SHASHI BHUSAN PRASADversusINSPECTOR GENERAL CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE & ORS.

1098                     [2019] REPORTS
                SUPREME COURT   10 S.C.R. 1098             [2019] 10 S.C.R.


 A                          SHASHI BHUSAN PRASAD
                                         v.
              INSPECTOR GENERAL CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL
                       SECURITY FORCE & ORS.
 B                        (Civil Appeal No.7130 of 2009)
                              AUGUST 01, 2019
         [N.V. RAMANA, MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR AND
                       AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
             Service Law:
 C
               Dismissal – Propriety of – Departmental Inquiry under CISF
       Rules – On the charge of gross misconduct in discharge of duties –
       Alleged that he had handed over an unlicensed fire-arm with
       ammunitions to a person, which had facilitated another person in
       committing an offence u/ss. 302/392 IPC and s. 27 of Arms Act – In
 D
       the meantime criminal case was also instituted against the delinquent
       u/s. 25(1) of Arms Act (wherein the delinquent was acquitted as the
       material witnesses turned hostile) – Inquiry Officer found him guilty
       – Disciplinary authority upheld the finding and inflicted penalty of
       dismissal from service – Order of dismissal further approved by
 E     Appellate as well as Revisional Authority – Writ Petition dismissed
       by High Court – Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: Acquittal in
       criminal proceedings would not absolve the delinquent from the
       liability under disciplinary proceedings – In the present case charge
       in criminal case and departmental enquiry were different having
       no nexus/co-relationship and were based on different sets of facts
 F
       – There was also no error committed in the procedure prescribed
       under the scheme of CISF Rules – There is no violation of principles
       of natural justice – Therefore, it was not open for the High Court to
       interfere with disciplinary proceedings under its limited scope of
       review u/Art. 226 & 227 of the Constitution – Central Industrial
 G     Security Force Rules, 1969 – r. 34.
             Departmental proceedings and Criminal Judicial proceedings
       – Scope of and effect of acquittal by criminal court on departmental
       proceedings – Discussed.

 H
                                     1098
    SHASHI BHUSAN PRASAD v. INSPECTOR GENERAL                         1099
        CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE

      Dismissing the appeal, the Court                                A
       HELD: 1.1 Two proceedings criminal and departmental are
entirely different. They operate in different fields and have
different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to
inflict appropriate punishment on an offender, the purpose of
enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally     B
and to impose penalty in accordance with the service Rules. The
degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is
different from the degree of proof necessary to record the
commission of delinquency. Even the rule relating to appreciation
of evidence in the two proceedings is not similar. In criminal
law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the             C
prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, he cannot be convicted by a Court of law
whereas in the departmental enquiry, penalty can be imposed on
the delinquent on a finding recorded on the basis of
‘preponderance of probability’. Acquittal by the Court of             D
competent jurisdiction in a judicial proceeding does not ipso facto
absolve the delinquent from the liability under the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the authority. This is what has been considered
by the High Court in the impugned judgment in detail and needs
no interference by this Court. [Para 19] [1107-G; 1108-A-C]
                                                                      E
       1.2 In the instant case the charge in the criminal case and
departmental enquiry were different having no nexus/co-
relationship and were based on different sets of facts and evidence
which has been independently enquired in the disciplinary
proceedings and in a criminal trial. Acquittal in the criminal
proceedings would not absolve the appellant from the liability        F
under the disciplinary proceedings instituted against him in which
he had been held guilty and in sequel thereto punished with the
penalty of dismissal from service. That apart, much before the
judgment of the criminal case could be pronounced, the
departmental enquiry was concluded and after the Inquiry Officer      G
had held him guilty, he was punished with the penalty of dismissal
from service.[Paras 21, 22] [1109-D, F-G]
      Depot Manager A.P. State Road Transport Corporation
      v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya and Others (1997) 2 SCC
                                                                      H
1100            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 10 S.C.R.


