Supreme Court of India
SHANKARversusSTATE OF RAJASTHAN
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 315
- Decided
- 2 April 2026
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- SANJAY KAROL
Holding
The dying declaration was admissible, credible, and corroborated by medical evidence, and no manifest error was found in the lower courts, so the concurrent convictions under Sections 302 and 342 IPC stand.
Summary
The appellant, Shankar, was convicted for brutally beating his wife, Sugna Bai, pouring kerosene on her and setting her on fire, resulting in her death. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC and a year under Section 342 IPC, relying heavily on the victim's dying declaration. On appeal, the appellant challenged the admissibility of the dying declaration, alleging the victim was not of sound mind and that the statement was improperly recorded. The Supreme Court examined the provisions of Section 32 of the Evidence Act and Section 26 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, finding the declaration consistent, credible, and corroborated by medical evidence. It also held that the lower courts did not commit any manifest error in law or fact, and the concurrent convictions were therefore valid. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence.
Issues considered
- Whether the dying declaration of the deceased is admissible and reliable under Section 32 of the Evidence Act and Section 26 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
- Whether the trial court erred in relying on the dying declaration despite alleged infirmity of the victim.
- Whether there was any manifest error of law or misappreciation of evidence that warrants interference with the concurrent convictions under Sections 302 and 342 IPC.
- Whether the medical and eyewitness evidence sufficiently corroborates the dying declaration to sustain the conviction.
Legislation cited
- Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023s. 26
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 32
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 342
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the concurrent conviction of the appellant-accused for killing his wife by setting her on fire, ought to be upheld. Headnotes† Evidence Act, 1872 – s.32 – Dying declaration – When can be relied over her and killed her by setting her on fire – Concurrent conviction u/s.302, IPC relying upon on the dying declaration of the deceased stating that it was the appellant who had poured kerosene on her and set her on fire – Challenge to: Held: Dying declarations are exceptions to
Subjects
Dying declarationWife killed by setting her on fireKerosene pouredConcurrent findings of convictionConcurrent convictionMedical evidence consistent with dying declarationBurning a wifeDowryDomestic violence
Judgment
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 298 : 2026 INSC 315
Shankar
v.
State of Rajasthan
(Criminal Appeal No. 1735 of 2026)
02 April 2026
[Sanjay Karol* and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the concurrent
conviction of the appellant-accused for killing his wife by setting
her on fire, ought to be upheld.
Headnotes†
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.32 – Dying declaration – When can
be relied upon – Appellant beat up his wife, poured kerosene
over her and killed her by setting her on fire – Concurrent
conviction u/s.302, IPC relying upon on the dying declaration
of the deceased stating that it was the appellant who had
poured kerosene on her and set her on fire – Challenge to:
Held: Dying declarations are exceptions to the rule of hearsay and,
if a Court finds them consistent, believable and free of tutoring, it
can convict the person named therein – In the present case, the
medical evidence is consistent with the dying declaration – Appeal
dismissed – Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 – s.26 – Penal
Code, 1860 – ss.302, 342. [Paras 9, 12]
Concurrent findings of conviction – Scope of interference,
restricted:
Held: It would only be permissible for this Court to interfere if the
Courts below had committed manifest errors in law, misdirected
itself in appreciating evidence, or completely missed out crucial
pieces of evidence that would have bearing on the overall outcome
of the case. [Para 7, 13]
Crimes Against Women – Dowry, domestic violence, etc. –
Long-drawn legislative efforts for eradication of however, not
to much yield – Reasons therefor. [Paras 14-18]
* Author
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 299
Shankar v. State of Rajasthan
Case Law Cited
Manjunath v. State of Karnataka [2023] 14 SCR 727 : 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1421; Shayara Bano v. Union of India [2017] 9 SCR
797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1; Joseph Shine v. Union of India [2018] 11
SCR 765 : (2018) 2 SCC 189; Secretary, Ministry of Defence v.
Babita Puniya [2020] 3 SCR 833 : (2020) 7 SCC 469; Vineeta
Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma [2020] 10 SCR 135 : (2020) 9 SCC 1;
Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar [2014] 8 SCR 128 : (2014) 8 SCC
273; Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora [2016] 9 SCR
515 : (2016) 10 SCC 165; Shakti Vahini v. Union of India [2018] 3
SCR 770 : (2018) 7 SCC 192; Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M [2018]
4 SCR 955 : (2018) 16 SCC 368 – referred to.
List of Acts
Evidence Act, 1872; Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023; Penal
Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961; Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005; Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.
List of Keywords
Dying declaration; Wife killed by setting her on fire; Kerosene
poured; Concurrent findings of conviction; Concurrent conviction;
Medical evidence consistent with dying declaration; Burning a wife;
Dowry; Domestic violence.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1735 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.08.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in DBCRA No. 65 of 2015.
