SHANTI BUDHIYA VESTA PATEL AND ORS.versusNIRMALA JAYPRAKASH TIWARI AND ORS.

                       [2010] 4 S.C.R. 958


A         SHANTI BUDHIYA VESTA PATEL AND ORS.
                               v.
          NIRMALA JAYPRAKASH TIWARI AND ORS.
            (Civil Appeal Nos. 3549-3551 of 2010)

B
                         APRIL 21, 2010
    [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.]

        Deed and document:

C       Power of Attorney (POA) - Party executing the POA is
  bound by the acts of the POA holder- On facts, predecessor-
  in-interest of appellant executed POA in favour of respondent .
  9 - On the death of predecessor, all the appellants executed
  POA in favour of respondent 9 - On the basis of POA,
D respondent 9 entered into consent terms with opposite parties
  - Consent terms challenged by appellants - Held: Appellants
  are estopped from questioning the, acts done by respondent
  9 - Court can accept the consent terms entered into by the
  POA holder on behalf of the parties and consent decree so
E obtained would be valid - Compromise/Settlement- Estoppel
  - Consent decree - Power of Attorney.

        Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

        0.23 r.3 - Compromise under - Burden to prove that
F ·compromise tainted by fraud or coercion - Held: Lies on the
  party who alleges the same - On facts, particulars in support
  of the allegation of fraud or coercion in obtaining consent
  decree not properly pleaded as required by law - Consent
  decree would remain valid - Compromise/settlement -
G Consent decree.

        The original plaintiff, 'BVP' was the predecessor of
    the appellants, who was appointed as a watchman by one
    'RKT' for taking care of the suit property and for this
H                              958
      SHANTI BUDHIYA VESTA PATEL v. NIRMALA             959
               JAY™KASH TIWARI

_purpose, a Kachc'ha shed on the suit property was             A
provided to him. In due course of time, 'BVP' extended
the shed to construct 38 rooms which were let out by him.
After the death of the real owner of the suit property, suit
property was recorded in the name of wife of the owner;
respondent no.7. In 1992, by way of consent decree, in a       B
suit between respondent 7 and 8, the latter became the
owner of the suit property. In 1994, 'BVP' entered into a
Development Agreement with respondent 9 whereby
'BVP' transferred his rights, title and interest in the suit
property in favour of respondent 9. In 1999, 'BVP' filed a     c
suit against respondent no.7 and 'RKT', the predecessor-
in-title of respondent no.1 to 6 for seeking a declaration
that• he was the owner of the suit property by adverse
possession. 'RKT' also filed a suit for declaration of title
in his favour. Against this, respondents 7 and 8 filed a       o
counter claim seeking eviction of 'BVP' and his tenants
from the suit property.

     The trial court dismissed the suit filed by 'BVP' and
allowed the counter claim .filed by the respondents 7 and
8. Appeals were filed against the order of trial court.        E
Respondent 9 who was Power of Attorney holder of 'BVP'
also filed ai;i appeal. During the pendency of appe.als,
'BVP' died on 15.12.2004. On 7.1.2005, each of the
appellants executed an irrevocable Power of Attorney in
favour of respondent 9. On the basis of Power of Attorney,     F
respondent 9 sought for impleadment of appellants.

    On 26.4.2006, the appellants executed a Power of
Attorney in favour of another person 'NMP' on the ground
that respondent 9 colluded with respondent 8 and               G
coerced them to enter into a compromise with
respondent 7 and 8. The appellants also alleged that they
were threatened with dire consequences by respondent
8 and 9 and in this regard, they had lodged complaint
with the police and despite this, respondent 9 entered into    H
    960      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2010) 4 S.C.R.


A consent terms with respondents 7 and 8 and thereafter
  submitted to the eviction decree. On 13.6.2006, High
  Court allowed the application filed by respondent 9. The
  same was not challenged by any of the tenants.

         The· appellants filed applications before the High
8
    Court praying for recall of order dated 13.6.2006 alleging
    that fraud was played upon the High Court by filing the
    said consent terms. High Court dismi$sed the
    applications. Hence the app.eals. -

C         Dismissing the
                      . . appeals,
                        ·   .      the G6urt

        HELD: 1 ..1 ~; A .De~elopment ·Agree~en_t dated
  12.01.1994 was entered into between 'BVP' and
   respondent no. 9 whereby and whereunder 'BVP' had
0 transferred his rights, titl.e and interest in the suit premises
  in favour of respondent no. 9 for a consideration of Rs
  2,00,000/-. The records
                   '
                             showed that the said amount .
                                                              was
  fully paid and ahfo that the said agreement was registered
  ~it,h the office of the Sub-Registrar. Thus, by entering into
E the said agreement and accepting the said consideration
  in full and final satisfaction for the transfer.     of the
                                                           -- suit
  property in favour of the respondent no. 9, 'BVP' divested
  himself of his right, title and interest in the suit property.
  Pursuant to the said agreement, 'BVP' executed an
  irrevocable Power of Attorney dated 17.02.1994 irffavour
F of respondent no. 9 for a period of 15 years. A Deed of
  Confirmation dated 15.12.1995 duly registered on the
  same date was executed between 'BVP' and respondent
  no. 9 by which 'BVP' confirmed that the said Development
  Agreement was subsisting, valid and in full force and
G would be binding on the heirs, executors, administrators
  and assigns of the parties to the said Development
  Agreement. This was followed by a Declaration dated
  23.08.2001 by 'BVP' wherein he acknowledged the rights,
  title and interest of the respondent no. 9 over the suit
H
       SHANTI BUDHIYA VESTA PATEL v. NIRMALA           961
                JAYPRAKASH TIWARI

