Supreme Court of India
SHANTI PRASAD JAIN (D) THROUGH LRS.versusPRAKASH NARAIN MATHUR
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 530
- Decided
- 15 April 2009
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- TARUN CHATTERJEE
Holding
The High Court was justified in striking out the defence under Section 15(7) and in rejecting the condonation of delay, as its discretionary exercise was proper and not arbitrary.
Summary
The landlord filed an eviction suit alleging non‑payment of rent and obtained an order from the Rent Controller directing the original tenant to pay rent at Rs 105 per month from 1985. After the tenant's death in 1997, his heirs (the appellants) failed to make timely payments, depositing the arrears in lump sums years later. The landlord sought to strike out the tenants' defence under Section 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act and opposed the tenants' application for condonation of delay under Section 151 of the CPC; the Rent Controller rejected the condonation and struck out the defence, a decision later reversed by the Additional Rent Control Tribunal. The High Court set aside the Tribunal’s order, upheld the strike‑out of the defence and rejected the condonation application. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretionary power. It held that the tenants were in negligent, willful default, their explanation was belated and unsubstantiated, and the High Court’s exercise of discretion was proper. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, leaving the High Court’s order intact.
Issues considered
- The appropriateness of striking out the tenants' defence under Section 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
- Whether the application for condonation of delay in depositing rent under Section 151 of the CPC should have been allowed.
- Whether the High Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction correctly in rejecting the condonation and striking out the defence.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 151
- Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 15(1), s. 15(7)
Subjects
Delhi Rent Control ActSection 15(7)arrears of rentcondonation of delayevictionlandlord-tenant disputediscretionary powerSupreme Court of India
Judgment
[2009) 6 S.C.R. 96
A SHANTI PRASAD JAIN (D) THROUGH LRS.
v.
PRAKASH NARAIN MATHUR
(Civil Appeal No. 2544 of 2008)
APRIL 15, 2009
B
[TARlJN CHATIERJEE AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.]
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - s. 15(7) - Arrears of rent
- Failure to pay - High Court striking out defence of tenant
c and also rejecting application for condonation of delay in
depositing rent - Interference with - Held: Not called for -
High Court rightly exercised the discretion in striking out the
defence uls. 15(7) and rejecting the application for
condonation of delay in deposit of rent, in favour of landlord
D - Tenants committed default in depositing rent in compliance
with the order of Rent Controller - Application for condonation · -~
of delay was a belated one and afterthought attempt to explain
willful default.
The question which arose for consideration in this
E appeal was whether the High Court was justified in
allowing the application filed by the respondent-landlord
for stril<ing out the defence of the appellant-tenant under
Section 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and
rejecting the application for condonation of delay in
F depositing rent under section 151 CPC filed by the tenant.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. On examining the submissions made by
the counsel for the parties and the impugned judgment
G
as well as the orders passed by the Additional Rent
Control Tribunal and the Rent Controller, and also the
averments made in the application for condonation of
delay and the averments made by the landlord/
H 96
SHANTI PRASAD JAIN (D) THROUGH LRS. v. 97
PRAKASH NARAIN MATHUR
~-
respondent in the application under section 15(7) of the A
- Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, no interference is called for
in respect of the impugned judgment of the High Court.
[Para 11] [107-C-E]
1.2. The appellants were guilty of negligent default in B
depositing the rent in compliance with the order of the
Rent Controller, under section 15(1) of the Act. The
application for condonation of delay was a belated one
and afterthought attempt was made to explain the willful
default. That apart, In the application for condonation of
delay, the appellants, for the first time, contended that
c
they were advised by their counsel that they were not
obliged to comply with the order under section 15(1) of
the Act, till the appellants were brought on record.
Whereas contradictory stand was taken by them that rent
was submitted regularly to their counsel through their D
clerk to assure that it was duly deposited. That apart,
neither any affidavit from the counsel or from his clerk
was filed regarding deposit of rent with them nor any
details of deposit of money given to the counsel through
his clerk was given. Therefore, the explanation, apart from E
being an afterthought, was clearly bogus and unworthy
of any credence. The order passed under section 15(1)
of the Act was passed by the Rent Controller, in 1989
-~ directing the original tenant to pay or deposit rent at the
...
