which resulted in acquittal
of the accused – The Investigating Officer is expected to be diligent
while discharging his duties – He has to be fair, transparent and his
                                                                        G
only endeavour should be to find out the truth – However, he has
not even taken bare minimum care to find out the whereabouts of
the imposter who executed the PoA – The evidence on record clearly
revealed that PoA was not executed by the complainant and the
beneficiary is the accused, still the accused could not be convicted
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                                439
440           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2018] 4 S.C.R.


A     – The latches in the lopsided investigation went to the root of the
      matter and fatal to the case of prosecution.
            Dismissing the appeals, the Court
            HELD: 1. Section 463 defines the offence of forgery, while
      Section 464 substantiates the same by providing an answer as to
B     when a false document could be said to have been made for the
      purpose of committing an offence of forgery under Section 463,
      IPC. Section 465 provides punishment for the commission of the
      offence of forgery. In order to sustain a conviction under
      Section 465, first it has to be proved that forgery was committed
C     under Section 463, implying that ingredients under Section 464
      should also be satisfied. Therefore unless and until ingredients
      under Section 463 are satisfied a person cannot be convicted
      under Section 465 by solely relying on the ingredients of Section
      464, as the offence of forgery would remain incomplete.
      [Para 19][447-A-C]
D
             2. A charge of forgery cannot be imposed on a person who
      is not the maker of the same. Making of a document is different
      than causing it to be made. As Explanation 2 to Section 464 further
      clarifies that, for constituting an offence under Section 464 it is
      imperative that a false document is made and the accused
E     person is the maker of the same, otherwise the accused person
      is not liable for the offence of forgery. The definition of “false
      document” is a part of the definition of “forgery”. Both must be
      read together. ‘Forgery’ and ‘Fraud’ are essentially matters of
      evidence which could be proved as a fact by direct evidence or
      by inferences drawn from proved facts. In the case in hand, there
F
      is no finding recorded by the trial Court that the respondents
      have made any false document or part of the document/record to
      execute mortgage deed under the guise of that ‘false document’.
      Hence, neither respondent no.1 nor respondent no.2 can be held
      as makers of the forged documents. [Paras 25, 26][449-E-H; 450-
G     A]
            3. The imposter has not been found or investigated into by
      the concerned officer. Nothing has been spilled on the relationship
      between the imposter and respondent no.1. Strong suspicion,
      coincidence, grave doubt cannot take the place of proof. A duty
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        SHEILA SEBASTIAN v. R. JAWAHARAJ & ANR.                          441


is cast upon the courts to ensure that suspicion does not take           A
place of the legal proof. In this case, the trial court as well as the
appellate court carried away by the fact that accused is the
beneficiary or the executant of the mortgage deed, where the
prosecution miserably failed to prove the first transaction i.e.
PoA as a fraudulent and forged transaction. The evidence clearly
                                                                         B
revealed that PoA was not executed by the complainant and the
beneficiary is the accused, still the accused could not be convicted.
The latches in the lopsided investigation goes to the root of the
matter and fatal to the case of prosecution. If this is the
coordination between the prosecution and the investigating
agency, every criminal case tend to end up in acquittal. In the          C
process, the common man will lose confidence on the criminal
justice delivery system, which is not a good symptom. It is the
duty of the investigation, prosecution as well as the Courts to
ensure that full and material facts and evidence are brought on
record, so that there is no scope for miscarriage of justice.
                                                                         D
[Paras 27, 28][450-C-E, G; 451-A]

      Md. Ibrahim and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. (2009)
      8 SCC 751 : [2009] 9 SCR 845 ; Mir Nagvi Askari v.
      Central Bureau of Investigation (2009) 15 SCC 643 :
      [2009] 13 SCR 124 ; Latesh @ Dadu Baburao Karlekar                 E
      v. The State of Maharashtra (2018) 3 SCC 66 – relied
      on.

      Guru Bipin Singh v. Chongtham Manihar Singh &
      Another (1996) 11 SCC 622 : [1996] 7 Suppl. SCR
      611 – referred to.                                                 F
      Dickins v. Gill (1896) 2 QB 310 – referred to.

                        Case Law Reference
      [1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 611       referred to         Para 5
                                                                         G
      [2009] 9 SCR 845              relied on           Para 21
      [2009] 13 SCR 124             relied on           Para 24
      (2018) 3 SCC 66               relied on           Para 27
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442            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 4 S.C.R.


