Holding

Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 governs the devolution of the coparcenary interest and Section 8 does not apply, so the half‑share devolves to all heirs as at least one son was born before the Act.

Summary

The case concerned the devolution of a Mitakshara coparcenary property after the death of Babu Ram in 1989, who left two sons (born 1938 and 1956) and three daughters. The trial court held part of the property to be separate and part ancestral; the appellate courts affirmed, while the High Court held that the pre‑1956 Hindu law governed the succession. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined Sections 6 and 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the 2005 Amendment, determining that Section 6 governs where at least one son was born before the Act and that Section 8 does not apply. The Court also held that the 2005 Amendment was inapplicable because the succession opened after the Act’s commencement. Consequently, the half‑share of the deceased devolved on all his heirs under Section 6, and the decree was modified accordingly. The appeal was partly allowed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applies to the devolution of interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property where the deceased died after the Act but left surviving female heirs of Class I.
Whether the law in force prior to the 1956 Act governs the succession of the property in question.
Whether the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 is applicable to the succession that opened in 1989.
Whether the birth of the second son prior to the commencement of the 1956 Act affects the applicability of the proviso to Section 6.

Legislation cited

Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 4, s. 6, s. 8
Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005

Subjects

Hindu Succession ActMitakshara coparcenaryIntestate successionSection 6Section 8Amendment Act 2005Ancestral propertySeparate propertyJoint Hindu familyDevolution of interest

Judgment

A SHEELA DEVI AND ORS.
v.
LAL CHAND AND ANR.

SEPTEMBER 29, 2006
B
[S.B. SINHA AND DAL VEER BHANDARI, JJ.]

Hindu Law:

C Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Ss. 6 and 8:

Intestate succession-Property in dispute owned by a person belonging
to Mitakshara coparcenary-The owner died after 1956 Act came into force
leaving behind two sons and three daughters-In terms of Revenue records,
each child was entitled to I/5th share in the property-Challenged by the
D sons-Decreed by trial Court-Appeal against dismissed by first appellate
Court-Second appeal dismissed by the High Court-On appeal, Held: In
terms of Section 6 of the Act, if a person died leaving behind surviving female
members specified in Class I of the Schedule his interest in Mitakshra
Coparcenary property shall devolve upon heirs by intestate succession and
not by survivorship-So long as the property remains in the hands of a single
E person, the property could be disposed of by him-But once a son is born,
he would acquire interest in the co-parcenary property-Since the succession
in the present case having opened in I989 after the death of the owner/father
of the parties in dispute, provision of Amendment Act, 2005 not attracted-
Section 6 of the Act governs the law relating to succession on the death of
F a coparcener in the event the heirs are only male descendants but proviso
to Section 6(I) creates an exception to the general rules-Though first son
was a co-parcener but no evidence furnished by them to show that second
son of the deceased was also born prior to coming into force of the 1956
Act-Hence, it was the half share in the property of the deceased which
would devolve upon all his heirs in terms of the provisions of the Act-Decree
G modified accordingly.
One 'B', owner of the property in dispute, died in the year 1989 leaving
behind two sons (Plaintiffs-Respondents) and three daughters (Appellants).
One of his sons was born in the year t 938 whereas other son was born in the
H 874
SHEELADEVI~LALCHAND 875
year 1956. The names of the parties were shown in the revenue records having A
I/5th share each in the property, which was challenged by plaintiffs-
respondents, sons of 'B'. The trial Court decreed the suit holding that 'B'
and his sons constituted a joint Hindu family and I/5th share in the property
· was their sepa•te property and 4/5th share was ancestral property of 'B'
qua plaintiffs. The decree was affirmed by the appellate Court. Appeal tiled by B
appellants/daughters of'B' was dismissed by the High Court holding that the
nature of the property must be recorded as Hindu Coparcenary and ancestral
property; it was stated that the law applicable before the Act came into force
would govern the rights of the parties. Hence the present appeal.

Appellants-daughters of the deceased 'B' contended that the High Court C
committed a manifest error in arriving at the findings, in total disregard of
the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; that keeping in view the
fact that the succession opened only in the year 1989 when 'B' died, the
question of applying the law as was obtaining prior to coming into force of
the Act did not arise; and that the provisions contained in Section 8 of the
Act are clear and explicit and in that view of the matter the succession of the D
parties would be governed in terms of the Schedule appended thereto.

