Holding

Acts that threaten the community at large and disturb the even tempo of life constitute a breach of public order, and the petitioner’s detention under the National Security Act was therefore valid.

Summary

The petitioner, Sharad Kumar Tyagi, challenged his preventive detention under the National Security Act, 1980, arguing that the three incidents cited—extortion of "chauth" from a mango garden contractor, a shopkeeper, and a market threat with a revolver—did not affect public order, that the third incident was fabricated, that he was denied a friend’s assistance before the Advisory Board, and that the Central Government failed to consider the State’s report. The Supreme Court held that each incident threatened the community at large and disturbed the even tempo of life, thereby affecting public order; the third incident was verified as genuine; the petitioner had been permitted to have a friend but chose not to avail it, so no denial occurred; the Central Government had indeed considered the report; and the delay in arrest was due to his absconding, which did not invalidate the detention. Consequently, the detention order was upheld and the writ petition dismissed.

Issues considered

The three incidents alleged against the petitioner constitute a breach of public order under the National Security Act.
Whether the third incident cited in the grounds of detention was fabricated.
Whether denial of a friend’s assistance before the Advisory Board vitiates the detention order.
Whether the Central Government failed to consider the State’s report under Section 3(5) and exercise its power under Section 14 of the Act.
Whether the delay in arrest, owing to the petitioner’s absconding, invalidates the detention.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 82, s. 83
National Security Act, 1980s. 10, s. 11, s. 14, s. 3(2), s. 7(2), s. 8

Subjects

National Security Actpreventive detentionpublic orderadvisory boardfriend assistancedelay in arrestabscondingextortionthreat with firearmSupreme Court

Judgment

SHARAD KUMAR TYAGI
A
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.

JANUARY 18, 1989

[MURARI MOHON DUTT AND S. NATARAJAN, JJ.] B

National Security Act 1980 Sections 3(2), 7(2) and 11-Detenu-
Demanding Chauth for gundagardi of mango-On refusal to pay-
Threatening contractors and shop-keepers-Reports lodged with
police-Whether incidents affect 'Law and Order' or 'maintenance of
public order'-Detention order-Whether valid.
c
,,.,
·:--· Advisory Board-Representation by friend-Duty of detenu to
make the request. ·

Detention order-Challenge to-On ground of delay in arrest of
detenu-When sustainable. D

On April 5, 1988 an order of detention was passed against the
petitioner in the writ petition under s. 3(2) of the National Security Act.
He could not be served with this order and taken into preventive
custody as he was absconding. He was treated as an absconder and
resort was had to s. 7(2) of the Act. A proclamation was obtained E

- against him under Sections 82 and 83 of the Criminal Procedure Code
1973 and was executed on May 5, 1988. He surrendered thereafter in
Court on July 4, 1988 and was sent to the District Jail where he was
served the detention order and the grounds of detention on July S, 1988.

In the grounds of detention three incidents were enumerated indi- F
eating that the petitioner had acted in a manner which was against the
maintenance of public law and order situation. The incidents were:

(1) On July 8, 1987 the petitioner had gone along with his
associates and threatened the contractor of a mango garden that fees for
goondagardi (Chauth) should be paid to him and assaulted the con- G
tractor. The matter was reported to the police who registered a case
-""* under Sections 301and323 I.P.C ..

(2) On February 11, 1988 the petitioner threatened a shopkeeper
that be should pay Rs.10,000 immediately falling which he would be
killed. The shopkeeper reported the matter to the police "ho had H
257
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19891 1 S.C.R.

registered a case under s. 506 I.P.C.
A
(3) On March 3, 1988 the petitioner taking a Revolver in his hand
moved in the market area and, threatened the shopkeepers if they do
not pay 'Chauth' they could not open their shops. On account of this
threat the entire market was closed.
B
The grounds of detention al8o informed the petitioner that he
could make a representation under s. 3 of the Act and that the matter
would be submitted under s. 10 to the Advisory Board, and that he
could make any representation for the consideration of the Board. I

c
The meeting of the Advisory Board was fixed on August 2, 1988.
The Board considered the written and oral representations of the
ll
petitioner and gave a report that there was sufficient cause for the
detention of the petitioner. The State Government accepted the report
of the Advisory Board and passed a further order on August l 7/18,
1988 confirming the detention of the petitioner.
D
In the writ petition to this Court the detention order was assailed
on the following grounds:
( l) The three grounds set out in the grounds of detention are not
incidents which would affect the maintenance of public order or the
E even tempo of the life of the community. (2) the third incident has been
co11cocted in order to give credibility to the detention order. (3) The
petitioner was denied the opportunity to have the assistance of a friend
when he appeared before the Advisory Board, and (4) That the Central
,.
Government had not considered the petitioner's case when the State
Government sent a report under section 3(5) of the Act and the non-
application of mind by the Central Government vitiates the detention of
F the petitioner.