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Ms. Kavita Vadia, Sr. Adv., Tabrez Ahmad, Syed Mehdi Imam,
Varun Verma, Chavi Jain, S. U. Abbas.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Divynk Panwar, Ms. Pallavi Garg, Ms. Sanjana Sharma, Prajjwal
Singh, Ms. Nidhi Jaswal.
300 [2026] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Karol, J.
Leave granted.
2. Shankar, the appellant was accused of having beaten up, poured
kerosene over his wife – Sugna Bai, and killed her by setting her
on fire. The Trial Court, Sessions Judge, Bundi, in Sessions Case
No.249/2012 in terms of judgment dated 10.12.2014 sentenced him
to life imprisonment under Section 302 and rigorous imprisonment
for one year under Section 342, Indian Penal Code 18601. Fines
of Rs.1000/- each for both the offences was also imposed, and
simple imprisonment for one month was indicated to be suffered
by him in the event of default. Criminal Appeal No.65 of 2015
was dismissed by the learned Division Bench by judgment dated
20.08.2019. Shankar, now is before this Court, asking us to overturn
his concurrent conviction.
3. The facts, leading up to the position as indicated above was that
the deceased had married the appellant about a month prior to
her death on 19.10.2012 and within approximately 20 days the
relationship had taken a sour turn on account of alleged excessive
consumption of alcohol and the former possessing a violent streak.
The deceased had apparently gone to her parental home when
the appellant demanded that she return home immediately and
make fresh food for him. While she was complying with such a
demand, the appellant beat her up and, while doing so was allegedly
drunk. Although she managed to free herself and move away, the
appellant allegedly poured kerosene and threw a lit matchstick on
her. Resultantly, she screamed causing the neighbours and those
nearby including the appellant, to come to her aid. This included
pouring water and also using blanket to quell the flame. Parents of
the deceased who had, by this time, reached the scene of incident
called the ambulance and she was taken to MBSH Hospital,
Rajasthan for treatment.
1 IPC
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 301
Shankar v. State of Rajasthan
4. The FIR was recorded as under:
“Statement Smt. Sugna Bai W/o Shankar D/o Bheru
caste Bhil age 20 years R/O Near Power House, Dabi
PS, Dabi District Bundi, presently Dhaneshwar PS, Dabi
District Bundi (Rajasthan), under treatment, admitted in
Burn Ward, Bed No.3, MBSH Hospital (Rajasthan), Date
15-10-12, Time 5.20 pm, on request, stated in the form
that I was living with my husband at the above mentioned
address in a rented room in the house of Shri Gulab Chand
S/o Gajanand Ji Kalal in village Dhaneshwar, my parental
home is also in village Dhaneshwar. About a month before
my relationship with my x-husband Ramesh S/o Nanda
caste Bhil resident of Dabi broke down, with the consent
of my parents, I had a love married with Shankar S/o
Modhu caste Bhil resident of Dabi, presently Dhaneshwar.
He kept me well for about 20 days, but for the last 10-
12 days, my husband Shankar used to beat me up after
drinking alcohol every day and did not allow me to talk
to anyone. Today, on 15-10-12, at about 12:30 PM, I had
gone to my father’s house to meet my mother, where my
husband Shankar came and said, come home and make
rotis, I am hungry. As soon as I said that, I came from
home to our rented room and came and started cutting
ladyfinger to make vegetables. Then my husband Shankar
came who was drunk. As soon as he came, he started
beating me with kicks and punches and strangled me,
from which I was freed with great difficulty. Then a plastic
bottle kept in the room was filled with about half a bottle of
kerosene oil. He locked the room from inside and poured
kerosene on me and set me on fire with a matchstick
and opened the latch from inside and ran away. When
I shouted, he came back outside and threw a blanket
on the fire on my body. At that very moment, the tenant
living in the adjacent room, whose name and address I
do not know, came running. My husband ran outside and
the tenant woman poured water on me and after wetting
the blanket, put it on me then my fire was extinguished.
Later whoever heard about it came running. Somebody
informed my parents and they also came running to my
room and called 108 ambulance, which brought me for
302 [2026] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
treatment and got me admitted to Bada Safakhana Kota,
where I am undergoing treatment. Due to the burns, my
whole body including face has blisters and the skin has
torn. SD Ni. Thumb impression Sugna Bai Police Station
Debi District Bundi Bumukam MBSH Burn ward Kota/
Date 15-10-12 Time 5.45 PM Action Police. It is certified
that the above mentioned form statement of the victim
Smt. Sugna Bai W/O Shankar D/O Bheru caste Bhil age
20 years R/O present Dhaneshwar Jair admitted in Burn
Ward Bed No. 3 MBSH Kota, should be written down word
by word as per the statement given by the victim, please
read it out loud and consider it to be correct. When the
body of the victim was examined, the skin on forehead,
left cheek, beard, hands and entire body was burnt due to
fire. This has happened. They will be medically examined.
