SHEELAM RAMESH AND ANR.versusSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

                   SHEELAM RAMESH AND ANR.                                      A
                                     v
                   STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

                           OCTOBER 12, 1999

              [G.T. NANAVATI AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.]                              B

      Criminal Trial:

      Murde~Identification     of accused-Source of light-Sufficiency
of-Accused members of Peoples War Group firing at one of the ex-members         C
of the said Groui:r-Accused already known to the eye witnesses-Eye wit-
nesses deposing that they could identify the accused due to street lights and
lights coming from the neighbouring shops-Held, there was sufficient light
for identification of accused.

       Criminal Procedure Code, 197~Section 154-FlR-Filing of-Mur-              D
der-l'olice Station at a short distance-FIR-Delay in lodging -Effect
of-Accused members of PWG am1ed with weapons firing at one of three
ex-members of the said Group-One of the eye witnesses rushing to the police
station at a distance-Injured taken to hospital where he succumbed to his
injuries 55 minutes after the incident-Infonnant returning to police station    E
and logding FIR after 5 minutes-Held, it is natural human conduct for an
infonnant to run first to the hospital and ensure that injured gets medical
heli:r-Thus, there is no delay in lodging the FIR-Penal Code, 1860, S.302
r/w S.34-Anns Act, 1959-S.27-Tmorist and Disruptive Activities (Preven-
tion) Act, 1987 Ss.3(2) (i) (ii) and 5.
                                                                                F
       Penal Code, 1860-Ss.302 and 34-Murde~ommon intention-/'re-
a"anged plan to cause death-Use of fire anns established-Held, conviction
sustainable.

      Evidence Act, 1872---Witnesses-Examination of eye witnesse~o in-          G
dependent witnesses examined-Effect of-Held, non-examination of inde-
pendent witnesses, cannot be a ground to discard the eye witness---Conviction
can be based on sole evidence of a witness if it inspires confidence-Courts
concerned with quality and not quantity of evidence.

      Accused-appellants were prosecuted for offences under S.302 IPC           H
                                     589
    590                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A read with S.34 IPC, S.27 of the Arms Act, 1959 and Ss.3(2) (i) (ii) and 5
  of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. According
  to the prosecution, accused- appellants were members of Peoples War
  Group (PWG). According to the prosecution, on the fateful day, while 'R'
  PWs 1 and 2, all ex-members of PWG were siting in front of a Hair Cutting
B Saloon, accused appellants armed with pistol and tamanchas came and
  fired at 'R'. PW-1 rushed to the police station at a distance, brought the
  police and took the injured to the hospital. 'R' succumbed to his injuries
  in the hospital 55 minutes after the incident. Thereafter, PW! returned
  to the police station and lodged FIR after 5 minutes. Trial Court relying
  upon the evidence of PWs 1 to 4 convicted and sentenced the accused.
C Hence the present appeal.
          On behalf of accused-appellants it was contended that there was a
    delay of one hour in filing the FIR though the police station was at a
    distance of 200 ft. from the place of occurrence; that there was no suffi-
D   dent light for identification of accused and that no independent witnesses,
    though present at the time of occurrence were examined by the prosecu-
    tion.

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

E          HELD : 1. There was no delay in filing the FIR. The evidence shows
    that the offence took place at 7 .00 p.m. and PW 1 rushed to the police station
    and came back to the place of occurrence with police. It was natural human
    conduct for the informant PW 1 to run towards the police station as the
    deceased had suffered injuries. His first duty, in addition to his safety, was
    to bring police to the place of occurrence and to ensure that medical help was
F   given to the deceased. He came back to the place of occurrence with police
    and the deceased was taken to the hospital where he succumbed to his in-
    juries at 7.55 p.m. Immediately, thereafter, within 5 minutes PW 1 returned
    to the police station and lodged the formal FIR. [593-D; E 594-A; BJ