~
rate of Rs.105/- per month w.e.f. year 1985 and to continue F
to pay or deposit the rent at the said rate by 15th of each
succeeding month. It also appears from the record that
in the year 1995, one of the sons of the deceased tenant-
appellant No.2, had filed an application for impleadment
in the eviction petition on the ground that he was a G
member of HUF of the original tenant and he was in fact
running a business as a member of the HUF and was not
a sub-tenant in respect of the premises in question. The
said son SK was impleaded by order in 1995 against
which, a revision petition was filed by the landlord/ H
98 SlJPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A reopondont boforo tho High Court which only otoyod nil ~
further proeoodlng& In thtJ ovlctlon procoodlng. SP tho
orlglnal t.enant died In 1997 and nfter hlo doath, tho ront
was admittedly not paid In compliance with the order
-
under Section 15{1) of the Act. While rejecting the
B explanation offered by the appellants in the application
for condonation of delay which was duly considered by
the High Court and the High Court came to a positive
finding. (Para 12] [107-E-H; 108-A-H; 109-A-D]
1.3. The High Court was fully justified and within its
c jurisdiction to reject the application filed by the appellants
for condonation of delay in the matter of deposit of rent
in compliance with the order passed under section 15(1)
of the Act, even if the entire amount of rent defaulted by
the app~llants or by their predecessor-in-interest was ...
D subsequently deposited in the office of the Rent
Controller. [Para 13] [110-8-C] ;.
1.4. The power of the Court either to strike out the
defence under section 15(7) or to reject the application
E for condonation of delay in deposit of rent was
discretionary in nature. On examination the impugned
order of the High Court and the statements made in the
applications and the findings arrived at by the High
Court, no ground is found that the High Court failed to
-+
F exercise its discretion in favour of the tenant for not
condoning the delay in depositing the rent and therefore,
it was open to the High Court not to use its discretion in
favour of the tenant in rejecting the application for
c.ondonation of delay and thus, the discretion used by the
High Court in favour of the landlord/respondent to strike
G
out the defence under section 15(7) of the Act was
perfectly justified. [Para 14] [110-G-H; 111-A-C) -+
1.6. The High Court also considered that the
appellants failed to explain as to why the deposits made
H
SHANTI PRASAD JAIN (0) THROUGH LRS. v. 99
PRAKASH NARAIN MATHUR
for tho p~rlod from 23rd of Moy, 1987 to 27th of A
- S~ptombar, 2002 wore oo dapooltod belatedly and
deposited the oame In lumpsum only on three occasions.
ihe discretion exercised by the High Court as well as the
Rent Controller In favour of the landlord/respondent
cannot be held to be arbitrary or unjust. The impugned B
judgment of the High Court cannot be interfered with.
[Paras 15 and 16] [111-C-E]
1.6. The appellants failed to implead owners of the
property in question having purchased the same from C
respondent no. 1 as respondents despite the fact that the
· said parties were impleaded in the eviction proceeding
before the Rent Controller as well as in the High Court
from which appeal arise. [Para 17] [111-E-G]
jain Motor Car Co. Delhi v. Swayam Prabha Jain (Smt.) D
by Anr. 1996 (3) SCC 55 and Aero Traders (P) Ltd. v.
Ravinder Kumar Suri 2004 (8) SCC 307, referred to.
Case Law Reference:
1996 (3) sec 55 ·Referred to. Para 14 E
2004 (8) sec 307 Referred to. Para 14
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
~ 2544 of 2009.
F
From the Judgment & Order dated 31.01.2008 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in C.M. (Main) No.50 of 2005.
Aeltemesh Rein, Aldanish Rein, Maheravish Rein and K.K.
Gupta for the Appellant.
G
Sushil Dutt, Vikram Singh and Ram Gupta for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. Leave granted. H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A 2. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order c;,
dated 31st of January, 2008 passed by a learned Judge of the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CM (Main) No. 50 of 2005
whereby an application filed under Article 227 of the
-
Constitution at the instance of the landlord/respondent was
B allowed and the order passed by the Additional Rent Control
Tribunal, Delhi dated 5th of November, 2004 allowing the
tenant's appeal and setting aside the order dated 18th of May,
2004 passed by the Rent Controller, Delhi was set aside )
whereby the High Court had allowed the application filed by the
c landlord/respondent under Section 15(7) of the D~lhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 (in short 'the Acf) and rejected the
application for condonation of delay in depositing the rent under
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short, "the
Code") of the tenant and consequent thereupon, the defence
of the tenant was struck out.