A           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
      Nos. 359-360 of 2010.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 25.01.2008 of the Madurai
      Bench of the High Court at Madras in Crl. R. C. No. 523 of 2005 & Crl.
      R. C. No. 546 of 2005.
B           R. Anand Padmanaban, Romil Pathak, Ananya Mukherjee, Akshay
      R.(for Pramod Dayal), Advs for the Appellant.
            Sabarish Subramanian, Prabhu Rama Subramanian, Y. William
      Vinoth Kumar, V. G. Pragasam (for M/s. Legion of Lawyers), Advs for
      the Respondents.
C
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            N. V. RAMANA, J. 1. These criminal appeals are filed against
      the impugned order dated 25.01.2008, passed by the High Court of
      Judicature at Madras, Madurai Bench in Criminal Revision Case Nos.523
D     & 546 of 2005, wherein the High Court has allowed the criminal revisions
      and held that the conviction of accused respondents is not sustainable
      under Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereinafter ‘IPC’].
              2. The case of the prosecution giving rise to these appeals, in
      brief, is that the complainant Mrs. Doris Victor (deceased mother of the
      appellant) was the owner of a plot in survey numbers
E
      1777/1A,1778/1,1779/1 and 1779/2 in Valliyoor village. The complainant
      alleges that, accused no. 1, (R. Jawaharaj), with the aid of an imposter
      who by impersonating as Mrs. Doris Victor created a Power of Attorney
      (hereinafter‘PoA’) in his name as if he was her agent. It was further
      alleged that, using the aforesaid PoA the accused no. 1, attempted to
F     transfer the property of complainant by executing a mortgage deed in
      favour of accused no. 2, (Rajapandi) for a sum of Rs.50,000/-. After
      getting the information about the aforesaid transaction, the owner of the
      property Mrs. Doris Victor gave a complaint to the police which was
      subsequently registered as FIR dated 14.03.1998. After the completion
      of investigation, a final report was filed against the aforesaid accused
G
      under Sections 420, 423 and 424,IPC. The complainant Mrs. Doris Victor
      died after filing the complaint.
             3. The learned Judicial Magistrate framed charges against accused
      no. 1 for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 420,423 and
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        SHEILA SEBASTIAN v. R. JAWAHARAJ & ANR.                                443
                   [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

465,IPC and against the accused no. 2 for the offences under Sections          A
424 and 465 read with 109,IPC. Both the accused were tried by the
learned Judicial Magistrate at Valliyoor in C.C. No: 62/1999, wherein
accused no. 1 was convicted under Section 465, IPC and was sentenced
to undergo 2 years of simple imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-
and accused no. 2 was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a
                                                                               B
period of 1 year and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- for the offences under
Section 465 read with Section 109, IPC vide order dated 12.03.2003.
       4. Aggrieved by the same, the Respondents—Accused appealed
before the Ld. Sessions Judge at Tirunelveli by way of Criminal Appeal
Nos. 72 & 78 of 2003, which ended up in dismissal by upholding the
order of conviction.                                                           C

        5. Thereafter, the respondents approached the High Court of
Madras, Bench at Madurai, wherein the High Court acquitted the revision
petitioners by setting aside the concurrent findings of the courts below.
The High Court, basing on the decision in Guru Bipin Singh v.
Chongtham Manihar Singh & Another, 1996 (11) SCC 622 observed                  D
that, the requirement of Section 464, IPC is not satisfied in view of what
has been stated under Explanation 2 to Section 464. Further from the
perusal of the Explanation, it is clear that to get attracted the offence of
forgery, “making of a false document is essential. Hence perusing the
given facts and circumstances before it, the High Court concluded that,        E
as no case is made out under Section 464, IPC offence under Section
420 of the IPC being a consequential one, equally cannot be sustained.
       6. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the High Court setting aside
the concurrent findings of conviction recorded by the Courts below against
the respondents, the appellant(daughter of the deceased Doris Victor)          F
filed the present appeal before this Court.
      7. The counsel for the appellant submits that, the High Court failed
to appreciate the material placed on record and acquitted the respondent
solely on the basis that their signatures are not found on the forged
document. According to the appellant,this is an erroneous interpretation       G
of Section 464 of IPC which mandates that anyone who makes a false
document is guilty of forgery. The respondents allegedly created the
forged power of attorney with the sole intention of grabbing the property
belonging to Mrs. Doris Victor.

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444            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 4 S.C.R.


