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Supreme Court of India

SHANTI DEVI ALIAS SHANTI MISHRAversusUNION OF INDIA & ORS.

Citation
2020 INSC 632
Decided
5 November 2020
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

Patna High Court possessed territorial jurisdiction to entertain the 2014 writ petition because a part of the cause of action, namely the stoppage of pension received in Darbhanga, arose within its jurisdiction.

Summary

The appellant, Shanti Devi, sought to revive a writ petition filed by her late husband, a retired Coal India employee, challenging the stoppage of his pension and a demand for repayment of over Rs 8 lakhs. The earlier petition for refund of a smaller amount had been dismissed by the Patna High Court on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, and the husband subsequently filed a petition in the Jharkhand High Court. After the pension was stopped in 2013, a new writ petition (Writ Petition No. 5999 of 2014) was filed in Patna High Court, which the Single Judge dismissed, again citing lack of territorial jurisdiction and suggesting the case should be heard in Jharkhand. The Supreme Court held that the cause of action for the 2014 petition arose in Patna, where the pension was regularly received, and that the High Court therefore had jurisdiction despite the earlier dismissal. It rejected the forum non conveniens argument and revived the writ petition, also directing provisional pension to the appellant. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the Patna High Court’s order.

Issues considered

  • The question whether Patna High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain Writ Petition No. 5999 of 2014 under Article 226(2) of the Constitution.
  • Whether a part of the cause of action for the 2014 petition arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Patna High Court despite the earlier petition being dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
  • Whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens can bar the High Court from hearing the petition.

Legislation cited

Subjects

territorial jurisdictioncause of actionArticle 226pensionCoal Mines Provident Fund Actforum non convenienswrit petitionhigh court jurisdiction

Judgment

                        [2020] 12 S.C.R. 279                             279


            SHANTI DEVI ALIAS SHANTI MISHRA                              A
                                  v.
                    UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
                   (Civil Appeal No. 3630 of 2020)
                       NOVEMBER 05, 2020                                 B
       [ASHOK BHUSHAN, R. SUBHASH REDDY AND
                  M.R. SHAH, JJ.]
       Constitution of India – Art. 226 – Code of Civil Procedure –
s. 20 – Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions
                                                                         C
Act, 1948 – Family Coal Mines Pension Scheme, 1998 – Territorial
jurisdiction – The Government notified a Family Coal Mines Pension
Scheme, 1998 dated 05.03.1998 – Earlier, the late husband of the
appellant did not opt for the said pension scheme – However, later
the husband of appellant opted for the pension scheme by notification
dated 09.01.2002 – The late husband of the appellant claimed             D
payment for pension from Darbhanga, State of Bihar – A writ petition
was filed by the husband of the appellant in Patna High Court
where prayed for grant of refund of Rs.1,33,559/- which was
wrongly withheld/ illegally deducted from him – The said writ petition
was dismissed on 08.02.2013 on the ground of lack of territorial
                                                                         E
jurisdiction – After dismissal of the said writ petition, the husband
of appellant filed writ petition in Jharkhand High Court for the
same relief – Thereafter, letters dated 07.10.2013 and 06.11.2013
were issued from the office of Regional Provident Fund
Commissioner to the husband of the appellant – The letter stated
that since husband of appellant initially had not opted for pension      F
scheme in pursuance of 1998 notification, he could not have opted
for pension in the year 2002 – It was further stated that pension
was erroneously settled by Regional Commissioner, hence, more than
Rs.08 lakhs was to be recovered from the husband of the appellant
– It was also communicated through same letters that it was decided
                                                                         G
to stop payment of monthly pension w.e.f. November, 2013 –
Husband of appellant filed another writ petition in Patna High Court
where he challenged the letters dated 07.10.2013 and 06.11.2013
– The Single Judge of the High Court after noticing the earlier
order of the High Court dated 08.02.2013 and observing that after
dismissal of writ petition, the petitioner had filed another writ        H
                                 279
280            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A     petition before the Jharkhand High court and the same was pending,
      held that the order of stoppage of pension is part of retirement
      benefit, and petitioner ought to have filed the writ petition before
      the Jharkhand High Court – Hence, the writ petition challenging
      letters was again dismissed on ground of lack of territorial
      jurisdiction – The LPA filed against the order of the Single Judge
B
      was also dismissed – On appeal, held: The Single Judge of the
      High Court did not correctly consider the facts and pleadings in
      the writ petitions filed – The earlier writ petition was filed for refund
      of wrongly withheld/ illegally detained amount and the subsequent
      writ petition challenging letters dated 07.10.2013 and 06.11.2013
C     was filed when payment of pension after 08 years was stopped and
      husband of appellant was directed to return the amount of more
      than Rs.08 Lakhs – The cause of action for filing a subsequent writ
      petition was entirely different – The Single Judge of the High Court
      committed error in dismissing the subsequent writ petition because
      of dismissal of earlier writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial
D
      jurisdiction – For a retiree, who is settled and receiving pension at
      Darbhanga, it cannot be said that it was necessary for him to file
      his petition in the Jharkhand High Court where his earlier writ
      petition was pending – The part cause of action had arisen in the
      territorial jurisdiction of Patna High Court as the husband of
E     appellant was continuously receiving pension for last 8 years in
      Darbhanga – The stoppage of pension at the same place gave a
      cause of action – Thus, the said writ petition is revived at the Patna
      High Court.
            Allowing the appeal, the Court
F           HELD: 1. The Single Judge of the High Court did not
      correctly consider the facts and pleadings in Writ Petition
      No.13955 of 2006 and Writ Petition No. 5999 of 2014. The earlier
      writ petition filed by the petitioner in the year 2006 was where
      petitioner had prayed for refund of wrongly withheld/illegally
G     detained amount of Rs.1,33,559/-. When the earlier writ petition
      was filed, there was no issue of non-payment of pension or
      stoppage of pension since the pension had been started w.e.f.
      May, 2005. The subsequent Writ Petition No. 5999 of 2014 was
      filed when payment of pension after 08 years was stopped and