Dismissing the writ petition,
HELD: l.(a) The demand for chauth from the contractor and the
attack lannched on him would show that it was not a case of singling
G out a particular contractor for payment of chauth but a demand
expected to be complied with by all owners or contractors of mango
groves in the locality. In such circumstances the demand inade and )!-
the attack launched would undoubtedly cause fear and panic in the
m.inds llf all the owners and contractors of mango groves in that
ar~a, and this would have affected the even tempo of life of the
H co11.1munity. [265E-F]
S.K. TYAGI v. STATE OF U.P. 259

l.(b) The incident in the second ground must also be viewed in
A
the same manner in which the first incident has been construed as
indicated above. It is not as if the demand and the threat following it
were made against Ashok Kumar in an isolated manner. On the other
hand, the demand had been made as part of a scheme to extort money
from all the shopkeepers under a threat that their continuance of busi-
ness and even their lives would be in danger if chauth was not paid. This B
-~ demand would have certainly made all the shopkeepers in that loca-
lity feel apprehensive that they too would be forced to make payments to
the petitioner. and that otherwise they would not be allowed to run their
shops. [265G-H; 266A-B]

l.(c) In so far as the incident in the third ground is con·
cerned, the petitioner is stated to have taken a revolver with him and c
threatened all the shopkeepers in the market, that if anyone failed to
pay 'chauth' he would not be allowed to open his shop and he would
have to face the consequences. Tbs incident cannot be considered as
merely causing disturbance to the law and order situation but must be
viewed as affecting the even tempo of life in the market. [2668-D I D

l.(d) Whether an act relates to. law and order or to public order
depends upon the impact of the act on the life of the community. In
other words if the reach and effect and potentiality of the act disturb or
dislocate the even tempo of the life of the community, it will be an act
which will affect public order. [266E, GI

In the instant case, it cannot be said that the demands made and
threats given by the petitioner to the contractors and shopkeepers as
mentioned in the three grounds would have its reach only to the limited
extent of affecting the law and order situation, and not go so far as to
affect the maintenance of public order. [267EI F

Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, [1966] 1 SCR 709;
Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 3 SCR 288; Nagendra Nath
Mondalv. State of West Bengal, [1972] 1SCC498; Nandlal Roy v. State
of West Bengal, [1972] 2 SCC 524 referred to and Guiab Mehra v. State
of U.P., [1987] IV SCC 302, distinguished. G

--¥ 2. It is not possible to accept the contention that third incident
referred to in the grounds of detention is a concocted affair. The
records go to show that H.C. Khajan Singh had promptly reported the
incident at the police station and the truth of bis report had been
verified by IDspector R.C. Verma. [267H; 268A] H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1989) I S.C.R.
State of U.P. v. Kamal Kishore Saini, AIR 1988 SC 208 at 213
A referred to.

3. Though the Advisory Board had permitted the detenu to
appear along with a friend the detenn had failed to take a friend with
him. He did not also represent to the Advisory Board that he did not
B have adequate time to get the services of a friend and that he required
time to have the services of a friend. Such being the case, be cannot take
advantage of bis own lapses and raise a contention that tl:.e detention
order is illegal because he was not represented by a friend at the meet-
ing of the Advisory Board. He did not also choose to represent to the
Advisory Board that be was not given sufficient time to secure the
service of a friend. [271C-D; 272BI
c
4.(a) The Central Government bad in fact considered the report
sent by the State Government under section 3(5) of the Act, and saw no
reason to revoke the detention order in exercise of its powers under
s. 14. [272D)
D
4.(b) The petitioner was absconding and proclamations were
made under sections 82 and 83 Cr.P.C. and it was only thereafter the
petitioner bad surrendered himself in Court. The challenge to the
detention order on ground of delay in arrest is not sustainable. This is
not a case where the petitioner was freely moving about but no arrest
E was effected because his being at large was not considered a hazard to
the maintenance of public order. [272F)

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petit!on /
(Crl.) No. 359 of 1988.