D
3. The facts in brief are as follows :- -•
The landlord/respondent has filed an eviction petition in
respect of Property No.2076, Katra Roshan Dola, Kinari
E Bazaar, Delhi (hereinafter referred to 'premises in question')
against the tenant/appellant inter alia on the grounds of non-
payment of rent and subletting before the Rent Controller, Delhi.
In the eviction petition, an order was passed under Section
15(1) of the Act by the Rent Controller, Delhi on 15th of March,
of
1989 directing the original appellant, Shanti Prasad Jain {since
F
deceased) to pay or deposit rent@ Rs. 105/- per montfrwith
effect from 1st January, 1985 and to continue to pay or deposit
-
at the said rate by 15th of each succeeding month. Shanti
Prasad Jain died on 23rd of May, 1997. During his lifetime.
there was no dispute that the rent was not regularly paid in
G compliance with the aforesaid order oOhe Rent Controller. One
of the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased tenant
Shanti Prasad Jain namely, Sunil Kumar Jain, thereafter filed
an application for impleadment in the aforesaid eviction petition
in the year 1995 during the lifetime of Sh2nti Prasad Jain before
H the Rent Controller seeking impleadment on the ground that he
SHANTI PRASAD JAIN (D) THROUGH LRS. v. 101
. PRAKASH NARAIN MATHUR [TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]
" \,
was a member of the HUF of Shanti Prasad Jain and that he A
was running the business in the name and style of Mis
Vardhman Jewels (India) as a member of the HUF and that he
was not a sub-tenant in respect of the premises in question.
This application was allowed by an order dated 1st of
September, 1995 by the Rent Controller, Delhi. Against the B
aforesaid order, the landlord/respondent filed a Civil Revision
Case No. 1043 of 1995 before the High Court at Delhi and the
High Court had only stayed the eviction proceeding till the
disposal of the Revision Case. It is not in dispute that after the
death of Shanti Prasad Jain (sine~ deceased), the rent was not c
deposited in compliance with the aforesaid order passed under
Section 15(1) of the Act. The admitted position in respect of
the deposit of rent and default and belated payment of rent was
as follows :-
(1) Rent for the period from 23rd May, 1997 to August, 1999 D
was deposited on 2/9/1999.
(2) Rent for the period from September, 1999 to
September, 2000 was deposited on 27th of March, 2000.
(3) Rent for the period from October, 2000 to March, 2003 E
was deposited oh 27th of September, 2002. Be it
mentioned here that deposit of rent for the period from
1 October 2000 to March, 2003 was, however, made at the
time when the respondent had already filed an application
" under Section 15(7) of the Act before the Rent Controller, F
Delhi for striking out the defence of the tenant.
4. In view of the aforesaid default and delayed payment of
rent for the aforesaid period, an application under Section 15(7)
of the Act for striking out the defence of the appellants was filed G
,. by the landlord/respondent on 3rd of January, 2003. This
application under ,Section 15(7) of the Act filed by the
respondent was oppbsed by the appellants on the ground that
the rent upto 31st pf January, 2003 was already deposited
before moving the application under Section 15(7) filed by the
H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A respondent and therefore the respondent was not entitled to any
relief on the application under Section 15(7) of the Act. It may
be mentioned herein that no plea was made out by the
appellants that they were advised by their learned counsel not
to deposit the rent in compliance with the order passed under
B Section 15(1) of the Act as at that time, they were not brought
on record in the eviction proceeding. As noted herein earlier,
the application for striking out the defence of the appellants was
filed on 3rd of January, 2003 and after about a year or so, the
appellants filed an application for condonation of delay in
c depositing the rent for the period as mentioned herein earlier
on the ground that they were advised by their learned counsel
who appeared for the original tenant, Shanti Prasad Jain (since
-
deceased) not to deposit the rent because they were not
brought on record in the eviction proceeding at that point of
time and that the appellants used to deposit the monthly rent
D regularly with the clerk of the learned counsel for the appellants
or their predecessor in interest but it was not known why such
deposits wem not made. Believing that the counsel or his clerk
would be taking steps to make the deposit of rent, no enquiry
was made by them either from the clerk or from the counsel as
E it was taken by them that the order passed was duly complied
with. In the said application for condonation, it was further
alleged that since the eviction proceeding was stayed by the
High Court in Civil Revision Case No. 1043 of 1995 and that
on the death of the original tenant, application was filed for
F impleadment of the heirs and legal representatives of the
deceased tenant, which was allowed only on 21st of October,
2002 in the aforesaid Revision Petition, the cause shown in the
application under Section 151 for not depositing the rent in
compliance with the order passed by the Rent Controller must
G be accepted to be sufficient cause for condoning the same.