Text of the form.
From the search and inspection, the case falls under
sections 323,307 IPC, hence, a case was registered at
the return at police station. ASI was busy on the spot and
investigation was commenced.
Sd Inspector
Thumb Sugana Bai
Sd Gopal Lal
ASI PS-Dabi/Date 15.10.12
Time 10 PM.
Police action Taken-
The above mentioned form statement of Smt. Sugana Bai
W/o Shankar caste Bhil, age 20 years R/O near Power
House, Dabi, presently Dhaneshwar PS Dabi ( Bundi),
under treatment, admitted in MBS Hospital Burn Ward Bed
No. 3, Kota was brought and presented by Gopal Lal ASI
I/C police station. From the written form statement, the
crime under section 323, 307 IPC is found to fall under
the category, hence, case No. 220/12, Section above, was
registered and investigation was started.”
5. Upon completion of investigation, challan was presented for trial.
To establish its case, the prosecution examined 15 witnesses and
exhibited 23 documents. The accused did not lead any oral evidence
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 303
Shankar v. State of Rajasthan
and only furnished only one document in defence. In his statement
under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732 he pled
innocence and deliberate false implication. The findings of the Trial
Court are tabulated as below:
Sl. Point for consideration Relevant Conclusion
No. paragraphs
1. Whether the death of Smt. Sugna 9-13 Death of Sugna Bai
Bai was not natural but was was not natural and
caused as a result of the injuries caused by injuries
caused by the burning of her due to igneous
body with fire substance before substance.
death.
2. Did the accused Shankar
voluntarily restrain his wife Smt.
Sugna Bai Bhil (deceased) in The prosecution has
a rented room in the house of been successful in
Gulab Chand Kalal situated in proving the offences
against the appellant
Munja Dhaneshwar at about
under Sections 342
12-12.30 PM on 15.10.2012 and
and 302 IPC beyond
wrongfully confined her by locking
reasonable doubt.
the room from inside.
14-55
Whether the accused Shankar
with the intent to commit culpable
homicide of his wife Smt. Sugna
Bai Bhil, on the said date, time
and place, voluntarily brunt her
3. by pouring kerosene oil on her
body and setting her on fire with
an igneous substance (match
stick) and as a result of the
injuries caused by the burning
she died on 19.10.2012 at 7 .a.m.
in Maharao Bhim Singh Hospital,
Kota, while undergoing treatment.
Under these circumstances the
accused committed the murder
of his wife Smt. Sugna Bai Bhil.
4. If yes then what will be the 57-64 Particulars already
punishment? mentioned in para 1
(supra)
2 Cr.PC
304 [2026] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
6. On appeal, the High Court found the view taken by the Trial Court
to be entirely justified, including the reliance placed on the dying
declaration of the deceased. As such, the conviction and sentence
of the appellant was confirmed.
7. We have heard Ms. Kaveeta Wadia, learned senior counsel for
the appellant and Mr. Divynk Panwar, learned counsel for the
respondent-State. At the outset, it must be stated that the scope
of interference in concurrent findings of conviction, is well- settled,
as being fairly restricted. It would only be permissible for this Court
to do so if the Courts below had committed manifest errors in law,
misdirected itself in appreciating evidence, or completely missed
out crucial pieces of evidence that would have bearing on the
overall outcome of the case. The only aspect that remains to be
seen is whether any of these criteria above, or any other ones of
the recognised parameters, are met.
8. The dying declaration which forms the basis of punishment awarded
to the appellant, is not appended to the record placed before this
Court. We record our surprise on that count, particularly given
that it is the most essential document in a case of this nature.
In these circumstances, we have no choice but to reproduce for
reference, the relevant portion of the judgment of the Trial Court as
follows:-
“Dying statement Exhibit P.20 has been recorded by
PW. 12 Ajay Kumar Sharma, the then Additional Civil
Judge (Special Court) No.4, Kota in the form of question
and answer and before recording this statement, the
clinical opinion has been taken on the back side of the
paper of the same statement itself in which doctor has
shown Sugna Bai to be competent to make the said
statement. It is also mentioned on the same page that
Sugna Bai has been identified by Gopal Lal Meena, ASI
and the endorsement to this effect bears the signature
of Gopal Lal Meena. The dying declaration Exhibit
P.20 is based on only 05 questions and their short
answers in the form of question and answer. Here the
said questions and their answers are being written as
follows:-
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 305
Shankar v. State of Rajasthan
Question.1 Who did this to you?