F (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

R.K. Jain, R.K. Khanna and A.S. Pundir for the Petitioner.

Yogeshwar Prasad, Mrs. Rachna Gupta, Mrs. Rachna Joshi, Dalveer
Bhandari, Ms. C.K. Sucharita and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Res-
G pondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

NATARAJAN, J. This petition under Article 32 of the Constitu-
tion of India has been filed by the petitioner to seek the issue of
H appropriate writs for quashing an order of detention passed against
S.K. TYAGI v. STATE OF U.P. [NATARAJAN, J.[ 261

him under Section 3(2) of-;the )llational Security Act (hereinafter the
A
'Act') by the State of Uttar Pradesh and for his release from custody.
On April 5, 1988 ·an order of detention was passed against the
petitioner under Section 3(2) of the Act but the petitioner could not be
served the order of detention and taken into preventive custody as he
was absconding. Consequently he was treated an absconder and resort
was had to Section 7(2) of the Act and a proclamation was obtained B
against him under Sections 82 and 83 of the Criminal Procedure Code
on May 4, 1988 and the said order was executed on May 4, 1988.
Thereafter the petitioner surrendered himself in Court on July 4, 1988
'
r and he was sent to the District Jail at Meerut where he was served the
detention order and the grounds ~f detention on July 5, 1988.

In the grounds of detention thr~e grounds were set out for the c
detention of the petitioner and they read as follows:

1. On 8.7.87 at about 9.30 P.M. in the night at Kasha
Sardhana, Police Station Sardhana (Meerut) you alongwith your
other companions went to the garden of Lala Om Prakash Jain. D
which is in the possession of Yusuf S/o Ismail on contract. You
said to Yusuf etc. who were present there that they do not pay
the (CHAU1H) fee for GUNDAGARDI of the Mango, there-
fore, you using abusive language said "Kill the Salas,' so they
may vanish for ever and you people with an intention to kill
Yusuf etc. assaulted them. On the information of Shri Yusuf a E
case has been registered against you as Crime No. 211 under
Sections 307, 323 I.P.C., which is under consideration of the
Court. Due to your aforesa.id misdeed terror in Sardhana and in
District Meerut terrorism has spread and in this way you have
acted in such manner which is against the Maintenance of Public
Law and order situation. F

2. On 11-2-88 at about 11.00 A.M. in the day at the Binauli
Road in Kasba and Police Station Sardhana you alongwith your
companion Vinay Kumar went to the Shop of Shri Ashok Kumar
and you threatened Shri Ashok Kumar that he should pay
Rs.10,000 (Ten thousand) by tomorrow or day after tomorrow G
otherwise he will be killed. On the basis of information of Shri
Ashok Kumar Crime No. 48 under Section 506 1.P.C. has been
diarised which is under consideration. Due to your aforesaid
indecent terror in Kasba Sardhana and in the District of Meerut
terrorism has prevailed and in this way you have acted in such
manner which is against the maintenance of the Public Law and H
Order situation.
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 119891 1 S.C.R.

A 3. On 3.3.88 in the Kasba of Sardhana, Police Station
Sardhana, District Meerut, you taking a Revolver in your hand
in the market of Sardhana said to the Shopkeepers that who
so-ever will not pay money (CHA UTH), he cannot open the
shop in the market, due to which the shops were closed in the
market. H.C. Khajan Singh with the help of other employees
B
when tried to arrest you then you ran away on the Motor Cycle
alongwith your companion while firing in the air. Information to
this effect has been got diarised by HC. Khajan Singh at Police
Station in G.D. No. 14 at 10-10 hours and investigation to this
effect has been done by the Investigation Inspector Shri R.C.
Verma and on investigation the aforesaid incidents were found
c correct and entry to this effect has been carried out at G.D. No.
33. By your aforesaid indecent activity in Sardhana and in
District Meerut terrorism has prevailed and in this way you have
acted in such manner which is against the provisions of Main-
tenance of Public law and Order situation.
D The grounds of detention also set out the following:

(1) The petitioner if he so desires could make represen-
tation under Section 8 of the Act to the Home Secretary,
Ministry of Home, State Government through the Superinten-
dent of Jail at the earliest possible;
E
(2) That the papers relating to the petitioner's detention
would be submitted under Section 10 of the Act to the Advisory
Board within three weeks from the date of detention and that if
the representation is received late it would not be considered by _Jiii
F
the Advisory Board; -,Ill
(3) That if the petitioner so desired he could also make
representation to the Government of India by addressing the
representation to the Secretary, Governme~t of India, Ministry
of Home (Internal Security Department), North Block, New
Delhi through the Superintendent of the Jail, and
G
(4) That if under the provisions of Section 11(1) the
petitioner desired to have a personal hearing by the Advisory
Board he should specifically make mention of it in his represen-
tation or he should inform the State Government of his desire
through the Jail Superintendent.
H
S.K. TYAGJ v. STATE OF U.P. INATARAJAN, J.J 263

It is common ground that the petitioner made a representation to
A
the Government against his detention and the order passed therefor.
Therein he had set out tha t he wished to have the services of a frien.d at
1

the time of the meeting of the Advisory Board to make representations
on his behalf. The representation was received by the District Magis-
trate, Meerut on July 15, 1988. After receipt of the comments of the
SSP, Meerut the representation along with the comments of the Dis- B
trict Magistrate were sent to the State Government on July 21, 1988.
Even prior to it the copies of the representation were forwarded to the
State Government and the Advisory Board on July 19, 1988. The
representation was considered and rejected by the State Government
on July 28, 1988 and the petitioner wasfoformed of the same through
the Jail Superintendent, Meerut.
c
The meeting of the Advisory Board to consider the case of the
petitioner was fixed on August 2, 1988 and a Radio-gram was sent by
the State Government to the District Magistrate and the Superinten-
dent District Jail, Meerut informing the date of the meeting of the
Advisory Board. The Radio-gram further set out as follows: D

"Board further directs that either District Magistrate or Superin-
tendent of Polic.e to appear before the Board on the date of hearing
with all relevant records and on request of the detenu his best friend
(non-advocate) may also be allowed to appear with him." A copy of
the Radio-gram was sent to the Jail Superintendent and it was shown
to the petitioner~and his acknowledgement was obtained. The Ad-
visory Board considered the written and oral representations of the
petitioner and gave a report that there was sufficient cause for the ·
detention of the petitioner. The State Government accepted the report
of the Advisory Board and passed a further order on August 17/18,
1988 confirming the detention of the petitioner. Thereafter the F
petitioner has come forward with this petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution.

In his petition, the petitioner has raised several grounds to assail
his detention, one of them being the non-furnishing of the investiga-
tion report of Shri R.C. Verma, Inspector of Police who had verified G
the truth and correctness of the report of HC 1057 Khajan Singh about
tl;ie incident which took place on March 3, 1988. However, during the
hearing of the writ petition no arguments were advanced in respect of
this gro1g1d of objec\ion..

MI··. Ji!.\\\, k~n;i.~d ~<.>u11sel for the petitioner assailed the o~de• of H
detention on the following grounds:
-···.~·'Jr'..,,..--_-.·:...
' ,....;. -

264 ~ SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R.
-~
\.. (1) All the three grounds set out in the grounds of deten- '
A
tion even if true, are not incidents which would affect the main-
tenance of public order and at best they can be construed only as
offences committe'd against-individuals or incidents which are
likely to affect the law and order situation.

B · ·;- --(2) The third ground is a concocted incident in order to
give credibility to the detention order by making it appear that
the petitioner was indulging in anti-social acts which affected the
-- . maintenance of public order.

· (3) The petitioner was denied opportunity to have the
assistance of a friend when he appeared before the Advisory
c Board on August 2, 1988.

Besides these contentions Mr. Jain also raised-a fourth conten-
tion that under Section 3(5) tJf the Act the State Government is
enjoined to send ·a report within seven days to the Centre Govern-
. D. ment, of the detention·of any detenu under the Act together with the
grounds on which the order had been made and on receipt of such a
report the Central Government is bound to consider the matter and
either approve the detention or revoke the. same in exercise of its
powers und"r Section 14 of the Act. In this case there was no material \._
to show that the Central Government had performed its duty under r
E the Act. ·

Since this contention was not raised in the petition and since the
Central Government had not been impleaded a party respondent, the
petitioner's counsel filed a petition and sought leave of Court for rais-
ing an additional ground and for impleading the Cenhal Government
F as a party respondent. These prayers were acceded and on notice being
issued to the Central Government, the Central Government made its
representation through counsel.