5. The Rent Controller, Delhi by an order dated 18th of
May, 2004 had rejected the application for condonation of delay
in depositing the rent for the period as mentioned herein earlier
H as it was found by the Rent Controller that no satisfactory
SHANTI PRASAD JAIN (D) THROUGH LRS. v. 103
PRAKASH NARAIN MATHUR [fARUN CHATTERJEE, J.}
J<
explanation was given by the heirs and legal representatives A ...
of the deceased tenant as to why the rent was not deposited
month by month by 15th of each succeeding month as per the
order passed under Section 15(1) of the Act. It was also held
that the rent for the period mentioned herein earlier was
deposited collectively for three years in two installments which B
would clearly show that the order was not complied with willfully
by the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased.
' Consequent thereupon, the Rent Controller rejected the
application for condonation of delay filed by the appellants and
allowed the application filed under Section 15(7) of the Act c
directing the defence of the appellants to be struck out.
6. Feeling aggrieved by this order of the Rent Controller,
an appeal was taken by the appellants before the Additional
Rent Control Tribunal. Delhi which came to be registered as
)<
MCA No.~302 of 2004 which was allowed by taking a view that D
notwithstanding the fact that the succession was not held in
abeyance and took effect immediately upon the demise of the
original tenant Shanti Prasad Jain and in view of the definition
of "tenant" under the Act which includes heirs and legal
representatives· of the tenant, there was no obligation on the E
heirs and legal repre~entatives of the decea;;ed tenant to
comply with the order passed under Section 15(1) of the Act
until the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased tenant
~
were brought on record in the eviction proceeding. The
Additional Rent Control Tribunal further held that since in the F
revision case before the High Court challenging the order of
impleadment, the High Court had stayed all further proceedings
pending before the Rent Controller on 1st of September, 1995,
the Rent Controller was not justified in striking out the defence
of the appellants. It was against this order of the Additional Rent G
+ Control Tribunal, the landlord/respondent filed an. application
under Article 227 of the Constitution before the High Court of
Delhi at New Delhi. The High Court, by the impugned order,
inter alia, held that the Additional Rent Control Tribunal had
gone wrong in failing to appreciate that the application filed by
H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A Sun ii Kumar Jain, one of the heirs and legal representatives of "'
the deceased tenant seeking impleadment as a party
respondent on the ground that he was a member of HUF of late
Shanti Prasad Jain and the impleadment application of Sunil
Kumar Jain, as HUF, was allowed by the Rent Controller on 1st
B of September, 1995 and that in view of the fact that the High
Court had only stayed all further proceedings in the Civil
Revision Case, but had not granted stay of operation of the
order allowing impleadment, it was held that the Additional Rent )
Control Tribunal was not correct in holding that merely because
c the formal order bringing the legal representatives of late Shanti
Pra:;ad Jain was not passed, the obligation of his heirs and
legal representatives to pay rent stood suspended till they were
brought on record as heirs and legal representatives of the
deceased tenant. The impugned order of the High Court also
disclosed that the liability of the heirs and legal representatives
D
of the deceased tenant to pay or deposit rent in compliance
Ji
with the order passed under Section 15(1) of the Act did not
absolve the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased
tenant of their obligation to continue to pay rent after the demise
of the tenant. So far as the application filed by the appellants
E for condoning the delay in deposit of rent was concerned, the
High Court agreed with the order of the Rent Controller
rejecting the said application and thereby the defence of the
appellants was struck out under Section 15(7) of the Act.
Feeling aggrieved by the impugned order of the High Court,
F the appellants have come up by way of a special leave petition
which on grant of leave was heard in presence of the learned
counsel for the parties.
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and
G after examining the impugned order including the orders passed
by the Additional Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi and Rent ...