Respondents submitted that having regard to the provisions contained
in Section 6 of the Act, the concept of Mitakshara coparcenary having been
saved, the parties would be governed thereby.
E
•Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD:l.1. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act would clearly show
that where the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in
class I of the Schedule, his interest in the Mitakshara coparcenary property F
shall devolve by intestate succession and not by survivorship. (879-G-HJ

1.2. The principle of law applicable in this case is that so long a property.
remains in the hands of a single person, the same was to be treated as his
separate property and thus, he would be entitled to disposeoft~e eoparcenary .
property as the same were his separate property, but, if a son is subsequently G
born to him or adopted by him, the alienation whether it is by way of sale,
mortgage or gift, will nevertheless stand, for a son cannot object to alienations
.. so made by his father before he was born or begotten. (880-B-CJ

C. Krishna Prasad v. C./. T, Bangalore, (1975) 1 SCC 160, relied on.
H
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A Chatturbhooj v. Dharamsi, 98, 438; Lal Bahadur v. Kanhaia Lal, 34
I.A. 65: 29A. 244: 4 A.L.J. 227: 9 Bom. L.R.: 597: It C.W.N. 417: 17 M.L.J.
228; Visalatchi v. Annasamy, 5 M.H.C.R. 150: Adurmoni v. Chowdhry, 3 C.1
and Allah Diyo v. Saha, (1942) A.L.J. 443: 1942 A. 331 - referred to.

Hindu law Principles & Precedents, 8th Edn. (1987) by N.R.
B Raghavachariar, referred to.
-
1.3. Although in 1927 '8' had no son and the property at his hands
became a separate property, in view of the well-settled principles of Hindu
Law, as soon as a son was born to him the concept of the property being a
C coparcenary property in terms of Mitakashara School of Hindu Law revived.
(881-G)

MT. Pankajammal & Anr. v. MT. Parthasarthy A(vangar, AIR 33 (1946)
Madras 99; Muttayan Chettiar v. Sangili Vira Pandia Chinnatambiar, (LRl.A.
Vol. IX Page 1281; Pratap Narain v. Commissioner ofincome-Tax, U.P., (63
D ITR 5051 and Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and Ors. v. Chander Sen
and Ors., (198613 sec 567, referred to.
Law of Joint Family System, Debts, Gifts, Maintenance, Damdupat,
Benami Transaction and Pre-emption, First Edition 1993 by Dr. Paras Diwan
and Hindu law & Usage, 14th Edition by Mayne, referred to.
E 2. In the instant case, the succession having opened in 1989, evidently,
the prov~ions of Amendment Act, 2005 would have no application. Sub;section
(1) of Section 6 of the Act governs the law relating to succession on the death
of a coparcener in the event the heirs are only male descendants. But, prov\so
appended to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act creates an exception to the
F general rules. It was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the Plaintiffs-
Respondents to show that apart from eldest son of 'B', his younger son will
also derive the benefit thereof. So far as the second son is concerned, no
evidence has been brought on records to show that he was born prior to coming
into force of the Hindu Succession Act. Thus, it was the half share in the
property of• B' which would devolve upon all his heirs and legal representatives
G as at least one of his sons was born prior to coming into force of the Act.
Except to the aforementioned extent, the Courts below are correct in applying
the provisions of Section 6 of the Act and holding that Section 8 thereof will ;

have no application. (885-C-D-E-F]
Commissioner of Income Tax v. P.L. Karuppan Chettiar, 119931 Supp. 1
H SCC 580; Additional Commissioner of Income Tax v. M. Karthikeyan, (19941
SHEELA DEVI v. LAL CHAND [SINHA, J.] 877
Supp. 2 SCC 112 and Daya Singh (Dead) through L.Rs. and Anr. v. Dhan A
Kaur, (1974) 1SCC700, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4326 of2006.

From the final Order dated I 0.10.2005 of the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 1627of1994. B
Nidesh Gupta, Vinod Shukla and S. Janani for the Appellants.

Manoj Swarup for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
S.8. SINHA. J. Leave granted.