property, the receipt of consideration of Rs.2,00,000/- and   A
extended the period of the said Power of Attorney
indefinitely and undertook to ratify and confirm the acts
done by respondent no. 9. [Paras 19, 21] [971-B-E; 972-
B-Dl
                                                             B
  · 1.2. The appellants challenged the consent decree
passed by the High Court, particularly when each one of
them had, upon the death of 'BVP', executed an Affidavit-
cum-Declaration as well as separate Powers of Attorney
dated 07 .01.2005 in favour of the respondent no. 9. All the C
said Powers of Attorney were irrevocable and duly
registered for valuable consideration. In the said
affidavits, the appellants categorically admitted the right
of ownership of respondent no. 9 over the suit property.
By executing the said Powers of Attorney in favour of the
respondent no. 9, the appellants had cons.ciously and D
willingly appointed, nominated, constituted and
authorized respondent no. 9 as their lawful Power of
Attorney to do certain deeds, things and matters. The
appellants also constituted respondent no. 9 as their
lawful attorney authorizing him, to sig11 petitions, appear· E
before the Courts and also to compromise or corppound
disputes. ThuSl, the appellants were estopped from
questioning the acts done by respondent no. 9. The ·
appellants could not be said to have any right to assail
the consent decree passed by the High Court. The fact F
that under the consent terms the appellants were paid a
sum of Rs 10,00,000/- when they were not entitled to the. ·
same also reinforces conviction that the consent terms
arrived at were just. [Paras 23, 24, 25, 27] (972-E-G; 973-
B-C, G-H; 974-B-D]                                           G
    Jineshwardas (D) by LRs. and Ors. v. Jagrani (Smt.) and
Another (2003) 11 SCC 372, referred to.

    1.3. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants had
nothing remaining in the suit property after he had           H
     962     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.

A transferred the same under the said Development
  Agreement to respondent no. 9 for a full and final
  consideration of Rs 2,00,0001-. Thus, the predecessor-in
  interest of the appellants had no right, title or interest
  subsisting in the suit property. The appellants are the
B legal heirs of 'BVP' and as such they could not have
  claimed a title better than that of 'BVP'. A general
  proposition of law is that no person can confer on
  another person, a better title than he himself has. [Para
  28) [97 4-E-G]
c       Mahabir Gape v. Harbans Narain Singh 1952 SCR 775;
    Asaram v. Mst. Ram Kali 1958 SCR 986; A// India Film
    Corporation Ltd. v. Raja Gyan Nath (1969) 3 SCC 79; Byram
    Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India and Others (1992)
    1 sec 31, referred to.
D
          2. It is settled positiOJl of law that the burden to prove
     that a compromise arrived at under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC,
     was tainted by coercion or fraud lies upon ttfe party who
    alleges the same. However, in the facts and
E   circumstances of the case, the appellants, on whom the
    burden lay, have failed to do so. Although, the application
    for recall did allege some coercion, it could not be said
    to be a case of established coercion. Three criminal
    complaints were filed, but the appellants did not pursue
F   the said complaints to their logical end. It is a plain and
    basic rule of pleadings that in order to make out a case
    of fraud or coercion, there must be an express allegation
    of coercion or fraud and all the material facts in support
    of such allegations must be laid out in full and with a high
G   degree of precision. In other words, if coercion or fraud
    is alleged, it must be set out with full particulars. In the
    present case, the appellants, however, failed to furnish
    the full and precise particulars with regard to the alleged
    fraud. Since the particulars in support of the allegation
    of fraud or coercion were not properly pleaded as
H   required by law, the same must fail. Rather the Affidavits-
      SHANTI BUDHIYA VESTA PATEL v. NIRMALA              963
               JAYPRAKASH TIWARI
cum-Declarations executed by the appellants indicate             A
that no coercion or fraud was exercised upon the
appellants by respondent no. 8 or 9 at any point of time
and thus the consent decree cannot be said to be
anything but v.alid. [Paras 31- 33] [975-H; 976-A-D; 977-
A-B]                                                             B

    Shankar Sitaram Sontakke v. Balkrishna Sitaram
Sontakke AIR 1954 SC 352; Loonkaran v. State Bank, Jaipur
(1969) 1 SCR 122, relied on. ·
           '
     Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai 1951 SCR 548,               C
referred to\ ·,                        '