Controller, Delhi and considering the materials on record, we
are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the present
case and in view of the nature of the explanation offered by the
appellants in their application for condonation of delay, which
H
SHANTI PRASAD JAIN (D) THROUGH LRS. v. 105
PRAKASH NARAIN MATHUR [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
"' was not accepted either by the Rent Controller or by the High A
Court in the impugned order, we do not find any ground. to
interfere with the impugned order of the High Court allowing the
application for striking out the defence of the appellants under
Section 15(7) of the Act and rejecting the application for
condonation of delay in depositing the rent for the periods B
mentioned herein earlier:
~
8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants,
at the first instance, contended that the liability of the appellants
to deposit rent in compliance with the order passed under
Section 15(1) of the Act would only arise when the appellants c
were brought on record in the eviction proceeding. Therefore,
according to the learned counsel for the appellants, no duty was
cast upon the appellants to comply with the order passed under
section 15(1) of the Act till the appellants were brought on
record in the eviction proceeding. If this position is accepted, D
~- and the court finds that the explanation offered by the appellants
for not depositing the rents in compliance with the order passed
under Section 15(1) of the Act must be accepted, the question
of striking out the defence of the appellants under Section 15(7)
of the Act cannot arise at all. E
9. Learned counsel for the appellants further contended
that although some delay in depositing the rent in compliance
with the order of the Rent Controller, Delhi under Section 15
(1) of the Act was committed either by the original tenant Shanti F
Prasad Jain, since deceased, or by his heirs and legal
representatives, namely, the appellants, even then, the entire
amount was deposited either by the original tenant during his
life time or by the appellants after they were brought on record
in the eviction proceeding, the High Court ought to have used
G
its discretion in favour of the appellants by not striking out the
-;. defence and allowed the application for condonation of delay
in the matter of deposits under Section 15(1) of the Act.
Therefore, learned counsel for the appellants contended that the
High Court was not justified in not taking a lenient view of the
matter and in not accepting the explanation given by the H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 6 S.C.R.
A appellants in their application for condonation of delay in
depositing the rents in compliance with the order passed under
Section 15(1) of the Act. It was further contended by the learned
counsel for the appellants that in the facts and circumstances
of the present case and in view of the admitted fact that the
B rents were deposited in their entirety, the explanation offered
by the appellants in their application for condonation of delay,
ought to have been accepted and the application for striking
out the defence under Section 15(7) of the Act ought to have
been rejected.
C 10. These submissions of the learned counsel for the
appellants were contested by the learned counsel for the
respondent. Learned counsel for the respondent had drawn our
attention to the order of the Rent Controller, Delhi as well as of
the High Court and also of the Additional Rent Control Tribunal
D to show that even if deposits were made either by the original
tenant (since deceased) or after the heirs and legal
representatives were brought on record in the eviction
proceeding, the default was committed by depositing rents not
within the time contemplated under Section 15(1) of the Act and
E no proper explanation was given by the appellants for not
depositing the rent in time as it would be evident from the
record that neither the clerk of the learned counsel for the
appellants nor the learned counsel for the appellants came
forward to support the case of the appellants in their application
F under Section 151 of the Code. It was also contended by the
learned counsel for the respondent that on the death of the
tenant, the succession of his heirs and legal representatives to
the tenancy of the deceased tenant immediately came into
being and, therefore, it was the duty of the heirs and legal
G representatives of the deceased tenant to comply with and
deposit rents in compliance with the order passed under
Section 15(1) of the Act although they were not brought on
record in the eviction proceeding. According to the learned
counsel for the respondent, even if it can be presumed that after
H the d~ath of the original tenant Shanti Prasad Jain, that is, on
SHANTI PRASAD JAIN (D) THROUGH LRS. v. 107
PRAKASH NARAIN MATHUR [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
23rd of May, 1997 till the heirs and legal representatives were A
substituted and brought on record in the eviction proceeding
on 23rd of October, 2002, even after 23rd of October, 2002
· • the substituted appellants had failed to comply with the order
passed under Section 15(1) of the Act. Therefore, the learned
counsel for the respondent contended that the· High Court 8
having acted within its jurisdiction and found that the explanation
offered by the appellants in their application for condonation of
delay was not acceptable, the question of interfering with the
impugned order of the High Court striking out the defence under
Section 15(7) of the Act and also rejecting the application for C
condonation of delay in deposit of rent would not arise.