H
 SHANTI DEVI ALIAS SHANTI MISHRA v. UNION OF INDIA                      281
                      & ORS.

the petitioner was directed to return the amount of                     A
Rs.8,09,268/-. The cause of action for filing Writ Petition No.5999
of 2014 was entirely different. The Single Judge committed error
in holding that in view of dismissal of the earlier writ petition on
the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, the Writ Petition is
also dismissed. [Para 15][290-D-G]
                                                                        B
       2. The second reason given by Single Judge that petitioner
ought to have filed the writ petition before the Jharkhand High
Court also does not commend to this Court. For a retiree, who is
settled in Darbhanga and receiving pension at District
Darbhhanga, it cannot be said that it was necessary for him to file
his petition in the Jharkhand High Court where his earlier writ         C
petition was pending. The subject matter of the earlier writ petition
was entirely different and the dismissal of the writ petition does
not preclude the petitioner to file subsequent writ petition in the
same High Court. [Para 16][290-G-H; 291-A]
       3. Form the facts of the present case, this Court is of the      D
considered opinion that part of cause of action has arisen within
the territorial jurisdiction of Patna High Court. The deceased
petitioner was continuously receiving pension for the last 08 years
in his saving bank account in State Bank of India, Darbhanga.
The stoppage of pension of late husband of appellant affected           E
him at his native place, he being deprived of the benefit of pension
which he was receiving from his employer. The employer requires
a retiring employee to indicate the place where he shall receive
pension after his retirement. Late husband of appellant had opted
for receiving his pension in State Bank of India, Darbhabga, State
of Bihar, which was his native place, from where he was drawing         F
his pension regularly for the last 08 years, stoppage of pension
gave a cause of action, which arose at the place where the
petitioner was continuously receiving the pension. This Court
thus, is of the view that the view of the Single Judge as well as
the Division Bench holding the writ petition not maintainable on        G
the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction was completely
erroneous and has caused immense hardship to the petitioner.
Therefore, the writ petition stands revived before Patna High
Court. [Para 29][298-F-H; 299-A-B]

                                                                        H
282            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A           Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu
            and Ors. (1994) 4 SCC 711 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR
            252; Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra
            and Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 640 : [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 82;
            Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair and
            Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 277 : [2004] 2 SCR 202; Kusum
B
            Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr. (2004)
            6 SCC 254 : [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 841; Nawal Kishore
            Sharma v. Union of India and Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 329 :
            [2014] 7 SCR 1027 – relied on.

C           Saryu Singh v. The Union of India and Ors. 2015 (2)
            PLJR 256 – referred to.

                             Case Law Reference

      [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 252           relied on        Para 21
D
      [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 82            relied on        Para 22

      [2004] 2 SCR 202                  relied on        Para 24

      [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 841           relied on        Para 25
E
      [2014] 7 SCR 1027                 relied on        Para 26

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 3630
      of 2020.

F           From the Judgment and Order dated 03.05.2018 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Patna in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1265 of 2017.

             Arvind Kumar Gupta, Rishi Bharadwaj, Shaurya Dogra,
      Abhiesumat Gupta, Jayant K. Sud, Adv. G.S. Makker, Sreekumar C.N.,
      Bhuvan Kapoor, Uddyam Mukherjee, Krishnayan Sen, Lalit Kumar,
G
      Kaustubh Shukla, Parijat Kishore, Abhay Singh, Advs. for the appearing
      parties.



H
 SHANTI DEVI ALIAS SHANTI MISHRA v. UNION OF INDIA                           283
            & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                             A
      ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
      1. Leave granted.
       2. This appeal has been filed questioning the Division Bench
judgment of Patna High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.1265 of             B
2017 dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal of the appellant. Letters Patent
Appeal was filed against the judgment of learned Single Judge dated
04.08.2017 by which Writ Petition No.5999 of 2014 filed by her late
husband in which she was substituted after death of her husband was
dismissed by learned Single Judge on the ground of lack of territorial
jurisdiction.                                                                C