The contentions of the petitioner in his petition have been
refuted by the respondents in their counter affidavits, one by the sec-
·G and respondent, District Magistrate, Meerut and the other filed by
Shri P.N. Tripathi, Upper Division Assistant, Confidential Section-8 _,..\
of U.P. (Civil), Secretariat, Lucknow on behalf of the first respon-
dent, the State ofU.P.
\
\ We will now examine the merits of the contentions of the
\ H petitioner in seriatum. The first contention is that the three grounds
)
/
S.K. TYAGI v. STATE OF U.P. [NATARAJAN, J.i 265

mentioned in the grounds of detention could by no stretch of imagina-
A
tion be construed as acts which would affect the maintenance of public
order or the even tempo of life of the community. Mr. Jain, learned
counsel for the petitioner referred to Guiab Mehra v. State of U.P.,
[ 1987] IV SCC 302 and urged that the first ground of detention in that
case also pertained to the detenu therein threatening to shoot the
shopkeepers of Khalasi Line locality if they failed to give money to B
him and the shopkeepers becoming terror stricken and closing their
shops. This Court had construed the ground as only affecting law and
order and not the maintenance of public order. Mr. Jain argued that
grounds 1 and. 2 were threats meted out to individual persons regarding
which criminal cases have been registered and the 3rd ground was
identical to the one noticed by this Court in Guiab Mehra's case.
Consequently, it was argued that we should also hold, as was done in
c
Guiab Mehra's case that the grounds set out against the petitioner
would at best affect only the law and order situation and would not
pose a threat to the maintenance of public order~ We have given tl)e
matter our careful consideration but we find ourselves unable to agree
with the contention of Mr. Jain. In ground No. 1, the petitioner had D
gone with his associates and threatened one Yusuf, the contractor of a
mango grove that fees for goondagardi (Chauth) should be paid to him
and the petitioner and his associates assaulted Yusuf saying that they
will "Kill the salas". On Yusuf reporting the matter to the police a case
was registered under Sections 307 & 323 l.P.C. against the petitioner
and his associates. The demand for chauth from the contractor and the E

... attack launched on him would show that it was not a case of singling
out a particular contractor for payment of chauth but a demand
expected to be complied with by all owners or contractors of mango
groves in the locality. In such circumstances the demand made and the
attack launched would undoubtedly cause fear and panic in the minds
of all the owners and contractors of mango groves in that area and this F
would have affected the even tempo of life of the community. Similarly,
the second ground pertains to the petitioner going to the shop of one
Ashok Kumar and making a demand of Rs.10,000 and threatening him
that unless the money was paid on the following day or the day after
the shopkeeper would be killed. The shopkeeper had reported the
matter to the police authorities and a case has been registered against G
the petitioner u/s 506 I.P.C. This incident must also be viewed in the
same manner in which the first incident has been construed. It is not as
if the demand and the threat following it were made against Ashok
Kumar in an insolated manner. On the other hand, the demand had
been made as part of a scheme to extort money from all the shop-
keepers under a threat that their continuance .of business and even H
'
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 1 S.C.R.

their lives would be in danger if chauth was not paid. The demand
A
made on Ashok Kumar would have certainly made all the shopkeepers
in that locality feel apprehensive that they too would be forced to
make payments to the petitioner and that otherwise they would not be
allowed to run their shops.

B It so far as the 3rd incident is .concerned, it is seen that the
petitioner had taken a revolver with him and threatened all the
shopkeepers in the market of Sardhana that if anyone failed to pay
"chauth" he would not be allowed to open his shop and he would have
to face the consequences. On account of this threat the shop owners
downed the shutters of their shops and at that point of time H.C.
Khajan Singh happened to reach the market. Seeing what was happen-
c ing H.C. Khajan Singh attempted to apprehend the petitioner but he
managed to escape on his motor cycle after firing several shots in the )t
air with his revolver. H .C. Khajan Singh had at once returned to the
station and made an entry in the general diary about this incident.