11. We have carefully examined the submissions so made
by the learned counsel for the parties and examined the
impugned judgment as well as the orders passed by the
Additional Rent Control Tribunal and the Rent Controller, Delhi D
and also the averments made in the application for condonation
of delay and the averments made by the landlord/respondent
in the application under Section 15(7) of the Act and after
carefully examining the same, we are of the view that the learned
counsel for the respondent was fully justified in submitting that E
no interference is needed in respect of the impugned judgment
of the High Court. Reasons are as follows :-
12. The appellants were guilty of negligent default in
· depositing the rent in compliance with the order of the Rent
Controller, Delhi, under Section 15(1) of the Act. From a bare F
reading of the averments made in the application for
condonation of delay, it would be evident that the appellants
could not provide any explanation or justification for such willful
default and in fact they have made contradictory statements in
their application for condonation of delay which was not the G
t defence taken by them in the objection filed to the application
under section 15(7) of the Act filed by the respondent. From a
• bare reading of the response to the application under Section
15(7) of the Act filed by the appellants/ it is clear that the
appellants had never pleaded that they were acting of the basis H
t
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A of advise given by the learned counsel nor was it mentioned
that the appellants had given the rent regularly to the learned
counsel or his clerk as was subsequently pleaded in the
application for condonation of delay filed by them after more
than one year of the filing of the application under Section 15(7)
8 of the Act. It also appears from the record that the application
for condonation of delay was filed when the hearing of the
application under Section 15(7) of the Act was concluded and
the matter was adjourned for orders on 16th of February, 2004
and since on 16th of February, 2004, the learned Judge was
C on leave and the matter was again deferred to 23rd of February,
2004, only at that stage, that is, on 23rd of February, 2004, the
application for condonation of delay was filed at the instance
of the appellants. In view of the above, it can be safely
concluded that the application for condonation of delay was a
belated one and afterthought attempt was made to explain the
D willful default. That apart, as noted herein earlier, in the
application for condonation of delay, the appellants, for the first
time, contended that they were advised by their counsel that
they were not obliged to comply with the order under Section
15(1) of the Act, till the appellants were brought on record.
E Whereas contradictory stand was taken by them that rent was
submitted regularly to their learned counsel through their clerk
to assure that it was duly deposited. That apart, neither any
affidavit from the learned counsel or from his clerk was filed
regarding deposit of rent with them nor any details of deposit
· F of money given to the learned counsel through his clerk was
given. Therefore, in our view, the explanation, apart from being
an afterthought, was clearly bogus and unworthy of any
credence. As noted herein earlier, the order passed under
Section 15(1) of the Act was passed by the Rent Controller,
G Delhi on 15th of March, 1989 directing the original tenant to pay
or deposit rent at the rate of Rs.105/- per month w.e.f. 1st of •
January, 1985 and to continue to pay or deposit the rent at the
aforesaid rate by 15th of each succeeding month. It also
appears from the record that in the year 1995, one of the sons
H of the deceased tenant Shanti Prasad Jain, who is now
SHANTI PRASAD JAIN (D) THROUGH LRS. v. 109
PRAKASH NARAIN MATHUR [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
"· appellant No.2, had filed an application for impleadment in the A
eviction petition on the ground that he was a member of HUF
of the original tenant Shanti Prasad Jain and he was in fact
running a business in the name and style of M/s.Vardhman
Jewel (India) as a member of the HUF and was not a sub-tenant
in respect of the premises in question. As noted herein earlier, B
the aforesaid son, namely, Sunil Kumar Jain, was impleaded
by an order dated 1st of September, 1995 against which, a
revision petition was filed by the landlord/respondent before the
High Court which only stayed all further proceedings in the
eviction proceeding. As noted herein earlier, Shanti Prasad c
Jain, the original tenant died on 23rd of May, 1997 and after
his death, the rent was admittedly not paid in compliance with
the order dated 15th of March, 1989 under Section 15(1) of the
Act. Therefore, in view of our discussions made herein above,
we do not find any possible ground to interfere with the 0 ,•
judgment of the High Court. While rejecting the explanation
offered by the appellants in the application for condonation of
delay which was duly considered by the High Court and the High
Court came to a positive finding in the following manner :-
"The application seeking condonation of delay was not E
supported by the affidavit of the counsel who is alleged to
have received the rent from the respondents from time to
time and failed to deposit the same in the Court and is also
alleged to have tendered the advice that the rent need not
be paid or deposited till the respondents are brought on F
record. No action appears to have been taken against the
counsel before the Bar Council complaining about his
aforesaid conduct. I may note that though it was stated by
the respondents in their reply to the application under
Section 15(7) of the Act that they had taken action against G
the counsel, no details thereof were furnished before the
. Lower Court and none have been furnished even before
me. Thus, the respondents have failed to disclose what
~action has been taken by them against their erstwhile
counsel. This belies their stand with regard to the legal H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A advise allegedly given by their counsel and also the stand
that they had tendered the rents regularly to their counsel
who failed to deposit the same in court."