       3. The allegation of appellants that they had revoked
 the Powers of Attorney executed by them in favour of the
  respondent no. 9 by filing complaints with the police is       0
  devoid of merit. Although there is no denying. the fact that
  three complai~1(s were filed on three different dates with
  the police agaiost the alleged harassment ari·d threats by
  respondent nos. 8 and 9, it is difficultto understand how
  the Powers of Attorney executed by the appellants or           E
  their predecessor-in-interest stood revoked. The record
  of the case would reveal that each of the complaints was
  filed by a separate person - the first complaint was filed
  by the appellants themselves, the second by an Advocate
  and the third by one 'NMP', who was himself a builder.
  All these complaints came to be filed when said 'NMP'          F
  cam~ into the picture. Further, all the Powers of Attorney
  execut~d in favour of respondent no. 9 as also all the
  deeds and documents entered into between the
  predecessor-in-interest of the appellants and respondent
  no. 9 were duly registered with the office of the Sub-         G
  Registrar. Neither any document nor any of the Powers
. of Attorney was ever got cancelled by the appellants.
  [Para 36] [978-A-E)

     4. The Power of Attorney in favour of said 'NMP' was        H
    964    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A executed by the appellants on 26.04.2006 whereas the
   first complaint was filed with the police on 01.05.2006 and
   the consent terms were entered into on 22.05.2006. The
   consent decree was actually passed by the High Court
   on 13.06.2006. The appellants, thus, had ample time and
B opportunity with them to bring the said allegations to the
   notice and knowledge of the High Court at any time
   between 26.04.2006 and 13.06.2006. The appellants had
   considerable amount of time available with them. With
   regard to the complaints filed, the appellants did not take
c any follow up action to bring them their logical end.It is
   crystal clear that the appellants chose not to avail an
   opportunity which was available to them. In such
   circumstances, it would not be appropriate to say that the
   deeds and documents as well as the Powers of Attorney
  executed in favour of respondent no. 9 stood revoked
0
  merely by filing complaints with the police. A registered
  document has a lot of sanctity attached to it and this
  sanctity cannot be allowed to be lost without following
  the proper procedure. The stand taken by the appellants
  throughout that they had, by executing a Power of
E Attorney in favour of 'NMP', revoked the Powers of
  Attorney executed in favour of respondent no. 9 is found
  to be baseless. In fact, a look at the terms of the Power
  of Attorney executed in favour of 'NMP' would show to
  the contrary. [Paras 37 to 40] [978-G-H; 979-A-F]
F
        5. Respondent no. 9 in the counter-affidavit filed in
   this Court, prayed for declaring the consent terms to be
   cancelled and annulled on the ground that the consent
   terms were rendered infructuous due to the failure of
G respondent no. 8 to perform his obligations as per the
 . consent terms. A money game is being played. Since the
   stakes are high, each party is trying to draw the
   maximum advantage. There seems to be no· other reason
   for respondent no. 9 having adopted such a course of
H action. ·in view of this, entering into the compromise as
       SHANTI BUDHIYA VESTA PATEL v. NIRMALA                965
                JAYPRAKASH TIWARI

 also filing of the same in the High court by respondent
 no. 9 on behalf of the appellants was without any fraud
 and well within the scope of his authority. [Paras 41 and
 42] [980-C-F]
                      Case Law Reference:
     12003) 11 sec 372 .          referred to          Para 26
     1952 SCR 775 All             referred to          Para 28
     1958 SCR 986                 referred to         ·Para 28
     (1969) 3 sec 79              referred to          Para 28
     (1992) 1 sec 31              referred to          Para 30
     1951 SCR 548                 referred to          Para 32
     AtR 1954 SC 352              relied on.           Para 34
     (1969) 1 SCR 122             relied on            Para 35
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
 3549-3551 of 2010.      ·

      From the Judgment & Order dated 12.10.2007 of the High
 Court of Judicature. at Bombay, in Civil Application No. 3628
 of 2006 in First Appeal No. 1388 of 2003, Civil Application No.
 3629 of 2006 in First Appeal No. 1389 of 2003 arid Civ.il
 Application No. 3630 of 2006 in First Appeal No. 1390 of 2003 ..

                             WITH
 C.A. No. 3552-3554 of 2010.

       Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Pallav Sishodia, Ashok H. Desai,
· Dushyant A. Dave, Jaydeep Gupta, Dilip A. Taur, Sagar Pawar,
  Santosh Kumar Tripathi, Shirin Khajuria, Kanika Gomber, .
  Mallika Joshi, Rajiv Kumar Dubey, Rajan Narain, Mohan
  Jayakara, Javaid Muzaffar, Ashwin S. Umesh Kumar Khaitan,
  Anil Kumar for the appearing parties. ·
          966      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010) 4 S.C.R.


      A         The Judgement of the Court was delivered by

                DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. Leave granted.

·""          2. In the present appeals, the appellants have challenged
        the legality and validity of the order dated 12.10.2007 passed
      B by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay whereby the High
        Court dismissed all the three Civil Applications preferred by the
        appellants herein seeking recall of an earlier order dated
        13.06.2006 passed by the High Court which was based on the
        consent terms duly signed by all the parties.
      c
              3. In order to properly appreciate the precise nature and
        scope of the controversy arising in the present appeals, it would
        be appropriate as well as expedient to set out a brief statement
        of pertinent facts. The original appellant, Budhiya Vesta Patel,
      0 was the predecessor-in-interest of the present appellants.
        Budhiya Vesta Patel was appointed as a watchman by one R.K.
        Tiwari, who was cultivating grass on the suit property since
        1954-55, to take care of the suit property and for this a Kachcha
        shed on the suit property was provided to him. In due course
      E of time, Budhiya Vesta Patel extended the shed to construct a
        chawl known as Budhiya Patel Chawl consisting of 38 rooms,
        which were let-out by him.