'D This incident cannot be considered as merely causing disturbance
to the law and order situation but must be viewed as one affecting the
even tempo of life in the market. The shopkeepers had closed their
shops and they as well as the public in the market area would have felt
terrified when they saw the petitioner moving with a revolver and
demanding 'chautb' payment by the shopkeepers.
E
Whether an act would amount to a breach of law and order or a
breach of public order bas been considered by this Court in a number -
of decisions and we may only refer to some of them viz. Dr. Ram
Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, [1966) 1 SCR 709; Arun Ghosh v.
State of Wesi Bengal, [1970) 3 SCR 288; Nagendra Nath Monda/ v.
4
F State of West Bengal, [1972) 1 SCC 498 and Nandlal Roy v. State of ·
West Bengal, [1972) 2 SCC 524. In Guiab Mehra's case (supra) after
noticing all these decisions, it was set out as follows:

"Thus from these observations it is evident that an act
whether amounts to a breach of law and order or a breach
G of public order solely depends on its extent and reach to the
society. If the act is restricted to particular individuals or a
group of individuals it breaches the law and order problem
but if the effect and reach and potentiality of the act is so
deep as to affect the community at large and/or the even
tempo of the community then it becomes a breach of the
public order."
S.K. TYAGI v. STATE OF U.P. INATARAJAN, J.} 267

..,Jo,. In State of U.P. v. Hari Shankar Tewari, 11987] 2 SCC 490 refer-
A
ring to S.K. Kedar v. State of West Bengal, 11972] 3 SCC 816 and
Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, 11982] 2 SCC 403 it was held as
follows:

"Conceptually there is difference between law and order
and public order but what in a given situation may be a B
matter covered by law and order may really tum out to be
one of public order. One has to tum to the facts of each
case to ascertain whether the matter relates to the larger
circle or the smaller circle.

Thus whether an act relates to law and order or to public C
'f- order depends upon tile impact of the act on the life of the
community or in other words the reach and effect and
potentiality of the act if so put as to disturb or dislocate the .
even tempo of the life of the community, it will be an act
which will affect public order." D,

Viewed in this perspective, it cannot be said that the demands
made and threats given by the petitioner to the contractors and
~ shopkeepers as mentioned in the grounds would have its reach only to
the limited extent of affecting the law and order situation and not go so
far as to affect the maintenance of public order. We ~re therefore, E
unable to sustain the first contention urged on behalf of the petitioner.
..
Learned counsi:I for the petitioner then contended that no
credence should be given to the last mentioned ground because the
~- names of the shopkeepers who had closed their shops out of fear for
the petitioner or the names of the witnesses to the incident have not F
been set out in the grounds.

It was further contended that the 3rd incident has been concoc-
ted in order to give a colour of credibility to the detention order. The
counsel argued that in the report made by Inspector R.C. Verma for
an order of detention being passed against the petitioner, a number of G
instances were given but in spite of it the police authorities felt
diffident about the adequacy of the materials and had therefore con-
cocted the third incident given as ground no. 3. We do not find any
merit in this contention because the records go to show that H.C.
Khajan Singh had promptly reported the incident at the police station
and the truth of his report had been verified by Inspector R.C. Verma. H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R.

It is not therefore possible to accept the contention that the 3rd
A
incident referred to in the grounds of detention is a concocted affair.

In Guiab Mehra's case upon which reliance was placed by Mr.
Jain, we find that the facts therein were quite different. The first
ground of detention in that case pertained to the detenu demanding
B money from the shopkeepers of Khalasi Line but no shopkeeper had
come forward to complain about the detenu and only a picket
employed at the police station had made a report. The second ground
related to the detenu lobbing a comb at a police party when it tried to
effect his arrest. It was in those circumstances, this Court deemed it
appropriate to quash the order of detention. In the present case, it may
be seen that specific reports had been given by Yusuf and Ashok
c Kumar about the incidents forming grounds 1 and 2 and cases had
been registered against the petitioner. In so far as the 3rd ground is
concerned, H.C. Khajan Singh was himself a witness to the threats
given by the petitioner to the shopkeepers with a revolver in his hand
and the firing of the revolver by the detenu while leaving the place.
D The report of H.C. Khajan Singh has been verified by Inspector R.C.
Verma and found to be true. It is thus seen that the facts in the two
cases have no similarity whatever. On the other hand the observation
in State of U.P. v. Kamal Kishore Saini, AIR 1988 SC 208 at 213 would
be of relevance in this case. It was held in that case that if firing is
made in a public street during the day time, the incident would
E undoubtedly affect public order as its reach and impact would disturb
public tranquility and it would affect the even tempo of the life of the
people in the locality concerned. Therefore the decision in Guiab
Mehra's case (supra) cannot be of any avail to the petitioner.