Interpretation of some of the provisions of The Hindu Succession Act,
1956 (for short "the Act") and, in particular, Sections 6 and 8 thereof arises
for consideration in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order D
dated I0th October, 2005 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
in RSA No. 1627of1994 dismissing an appeal from a judgment and order
dated 23rd May, 1994 passed by the Additional District Judge, Patiala affirming
a judgment and decree dated 17th May, 1990 passed by the Subordinate
Judge Ist Class Samana decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiffs-respondents
herein. E
The relationship between the parties is not in dispute. Tulsi Ram was
the owner of the property. He died in the year 1889 leaving behind five sons,
viz., Waliati, Babu Ram, Charanji Lal, Hukam Chand and Uggar Sain. The
aforementioned five sons of Tulsi Ram were members of a Mitakshara
Coparcenary. We are concerned with the estate of one of the sons of Tulsi F
Ram, viz., Babu Ram, whose children are parties before us. It is not in dispute
that Uggar Sain died issueless in 1931. The names of all the brothers were
mutated in the year 1927 in respect of the properties left by Tulsi Ram. Babu
Ram thed in the year 1989 leaving behind two sons, viz., Lal Chand and Sohan
Lal (Plaintiffs-Respondents) and three daughters (Appellants herein). Lal Chand G
was born in 1938 whereas Sohan Lal was born in 1956.

A finding of fact has been arrived at that the parties are governed by
the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. The sons of Tulsi Ram were, thus,
coparceners. Upon the death of Tulsi Ram, Babu Ram inherited I/5th share
in the property. However, on the death of Uggar Sain, I/20th share of Tulsi H
878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A Ram's property was also devolved on him. Indisputably, the names of the
parties were shown in the revenue records having I/5th share each. The said
order of the revenue authorities came to be challenged by plaintiffs-respondents
herein, inter a/ia, on the premise that defendants had not acquired any right, f
title and interest in the property.

B The learned Trial Judge in his judgment recorded the following:

"9. As a result keeping in view the evidence on record I hold that
the plaintiffs and Babu Ram had constituted a Joint Hindu Family and
out of the land in suit I/5th share was separate property of Babu Ram
and 4/5th share was ancestral property in the hands of Babu Ram qua
c the plaintiffs. The issue is decided accordingly.''

The suit of the plaintiffs was decreed on the basis thereof. The Appellate
Court also affirmed the decree passed by the learned Trial Judge. 'On a
Second Appeal having been filed by Appellants herein, according to the High
D Court, the only question which required determination was as to whether the
provisions of Section 8 of the Act would apply to the facts of the present
case or the law as applicable prior to the enforcement of the 1956 Act would
apply. The High Court opined that for the purpose of determination of the
said question it was necessary to determine the nature of the property.
Having held that the nature of the property must be recorded as Hindu
E Coparcenary and ancestral property, it was stated that the law applicable
before the Act came into force would govern the rights of the parties and not
the provisions of the Act.

Mr. Nidesh Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Appellants
submitted that the High Court committed a manifest error in arriving at the
F aforementioned findings in total disregard of the provisions of the 1956 Act.
The learned counsel would contend that keeping in view the fact that the
succession opened only in the year 1989 when Babu Ram died, the question
of applying the law as was obtaining prior to coming into force of the Act
did not arise. It was urged that the provisions contained in Section 8 of the
G Act are clear and explicit and in that view of the matter the succession of the
parties would be governed in terms of the Schedule appended thereto.

Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondents,
however, would submit that having regard to the provisions contained in
Section 6 of the Act, the concept of Mitakshara coparcenary having been
H saved, the parties would be governed thereby.
SHEELA DEVI v. LAL CHAND [SINHA. J.] 879
The Act was enacted to amend and codify the law relating to intestate A
succession amongst Hindus. Section 4 of the Act provides for an overriding
effect of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act reads as under:

"For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing contained
in this Act shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any law for the
time being in force providing for the prevention of fragmentation of B
agricultural holdings or for the fixation of ceilings or for the devolution
of tenancy rights in respect of such holdings."