 A            699 : [1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 941 ; Ajit Kumar Nag v.
              General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Limited
              Haldia and Others (2005) 7 SCC 764 : [2005] 3 Suppl.
              SCR 314 – relied on.
              M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Ors.
 B            (1999) 3 SCC 679 ; G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and
              Ors. (2006) 5 SCC 446 : [2006] 2 Suppl. SCR 253 –
              distinguished.
            2. It is not the case of the appellant that any error committed
       in the procedure prescribed under the scheme of Central
 C     Industrial Security Force Rules, 1969 has been violated or
       opportunity to hearing has not been afforded or the principles of
       natural justice has been violated. In absence thereof, it is
       otherwise not open for the Courts to interfere in the disciplinary
       proceedings under its limited scope of review under Articles 226
       and 227 of the Constitution of India. [Para 23] [1109-H; 1110-A]
 D
                               Case Law Reference
              [1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 941          relied on          Para 17
              [2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 314          relied on          Para 18
              (1999) 3 SCC 679                 distinguished      Para 20
 E
              [2006] 2 Suppl. SCR 253          distinguished      Para 22


              CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.7130 of
       2009
 F
             From the Judgment and Order dated 17.07.2018 of the High Court
       of Orissa, Cuttack in O.J.C.No.16872 of 1997.
             Abhay Kumar, Saurabh Mishra, Vineet Kumar Singh, Advs. for
       the Appellant.
 G           R. Balasubramanian, Sr. Adv., Ms. Manjula Gupta, D.L. Chidanand,
       B.V. Balaram Das, Advs. for the Respondents.




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    SHASHI BHUSAN PRASAD v. INSPECTOR GENERAL                                 1101
  CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE [RASTOGI, J.]

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                              A
      RASTOGI, J.
       1. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order
dated 17th July, 2008 passed by the High Court of Orissa dismissing the
writ petition filed by the appellant.
                                                                              B
       2. The brief seminal facts which may be relevant for consideration
of the present appeal are that while serving as Constable in Central
Industrial Security Force (in short “CISF”) Unit, Rourkela Steel Plant,
Rourkela, a criminal case was instituted against the appellant in Plantsite
P.S. Case No. 378 of 1992 under Section 25(1) of the Arms Act and he
was arrested on 30th November, 1992 on the allegation that he had             C
provided a country made revolver to Subash Chandra Agarwalla, who
murdered his aunt with it, giving rise to Sessions Trial No. 188/41 of
1993. At the same time, for a gross misconduct being committed by him
in discharge of his duties, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against
him by serving a Memorandum along with the charge-sheet dated 9th             D
February, 1993 under Rule 34 of CISF Rules, 1969.
       3. After holding disciplinary inquiry in terms of the procedure
prescribed under the scheme of Rules, 1969, the Inquiry Officer after
due compliance of the principles of natural justice, recorded a finding of
guilt and the charge against the delinquent appellant stood proved as it      E
reveals from the report of Inquiry(Annexure P-4 of the paper book)
dated 27th April, 1994. After copy of the inquiry report was made available
to the appellant and after affording him an opportunity of hearing, the
Disciplinary Authority concurred with the finding recorded by the Inquiry
Officer and while upholding the guilt inflicted him with a penalty of
dismissal from service vide Order dated 21st May, 1994. It may be             F
relevant to note that the Sessions Trial No. 188/41 of 1993 was also
proceeded against him and it reveals from the record that since the
material prosecution witnesses stood hostile, he was acquitted by the
competent Court of jurisdiction vide judgment dated 12th September, 1995.
      4. Being dissatisfied with the order of dismissal passed by the         G
Disciplinary Authority, the appellant preferred departmental appeal
primarily on the ground that since he has been acquitted in the criminal
case which is based on the same set of facts and evidence, the order of

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1102                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 10 S.C.R.