G
           .
          2. It cannot be accepted that there was no sufficient light for identifica-
    tion of the accused by PWs 1 and2. PWs 1 and2 were the ex-members of PWG
    and therefore, accused persons were known to them. In cross-examination of
    PW 1, it was brought out that he could identify the accused due to street
    lights and lights coming from the neighbouring shops. PW 2 has deposed
    that he knew the accused even before the incident and he was able to identify
H   them in the light. It is true that this fact was not stated by PW 2 in his
                     SHEELAM RAMESH v. STATE                             591
statement under S.161 Cr. P.C. but only because of this omission, the iden-     A
tification cannot be discarded in view of clear evidence of PW 1. Further PWs
3 and 4, partners of Hair Cutting Saloon have clearly deposed before the
Court that they could identify the accused persons as the street lights and
the lights in the shops were burning. These two witnesses also identified the
accused in the court. [594-C; D; EJ
                                                                                B
      3. The evidence on record establishes that accused came together
armed with fire arms and fired from the pistol and c01mtry made gun.
Both pistol and the country made gun were used, is established from the
empty cartridges recovered from the place of occurrence. The very fact
that the accused came together to the place of occurrence with fire arms
would prove that there was a pre-arranged plan amongst them to cause
                                                                                c
death. As there was participation of accused-appellants in furtherance of
the common intention of causing death, conviction under S.302 IPC r/w
S.34 IPC can be sustained. [595-B; C; DJ

      4. There is nothing on evidence to show that there was any other eye      D
witness to the occurrence. Having examined all the eye witnesses even if
other persons present nearby were not examined, the evidence of the eye
witnesses cannot be discarded. Courts are concerned with quality and not
with quantity of evidence and in a criminal trial, conviction can be based
on the sole eviden~e of a witness if it inspires confidence. [596-A; BJ
                                                                                E
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal appeal No.
685 of 1999.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 15.11.95 of the Designated
Court, Karimnagar in Andhra Pradesh in Sessions Case No. 90 of 1994.
                                                                                F
      S.R. Bhat for the Appellants.

      G. Prabhakar for the Respondent.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                                G
      PHUKAN, J. This appeal under Section 19 of the Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1989 (for short the TADA) is
against the judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge (Designated
Court), Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh. By the impugned judgment and
order accused-appellants Sheelam Ramesh (A-2) and Samudrala @ Kum- H
    592                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A mari Mallesham @ Rajanna (A-3) were convicted under Section 302 IPC
    read with Section 34 I.P.C., Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 and Sections
    3(2)(i)(ii) and 5 of the TADA.

         A2, A3 and another Bheemanna @ Bairi Ramchander (A-1) are
   members of CPI (ML) Peoples War Group (in short PWG). Deceased
B Ramtenki Chandraiah, Manchikatla Shankar (PWl) and Thota Paul (PW2)
 · were members of the said PWG but they severed their connections with
   the group since four years prior to occurrence and they were residing at
   Jagtial for their safety and security, away from their villages.

C          On 30.01.1993 at about 07.00 p.m. deceased, PWs-1and2 were sitting
    as usual in front of Shri Venkateshwara Hair Cutting Saloon near the bus
    stand of Jagtial. Suddenly Al to A3 armed with pistol and tamanchas
    (country made gun) came and fired at the deceased. PWl escaped and ran
    to J agtial police station. Deceased-Ramtenki Chandraiah was hit by gun
D   fire and was injured. He was taken to the Government Hospital, J agtial
    where he succumbed to the injuries. Thereafter, accused went away from
    the place of occurrence on their cycles. PW2 went towards another side.
    Subsequently, A2 and A3 were apprehended. After investigation, charge-
    sheet was submitted under Sections 302, 307 read with 34 IPC, Section 7
    of the Arms Act, 1959 and Sections 3 and 4 of the TADA. The case of Al
E   was separated as he was absconding. Eleven witnesses' were examined on
    behalf of the prosecution. Seized articles were produced and the court
    below found both accused - appellants guilty under the aforesaid section
    except Section 307 l.P.C. and convicted them accordingly.