In so far as the 3rd contention is concerned, it was urged that ...a1lll
F in spite of the petitioner having specifically asked for the assistance of a .,....
friend at the time he was heard by the Advisory Board, he was denied
opportunity to have such. assistance. The petitioner has averred in his
petition as follows:

"The petitioner orally as well as in writing requested the
G Chairman of the Advisory Board to allow him to engage a
counsel or atleast a person who is acquainted with the law ~
to represent him before the Advisory Board, as the
petitioner was illiterate and was not capable of represent-
ing his case before the Advisory Board. Unfortunately, the
Advisory Board rejected the request of petitioner and did
H not allow him to engage a legal counsel or atleast a person
S.K. TYAGI v. STATE OF U.P. [NATARAJAN, J.[ 269

who is acquainted with the provisions of the National
A
Security Act and forced the petitioner to appear before the
Advisory Board without any defence helper. This part of
the act of the members of the Advisory Board is illegal,
unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14, 19, 21and22 of
the Constitution oflndia."
B
In the counter affidavit of the District Magistrate, this allegation has
been refuted as follows:

"Averments made in para No. 2 are wrong and denied. The
petitioner was detained on 5.7.88 in Distt. Jail, Meerut and
his detention is absolutely legal and constitutional. It is C
wrong to say that the petitioner was not provided an
opportunity by the Advisory Board to defend himself. On
the contrary, he was heard by the Advisory Board on
2.8.89 and the detaining authority had no objection to his
case being represented by a person who is not an advocate.
The fact that his request was rejected by the Advisory D
Board is not in the notice of detaining authority. As per the
Tele. dated 26.7.88 of the Home Dept!. of Government of
U.P., Lucknow, the petitioner was allowed to appear before
the Advisory Board through non-advocate r.ext friend. A
copy of the said message is annexed hereto and marked as
annexure R-1. E

However the petitioner's assertion that he is illiterate is
wrong because he knows English and has submitted detai-
led representation. According to information available,
petitioner is an Intermediate. The ratio of the decision in
A. K. Roy v. U. O.l., (reported in AIR 1982 SC 709) has not F
been contravened in any manner in the instant case."

In the counter affidavit on behalf of the State of U .P. it has been stated
as follows:

"But it is evident from the record that the Advisory Board G
had directed the State Govt. through its letter dated 2 lst
July, 1988 that since the petitioner Shri Sharad Tyagi had
requested to appear alongwith his next friend, he may be
informed to attend the Board's meeting alongwith his next
friend (non-advocate) on the date of hearing. The State
Government complied with the instructions of the Advisory H
270 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R.

A Board and had sent the necessary directions to the District
Authorities through its radiogram message dated 26 July,
1988, a copy of which is annexed hereto and marked as
Annexure R-I".

Besides the specific averment made in the counter affidavit, Shri
B Yogeshwar Dayal, learned counsel for the State of U .P. also drew our
attention to the radiogram sent by the Government to the District
Magistrate wherein it has been clearly stated that "on request of
detenu his next friend (non-advocate) may also be allowed to appear I
with him." Mr. Yogeshwar Dayal also made available to us the file
containing the original records relating to the detention of the
petitioner. We find from the records that the radiogram had been
c served
t
on the petitioner through the Superintendent of the Meerut
Distict Jail. The petitioner has affixed his signature in English therein x
and also written the word "date" but he has not filled up the date. (It is
stated in the counter affidavit that the petitioner is not an illiterate but
has studied upto Intermediate). This would falsify the averment in the
D rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner's wife Smt. Shobha Tyagi
"that the copy of the telegram annexed to the counter affidavit bf the
respondent No. 2 was not served upon the detenu; the detenu was
never informed that he was entitled to be represented by a friend who
is not an advocate." Mr. Jain's contention was that even if the
radiogram had been shown to the petitioner, it must have been done
E belatedly and there would not have been time for the petitioner to
contract anyone and make arrangements for a non-advocate friend
appearing alongwith him at the meeting of the Advisory Board. We J

are unable to countenance this argument because of several factors. In '
the first place, the petitioner has not raised such a plea in his petition .
.His specific contention was that he iiad requested the Chairman of the
F Advisory Board in writing as well as orally to permit him to have the
services of a counsel or a person acquainted with the law to represent
his case before the Advisory Board but the Advisory Board rejected
his request. It was not therefore his case that he was shown the
radiogram belatedly and he did not have time to make ai:rangements
for anyone to appear alongwith him before the Advisory Board.
G Another circumstance which militates the contention of Mr. Jain is
that there is no material to show that the petitioner had orally
represented to the Chairman of the Advisory Board that he wanted the
services of a friend and that he had been shown the radiogram very
late. The respondents have filed a copy of the letter sent by the Addi-
tional Registrar of the High Court to confirm that the Advisory Board
H had accorded permission to the petitioner to appear before the Board
S.K. TYAGI v. STATE OF U.P. [NATARAJAN, J.[ 271