Section 6 of the Act deals with devolution of interest in coparcenary
property and is in the following terms:
c
"6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property. -When a male
Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of
his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest
in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving
members of coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act:
D
Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female
relative specified in class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified
in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of
the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve
by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under E
this Act and not by survivorship.

Explanation I.- For the purposes of this section, the interest of
a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the
property that. would have been allotted to him if a partition of the
property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of F
whether he was entitled to claim partition or not.

Explanation 2- Nothing contained in the proviso to this section
shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself
from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his
heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein." G

A bare perusal of the said provisions would clearly show that where the
1.. deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in class I of the
Schedule, his interest in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve
by intestate succession and not by survivorship.
H
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A We have noticed hereinbefore that a finding of fact has been arrived at
that the properties in the hands of Babu Lal and his brothers were joint family
property.

The principle of law applicable in this case is that so long a property f

remains in the hands of a single person, the same was to be treated as a
B separate property and thus, would be entitled to dispose of the coparcenary
property as the same were his separate property, but, if a son is subsequently
born to him or adopted by him, the alienation whether it is by way of sale,
mortgage or gift, will nevertheless stand, for a son cannot object to alienations
so made by his father before he was born or begotten. (See Krishna Prasad
C v. C.LT. Bangalore, [1975] 1 SCC 160. But once a son .is born, it becomes a
coparcenary property and he would acquire an interest therein.

In N.R. Raghavachariar's Hindu law Principles & Precedents, 8th
Edn. 1987, Section 244, it is stated :

".... Besides, it is absolutely immaterial whether the sons were born to
D the inheritor before or after the inheritance fell in. But if the property
is inherited from a paternal ancestor beyond the third degree then the
property is not ancestral as against the inheritor's sons, and the
inheritor has absolute powers of disposal over it. So also, if the
inheritor has neither a son, son's son nor son's son's son, the property
E is absolute in the inheritor's hands even though he may have other
relations, for instance, a great-great-grandson or a paternal uncle, in
the case of inheritance from father [Janki v. Nand Ram, 11 A. 194].
But property which comes to an inheritor from one of his three
immediate paternal ancestors as absolute property owing to the
absence of sons, grandsons or great-grandsons, becomes ancestral
F property with the birth of any of them, though an - alienation made
by the inheritor before such birth, cannot be impeached. The character
of ancestral property is not taken away by there being a partition of
the property in the family of the inheritor, and though a share of
ancestral property allotted to a coparcener on partition will be his
G separate property as regards others [Bejai Bahadur v. Bhupindar,
17A. 456: 22 1A. 139 (P.C.) it will be ancestral property as against the
alloUee's sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons whether born before
or after the partition. [Chatturbhooj v. Dharamsi, 9B. 438; Lal Bahadur
v. Kanhaia Lal, 34 IA. 65: 29 A. 244: 4 A.LJ. 227: 9 Born. L.R.: 597:
11C.W.N.417: 17 M.LJ. 228; Visalatchi v. Annasamy, 5 M.H.C.R. 150:
H
SHEELA,DEVI v. LAL CHAND [SINHA, J.] 881
Adurmoni v. Chowdhry, 3 C.I; Allah Diyo v. Soha, 1942 A.L.J. 443: A
1942 A. 331."

In Law of Joint Family System, Debts, Gifts, Maintenance, Damdupat,
Benami Transaction and Pre-emption, First Edition 1993, by Dr. Paras Diwan,
at page 51, it is stated :
B
" .... They take an interest in it by birth, whether they are in existence
at the time of partition or are born subsequently. Such share, however,
is ancestral property only as regards his male issues. As regards other
relations, it is a separate property, and if the coparcener dies without
leaving male issues, it passes to his heirs by succession. A person
who for the time being is the sole surviving coparcener is entitled to C
dispose of the coparcenary property as if it were his separate property.
., He may sell or mortgage the property without legal necessity or he
may make a gift of it. If a son is subsequently born to him or adopted
by him, the alienation, whether it is by way of sale, mortgage or gift,
will nevertheless stand, for a son cannot object to alienations made D
by his father before he was born or begotten."