      3. Brief facts of the case for deciding this appeal are:
          3.1 The husband of the appellant Shri Bashishtha Narayan
              Mishra was employed in Coal India Limited. He was
              working at Moira Colliery, Bankola Area, District              D
              Burdwan, West Bengal. Ministry of Coal, Government of
              India in exercise of power under Section 3E of Coal Mines
              Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948
              and in supersession of the Coal Mines Family Pension
              Scheme, 1971 notified a Family Coal Mines Pension
              Scheme, 1998 dated 05.03.1998. Late husband of the             E
              appellant did not opt for the pension Scheme notified under
              Notification dated 05.03.1998.
          3.2 By Notification dated 09.01.2002 Coal Mines Pension
              Scheme, 1998 was amended by inserting paragraph 2A in
              the Scheme providing that an employee, who had not opted       F
              for the Coal Mines Family Pension Scheme, 1971 but is
              covered by the Provident Fund Scheme may opt for
              pension within a period of nine months. After the
              Notification dated 09.01.2002, the same was circulated
              by Eastern Coal Fields Limited to all Regional
                                                                             G
              Commissioners/ Assistant Commissioners.
          3.3 The husband of the appellant in pursuance of the
              Notification dated 09.01.2002 submitted the option opting
              for Pension Scheme, which option was forwarded to the
              Sr. Personnel Officers by Manager, Moira Colliery by
                                                                             H
284   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A         letter dated 18.11.2003 requesting for transfer of
          Rs.1,38,164/- from provident fund account of B.N. Mishra
          to his pension fund. By further letter dated 20.11.2003 of
          Regional Commissioner, it was informed that amount of
          Rs.48,467/- has been adjusted under para 4(2) of Scheme,
          1998. Late B.N. Mishra was to retire on 30.04.2005. His
B
          papers for settlement of pension were forwarded to The
          Regional Commissioner–1, Coal Mines Provident Fund,
          Asansol. By letter dated 30.11.2005 written by Regional
          Commissioner, Coal Mines Provident Fund, Region-1,
          Asansol, the late husband of the appellant was asked to
C         deposit the amount of Rs.39,198/- towards recovery of
          pension contribution. The pension was sanctioned to Shri
          Mishra after about 14 months from retirement, thereafter,
          he started receiving pension w.e.f. May, 2005.
      3.4 Late Shri B.N. Mishra being native of Village Bhuskol,
D         Police Station, Darbhanga, District Darbhanga, he had
          claimed payment for pension from Darbhanga, State of
          Bihar. Pension started in account of Late Shri B.N. Mishra
          with State Bank of India, Darbhanga, State of Bihar. A
          Writ Petition No. 13955 of 2006 was filed by late Shri
          B.N. Mishra in Patna High court where he prayed for
E         grant of refund of Rs.1,33,559/-, which was wrongly
          withheld/ illegally deducted from the writ petitioner. The
          said writ petition was dismissed on 08.02.2013 on the
          ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. Learned Single
          Judge held that petitioner served in the State of West
F         Bengal under the authorities and organizations which are
          located either in States of West Bengal or Jharkhand,
          hence, High Court of Patna had no territorial jurisdiction.
      3.5 After dismissal of the above Writ Petition No.13955 of
          2006 on 08.02.2013, late Shri B.N. Mishra filed Writ
G         Petition No. 4930 of 2013 in Jharkhand High Court for
          the relief which he had claimed in the Writ Petition
          No.13955 of 2006 before Patna High Court. When notice
          of the writ petition filed by late Shri B.N. Mishra in
          Jharkhand High Court was received by office of Regional
          Provident Fund Commissioner, Asansol, a letter dated
H
SHANTI DEVI ALIAS SHANTI MISHRA v. UNION OF INDIA                           285
           & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

          07.10.2013 was issued to the husband of the appellant at          A
          his place of residence, i.e., Village Bhuskol, Police Station
          Darbhanga, District Darbhanga, State of Bihar stating that
          Shri B.N. Mishra having not opted initially for pension
          scheme in pursuance of 1998 notification, he could not
          have opted for pension in the year 2002. It was stated
                                                                            B
          that Pension of Shri B.N. Mishra was erroneously settled
          by Regional Commissioner, hence, Rs.8,01,334/- is to be
          recovered towards pension payment from May, 2005 to
          September, 2013.
     3.6 By further letter dated 06.11.2013 issued by Regional
         Commissioner, Coal Mines Provident Fund, Region-1,                 C
         Asansol, he was directed to refund amount of
         Rs.8,09,268/- and entire pension contribution alongwith
         interest. He was communicated that it has been decided
         to stop payment of monthly pension w.e.f. November,
         2013. After receipt of the letter dated 07.10.2013, Shri           D
         B.N. Mishra sent a reply on 07.11.2013 stating that letter
         dated 07.10.2013 has been issued due to personal bias
         arising due to punitive action taken by appropriate
         authorities against Regional Commissioner, Region-1,
         Asansol on a petition filed by Shri B.N. Mishra under the
         Right to Information Act, 2005. Petitioner sent                    E
         representations to Secretary, Ministry of Coal and
         Commission.
     3.7 A Writ Petition No. 5999 of 2014 was filed by late Shri
         B.N. Mishra in Patna High Court where he challenged
         the letter dated 07.10.2013 and 06.11.2013 and also sought         F
         direction for payment of pension to the petitioner with
         interest. The writ petition came for hearing before learned
         Single Judge on 04.08.2017. Learned Single Judge noticed
         the earlier order of the High Court dated 08.02.2013 by
         which his earlier Writ Petition No.13955 of 2006 was               G
         dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
         Learned Single Judge observed that on similar facts, the
         said writ petition having been dismissed on 08.02.2013 on
         the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction and writ petition
         having been filed by petitioner before the Jharkhand High
                                                                            H
286             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A                    Court, which is pending, the order of stoppage of pension
                     is part of retirement benefit, hence, the writ petition is
                     dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
                     A LPA No.1265 of 2017 was filed against the judgment
                     of learned Single Judge dated 04.08.2017. During the
                     pendency of writ petition, Shri B.N. Mishra died and his
B
                     wife Shanti Devi was substituted as writ petitioner. LPA
                     was filed before the Division Bench against the judgment
                     of learned Single Judge, which has been dismissed by the
                     impugned judgment, aggrieved by which order, this appeal
                     has been filed.
C           4. We have heard Shri Arvind Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for
      appellant, Shri Sreekumar C.N., for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and
      Shri Kaustubh Shukla for respondent Nos. 5 and 8. Shri Uddyam
      Mukherjee appeared for respondent No.4.
              5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that High Court
D     committed error in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of lack of
      territorial jurisdiction. High Court of judicature at Patna had territorial
      jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The part of cause of action had
      arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Patna High Court. Late Shri
      B.N. Mishra was receiving pension from State Bank of India, Darbhanga
E     w.e.f. May, 2005 after his retirement on 30.04.2005. After issuance of
      order dated 07.10.2013 and 06.11.2013 directing for refund of amount
      of Rs.8.01.334/- and 8,09,268/- and stopping the pension w.e.f. November,
      2013, the cause of action arose at Darbhanga where late Shri B.N.
      Mishra was residing and receiving pension. The earlier Writ Petition
      No.13955 of 2006 was filed on different cause of action where the
F     substantial prayer was for refund of the amount illegally deducted
      whereas Writ Petition No.5999 of 2014 was on entirely different cause
      of action. Late Shri B.N. Mishra was receiving pension at Darbhanga,
      which pension having been stopped from November, 2013, the cause of
      action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Patna High Court and
G     learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench erred in dismissing
      the writ petition relying on dismissal of earlier writ petition whereas cause
      of action of both the writ petitions were different and the Writ Petition
      No. 5999 of 2014 could not have been dismissed on the ground of lack
      of territorial jurisdiction.