A           8. Per contra, the ld. counsel for the respondents supported the
      judgment of the High Court and the interpretation given by the High
      Court,how the offence under Section 464, IPC is attracted. Further he
      submits that the appellant has got back the property and the mortgage
      deed has been cancelled by a competent civil court.
B           9. Before we proceed to deal with the merits of the case , it
      would be appropriate to have a look at the Statements of certain
      prosecution witnesses for better appreciation of the dispute involved in
      the case.

             10. P.W. 1 (Narayanan Pillai), who is a document writer, stated
C     that on 08.12.1997, both the accused accompanied a woman who
      identified herself as Mrs. Doris Victor and approached P.W.1 to execute
      a Power of Attorney in favour of accused no1. After the said document
      was made by P.W. 1, two witnesses put their signatures along with P.W.
      1 himself. Later they registered the said document in the office of Sub
D     Registrar,Panangudi. One month thereafter, both the accused came to
      the office of PW 1 for the execution of mortgage deed in respect of the
      said property for an amount of Rs. 50,000/-. PW 1 prepared the said
      document which was then signed by accused no.1. The said deed was
      registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Valliyoor wherein both the
      accused were present and accused no. 1 put his thumb impression on
E     the said document.

             11. PW 2(Irin Edward) was an acquaintance of Doris Victor, who
      was informed by one Dhanaraj of Panangudi that the accused no.1 has
      forged the Power of Attorney in respect of a property belonging to Doris
      Victor and attempted to alienate the same by executing and registering a
F
      mortgage deed in favour of Rajapandi. After inspecting the requisite
      official records, PW 2 informed to Doris Victor who was in Chennai,
      then both PW 2 & Doris Victor filed complaints against the accused
      persons.

G            12. PW 3 (Ramasubramanian),who was assisting PW 1 during
      the occurrence of the said incident, is an acquaintance of the accused
      and was not aware of the fact that the lady claiming to be Doris Victor
      was genuine or not. The statement made by PW3 corroborates with
      that of PW1.

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        SHEILA SEBASTIAN v. R. JAWAHARAJ & ANR.                                 445
                   [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

        13. PW 4 (Ms. Latha) was the Sub Registrar when the accused             A
persons came with the imposter for the registration of the Power of
Attorney. During the registration, along with the imposter, accused no. 2
Rajapandi put his signature as a witness. The left hand thumb impression
of the imposter was maintained in the office of Sub Registrar. The original
Power of Attorney was received by the accused no. 1 Jawaharaj who
                                                                                B
put his signature on the same.
      14. PW 6 (Mr. Nagaraja) was working as Sub Registrar when
accused no.1 executed the mortgage deed in favour of accused no.2
and he put his signature in the capacity of being the agent of Doris
Victor and registered the documents.
                                                                                C
      15. PW 7 (Mr. Ramu) is a Scientist in the Forensic Department
who has testified that there exist discrepancies between the disputed
signature of the imposter and the original signature of Doris Victor.
       16. PW 8 (Mr. Albonse Xavier), a finger print recording inspector,
has testified that the fingerprints present on the alleged forged Power of      D
Attorney do not match with that of Doris Victor.
       17. At this juncture, it is pertinent to have a look at the definition
of ‘forgery’ and the precedents on this aspect.
      463. Forgery—Whoever makes any false documents [or false
      electronic record] or part of a document [or electronic record,]          E
      with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person,
      or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with
      property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with
      intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits
      forgery.                                                                  F
      18. It would also be necessary to understand the scope of Section
464, IPC in this context-
      464. Making a false document.—A person is said to make a
      false document or false electronic record—
      First.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently—                                   G

      (a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a
          document;


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446      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 4 S.C.R.


A     (b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any
          electronic record;
      (c) affixes any electronic signature on any electronic record;
      (d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or
          the authenticity of the electronic signature,
B
      with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document
      or part of document, electronic record or electronic signature was
      made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by
      the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows
      that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or
C
      Secondly.—Who without lawful authority, dishonestly or
      fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document or
      an electronic record in any material part thereof, after it has been
      made, executed or affixed with electronic signature either by
      himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or
D     dead at the time of such alteration; or
      Thirdly.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to
      sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an electronic record or
      to affix his electronic signature on any electronic record knowing
      that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication
E     cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he
      does not know the contents of the document or electronic record
      or the nature of the alteration.
      Explanation 1.—A man’s signature of his own name may amount
      to forgery.
F
      Explanation 2.—The making of a false document in the name of
      a fictitious person, intending it to be believed that the document
      was made by a real person, or in the name of a deceased person,
      intending it to be believed that the document was made by the
      person in his lifetime, may amount to forgery.
G     Explanation 3.—For the purposes of this section, the expression
      “affixing electronic signature” shall have the meaning assigned to
      it in clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Information
      Technology Act, 2000.