              4. After the death of the real owner of the suit property, Mr.
          Anant Mahadeo Tambe, husband of Leela Anant Tambe,
      F   respondent no. 7 herein, the suit property stood recorded in the
          name of respondent no. 7. By means of a consent decree
          passed in Suit No. 1230 of 1992 between respondent no. 7
          and M/s. Hitesh Enterprises, respondent no. 8 herein, the latter
          became the owner of the suit property.
      G
             5. In the year 1999, Budhiya Vesta Patel filed a suit against
        respondent no. 7 and said R.K. Tiwari, the predecessor-in-title
        of Respondent nos. 1 to 6 herein, before the Bombay City Civil
        Court, Bombay being Suit No. 5163 of 1999 seeking a
      H declaration that he is the owner of the suit property by adverse
    SHANTI BUDHIYA VESTA PATEL v. NIRMALA     967
JAYPRAKASH TIWARI [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA. J.l

possession. Since said RX. Tiwan also claimed title to the suit
property, he also filed a suit.

     6. Against this, a counter-claim being Counter Claim No.
11 of 2002 seeking eviction of Budhiya Vesta Patel and his
tenants from the suit property was filed by respondent no. 7 and
respondent no. 8. The aforesaid suits were contested and on
the basis of the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed
and evidence was led.

     7. The trial Court by its judgment and order dated
10.02.2003 and 11.02.2003 dismissed the suit filed by Budhiya
Vesta Patel and allowed the counter claim filed by respondent
Nos. 7 and 8. The trial Court negatived Budhiya Vesta Patel's
claim of ownership of the suit property by adverse possession
since his initial possessio,n of the suit property was a
permissive possession.

     8. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order, several
appeals came to be filed before the High Court of Bombay.
Budhiya Vesta Patel had filed two appeals, being F.A. No. 1388
of 2003 and F.A. No. 1389 of 2003; the former against the
dismissal of the suit filed by him and the latter against the
decree passed against him in the counter claim. The third
appeal being, F.A. No. 1390 of 2003, was preferred by one
Yusuf Vali Mohd. Bilikhiya (respondent no. 9 herein), who was
the Power of Attorney holder of Budhiya Vesta Patel.
Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 also filed an appeal against the
judgment and order of the trial Court which was registered as
F.A. No. 1523 of 2003. However, subsequently, the same was
withdrawn.

     9. During the pendency of the aforesaid appeals, Budhiya
Vesta Patel died on 05.12.2004. On 07:01.2005, each of the
present appellants executed an irrevocable Power of Attorney
in favour of respondent no. 9. On the basis of the said Powers
of Attorney, respondent no. 9 filed three separate applications
being Civil Application Nos. 3180 of 2005, 3181 of 2005 and
    968      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010) 4 S.C.R.


A 992 of 2005 in the aforesaid three appeals wherein he prayed
  that the legal representatives of Budhiya Vesta Patel, i.e., the
  appellants be brought on record in all the three appeals in place
  of Budhiya Vesta Patel.

          10. On 26.04.2006, the appellants executed a Power of
8
    Attorney in favour of one Narender M. Patel. It is alleged by the
    present appellants that respondent no. 9 colluded with
    respondent no. 8 and, therefore, respondent no. 9 forced and
    coerced them to enter into a compromise with respondent nos.
    7 and 8, which was strongly objected to by the appellants. On
C   this, the appellants further allege that they were threatened with
    dire consequences by the aforesaid respondents.
    Consequently, the appellants got filed three complaints dated
    01.05.2006, 17.05.2006 and 23.05.2006 with the police
    against respondent nos. 8 and 9. However, it is alleged that
D   despite this, respondent no. 9 for himself and for and on behalf
    of the appellants as their Power of Attorney holder entered into
    consent terms with respondent nos. 7 and 8 in F.A. No. 1389
    of 2003 and thereby submitted to the decree of eviction. The
    High Court, by its order dated 13.06.2006, allowed the
E   aforesaid applications filed by respondent no. 9 and also
    disposed of the said appeals after taking on record the consent
    terms entered into between respondent nos. 7 and 8 on one
    hand and respondent no. 9 on the other. Subsequent to filing
    of the consent terms, the names of the tenants were deleted
F   from the array of the parties. No appeal was, however, filed by
    any tenant.

       11. The appellants f~ed, before the High Court, three civil
  applications being Civil Applications Nos. 3628 of 2006, 3629
G of 2006 and 3630 of 2009 praying for recall of aforesaid order
  dated 13.06.2006 alleging that fraud had been played upon the
  High Court by filing the said consent terms. By a common order
  dated 12.10.2007, the High Court dismissed the aforesaid
  applications. Hence the parties are, in appeal, before us.