 A     dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority is not legally sustainable.
       The appeal was rejected by the appellate authority vide order dated
       24th April, 1996 which was further assailed before the Revisional
       Authority that also met with the fate of its dismissal. That came to be
       challenged in a Writ Petition before the High Court under Articles 226
       and 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court of Orissa, on
 B
       appraisal of the material on record and taking note of the submission
       alleged by the appellant of his acquittal in the criminal trial vide judgment
       dated 12th September, 1995 still had faced the order of dismissal by the
       Disciplinary Authority being not sustainable but the High Court after
       examining in totality the facts and circumstances of the case, dismissed
 C     the writ petition vide judgment dated 17th July, 2008 which is a subject
       matter of appeal before us.
              5. The main thrust of submission of learned counsel for the
       appellant is that since both the criminal/departmental proceedings were
       based on same set of facts and evidence, and after he has been acquitted
 D     by the Court of competent jurisdiction vide judgment dated 12th September,
       1995, the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority was under an obligation to
       give precedence of the judicial proceedings and in the given
       circumstances, inflicting penalty of dismissal from service based on the
       report of inquiry was not legally sustainable and further submitted that
       the error has not only been committed by the departmental authorities
 E     but also by the High Court in not appreciating the submission made by
       the appellant in its right earnest and in the given circumstances, the
       judgment impugned dated 17th July, 2008 deserves to be interfered by
       this Court.
             6. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the appellant
 F     has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in M. Paul
       Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Ors.1and G.M. Tank Vs.
       State of Gujarat and Ors.2
             7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other
       hand, while supporting the finding recorded by the High Court under the
 G     impugned judgment dated 17th July, 2008 further submits that the charge
       in a departmental inquiry and in the criminal case stood against the
       appellant were totally different, in the criminal case he was charged for
       committing an offence under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act, while in
       1
           1999(3) SCC 679
 H     2
           2006(5) SCC 446
    SHASHI BHUSAN PRASAD v. INSPECTOR GENERAL                                1103
  CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE [RASTOGI, J.]

the departmental inquiry, the charge was of a delinquency which he           A
committed in discharge of his duties in handing over an unlicensed fire
arm with ammunitions(a country made revolver) concealed in a brief
case at the residence of Constable S.P. Patel on 19th November, 1992
which has facilitated Subash Chandra Agarwalla (accused) in a criminal
case against in committing an offence under Section 302/392 IPC and
                                                                             B
under Section 27 of the Arms Act.
       8. According to the learned counsel, both the allegations are based
on different sets of facts and evidence having no co-relationship and
once the appellant has been held guilty in a disciplinary inquiry has been
rightly punished with the penalty of dismissal from service, having no
nexus with the judgment of acquittal passed by the Court of competent        C
jurisdiction.
       9. Learned counsel further submits that what being urged by the
appellant has been examined by the High Court and this being the settled
principles of law that in a disciplinary inquiry one has to proceed on the
“preponderance of probability” whereas in the criminal case, the charge      D
is to be “proved beyond reasonable doubt” being based on two sets of
fundamental principles which has been examined by the High Court in
extenso needs no interference by this Court.
       10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their
assistance perused the material available on record.                         E

      11. At the outset, it may be apposite to take note of the Article of
charge which was imputed against him in the departmental
proceedings: -
      “No : 884481265 Constable Sashi Bhushan Prasad is charged              F
      with gross misconduct and serious breach of discipline unbecoming
      of a member of the armed force in that he handed over an
      unlicensed fire arm with ammunitions (a country made revolver)
      concealed in a brief case at the residence of No. 88441220
      Constable S.P. Patel on 19.11.92 in the evening by suppressing
      the fact that the same was used in a case of murder in the same        G
      day.”
     12. Disciplinary inquiry was held against him under Rule 34 of
CISF Rules, 1969 for the gross misconduct and serious breach committed

                                                                             H
1104            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 10 S.C.R.