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        SHEILA SEBASTIAN v. R. JAWAHARAJ & ANR.                                 447
                   [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

       19. A close scrutiny of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear          A
that, Section 463 defines the offence of forgery, while Section 464
substantiates the same by providing an answer as to when a false
document could be said to have been made for the purpose of committing
an offence of forgery under Section 463, IPC. Therefore, we can safely
deduce that Section 464 defines one of the ingredients of forgery i.e.,
                                                                                B
making of a false document. Further, Section 465 provides punishment
for the commission of the offence of forgery. In order to sustain a
conviction under Section 465, first it has to be proved that forgery was
committed under Section 463, implying that ingredients under Section
464 should also be satisfied. Therefore unless and until ingredients under
Section 463 are satisfied a person cannot be convicted under Section            C
465 by solely relying on the ingredients of Section 464, as the offence of
forgery would remain incomplete
       20. The key to unfold the present dispute lies in understanding
Explanation 2 as given in Section 464 of IPC. As Collin J., puts it precisely
in Dickins v. Gill, (1896) 2 QB 310, a case dealing with the possession         D
and making of fictitious stamp wherein he stated that “to make”, in itself
involves conscious act on the part of the maker. Therefore, an offence
of forgery cannot lie against a person who has not created it or signed it.
      21. It is observed in the case Md. Ibrahim and Ors. vs. State of
Bihar and Anr.,(2009) 8 SCC 751 that-                                           E
      “a person is said to have made a `false document’, if
      (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone
          else or authorised by someone else; or
      (ii) he altered or tampered a document; or                                F
      (iii) he obtained a document by practicing deception, or from
            a person not in control of his senses.”
       22. In Md. Ibrahim (supra), this Court had the occasion to
examine forgery of a document purporting to be a valuable security
(Section 467, IPC) and using of forged document as genuine (Section             G
471, IPC). While considering the basic ingredients of both the offences,this
Court observed that to attract the offence of forgery as defined under
Section 463, IPC depends upon creation of a document as defined under
Section 464, IPC. It is further observed that mere execution of a sale
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448            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2018] 4 S.C.R.


A     deed by claiming that property being sold was executant’s property, did
      not amount to commission of offences punishable under Sections 467
      and 471, IPC even if title of property did not vest in the executant.
            23. The Court in Md. Ibrahim (supra) observed that:
             “There is a fundamental difference between a person executing
B           a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property,
            and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner
            or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner,
            to execute the deed on owner’s behalf. When a person executes
            a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are
C           two possibilities. The first is that he bona fide believes that the
            property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be
            dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he
            knows that it is not his property. But to fall under first category of
            `false documents’, it is not sufficient that a document has been
            made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further
D           requirement that it should have been made with the intention of
            causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed
            by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority
            he knows that it was not made or executed.
                When a document is executed by a person claiming a property
E           which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is
            he claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore,
            execution of such document (purporting to convey some property
            of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document
            as defined under Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is
F           not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery,
            then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code are
            attracted.”
            24. In Mir Nagvi Askari vs. Central Bureau of Investigation,
      (2009) 15 SCC 643, this Court, after analysing the facts of that case,
G     came to observe as follows:
            “A person is said to make a false document or record if he satisfies
            one of the three conditions as noticed hereinbefore and provided
            for under the said section. The first condition being that the
            document has been falsified with the intention of causing it to be
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        SHEILA SEBASTIAN v. R. JAWAHARAJ & ANR.                                 449
                   [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

      believed that such document has been made by a person, by whom            A
      the person falsifying the document knows that it was not made.
      Clearly the documents in question in the present case, even if it
      be assumed to have been made dishonestly or fraudulently, had
      not been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that
      they were made by or under the authority of someone else.
                                                                                B
          The second criteria of the section deals with a case where a
      person without lawful authority alters a document after it has been
      made. There has been no allegation of alteration of the voucher in
      question after they have been made. Therefore, in our opinion the
      second criteria of the said section is also not applicable to the
      present case.                                                             C