H
 SHANTI DEVI ALIAS SHANTI MISHRA v. UNION OF INDIA                              287
            & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

       6. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 3 submits that the        A
writ petition had rightly been dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial
jurisdiction. He submits that late Shri B.N. Mishra after dismissal of the
writ petition had filed writ petition in the Jharkhand High Court, which
writ petition was still pending when he filed Writ Petition No.5999 of
2014 and the writ petition could not have been entertained by Patna
                                                                                B
High Court. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 does not
dispute that part of cause of action arose in territorial jurisdiction of
Patna High Court, however, he submits that on the principle of forum
conveniens, the writ petition could not have been entertained at Patna
and the writ petition ought to have been prosecuted in the Jharkhand
High Court.                                                                     C
       7. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 5 and 8, Shri Kaustubh
Shukla submits that late Shri B.N. Mishra had served in Eastern Coal
Fields Ltd. at West Bengal and had retired on 30.04.2005 from Burdwan,
West Bengal. It is submitted that Shri B.N. Mishra having accepted the
jurisdiction of the Jharkhand High Court could not have filed writ petition     D
at Patna High Court. The husband of the appellant had not opted for the
Coal Mines Pension Scheme in 1998 but he opted for the Scheme second
time in the year 2002 after subsequent notification dated 09.01.2002.
The deductions made by Regional Provident Fund Commissioner was in
accordance with Coal Mines Pension Scheme, 1998. Earlier writ petition
filed by petitioner being Writ Petition No.13955 of 2006 having bene            E
dismissed by the Patna High Court on the ground of lack of territorial
jurisdiction and no appeal having been filed by Shri B.N. Mishra the said
judgment became final. Shri B.N. Mishra after dismissal of his earlier
writ petition filed Writ Petition No.4930 of 2013 before the Jharkhand
High Court at Ranchi, which clearly proves that Shri B.N. Mishra had            F
accepted the jurisdiction of Jharkhand High Court and pursued his writ
petition there. The mere fact that letters dated 07.10.2013 and 06.11.2013
were received at Darbhanga, the Patna High Court shall have no
territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
      8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.4 also                 G
adopted the above submissions.
      9. Learned counsel for the parties have also placed reliance on
various judgments of this Court as well as judgment of Patna High Court,
which shall be noticed while considering the submissions in detail.
                                                                                H
288             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A           10. From the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties
      and the materials on record, the following questions have arisen in this
      appeal:-
             (i) Whether the writ petition filed by late Shri B.N. Mishra being
                 Writ Petition No. 5999 of 2014 is similar to Writ Petition No.
B                13955 of 2006 and the Patna High Court had territorial
                 jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition?
             (ii) Whether part of cause of action for filing the Writ Petition
                  No. 5999 of 2014 arose within the territorial jurisdiction of
                  Patna High Court?
C             11. Both the questions being interrelated are being taken together.
      We may first notice the relevant pleadings in Writ Petition No. 5999 of
      2014, which are the material facts or integral facts for claiming relief in
      the writ petition. In paragraph 5 of the writ petition, petitioner had pleaded
      that he retired on 30.04.2005 and thereafter settled at his native place in
D     Darbhanga District, State of Bihar where in his savings account with
      State Bank of India, Darbhanga his monthly pension is being paid since
      May, 2005. In paragraphs 20 and 22, petitioner has pleaded about the
      letter dated 07.10.2013 issued by Regional Provident Fund Commissioner,
      Region-1, Asansol and the letter dated 06.11.2013. Paragraphs 5, 20 and
      22 are extracted below for ready reference:-
E
             “5. That the petitioner was subsequently promoted as Personnel
             Manager in Moira Colliery, Eastern Coal Fields Ltd., Bankola Area,
             P.O. Moira, Dist. – Burdwan from where he retired from service
             on 30/04/2005 and thereafter settled at his native village in
             Darbhanga Dist., Bihar where in his S/B A/C with State Bank of
F            India, Darbhanga his monthly pension is being paid since May,
             2005.
                       Copy of notice of Super-annuation vide letter no. ECL/
                       C-5 (D) Superannuation/EE 1572 dated 23/24/11/2004
                       is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-1.
G
             20. That upon receipt of a copy of writ petition from the learned
             Central Govt. Counsel the Regional P.F. Commissioner, Region-
             1, Asansol issued a notice vide No. CPF/32/Legal/B.N. Mishra/
             R-1/ASN/3481 dated 7/10/2013 whereby he declared the payment
             of pension to the petitioner from May 2005 till date as wholly
H
 SHANTI DEVI ALIAS SHANTI MISHRA v. UNION OF INDIA                            289
            & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      against the provisions of Para-15 of Coal Mines Pension Scheme          A
      1998 which says that option once exercised shall be final and
      since the petitioner had firstly submitted a negative option so the
      subsequent submission of option in the affirmative is against the
      Scheme. Further the petitioner was also directed to refund the
      entire amount of pension amounting to Rs.8,01,334/- with interest
                                                                              B
      paid to him from May 2005 to October 2013. Furthermore, the
      pensioner was also informed vide the aforesaid notice that payment
      of pension to him shall be stopped from November, 2013.
                 Copy of letter no. CPF/32/Legal/B.N. Mishra/R-1/ASN/
                 3481 dated 7/10/2013 along with relevant portion of Para-
                 15 of CMPS 1998 is annexed herewith and marked as            C
                 Annexure-12.
      22. That the Regional P.F. Commissioner did not wait for a reply
      from the petitioner to the notice issued by him and instead in a
      haste issued letter No. CPF/32/1/Legal/B.N. Mishra/R-1/4056
      dated 6/11/2013 whereby he stopped payment of pension to the            D
      petitioner from the month of Nov. 2013 and also directed him to
      refund the entire amount of pension paid to the petitioner from
      May 2005 to Oct. 2013 amounting to Rs.8,09,268/-.
                 Copy of letter no. CPF/32/1/Legal/B.N. Mishra/R-1/4056
                 dated 6/11/2013 is annexed herewith and marked as            E
                 Annexure-14.”
       12. The copy of the letters dated 07.10.2013 and 06.11.2013 were
also annexed with the writ petition, which were addressed to late Shri
B.N. Mishra at his address of Village Bhusakoul, Police Station Darbhanga
Sadar, District Darbhanga, State of Bihar. Petitioner after receipt of the    F
letter dated 07.10.2013 immediately represented on 07.11.2013. There
is no dispute between the parties that the pension of late Shri B.N. Mishra
was stopped from November, 2013 and the Writ Petition No.5999 of
2014 was filed after stoppage of pension, which he was getting for the
last 08 years. Further by letter dated 06.11.2013, petitioner was also        G
directed to return the amount of Rs.8,09,268/-, which was amount of
pension he received in his bank account in State Bank of India, Darbhanga
from May, 2005.
      13. We may first notice the order of learned Single Judge dismissing
the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction dated
                                                                              H
290             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A     04.08.2017. Paragraph 5 of the judgment gives reasons for dismissing
      the writ petition. In paragraph 5, mainly two reasons have been given by
      the learned Single Judge for dismissing the writ petition; (i) Earlier Writ
      Petition No.13955 of 2006 for grant of retiral benefits was dismissed on
      08.02.2013 on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner
      did not move in LPA or before the Supreme Court; and (ii) When the
B
      petition of payment of retiral benefits is pending before the Jharkhand
      High Court, the petitioner should have filed the writ petition before the
      same High court against the order of stoppage of pension as the payment
      of pension is also a part of retiral benefits.
             14. In the LPA against the order of learned Single Judge, Division
C     Bench vide judgment dated 03.05.2018 after quoting paragraphs 4 and 5
      of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, Patna High Court observed
      that:-
            “We do not find any legal infirmity in the view so taken by the
            learned Single Judge. The appeal is dismissed.”
D
             15. The learned Single Judge did not correctly consider the facts
      and pleadings in Writ Petition No.13955 of 2006 and Writ Petition No.
      5999 of 2014. The earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner in the year
      2006 was where petitioner had prayed for refund of wrongly withheld/
      illegally detained amount of Rs.1,33,559/-. When the earlier writ petition
E     was filed, there was no issue of non-payment of pension or stoppage of
      pension since the pension had been started w.e.f. May, 2005. The
      subsequent Writ Petition No. 5999 of 2014 was filed when payment of
      pension after 08 years was stopped and the petitioner was directed to
      return the amount of Rs.8,09,268/-. The cause of action for filing Writ
F     Petition No.5999 of 2014 was entirely different. The learned Single Judge
      committed error in holding that in view of dismissal of the earlier writ
      petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, the Writ Petition
      is also dismissed.
             16. The second reason given by learned Single Judge that petitioner
G     ought to have filed the writ petition before the Jharkhand High Court
      also does not commend us. For a retiree, who is settled in Darbhanga
      and receiving pension at District Darbhhanga, it cannot be said that it
      was necessary for him to file his petition in the Jharkhand High Court
      where his earlier writ petition was pending. The subject matter of the
      earlier writ petition was entirely different and the dismissal of the writ
H
 SHANTI DEVI ALIAS SHANTI MISHRA v. UNION OF INDIA                              291
            & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