In M. T. Pankaiammal & Anr. v. M. T. Parthasarthv Aiyangar, AIR (33)
1946 Madras 99, it was held :

" ........ lfit were necessary I would on the circumstances above adverted E
be prepared to hold that there was no intention on the part of the
executant that the son to be adopted had to share the property with
any son that may be born to him subsequently. But as I have already
held on a construction of the settlement deed, the plaintiff became
entitled to the property only on the death of his father and as an
adopted son, according to Hindu Law, he had to share it along with F
the after born brother and his step-mother."

Although in 1927 Babu Ram had no son and the property at his hands
became a separate property. But, in view of the well-settled principles of
Hindu Law, as soon as a son was born to him the concept of the property
being a coparcenary property in terms of Mitakshara School of Hindu Law G
revived. The law in this behalf has succinctly been stated in Mayne's Hindu
• Law & Usage, 14th edition, at pages 627-628 and 641, in the following terms:

"Where ancestral property has been divided between several joint
owners, there can be no doubt that if any of them have male issue
H
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A living at the time of the partition, the share which falls to him will
continue to be ancestral property in his hands, as regards has male
issue, for their rights had already attached upon it, and the partition
only cuts off the claims of the dividing members. The father and his
male issue still remain joint. The same rule would apply even where
the partition had been made before the birth of male issue or before
B a son is adopted, for the share which is taken at a partition, by one
of the coparceners is taken by him as representing his branch. It was
held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that where a father divided
the family property between him and his sons, the share obtained by
him was his self-acquired property which he could bequeath to his
c wife .."

"Coparceners may hold property separately - An examination into the
property of the joint family wouia not be complete without pointing
out what property may be held by the individual members as their
separate property. All property which is not held in coparcenary is
D separate property and Hindu law recognizes separate property of
individual members of a coparcenary as well as of separated members.
(I) Property which comes to a man as obstructed heritage (Saprati
bandhadaya) is his separate property. It is not self-acquired property
within the meaning of Hindu law, though in their incidents, there may
be no difference between the two species.
E
(See also Muttavan Chettiar v. Sangili Vira Pandia Chinnatambiar,
[LR LA. Vol. DC Page 128].}

The question again came up for consideration before a Division Bench
of the Allahabad High Court in Pratap Narain v. Commissioner of Income-
F Tax, U.P., [63 ITR 505] wherein Pathak, J. (as His Lordship then was) opined:

"It seems to us that it is now well settled, that when Hindu undivided
family property is partitioned between the members of a Hindu
undivided family, and a share is obtained on such partition by a
coparc1:ner, it is ancestral property as regards his male issue. They
G take an interest in it by birth, whether they are in existence at the time
of partition or are born subsequently. We are of the opinion that it is
not correct to say that the share of the proper!)', upon partition, •
constitutes the separate property of the coparcener and that it is only
subsequently when a son is born that the property becomes ancestral
H
SHEELA DEVI v. LAL CHAND [SINHA, J.) 883

property or Hindu undivided family property: The birth of the son A
does not alter the nature of the property. The property all along
continues to be coparcenary property. But upon the birth of a son all
the rights which belong to a coparcener belong to that son, and the
enlarged rights hitherto enjoyed by the sole coparcener are now
abridged within their normal compass." B
We may, however, notice that the same learned Judge in Commissioner
of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and Ors. v. Chander Sen and Ors., [1986] 3 SCC 567,
in a case where father and his son constituted a HUF and had been carrying
on business in a partnership firm, stated the law in the following terms:

"We have noted the divergent views expressed on this aspect by c
the Allahabad High Court, Full Bench of the Madras High Court,
Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh High Courts on one side and
the Gujarat High Court on the other.

It is necessary to bear in mind the preamble to the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956. The preamble states that it was an Act to
D
amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession among
Hindus.