            The third and final condition of Section 464 deals with a
      document, signed by a person who due to his mental capacity
      does not know the contents of the documents which were made
      i.e. because of intoxication or unsoundness of mind, etc. Such is
      also not the case before us. Indisputably therefore the accused           D
      before us could not have been convicted with the making of a
      false document.
       25. Keeping in view the strict interpretation of penal statute i.e.,
referring to rule of interpretation wherein natural inferences are preferred,
we observe that a charge of forgery cannot be imposed on a person               E
who is not the maker of the same. As held in plethora of cases, making
of a document is different than causing it to be made. As Explanation 2
to Section 464 further clarifies that, for constituting an offence under
Section 464 it is imperative that a false document is made and the accused
person is the maker of the same, otherwise the accused person is not            F
liable for the offence of forgery.
       26. The definition of “false document” is a part of the definition of
“forgery”. Both must be read together. ‘Forgery’ and ‘Fraud’ are
essentially matters of evidence which could be proved as a fact by direct
evidence or by inferences drawn from proved facts. In the case in hand,         G
there is no finding recorded by the trial Court that the respondents have
made any false document or part of the document/record to execute
mortgage deed under the guise of that ‘false document’. Hence, neither
respondent no.1 nor respondent no.2 can be held as makers of the forged

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450             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2018] 4 S.C.R.


A     documents. It is the imposter who can be said to have made the false
      document by committing forgery. In such an event the trial court as well
      as appellate court misguided themselves by convicting the accused.
      Therefore, the High Court has rightly acquitted the accused based on
      the settled legal position and we find no reason to interfere with the
      same.
B
             27. A reasonable doubt has already been thoroughly explained in
      the case of Latesh @ Dadu Baburao Karlekar Versus The State of
      Maharashtra, (2018) 3 SCC 66 wherein ‘reasonable doubt’ has been
      enunciated by this Court as “a mean between excessive caution and
      excessive indifference to a doubt, further it has been elaborated
C     that reasonable doubt must be a practical one and not an abstract
      theoretical hypothesis.” In this case at hand, the imposter has not been
      found or investigated into by the concerned officer. Nothing has been
      spilled on the relationship between the imposter and respondent no.1.
      Law is well settled with regard to the fact that however strong the
D     suspicion may be, it cannot take the place of proof. Strong suspicion,
      coincidence, grave doubt cannot take the place of proof.Always a duty
      is cast upon the Courts to ensure that suspicion does not take place of
      the legal proof.In this case, the trial Court as well as the appellate Court
      carried away by the fact that accused is the beneficiary or the executant
      of the mortgage deed, where the prosecution miserably failed to prove
E     the first transaction i.e PoA as a fraudulent and forged transaction. The
      standard of proof in a criminal trial is proof beyond reasonable doubt
      because the right to personal liberty of a citizen can never be taken
      away by the standard of preponderance of probability.
             28. This case on hand is a classic example of poor prosecution
F     and shabby investigation which resulted inthe acquittal of the accused.
      The Investigating Officer is expected to be diligent while discharging his
      duties. He has to be fair, transparent and his only endeavour should be to
      find out the truth. The Investigating Officer has not even taken bare
      minimum care to find out the whereabouts of the imposter who executed
G     the PoA. The evidence on record clearly reveals that PoA was not
      executed by the complainant and the beneficiary is the accused, still the
      accused could not be convicted. The latches in the lopsided investigation
      goes to the root of the matter and fatal to the case of prosecution. If this
      is the coordination between the prosecution and the investigating
      agency,every criminal case tend to end up in acquittal.In the process,
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         SHEILA SEBASTIAN v. R. JAWAHARAJ & ANR.                               451
                    [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

the common man will lose confidence on the criminal justice delivery           A
system, which is not a good symptom. It is the duty of the investigation,
prosecution as well as the Courts to ensure that full and material facts
and evidence are brought on record, so that there is no scope for
miscarriage of justice.
        29. Although we acknowledge the appellant’s plight who has             B
suffered due to alleged acts of forgery, but we are not able to appreciate
the appellant’scontentions as a penal statute cannot be expanded by
using implications. Section 464 of the IPC makes it clear that only the
one who makes a false document can be held liable under the aforesaid
provision. It must be borne in mind that, where there exists no ambiguity,
there lies no scope for interpretation. The contentions of the appellant       C
are contrary to the provision and contrary to the settled law.The
prosecution could not succeed to prove the offence of forgery by adducing
cogent and reliable evidence.Apart from that, it is not as though the
appellant is remediless. She has a common law remedy of instituting a
suit challenging the validity and binding nature of the mortgage deed and      D
it is brought to our notice that already the competent Civil Court has
cancelled the mortgage deed and the appellant got back the property.
      30. In light of the above discussion, we find no reason to interfere
with the order passed by the High Court, resultantly appeals stand
dismissed being devoid of merits.                                              E


Devika Gujral                                             Appeals dismissed.



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                                                                               G




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