13. In view of the aforesaid findings of the High Court and
in view of our discussions made hereinabove, we are of the
B view that the High Court was fully justified and within its
jurisdiction to reject the application filed by the appellants for
condonation of delay in the matter of deposit of rent in
compliance with the order passed under Section 15(1) of the
Act, even if the entire amount of rent defaulted by the appellants
C or by their predecessor-in-interest was subsequently deposited
in the office of the Rent Controller.
14. In this connection, we may refer to two decisions of this
Court in the case of Jain Motor Car Co. Delhi v. Swayam
D Prabha Jain (Smt.) by Anr. [1996 (3) SCC 55] and Aero
Traders (P) Ltd. v. Ravinder Kumar Suri [2004 (8) SCC 307].
So far as Jain Motor Car case (supra) is concerned, this Court
has held that striking out the defence under Section 15(7) of
the Act in paying or depositing the rent in compliance with the
order passed under Section 15(1) oqhe Act is discretionary
E in nature and in appropriate cases 'having regard to the facts
and circumstances, it is open to the Rent Controller to exercise
his power to condone the delay in deposit of rent. It was also
held in ihat decision that the Rent Controller at the same time
is entitled to strike out the defence if the Rent Controller finds
F that default in deposit of rent was willful default and, therefore,
the Rent Controller is conferred with the power to exercise his
discretion to strike out the defence under Section 15(7) of the
Act. So far as Aero Traders (P) Ltd. case (supra) is concerned,
a Three-Judge Bench of this Court similarly laid down that the
G power to strike out the defence under Section 15(7) of the Act
was discretionary in nature. Keeping in mind the principles laid
down by this Court in the aforesaid two decisions, which clearly
say that the power of the Court either to strike out the defence
.
under Section 15(7) or to reject the application for condonation
H of delay in deposit of rent was discretionary in nature, we
SHANTI PRASAD JAIN (D) THROUGH LRS. v. 111
PRAKASH NARAIN MATHUR [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
examined the impugned order of the High Court and the A
statements made in the applications and the findings arrived
at by the High Court, we do not find any ground that the High
Court had failed to exercise its discretion in favour of the tenant
for not condoning the delay in depositing the rent and therefore,
it was open to the High Court not to use its discretion in favour B
of the tenant in rejecting the application for condonation of delay
and accordingly, the discretion used by the High Court in favour
•• . of the landlord/respondent to strike out the defence under
Section 15(7) of the Act was perfectly justified.
15. That apart, the High Court in the impugned order has c
also considered that the appellants had failed to explain as to
why the deposits made for the period from 23rd of May, 1997
to 27th of September, 2002 were so deposited belatedly and
depqsited the same in lumpsum only on three occasions.
D
16. In view of such discretion having been exercised by the
High Court as well as the Rent Controller in favour of the
landlord/respondent which, in our view, cannot be held to be
arbitrary or unjust, we are unable to interfere with the impugned
judgment of the High Court. · E
17. Before we conclude, we may also take into
consideration the maintainability of the appeal before this Court
as we find that the appellants had failed to implead one Shri
Prakash Chandra Khatri and Shri Mahesh Chand Khatri,
owners of the property in question having purchased the same F
from Respondent No.1 as respondents despite the fact that the
said parties were impleaded in the eviction proceeding before
the Rent Controller as well as in the High Court from which the
appeal arises.
G
18. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in
.. ~
this instant appeal and the appeal is thus dismissed. There will
be no order as to costs .
N.J. Appeal dismissed.
H
-
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "Delhi Rent Control Act"Sign in to search