petition does not preclude the petitioner to file subsequent writ petition in   A
the same High Court.
       17. The Division Bench of the High Court did not advert to the
facts or pleadings of the writ petition and only after quoting paragraphs
4 and 5 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ
petition without adverting to any issue, which was raised in the LPA by         B
the writ petitioner. Copy of the grounds of LPA No. 1265 of 2017 has
been filed as Annexure P-24, which indicate that petitioner has clearly
pleaded the relevant facts and specifically stated that cause of action
arisen in the year 2013 cannot be subject matter of writ petition filed 08
years ago in the year 2006. The main pleadings in the writ petition were
not dealt with by the High Court and the High Court having dismissed            C
the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, we need
to advert as to whether there was any cause of action for entertaining
the writ petition by Patna High Court.
      18. Mulla on the Code of Civil Procedure while commenting on
Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code defined cause of action in               D
following words:-
       “The expression ‘cause of action’ has acquired a judicially settled
       meaning. In the restricted sense ‘cause of action’ means the
       circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate
       occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary      E
       conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the
       infraction of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right
       itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact by which
       it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in
       order to support his right to the judgment of the Court………….”            F
     19. P. Ramanatha Aiyar in Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition,
Volume 1, has defined the cause of action in following words:-
      “’Cause of action’ has been defined as meaning simply a factual
      situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from
      the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been            G
      held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to
      be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which
      a defendant would have a right to traverse. “Cause of action” has
      also been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the
      defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the
                                                                                H
292            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A           subject matter of the grievance founding the action, not merely
            the technical cause of action.”
            20. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the cause of action in following
      words:-
            “A group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for
B           suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy
            in court from another person…………”
            21. This Court had occasion to consider the cause of action in
      context of Article 266 of the Constitution and has explained the expression
      “cause of action” in large number of cases. We may refer to a Three
C     Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas
      Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors., (1994) 4 SCC 711
      where in paragraphs 5 and 6 following has been laid down:-
            “5. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause
            — notwithstanding anything in Article 32 — and provides that
D           every High Court shall have power “throughout the territories in
            relation to which it exercises jurisdiction”, to issue to any person
            or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, “within
            those territories” directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement
            of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose.
E           Under clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its
            power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in
            part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises
            jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or
            authority or the residence of such person is not within those
            territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of
F           Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court
            can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the
            enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part
            III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of
            action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation
G           to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of
            the Government or authority or the residence of the person against
            whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said
            territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of
            Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of
            action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court.
H           That is at best its case in the writ petition.
 SHANTI DEVI ALIAS SHANTI MISHRA v. UNION OF INDIA                              293
            & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      6. It is well settled that the expression “cause of action” means         A
      that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed,
      to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In Chand
      Kour v. Partab Singh [ILR (1889) 16 Cal 98, 102 : 15 IA 156]
      Lord Watson said:
         “… the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence         B
         which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend
         upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It
         refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause
         of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff
         asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.”
                                                                                C
      Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial
      jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of
      the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking
      upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said
      facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has
      territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered    D
      on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or
      otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the
      question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts
      pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the
      instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain        E
      and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged
      must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5,
      7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of
      the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta
      High Court.”
                                                                                F
       22. This Court in Navinchandra N. Majithia Vs. State of
Maharashtra and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 640 had occasion to consider
territorial jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226(2). Dealing with
constitutional amendment made in Article 226(2), this Court laid down
following in paragraph 37:-
                                                                                G
             “37. The object of the amendment by inserting clause (2)
      in the article was to supersede the decision of the Supreme Court
      in Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao [AIR 1953
      SC 210] and to restore the view held by the High Courts in the
      decisions cited above. Thus the power conferred on the High
                                                                                H
294            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A           Courts under Article 226 could as well be exercised by any High
            Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within
            which “the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises” and it is no
            matter that the seat of the authority concerned is outside the
            territorial limits of the jurisdiction of that High Court. The
            amendment is thus aimed at widening the width of the area for
B
            reaching the writs issued by different High Courts.”
             23. It was further held that the collocation of the words “cause of
      action, wholly or in part, arises” seems to have been lifted from Section
      20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court also quoted the definition
      of “cause of action” given by Lord Esher in Read Vs. Brown in paragraph
C     39. In paragraphs 38, 39 and 41, following was laid down:-
            “38. “Cause of action” is a phenomenon well understood in legal
            parlance. Mohapatra, J. has well delineated the import of the said
            expression by referring to the celebrated lexicographies. The
            collocation of the words “cause of action, wholly or in part, arises”
D           seems to have been lifted from Section 20 of the Code of Civil
            Procedure, which section also deals with the jurisdictional aspect
            of the courts. As per that section the suit could be instituted in a
            court within the legal limits of whose jurisdiction the “cause of
            action wholly or in part arises”. Judicial pronouncements have
E           accorded almost a uniform interpretation to the said compendious
            expression even prior to the Fifteenth Amendment of the
            Constitution as to mean “the bundle of facts which would be
            necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support
            his right to the judgment of the court”.