H         12. Before we proceed to give an account of the
     SHANTI BUDHIYA VESTA PATEL v. NIRMALA     969
 JAYPRAKASH TIWARI [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.)

submissions made by the counsel appearing for the parties,
we wish to make note of a development that took place after
filing of this SLP by the appellants. After this SLP was filed,
respondent no. 9 filed a civil application before the High Court
praying for setting aside the consent decree dated 13.06.2006
on the ground that respondent no. 8 had failed to perform his
obligation under the consent terms, i.e., payment of Rs 1 crore
and 15 lakhs to him. The High Court, by an order dated
06.07.2009, dismissed the said application.

    13. We may now direct our attention to the rival
submissions made before us by the parties.

       14. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing
 for the appellants, submitted that the aforesaid consent terms
 were filed without the knowledge and consent of the appellants
 and as such the consent decree was passed without taking the
 consent of the appellants who were necessary parties. It was
 also submitted that the purpose behind executing ·a General
 Power of Attorney in favour of respondent no. 9 by Budhiya
 Vesta Patel and, upon his death, by the appellants was to
 safeguard their property by issuing clear instructions to him. It
 was the stand of the Dr. Dhawan that the fraudulent act of the
 respondent no. 9 in arriving at a settlement with the respondent
·nos. 7 and 8 and consequently filing the same in the High Court
 without obtaining the consent of the appellants amounted to a
 breach of the scope of the authority conferred on him by the
 appellants and thus the consent decree passed by the High
 Court was a nullity. Dr. Dhawan tried to further assail the validity
 of tbe consent terms as also the consent decree on the ground
 that the terms of the compromise arrived at were iniquitous.
      15. It was further submitted that since fraud had been
played by respondent no. 9 on the appellants by trying to siphon
off the properties belonging to the appellants, the Court has a
responsibility to protect the rights and interests of the appellants
and therefore the consent decree is required to be set aside
and quashed. In the course of his submissions, Dr.. Dhawan
      970      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2010] 4 S.C.R.


· Aalso referred to the three complaints filed by the appellants with
   the police against harassment and threats given to them by
   respondent nos. 8 and 9. Dr. Dhawan pointed out before us
   that coercion and goon tactics, in addition to fraud, had been
   employed by respondent nos. 8 and 9 to force the appellants
 B to sign the consent terms.                     ·

        16. It was further submitted that the High Court erred in
   dismissing the applications filed by the appellants seeking
   recall of its earlier order. The High Court failed to see through
   the monstrous designs of respondent no. 9 even though ample
 C material was placed on record anct allegations of fraud were
   clearly made before the High Court.

            17. On the other hand, Mr. Ashok H. Desai, Mr. Dushyant
      Dave and Mr. Jaydeep Gupta, learned senior counsel
 D    appearing for the respondent Nos. 7 and 8 as also respondent
      No. 9 strongly refuted the aforesaid submissions while bringing
      to the notice of the Court that, in fact, Budhiya Vesta Patel had
      himself entered into a Development Agreement dated
      12.01.1994 with respondent no. 9 whereby the former
 E    transferred his rights, title and interest in the suit property to the
      latter for a consideration of Rs. 2,00,000/-which was fully paid
      by respondent no. 9 to the Budhiya Vesta Patel and accepted
      by him prior to the execution of the said agreement. It was
      further submitted that the irrevocable Powers of Attorney which
 F    were executed in favour of respondent no. 9 by Budhiya Vesta
      Patel and, upon his death, by the appellants made the acts,
      which were carried out by respondent no. 9 in the best interest
      of the appellants, binding on the appellants and that there
      existed no valid ground for setting aside the compromise
 G    arrived at between the parties and the consent decree passed
      by the High Court.

        18. It was also submitted that as the appellants had failed
   to establish that under the term.s of the Power of Attorney which
   had executed in his favour by the appellants, respondent No. 9
 H was not authorized to enter mto a settlement of the kind he had
    SHANTI BUDHIYA VESTA PATEL v. NIRMALA     971
JAYPRAKASH TIWARI [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

entered, it could not be said that there was a conflict of interest
between the appellants and respondent No. 9 who was the
agent of the appellants.

     19. In the light of the rival submissions made by the counsel
appearing for the parties, we have perused the entire record
before us. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that a
Development Agreement dated 12.01.1994 had been entered
into between Budhiya Vesta Patel and respondent no. 9
whereby and whereunder Budhiya Vesta Patel transferred his
rights, title and interest in the suit premises in favour of
respondent no. 9 for a consideration of Rs 2,00,000/-. The
recOids show that the said amount was fully paid and also that
the said agreement was registered with the office of the Sub-
Registrar. Thus, by entering into the said agreement and
accepting the said consideration in full and final satisfaction for
the transfer of the suit property in favour of the respondent no.
9, Budhiya Vesta Putel divested himself of his r,!ght, title and
interest in the suit µroperty. Pursuant to the said agreement,
Budhiya Vesta Patel executed an irrevocable Power of Attorney
dated 17.02.1994 in favour of respondent no. 9 for a period of
15 years.
     20. We may here refer to some of the relevant portions of
the aforesaid agreement, which are being reproduced
hereinbe!o11'f

     "AND WHEREAS it is hereby further agreed by and
     between the parties hereto that the Developer shall be at
     full liberty to assign, transfer the benefit of the Agreement
     in respect of the aid property to party or parties of his
     choice at such terms and conditions as to be or he may
     deem fit and proper without any further consultation or
     consent of the Owner in that behalf