F        The Trial Court believe the evidence of eye-witnesses PW-1 to PW-
  4 and came to the finding that PW-1 and PW-2 severed their connection
  with PWG about 4 years prior to the occurrence and they were in the hit
  list of the above group and this was the motive for causing death of the
  deceased: The Trial Court also accepted the prosecution version of the
  story that PW-1, 2 and the deceased who were in the hit list of PWG were
G residing by the side of house of Deputy Superintendent of Police, at J agtial
  for their safety. Accepting the evidence of the prosecution, the Trial Court
  came to the finding that PW-1, PW-2 and deceased were in the habit of
  sitting at Sri Venkateshwara Hair Cutting Saloon. PWs 1 to 4 categorically
  deposed that all the three accused persons came and fired at deceased and
H that evidence of PW-1 to PW-4 could not be shattered in cross-examina-
              SHEELAM RAMESH v. STATE [PHUKAN, J.]                       593

tion. Accepting the above evidence for the prosecution, the Trial Court         A
came to the finding that prosecution could prove the charge under Section
302 read with Section 34 l.P.C. against A2 and A3.

      In view of the clear evidence of PW-1 to PW-4 that accused were in
possession of fire arms and fired at the deceased, the Court held that the
charge under Section 27 of the Arms Act has also been proved.        •          B

      The evidence of PW-1 to PW-4 that the accused persons were armed
with fire arms and caused death of the deceased was sufficient to come to
the conclusion that they did so to strike terror in the people of the area.
Accordingly, the Court held that charge under Section 3(2)(i)(ii) and
Section 5 of TADA was proved by the prosecution.
                                                                                c
      Regarding the charge under Section 307 read with Section 34 I.P.C.,
the Trial Court held that in absence of statements by PW- 1 or PW-2 or
any other eye witnesses that there was an attempt to cause death of PW-1
and PW-2, the charge could not be proved by the prosecution and accord-         D
ingly acquitted.

      The first contention raised by the Counsel for the accused- appellants
was that there was delay of one hour in filing the First Information Report
though the Police Station was at the distance of 200 ft. from the place of
occurrence. We find from the evidence that offence took place at 7.00 p.m.      E
and PW-1 rushed to the Police Station and came back to the place of
occurrence with police. Deceased was taken in the rickshaw to the hospital.
PW-1 also went there. PW-2 has also deposed that after the incident, he
came back to the place of occurrence and he, alongwith the police and
PWl, took the deceased to the hospital.
                                                                                F
      Dr. Rao, PW-6 has deposed that on the date of occurrence, he
examined the deceased at 7.45 p.m. PW-6 has clearly deposed that he
found several injuries on the deceased and death was caused due to
haemorrhage and shock from these injuries caused by fire arms. According
to PW-6, these injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course   G
of nature.

       From the evidence of M. Maruthi, PW-8, the Head-Constable, we
find that PW-1 came to the Police Station on the date of occurrence at 8.00
p.m., gave an oral statement which was recorded and treated as the FIR
~PD.                                                                            H
    594                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A          It was natural human conduct for. the informant PWl (who was on
    the hit list) to run towards the Police Station as the deceased was hit by
    guns and suffered injuries. His first duty, in addition to his safety, was to
    bring police to the place of occurrence and to ensure that medical help be
    given to the deceased. He came back to the place of occurrence with police
B   anc! the deceased was taken to the hospital where he succumbed to the
    injuries at 7.55 p.m. Immediately thereafter, PWl returned to the Police
    Station and lodged the formal FIR. The doctor PW6 has deposed that the
    deceased died at 7.55 p.m. From the above evidence, we hold that there
    was no delay in filing the FIR.

c         The next contention is that there was no sufficient light for identifica-
    tion of the accused by PWl and PW2. PWl and PW2 were the members
    of PWG and therefore, accused persons were known to them. In cross-ex-
    amination of PWl, it was brought out that he could identify the accused
    due to street light and lights coming from the neighbouring shops. PW2
D   has deposed that he knew the accused even before the incident and he was
    able to identify them in the lights of the area. It is true that this fact was
    not stated by PW2 in his statement under Section 161 Cr. P.C. but only
    because of this omission, the identification cannot be discarded in view of
    the clear evidence of PWl. Rachakonda Rakaiaha, PW3 and Kandi
    Lakshman PW4 who are partners of the hair cutting saloon have clearly
E   deposed before the Court that they could identify the accused persons as
    the street lights and the lights in the shops were burning. These two
    witnesses .!so identified A2 and A3 in the Court. Therefore, this submis-'
    sion of learned Counsel for the appellant has no force.