F           39. In Read v. Brown [(1888) 22 QBD 128 : 58 LJQB 120 : 60
            LT 250 (CA)] Lord Esher, M.R., adopted the definition for the
            phrase “cause of action” that it meant
                “every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to
                prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment
G               of the court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence
                which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is
                necessary to be proved”.
            41. Even in the context of Article 226(2) of the Constitution this
            Court adopted the same interpretation to the expression “cause
            of action, wholly or in part, arises” vide State of
H
 SHANTI DEVI ALIAS SHANTI MISHRA v. UNION OF INDIA                             295
            & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties [(1985) 3 SCC 217]. A three-              A
      Judge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas
      Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu [(1994) 4 SCC 711] observed
      that it is well settled that the expression “cause of action” means
      that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed
      to entitle him to a judgment in his favour. Having given such a
                                                                               B
      wide interpretation to the expression Ahmadi, J. (as the learned
      Chief Justice then was) speaking for M.N. Venkatachaliah, C.J.
      and B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J., utilised the opportunity to caution the
      High Courts against transgressing into the jurisdiction of the other
      High Courts merely on the ground of some insignificant event
      connected with the cause of action taking place within the territorial   C
      limits of the High Court to which the litigant approaches at his
      own choice or convenience. The following are such observations.
      (SCC p. 722, para 12)
         “If an impression gains ground that even in cases which fall
         outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, certain members    D
         of the court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the
         plea that some event, however trivial and unconnected with
         the cause of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of the
         said court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying
         the cause before such members giving rise to avoidable
         suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution and        E
         put the entire system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say
         so but if we do not strongly deprecate the growing tendency
         we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution
         and the system of administration of justice. We do hope that
         we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation.”     F
       24. In Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair Vs. Narayanan Nair and
Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 277, this Court explained the expression “cause
of action” and has quoted with approval the cause of action as defined
by Halsbury’s Laws of England in paragraph 16 and 17:-
      “16. The expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially          G
      settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means
      the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the
      immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means
      the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including
      not only the infraction of the right, but the infraction coupled with    H
296             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A            the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact
             which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed,
             in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. Every
             fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every
             piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises
             in “cause of action”.
B
             17. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.) it has been stated
             as follows:
                “‘Cause of action’ has been defined as meaning simply a factual
                situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain
C               from the court a remedy against another person. The phrase
                has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is
                material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and
                every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse.
                ‘Cause of action’ has also been taken to mean that particular
                act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his
D               cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding
                the action, not merely the technical cause of action.”
             25. Another judgment which needs to be noticed is Kusum Ingots
      & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 254
      wherein this Court reiterated the meaning of cause of action in paragraph
E     6. This Court reiterated that even if a small fraction of cause of action
      accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction
      in the matter. In paragraph 18, following was held:-
             “18. The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on
             the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which
F            have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to
             give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on
             the Court.”
             26. Another judgment which has been relied by learned counsel
      for the appellant is Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India and
G     Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 329. In the above case, the petitioner had filed a
      writ petition seeking various reliefs including disability compensation and
      pecuniary damages. The petitioner approached the Patna High Court
      for grant of various reliefs. Although, he was declared unqualified by
      orders issued by the Shipping Department, Government of India, Mumbai.
H
 SHANTI DEVI ALIAS SHANTI MISHRA v. UNION OF INDIA                           297
            & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

This Court held that Patna High Court has a jurisdiction to entertain the    A
petition. Following was laid down in paragraph 17:-
      “17. We have perused the facts pleaded in the writ petition and
      the documents relied upon by the appellant. Indisputably, the
      appellant reported sickness on account of various ailments including
      difficulty in breathing. He was referred to hospital. Consequently,    B
      he was signed off for further medical treatment. Finally, the
      respondent permanently declared the appellant unfit for sea service
      due to dilated cardiomyopathy (heart muscle disease). As a result,
      the Shipping Department of the Government of India issued an
      Order on 12-4-2011 cancelling the registration of the appellant as
      a seaman. A copy of the letter was sent to the appellant at his        C
      native place in Bihar where he was staying after he was found
      medically unfit. It further appears that the appellant sent a
      representation from his home in the State of Bihar to the respondent
      claiming disability compensation. The said representation was
      replied by the respondent, which was addressed to him on his           D
      home address in Gaya, Bihar rejecting his claim for disability
      compensation. It is further evident that when the appellant was
      signed off and declared medically unfit, he returned back to his
      home in the district of Gaya, Bihar and, thereafter, he made all
      claims and filed representation from his home address at Gaya
      and those letters and representations were entertained by the          E
      respondents and replied and a decision on those representations
      were communicated to him on his home address in Bihar.
      Admittedly, the appellant was suffering from serious heart muscle
      disease (dilated cardiomyopathy) and breathing problem which
      forced him to stay in his native place, wherefrom he had been          F
      making all correspondence with regard to his disability
      compensation. Prima facie, therefore, considering all the facts
      together, a part or fraction of cause of action arose within the
      jurisdiction of the Patna High Court where he received a letter of
      refusal disentitling him from disability compensation.”
                                                                             G
      27. Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on
a Division Bench judgment of Patna High court in Saryu Singh Vs.
The Union of India and Ors., 2015(2) PLJR 256. The above was a
case where the petitioner had claimed the due pensionary benefits whose
grievance was that payment made to him was less payment. In the
                                                                             H
298            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A     above context, the Division Bench in paragraphs 63, 64 and 66 laid down
      following:-
            “63. Recently pointed out the Supreme Court, in Nawal Kishore
            Sharma v. Union of India, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 329, that
            the question, whether or not cause of action, wholly or in part,
B           has arisen within the territorial limit of any High Court, shall have
            to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the
            proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In order
            to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that a
            legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the respondents
            within the territorial limit of the Court’s jurisdiction.
C
            64. In the backdrop of the position of law, as discussed above, it
            needs to be noted that the writ petitioner was, admittedly, an
            employee of Coal India Limited and as per the terms and conditions
            of his employment, the writ petitioner, as an employee, is,
            admittedly, required to be paid his pension and pensionery benefits
D           by his employer at Patna.
            66. If, therefore, the writ petitioner is not paid the sum of money,
            which is due and payable to him as pension and pensionery
            benefits, at Patna, it becomes obvious that his right to receive due
            and payable pension and pensionery benefits, at Patna, is being
E           denied; consequently the infringement of his right or his sufferance
            of injury is at Patna.”
             28. The above judgment of the same High Court was relevant in
      the facts of the present case, which judgment although was delivered
      prior in time, but was not noticed by the learned Single Judge as well as
F     the Division Bench.
             29. Form the facts of the present case, we are of the considered
      opinion that part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial
      jurisdiction of Patna High Court. The deceased petitioner was
      continuously receiving pension for the last 08 years in his saving bank
G     account in State Bank of India, Darbhanga. The stoppage of pension of
      late B.N. Mishra affected him at his native place, he being deprived of
      the benefit of pension which he was receiving from his employer. The
      employer requires a retiring employee to indicate the place where he
      shall receive pension after his retirement. Late Shri B.N. Mishra had
      opted for receiving his pension in State Bank of India, Darbhabga, State
H
 SHANTI DEVI ALIAS SHANTI MISHRA v. UNION OF INDIA                             299
            & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