     4. The consideration payable by the developer to the
     Owner for his share right, title, interest has been fixed at
     Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs only) and the said
    972      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A         consideration has been paid by the Developer to the
          Owner on or before the execution of these presents (the
          receipt and payment whereof the Owner doth hereby
          admit and acknowledge and of and from the same do
          hereby forever discharge the Developer "
B      21. Further, a Deed of Confirmation dated 15.12.1995
  duly registered on the same date was executed between
  Budhiya Vesta Patel and respondent no. 9 by which Budhiya
  Vesta Patel confirmed that the aforesaid Development
  Agreement was subsisting, valid and in full force and would be
C binding on the heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of
  the parties to the said Development Agreement. This was
  followed by a Declaration dated 23 08.2001 by Budhiya Vesta
  Patel wherein he acknowledged the rights, title and interest of
  the respondent no. 9 over the suit property~ the receipt of
D consideration of Rs 2,00,000/- and extended the period of the
  said Power of Attorney indefinitely and undertook to ratify and
  confirm the acts done by respondent no 9.

       22. The appellants have challenged the consent decree
E passed by the High Court praying that the same should be set
  aside as it was obtained by playing a fraud up<Jn them. We do
  not feel persuaded to hold so for a number of reasons which
  are being set out in the paragraphs below.

       23. It is interesting to see the appellants challenge the
F consent decree passed_ by the High Court, particularly when
  each one of them had, upon the death of Budhiya Vesta Patel,
  executed an Affidavit-cum-Declaration as well as separate
  Powers of Attorney dated 07.01.2005 in favour of the
  respondent no. 9. All the said Powers of Attorney were
G irrevocable and duly registered for valuable consideration. A
  bare perusal of the said Affidavits-cum-declarations would
  reveal that the appellants knew that respondent no. 9 was the
  constituted attorney of their predecessor-in-interest and that the
  suit property had been transferred to respondent no. 9 for a
H consideration of Rs 2,00,000/-. It is pertinent to note that in the
     SHANTI BUDhlYA VESTA PATEL v. NIRMALA     973
 JAYPRAKASH TIWARI [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

said Affidavits-cum-Declarations each of the appellants had
undertaken to be bound by all the deeds and documents
entered into between their predecessor-in-interest and
respondent no. 9 and they had also confirmed and ratified the
said deeds and documents thereby conferring right on
respondent no. 9 to enforce those at all times in the future. In
fact, in the said affidavits, the appellants categ01ically admitted
the right of ownership of respondent no. 9 over the suit property.

      24. By executing the said Powers of Attorney in favour of
the respondent no. 9, the appellants had consciously and
willingly appointed, nominated, constituted and authorized
respondent no. 9 as their lawful Power of Attorney to do certain
deeds, things and matters. The relevant clauses are being
extracted hereinbelow: -

     "6. To sign Petitior:i or present Petitions or Petition, to file:
     suit and to sign and verify claims, written statements,
     pleadings, applications, returns, and to appear, act in any
     Court- Civil, Criminal, Court Receiver and /or Revenue,
     original or appellate or Revisional or before any competent
     authority, Officer, or Officer for in respect of or in
     connection with the aforesaid and with buildings etc.
     thereon and/or any other proceedings, suit or appeal in
     connection with the management and superintendence cif
     my said lands for any purpose whatsoever necessary.

     7. To compromise, compound and/or negotiate and settle
     any dispute or disputes and refer the same to Arbitration."

     25. It is thus crystal clear that the appellants had not only
confirmed and ratified the deeds and documents entered into
betwee111' their predecessor.-in-interest and respondent no. 9 but
also constituted respondent no. 9 as their lawful attorney
authorizing him, inter alia, to sign petitions, appear before the
Courts and also to compromise or compound disputes. In fact,
the appellants are estopped from questioning the acts done by
respondent no. 9.
    974     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2010] 4 S.C.R.


A      26. The learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 7
  placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Jineshwardas (0)
  by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Jagrani (Smt.) and Another reported in
  (2003) 11 SCC 372 to argue that the party executing the Power
  of Attorney is bound by the acts of the Power of Attorney holder
B and that the Court could accept a compromise terms entered
  into by the Power of Attorney holder on behalf of the parties
  and that such a compromise would be a valid compromise.

       27. We are of the considered view that in the aforesaid
C circumstances, the appellants could not be said to have any
  right to assail the consent decree passed by the High Court.
  We do not think it proper for the appellants to question and
  challenge the consent terms signed and submitted by
  respondent no. 9 on their behalf which were duly accepted and
  acted upon by the High Court and which we also find to be just
D and reasonable. The fact that under the consent terms the
  appellants were paid a sum of Rs 10,00,000/- when they were
  not entitled to the same also reinforces our conviction that the
  consent terms arrived at were just.