-~ alongwith a non-advocate friend but in spite of it no one appeared along
A
with the petitioner on the date of hearing, and hence no mention was
made in the report of the Advisory Board about the non-appearance of
a friend on behaH of the petitioner. Mr. Jain argued that in a number
of decisions commencing from A.K. Roy v. Union of India, [1982] 1
sec 271 it has been consistently held that even though a detenu will
not be entitled to have legal assistance, he does have a right to have B
)j
the assistance of a friend at the time his case is considered by the
Advisory Board and hence denial of opportunity to have the assistance
of a friend would vitiate the detention. This principle is undoubtedly a
'
~-
well-stated one. It has however to be noticed that though the Advisory
Board had permitted the detenu to appear alongwith a friend the '
detenu had failed to take a friend with him. He did not also represent
to the Advisory Board that he did not have adequate time to get the
c

'
)I._ services of a friend and that he required time to have the services of a
friend. Such being the case, he cannot take advantage of his own lapses
and raise a contention that the detention order is illegal because he
was not represented by a friend at the meeting of the Advisory Board.
This position is a settled one and we may only refer to the observation D
of this Court in Vijay Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 934 at
939:

"It appears from the observation made by the High Court
~
that the appellant, without making any prayer before the
Advisory Board for the examination of his witnesses or for E
giving him assistance of his friend, started arguing his own
case, which in all probability, had given an impression to
the· members of the Advisory Board that the appellant
would not examine any witness. The appellant should have

~
I
'
made a specific prayer before the Advisory Board that he
would examine witnesses, who were standing outside. The F
appellant, however, did not make any such request to the ·
Advisory Board. There is no reason for not accepting the
statement of the detaining authority that the appellant was
permitted by the Advisory Board to have the assistance of
an advocate or friend at the time of hearing, but the appel-
!ant did not avail himself of the same. In the circumstances, G
we do not think that there is any substance in the conten-
-1' tion made on behalf of the appellant that the Advisory
Board acted illegally and in violation of the principles of
natural justice in not examining the witnesses produced by
the appellant at the meeting of the Advisory Board and in
not giving permission to the appellant to have the assistance H
of his friend."
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] I S.C.R.

A From the materials on record, we are satisfied that the appellant
was accorded permission to have the services of a friend and the
radiogram sent by the Government was duly communicated to him but
for some reason he had not availed the services of a friend. He did not
also choose to represent to the Advisory Board that he was not given
sufficient time to secure the services of a friend. Consequently, the
B
third contention also fails.

We are only left with the fourth and last contention. No
grievance was made in the petition that the Central Government had
not considered the petitioner's case when the State Government sent a --(
report under Section 3(5) of the Act and the non-application of mine! 1
C by the Central Government vitiates the detention of the petitioner.
This ground of objection was raised only during the arguments and
consequently the Central Government was permitted to be impleaded ;,,
as a party respondent. Learned counsel appearing for the Central
Government has stated that the Central Government had inf~ct con-
D sidered the report sent by the State Government and saw no reason to
revoke the order in exercise of its powers upon Section 14. There is no
reason to doubt the correctness of this statement.

One other argument advanced before us was that even though
the order of detention had been passed on April 5, 1988, no steps were ~
taken to take the petitioner into custody till he surrendered himself in
E Court on July 4, 1988. This contention is on the face of it devoid of
merit because it has been specifically stated in the counter affidavits
that the petitioner was absconding and hence proclamations were
made under Sections 82 and 83 Cr. P.C. and it was only thereafter the
petitioner had surrendered himself in Court. It is not therefore a case
where the petitioner was freely moving about but no arrest was ~
F effected because his being at large was not considered a hazard to the ,
maintenance of public order.

In the result we do not find any ground for quashing the order of
detention passed against the petitioner. The writ petition is accord-
ingly dismissed.
G
N.V.K. Petition dismissed.