of Bihar, which was his native place, fromwhere he was drawing his             A
pension regularly for the last 08 years, stoppage of pension gave a cause
of action, which arose at the place where the petitioner was continuously
receiving the pension. We, thus, are of the view that the view of the
learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench holding the writ
petition not maintainable on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction
                                                                               B
was completely erroneous and has caused immense hardship to the
petitioner.
      30. Another submission which has been advanced by learned
counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 is that the writ petition was rightly
dismissed on the principle of forum non conveniens. Forum non
conveniens has been defined by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law                C
Lexicon, 3rd Edition in following words:-
      “The principle that a case should be heard in a Court of the place
      where parties, witnesses, and evidence are primarily located.”
      31. Black’s Law Dictionary defines forum conveniens in following         D
words:-
      “The court in which an action is most appropriately brought,
      considering the best interests and convenience of the parties and
      witnesses.”
       32. This Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (supra) has                E
also referred to principle of forum conveniens. Following was stated in
paragraph 30:-
      “Forum conveniens
      30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part
                                                                               F
      of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the
      High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a
      determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter
      on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise
      its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum
      conveniens.[See Bhagat Singh Bugga v. Dewan Jagbir                       G
      Sawhney [AIR 1941 Cal 670], Madanlal Jalanv. Madanlal [AIR
      1949 Cal 495], Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Jharia Talkies &
      Cold Storage (P) Ltd. [1997 CWN 122], S.S. Jain & Co. v.
      Union of India [(1994) 1 CHN 445] and New Horizons Ltd. v.
      Union of India [AIR 1994 Del 126].”
                                                                               H
300                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A            33. As noted above, the learned single Judge has also observed
      that petitioner ought to have filed the writ petition in Jharkhand High
      Court where his earlier writ petition was pending. The earlier writ petition
      which was initially filed in 2006 in Patna High Court was for refund of
      the amount as noted above. After dismissal of the writ petition by Patna
      High Court on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, Shri B.N.
B
      Mishra had filed a Writ Petition No.4930 of 2013 in Jharkhand High
      Court for the relief which was claimed in Writ Petition No.13955 of
      2006. As noted above, the cause of action for filing the Writ Petition No.
      5999 of 2014 was entirely different. Stoppage of pension and asking for
      refund of more than Rs. 08 lakhs amount had serious adverse effect on
C     the petitioner, who was staying at his native place Darbhanga. A retired
      employee, who is receiving pension, cannot be asked to go to another
      court to file the writ petition, when he has a cause of action for filing a
      writ petition in Patna High Court. For a retired employee convenience is
      to prosecute his case at the place where he belonged to and was getting
      pension. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1
D
      to 3 on principle of forumnon conveniens has no substance.
             34. In result, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the
      Patna High Court and hold that Writ Petition No. 5999 of 2014 was fully
      maintainable at Patna High Court and learned Single Judge and Division
      Bench committed error in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of
E     lack of territorial jurisdiction. The writ petition stands revived before the
      Patna High Court.
             35. We are also of the view that appellant is entitled for an interim
      order in the writ petition for her sustenance. The appellant’s husband,
      who had filed the writ petition had died during the pendency of the writ
F     petition. After his death, the appellant, the widow was substituted. Six
      years have passed after filing of the writ petition wherein stoppage of
      pension was questioned. Appellant being the widow is also entitled for
      pensionary benefit for her sustenance since her husband was receiving
      pension. We are of the view that during the pendency of the writ petition
      the appellant is entitled to be paid provisional pension which shall be
G     subject to final decision in the writ petition. We, therefore, direct
      respondent Nos.4 to 8 to ensure that provisional pension to the appellant
      is paid from the month of December, 2020, which shall be subject to
      final orders passed in the writ petition. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

H     Ankit Gyan                                                     Appeal allowed.


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