E       28. As noted by us in one of the preceding paragraphs,
  the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants had nothing
  remaining in the suit property after he had transferred the same
  under the said development agreement to respondent no. 9 for
  a full and final consideration of Rs 2,00,000/-. Thus, the
F predecessor-in interest of the appellants had no right, title or
  interest subsisting in the suit property. The appellants are the
  legal heirs of Budhiya Vesta Patel and as such they could not
  have claimed a title better than that of Budhiya Vesta Patel. The
  predecessor-in interest of the appellants had relinquished his
G title. right vr interest over/in the suit property in favour of
  respondent no. 9. A general proposition of law is that no person
  can confer on another a better title than he himself has.
  [Reference in this regard may be made to the decisions of this
  Court in Mahabir Gope v. Harbans NArain Singh 1952 SCR
  775; Asaram v. Mst. Ram Kali 1958 SCR 986 and All India
H
     SHANTI BUDHIYA VESTA PATEL v. NIRMALA     975
 JAYPRAKASH TIWARI [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

Film Corporation Ltd. v. Raja Gyan Nath (1969) 3 SCC 79:]               A

     29. It is also the case of the appellants that there was no
due cor.1pliance with the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3. The
counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that
responsibility of the Court is to see that the consent terms have
                                                                        8
been arrived at in satisfaction of all the parties and that injustice
is not caused to any party. The counsel further submitted that
one of the modes by which Order 23 Rule 3 ensured this was
by requiring the compromise agreement to be in writing and
signed by the parties.
                                                                        c
      30. This was strongly refuted by the counsel appearing for
the respondents stating that it is well settled that under Order
23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a compromise
may be signed by the counsel or the Power of Attorney holder.
Counsel for the respondents referred to and relied upon the D
judgment of this Court in Byram Pestonji Gariwala Vs. Union
Bank of India and Others (1992) 1 sec 31 where it was held
thus:

     "39. To insist upon the party himself personally signing the E
     agreement or compromise would often cause undue delay,
     loss and inconvenience, especially in the case of non-
     resident persons. It has always been universally understood
     that a party can always act by his duly authorised
     representative. If a power-of-attorney holder can enter into F
     an agreement or compromise on behalf of his principal,
     so can counsel, possessed of the requisite authorisation
     by vakalatnama, act on behalf of his client. Not to
     recognise such capacity is not only to cause much
     inconvenience and loss to the parties personally, but also
     to delay the progress of proceedings in court. If the G
     legislature had intended to make such a fundamental
     change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and
     needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated:'

     31. It is settled position of law that the burden to prove that    H
        976       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.

    A   a compromise arrived at under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code
        of Civil Procedure was tainted by coercion or fraud lies upon
        the party who alleges the same. However, in the facts and
        circumstances of the case, the appellants, on whom the burden
        lay, have failed to do so. Although, the application for recall did
    B   allege some coercion, it could not be said to be a case of
        established coercion. Three criminal complaints were filed, but
        the appellants did not pursue the said criminal complaints to
        their logical end.

             32. It is a plain and basic rule of pleadings that in order to
    C   make out a case of fraud or coercion there must be a) an
        express allegation of coercion or fraud and b) all the material
        facts in support of such allegations must be laid out in full and
        with a high degree of precision. In other words, if coercion or
        fraud is alleged, it must be set out with full particulars. In
'   D   Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai reported in 1951 SCR 548
        it was held thus:

              "27. We turn next to the questions of undue influence and
              coercion. Now it is to be observed that these have not
    E         been separately pleaded. It is true they may overlap in part
              in some cases but they are separate and separable
              categories in law and must be separately pleaded.

              28. It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have
              been furnished. Now if there is one rule which is better
    F         established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud,
              undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must
              set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided
              on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from
              them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even
    G         to amount to an averment of fraud of which any court ought
              to take notice however strong the language in which they
              are couched may be, and the same applies to undue
              influence and coercion. See Order 6 Rule 4 of the Civil
              Procedure Code."
    H
     SHANTI BUDHIYA VESTA PATEL v. NIRMALA      977
JAYPRAl:<ASH TIWARI [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

      33. In the present case, the appellants have, however, failed A
to furnish the full and precise particulars with regard to the
allege; fraud. Since the particulars in support of the allegation
of fraud or coercion have not been properly pleaded as required
by law, the same must fail. Rather the Affidavits-cum-
Declarations executed by the appellants indicate that no 8
coercion or fraud was exercised upon the appellants by
respondent no .. 8 or 9 at any point of time and thus the consent
decree cannot be said to be anything but valid.

     34. In this regard, we wish to refer to the judgment of this C
Court in the case of Shankar Sitaram Sontakke v. Balkrishna
Sitaram Sontakke reported in AIR 1954 SC 352 wherein this
Court while dealing with the nature of a consent decree held in
para 9 as under:

    "9. The obvious effect of this finding is that the plaintiff is D '
    barred by the principle of res judicata from reagitating the
    question in the present suit. It is well settled that a consent
    decree is as binding upon the parties thereto as a decree
    passed by invitum. The compromise having been found not
    to be vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, E
    misunderstanding or mistake, the decree passed thereon
    has the binding force of res judicata.