F         The next point urged is that in view of the contradictions in the
    evidence of PWl and PW2 regarding the part played by accused A2 and
    A3, conviction is not sustainable. It is true that there are some contradic-
    tions regarding the part played by the accused A2 and A3.

          PWl and PW2 have deposed before the Court that all the accused
G   persons came holding fire arms. According to PWl, accused Al was
    holding a pistol, A2 country made gun and A3 a bag and they fired from
    both the pistol and the country made gun at the deceased. In
    cross-examination, it has been brought out that according to these
    witnesses, Al placed his pistol on the chest of the deceased and fired it
H   and A2 fired from the country made gun. According to PW-2, Al came
                   SHEELAM RAMESH v. STATE [PHUKAN, J.]                        595
,.   inside and fired at the deceased and subsequently, A3 came and fired at          A
     the deceased with country made gun. PW3, owner of the hair cutting saloon
     deposed before the Court that three people came on the cycle with fire
     arms and fired at the deceased and went away. PW4 deposed that two or
     three people came and fired at the deceased.

                                                                                      B
            The accused persons have been charged under Section 302 I.P.C.
     read with Section 34 I.P.C. From the evidence on record, it is established
     that they came together armed with fire arms and Al fired from the pistol
     A2 from the country made gun. From the seizure memo, we find that from
     the place of occurrence, two 9 mm empty cartridges and one 12 bore empty
     cartridge were recovered. From the evidence on record, we find that Al           c
     was holding a pistol and other accused were carrying country made gun.
     Both pistol and the country made gun were used and this fact is established
     from the empty cartridges recovered from the place of occurrence.


            The very fact that the accused Al to A3 came together to the place        D
     of occurrence with fire arms would prove that there was a pre-arranged
     plan amongst them to cause death. As there was participation of A2 and
     A3 in furtherance of the common intention of causing death, conviction
     under Section 302 l.P.C. read with Section 34 l.P.C. can be sustained.
     Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants has no       E
     force.

           Another fact to which our attention has been drawn is the recovery
     of the material objects from the place of occurrence after 12 hours though
     the distance from the Police Station was 200 ft. From the evidence of the        F
     Investigating Officer, Shri Reddy, P.W. 7, we find that after arranging an
     escort to guard the dead body of the deceased and the scene of occurrence,
     he went in search of the accused along with his staff in and around Jagtial
     town for the whole night and next morning at 6.00 a.m., he went to the
     hospital and till 8.00 a.m., he was there. Thereafter, he came to the place
     of occurrence and collected the material objects ..It is quite natural for the   G
     Police Officer to go in search of the accused person. In addition, he took
     the precaution of keeping a guard at the place of occurrence. So, this delay
     has been duly explained and adequate measures were taken so that the
     place of occurrence could not be disturbed. Therefore, the prosecution
     cannot be faulted and the contention of the learned Counsel is rejected.         H
    596                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A         According to learned Counsel for the accused-appellants, though
    PW3 has deposed that 10-15 persons were in the vicinity at the time of
    occurrence, no independent witness was examined by the prosecution.
    There is nothing on evidence to show that there was any other eye-witness
    to the occurrence. Having examined all the eye-witnesses even if other
B   persons present nearby not examined, the evidence of the eye-witnesses
    cannot be discarded. Courts are concerned with quality and not with
    quantity of evidence and in a criminal trial, conviction can be based on the
    sole evidence of a witness if it inspires confidence.

          From the reasons stated above, we find no merit in this appeal and
C accordingly it is dismissed.
    S.V.K.                                                   Appeal dismissed.