In view of the preamble to the Act i.e. that to modify where
necessary and to codify the law, in our opinion it is not possible when E
Schedule indicates heirs in Class I and only includes son and does
not include son's son but does include son of a predeceased son, to
say that when son inherits the property in the situation contemplated
by Section 8 he takes it as karta of his own undivided family. The
Gujarat High Court's view noted above, if accepted, would mean that
though the son of a predeceased son and not the son of a son who F
is intended to be excluded under Section 8 to inherit, the latter would
by applying the old Hindu law get a right by birth of the said property
contrary to the scheme outlined in Section 8. Furthermore as noted by
the Andhra Pradesh High Court that the Act makes it clear by Section
4 that one should look to the Act in case of doubt and not to the
preexisting Hindu law. It would be difficult to hold today the property
G
which devolved on a Hindu under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession
Act would be HUF· in his hand vis-a-vis his own son; that would
.. .. amount to creating two classes among the heirs mentioned in Class
· I, the male heirs in whose hands it will be joint Hindu f1'mily property
and vis-a-vis son and female heirs with respect to whom no such H
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A concept could be applied or contemplated. It may be mentioned that
heirs in Class I of Schedule under Section 8 of the Act included
widow, mother, daughter of predeceased son etc."

In paragraph I 5, however, the law was stated as under:

B "It is clear that under the Hindu law, the moment a son is born,
he gets a share in the father's property and becomes part of the
coparcenary. His right accrues to him not on the death of the father
or inheritance from the father but with the very fact of his birth.
Normally, therefore whenever the father gets a property from whatever
source from the grandfather or from any other source, be it separated
c property or not, his son should have a share in that and it will become
part of the joint Hindu family of his son and grandson and other
members who form joint Hindu family with him. But the question is:
is the position affected by Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956 and if so, how? The basic argument is that Sectio11 8 indicates
D the heirs in respect of certain property and Class 1 of the heirs
includes the son but not the grandson. It includes, however, the son
of the predeceased son. It is this position which has mainly induced
the Allahabad High Court in the two judgments, we have noticed, to
take the view that the income from the assets inherited by son from
his father from whom he has separated by partition can be assessed
E as income of the son individually. Under Section 8 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 the property of the father who dies intestate
devolves on his son in his individual capacity and not as karta of his
own family. On the other hand, the Gujarat High Court has taken the
contrary view."
F The said decision has been followed by this Court in Commissioner of
Income Tax v. P.L. Karuppan Chettiar, (1993] Supp I SCC 580 and Additional
Commissioner of Income Tax v. M. Karthikeyan, (1994] Supp 2 SCC 112.

In Eramma v. Veerupana and Ors., AIR (1966) SC 1879, this Court
G observed:
"It is clear from the express language of the section that it applies
only to coparcenary property of the male Hindu holder who dies after
the commencement of the Act. It 1s manifest that the language of
Section 8 must be construed in the context of Section 6 of the Act.
H We accordingly hold that the provisions of Section 8 of the Hindu
SH.EELA DEVI v. LAL CHAND [SINHA, J.] 885
Succession Act are not retrospective in operation and where a male A
Hindu died before the Act came into force i.e. where succession
opened before the Act, Section 8 of the Act will have no application."

(See also Daya Singh (Dead) Through L.Rs. and Anr. v. Dhan Kaur
[1974] 1 sec 100.)
B
The Act indisputably would prevail over the old Hindu Law. We may
notice that the Parliament, with a view to confer right upon the female heirs,
even in relation to the joint family property, enacted Hindu Succession Act,
2005. Such a provision was enacted as far back in 1987 by the State of Andhra
Pradesh. The succession having opened in 1989, evidently, the provisions of
Amendment Act, 2005 would have no application. Sub-section (I) of Section C
6 of the Act governs the law relating to succession on the death of a
coparcener in the event the heirs are only male descendants. But, proviso
appended to Sub-section (I) of Section 6 of the Act creates an exception. First
son of Babu Lal, viz., Lal Chand, was, thus, a coparcener. Section 6 is
exception to the general rules. It was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the D
Plaintiffs-Respondents to show that apart from Lal Chand, Sohan Lal will also
derive the benefit thereof. So far as the Second son Sohan Lal is concerned,
no evidence has been brought on records to show that he was born prior to
coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Thus, it was the half share in the property of Babu Ram, which would E
devolve upon all his heirs and legal representatives as at least one of his sons
was born prior to coming into force of the Act.

Except to the aforementioned extent; in our opinion, the courts below
are correct in applying the provisions of Section 6 of the Act and holding that
Section 8 thereof will have no application. The appeal is allowed in part and F
to the aforementioned extent. The decree would be modified accordingly. No
costs.

S.K.S. Appeal partly allowed.