    35. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in
Loonkaran v. State Bank, Jaipurreported in (1969} 1 SCR 122
where interpreting Section 202 of the Indian Contract Act, this    F
Court held thus:

    "Section 202 of the Contract Act provides that where the
    agent has himself an interest in the property which forms
    the subject matter of the agency, the agency cannot, in the G
    absence of an express contract, be terminated to the
    prejudice of such agent. It is settled law that where the
    agency is created for valuable Qonsideration and authority
    is given to effectuate a security or to secure interest of the
    agent, the authority cannot be revoked."                       H
    978     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A        36. The appellants also alleged that they had revoked the
    Powers of Attorney executed by them in favour of the
    respondent no. 9 by filing complaints with the police. We are
    of the considered opinion that this contention of the appellants
    is devoid of merit. Although there is no denying the fact that
B   three police complaints had been filed on three different dates
    with the Dolice against the alleged harassment and threats by
    respondent nos. 8 and 9, it is difficult to understand how the
    Powers of Attorney executed by the appellants or their
    predecessor-in-interest stood revoked. The record of the case
C   reveals that each of the complaints was filed by a separate
    person - the first complaint was filed by the appellants
    themselves, the second by an Advocate and the third by one
    Narendra M. Patel, who is himself a builder. It is significant to
    note that all these complaints came to be filed when said
    Narender M. Patei came into the picture. Further, it is important
0
    to take note of the fact that all the Powers of Attorney executed
    in favour of respondent no. 9 as also all the deeds and
    documents entered into between the predecessor-in-interest of
    the appellants and respondent no. 9 were duly registered with
    the office of the Sub-Registrar. Neither any document nor any
E   of the Powers of Attorney was ever got cancelled by the
    appellants.

         37. The appellants also further contended before us that
    they had revoked the Powers of Attorney executed in favour of
F   respondent no 9 by executing a fresh Power of Attorney in
    favour of said Narendra M. Patel. It is significant to note that
    despite filing of the complaints with the police nothing was done
    by the appellants to bnng the allegations contained in the said
    complaints to the notice and knowledge of the High Court
G   although that could have been comfortably done had the
    appellants wished to do so. The Power of Attorney in favour of
    said Narendra M Patel was executed by the appellants on
    26.04.2006 whereas the first complaint was filed with the police
    on 01.05.2006 and the consent terms were entered into on
H
    SHANTI BUOHIYA VESTA PATEL v. NIRMALA     979
JAYPRAKASH TIWARI [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

22.05.2006. The consent decree was actually passed by the             A
High Court on 13.06.2006.

     38. The appellants, thus, had ample time and opportunity
with them to bring the said allegations to the notice and
knowledge of the High Court at any time between 26.04.2006
                                                                      8
and 13.06.2006. The appellants had considerable amount of
time available with them, As noted earlier, with regard to the
complaints filed, the appellants did not take any follow up action
to bring them their logical end.

     39. It is crystal clear that the appellants chose not to avail   C
an opportunity which was available to them. In such
circumstances, it will not be appropriate to say that the deeds
and documents as well as the Powers of Attorney executed in
favour of respondent no. 9 stood revoked merely by filing
complaints with the police. We cannot lose sight of the fact that     D
a registered document has a lot of sanctity attached to it and
this sanctity cannot be allowed to be lost without following the
proper procedure.

     40. In any event, if we direct our attention to the contents     E
of the Power of Attorney executed by the appellants in favour
of said Narender M. Patel, we find that the stand taken by the
appellants throughout that they had, by executing a Power of
Attorney in favour of Narender M. Patel.. revoked the Powers
of Attorney executed in favour of respondent no. 9 to be
baseless. In fact, a look at the terms of the Power of Attorney       F
executed in favour of Narender M. Patel would show to the
contrary. The relevant portion of the said Power of Attorney is
being extracted hereinbelow: -

    "6. To correspond with all the body cooperate for otherwise       G
    including government and semi- government bodies and
    Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and make
    applications etc. in respect of any of the matters pertaining
    to the said the property and the said premises.
                                                                      H
    980       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010) 4 S.C.R.


A          AND FURTHER that these presents and the powers
           hereby given shall in no wise extend or be deemed or
           continued to extend to repeal, revoke, determine or make
           void any other power or powers of attorney at any time
           heretobefore or hereafter given or executed by us to or in
B          favour of any other person or persons for the same or any
           distinct or other purpose or purposes but such power or
           powers shall remain and be of the-same authority, validity
           and power, force and effect as if these presents had not
           been made~
c                                               (emphasis supplied)

        41. Before we part with the discussion, we wish to make
  note of the fact that respondent no. 9 has, in the counter-affidavit
  filed in this Court, prayed for declaring the consent terms to be
D cancelled and annulled on the ground that the consent terms
  have been rendered infructuous due to the failure of respondent
  no. 8 to perform his obligations as per the consent terms. We
  have a strong feeling that a money game is being played. Since
  the stakes are high, each party before us is trying to draw the
E maximum advantage. To us, there seems to be no other reason
  for respondent no. 9 having adopted such a course of action.

        42. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the
  considered view that entering into the compromise as also filing
  of the same in. the High court of Bombay by respondent no. 9
F on behalf of the appellants was without any fraud and well within
  the scope of his authority: Accordingly, we find no merit in the
  present appeals and the same are hereby dismissed. There
  will be no order as to costs.
    D.G.                                        Appeals dismis~ed