 A     by him in discharge of his official duties in handing over unlicensed fire
       arm with ammunitions (a country made revolver) concealed in a brief
       case at the residence of Constable S.P. Patel on 19th November, 1992
       and in support of the charge, the statement of PW-5 Smt. Laxmi Patel
       w/o Constable S.P. Patel was recorded. In the course of disciplinary
       inquiry, she had categorically stated that the appellant Constable came
 B
       to her house in the evening and handed over small brief case to her for
       keeping it in the house. When she asked the appellant at the time of
       handing over of the brief case as to what it contained, the appellant
       replied that it contained clothes. When her husband came back from
       duty, she told him of the brief case handed over to her by the appellant
 C     for keeping it in the house. Her husband PW-4 Constable S.P. Patel
       also narrated the fact which was reported by his wife PW-5 Laxmi
       Patel when he returned back on 19th November, 1992.
              13. There was further allegation against him that he had suppressed
       the fact that the country made revolver was used in the murder case the
 D     same day. After an independent inquiry was conducted by the Inquiry
       Officer the charge stood proved against him and it was confirmed by
       the Disciplinary Authority, after affording him an opportunity of hearing,
       and being a serious misconduct on the part of the appellant, which he
       had committed in discharge of duties, penalty of dismissal was inflicted
       upon him, after due compliance of the principles of natural justice in
 E     terms of the scheme of CISF Rules 1969 and that came to be confirmed
       on rejection of his appeal/revision by the Appellate/Revisional Authority
       and also by the High Court on dismissal of the writ petition vide judgment
       dated 17th July, 2008.
             14. At the same time, in the criminal case which was instituted
 F     against him, the charge against the appellant was “Accused Sashi bhusan
       Prasad stands charged U/s 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act.”
              15. So far as the charge in the departmental inquiry and the charge
       in the criminal case is concerned, indubitably it was different having
       been inquired on an independent set of facts and evidence in a
 G     departmental/judicial proceedings. That apart, the fact which reveal
       from the judgment of acquittal passed by the Court of competent
       jurisdiction dated 12th September, 1995 that Shankar Prasad Patel and
       his wife Laxmi Patel had appeared in a criminal case as PW-4 and PW-
       5 and both were declared hostile. Apart from that, the other material
 H
       SHASHI BHUSAN PRASAD v. INSPECTOR GENERAL                                   1105
     CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE [RASTOGI, J.]

witnesses were also declared hostile and that was the reason for which             A
the Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove the
charge against him while acquitting him vide judgment dated 12th
September, 1995.
       16. The facts noticed by us which have been inquired in a
disciplinary inquiry and in the judicial proceedings indisputedly are based        B
on different allegations and the set of evidence not based on the same
facts and circumstances and in the given situation, the very submission
made by the appellant of taking the benefit of acquittal in a judicial
proceedings instituted against him on the plea of having nexus with the
disciplinary inquiry loses its foundation.
                                                                                   C
       17. The scope of departmental enquiry and judicial proceedings
and the effect of acquittal by a criminal Court has been examined by a
three Judge Bench of this Court in Depot Manager A.P. State Road
Transport Corporation Vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya and Others3. The
relevant para is as under:-
                                                                                   D
          “…The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are
          two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is
          launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes
          to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the
          offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act
          of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty.         E
          The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service
          and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient
          that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as
          expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down
          any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental             F
          proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal
          case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be
          considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances.
          There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with
          departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge
          in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated           G
          questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement
          of public (sic duty), as distinguished from mere private rights
          punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is

3
    1997(2) SCC 699                                                                H
1106                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 10 S.C.R.


 A               conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as
                 per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence
                 Act. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry
                 in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of
                 duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct
                 defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict
 B
                 standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands
                 excluded is a settled legal position. The enquiry in the departmental
                 proceedings relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer and
                 proof in that behalf is not as high as in an offence in criminal
                 charge. It is seen that invariably the departmental enquiry has to
 C               be conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate efficiency in public
                 administration and the criminal trial will take its own course. The
                 nature of evidence in criminal trial is entirely different from the
                 departmental proceedings. In the former, prosecution is to prove
                 its case beyond reasonable doubt on the touchstone of human
                 conduct. The standard of proof in the departmental proceedings
 D
                 is not the same as of the criminal trial. The evidence also is different
                 from the standard point of the Evidence Act. The evidence required
                 in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by the Evidence Act.
                 Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether
                 the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent
 E               in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question
                 of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts
                 and circumstances. In this case, we have seen that the charge is
                 failure to anticipate the accident and prevention thereof. It has
                 nothing to do with the culpability of the offence under Sections
                 304-A and 338, IPC. Under these circumstances, the High Court
 F
                 was not right in staying the proceedings.”
                                                                 (Emphasis supplied)
             18. The exposition has been further affirmed by a three Judge
       Bench of this Court in Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. General Manager (PJ),
 G     Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Haldia and Others4, this Court held
       as under: -
                 “As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is
                 concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the
       4
           2005(7) SCC 764
 H
    SHASHI BHUSAN PRASAD v. INSPECTOR GENERAL                                 1107
  CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE [RASTOGI, J.]

      Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In    A
      our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal
      court would not debar an employer from exercising power in
      accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two
      proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They
      operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas
                                                                              B
      the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on
      the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with
      the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance
      with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement
      made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain
      officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of      C
      evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental
      proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a
      conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record
      the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation
      of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal
                                                                              D
      law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the
      prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond
      reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a
      departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed
      on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of
      “preponderance of probability”. Acquittal of the appellant by a         E
      Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him
      from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
      Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention
      of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court,
      the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be
                                                                              F
      quashed and set aside.”
                                                    (Emphasis supplied)
        19. We are in full agreement with the exposition of law laid down
by this Court and it is fairly well settled that two proceedings criminal
and departmental are entirely different. They operate in different fields     G
and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to
inflict appropriate punishment on an offender, the purpose of enquiry
proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose


                                                                              H
1108            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 10 S.C.R.


 A     penalty in accordance with the service Rules. The degree of proof
       which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of
       proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. Even the rule
       relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not
       similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless
       the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
 B
       doubt, he cannot be convicted by a Court of law whereas in the
       departmental enquiry, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent on a
       finding recorded on the basis of ‘preponderance of probability’. Acquittal
       by the Court of competent jurisdiction in a judicial proceeding does not
       ipso facto absolve the delinquent from the liability under the disciplinary
 C     jurisdiction of the authority. This what has been considered by the High
       Court in the impugned judgment in detail and needs no interference by
       this Court.
              20 The judgment in M. Paul Anthony case (supra) on which the
       learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance was a case where
 D     a question arose for consideration as to whether the departmental
       proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case on the basis of same
       sets of facts and evidence can be continued simultaneously and this
       Court answered in para 22 as under:-
             “The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of
 E           this Court referred to above are:
             (i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case
             can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being
             conducted simultaneously, though separately.
             (ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are
 F           based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the
             criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature
             which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be
             desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion
             of the criminal case.
 G           (iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave
             and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved
             in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of
             the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence
             and material collected against him during investigation or as
             reflected in the charge-sheet.
 H
    SHASHI BHUSAN PRASAD v. INSPECTOR GENERAL                                   1109
  CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE [RASTOGI, J.]

       (iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be             A
       considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but
       due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental
       proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.
       (v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being
       unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were          B
       stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be
       resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early
       date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be
       vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may
       get rid of him at the earliest.”
                                                                                C
       21. It may not be of assistance to the appellant in the instant case
for the reason that the charge levelled against the appellant in the criminal
case and departmental proceedings of which detailed reference has been
made were on different sets of facts and evidence having no nexus/co-
relationship. The kind of criminal act/delinquency which he had committed
in discharge of his duties in the course of employment. That apart,             D
much before the judgment of the criminal case could be pronounced, the
departmental enquiry was concluded and after the Inquiry Officer had
held him guilty, he was punished with the penalty of dismissal from
service.
       22. The judgment in G.M. Tank case(supra) on which the learned           E
counsel for the appellant has placed reliance was a case where this
Court had proceeded on the premise that the charges in the criminal
case and departmental enquiry are grounded upon the same sets of facts
and evidence. This may not be of any assistance to the appellant as we
have observed that in the instant case the charge in the criminal case          F
and departmental enquiry were different having no nexus/co-relationship
based on different sets of facts and evidence which has been
independently enquired in the disciplinary proceedings and in a criminal
trial and acquittal in the criminal proceedings would not absolve the
appellant from the liability under the disciplinary proceedings instituted
against him in which he had been held guilty and in sequel thereto punished     G
with the penalty of dismissal from service.
       23. It is not the case of the appellant that any error committed in
the procedure prescribed under the scheme of Rules 1969 has been
violated or opportunity to hearing has not been afforded or the principles
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1110             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 10 S.C.R.


 A     of natural justice has been violated, in absence thereof, it is otherwise
       not open for the Courts to interfere in the disciplinary proceedings under
       its limited scope of review under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution
       of India.
             24. Consequently, in our considered view, the appeal is without
 B     substance and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
              25. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.


       Kalpana K. Tripathy                                        Appeal dismissed.

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