Answer – My husband poured kerosene on me and set
me on fire.
Question.2 When did you get burnt?
Answer – I was burnt in my rented room at 12 noon.
Then my husband ran away.
Question.3 What was it about which you were burnt?
Answer – my husband drinks alcohol and suspects me.
If I look at anyone else, he fights.
Question.4 Who came to save?
Answer – There is a tenant near our house, his wife
saved him. I don’t know the name.
Questions.5 Who lives in the room?
Answer – My husband and I live here.
On this dying declaration (Exhibit P.20) the thumb
impression of Sugna Bai (deceased) is marked on. At
the end of this declaration, the said Magistrate put his
seal on it and has been signed.”
9. Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 26 of
its successor, Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 deal with dying
declarations. Generally speaking, these declarations enjoy a special
position given the timing and the nature thereof. This position rests
on a philosophical understanding that when a person is about to meet
his maker or in other words the oncoming of death and its finality is
imminent, considerations which may force a person to speak other
than the truth pale into insignificance and what does fall from them
would, therefore, be only the truth. They are exceptions to the rule
of hearsay and, if a Court finds them consistent, believable and
free of tutoring, it can convict the person named therein. This Court
306 [2026] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
has, in a number of judgments including one by one of us (Sanjay
Karol, J.) in Manjunath v. State of Karnataka3, after considering
the law on the issue culled out the applicable principles.
10. In assailing his concurrent conviction, one of the grounds urged
by the appellant was “…the magistrate while recording the dying
declaration of the deceased has reported that the mental condition
of the victim is not good and not in a position to give statement as
she was admitted in hospital on 15.10.2012 and died on 19.10.2012.
The Magistrate has taken her certification on some blank paper
and he had made the endorsement on blank paper it is true that
she could not sign on blank paper as she was not educated.” At
the cost of brevity, the statement of the concerned officer namely
Mr. Ajay Kumar Sharma, learned ACJM No.4-Kota at the relevant
time, is reproduced as under : -
“Examination in Chief :-
On 15-10-2012, I was posted as Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate No.4, Kota. On that day, Gopal Lal ASI of Police
Station Daabi presented a written requisition Exhibit P-19
to the effect that a woman from our police station area
is admitted in M.B.S. in a burnt condition and we want
to record her dying declaration. The order passed by me
on the application is from C to D and the signature is
from E to F. After this, I recorded the dying declaration
of Sugna Bai admitted in M.B.S. Hospital, Kota. Before
recording the statement, I had taken a certificate from
the duty doctor regarding the condition of giving the
statement of Sugna Bai, the dying declaration is Exhibit
P-20 on which the certificate of the doctor from E to F is
mentioned and Sugna Bai was identified by Shri Gopal
Lal, whose reference is mentioned from A to B. Sugna
Bai’s dying declaration is recorded by me in the form of
questions and answers. Exhibit P-20 has my signatures
G to H. When the statement of Sugna Bai was recorded,
she was in a position to give the statement and was
3 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 307
Shankar v. State of Rajasthan
conscious. After recording the said dying statement,
the said statement and documents were sent by me to
the concerned court through Exhibit P-22, on which my
signatures A to B are there.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY THE ADVOCATES OF
ACCUSED :-
It is true that I had sent Exhibit P-22 to the concerned
Court in my capacity as ACJM No.4 on which my seal is
not marked. It is true that I did not put a note on the dying
declaration Exhibit P-20 that injured was in a sound mind
to give the statement, and today herself said that I had
obtained a certificate in this regard from the duty doctor. It
is true that there is no mention that the dying declaration
is certified by the doctor. I first got the injured identified
from Gopal Lal and then took the certificates from the
doctor and after this the statements were recorded. On
the day the application Exhibit P-19 was presented, I
was working as the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kota. It is
true that I have not written the word C.J.M. below my
ordersheet. It is true that the name of the acting C.J.M. is
not mentioned in in Exhibit P-19. That day I had remand
duty and I was the one working. I am a resident of Jaipur.
I could very well understand the language in which the
injured gave her statement. I cannot say whether she
was speaking Hadoti or Mewadi Language at that time,
but I could been written in question-answer format as it is
according to the law. It is wrong to say that since injured
was not in a position to speak, I took injured’s statement
in question-answer format because that is as per law. It
is true that I have not mentioned the time in my dying
statement as to what time the statement was taken. It
is wrong to say that I took the help of Gopal Lal ASI to
understand the language of religion. When I recorded
Injured’s statement, only I and injured were present. No
one else was present. I had sent injuried’s family out. I
did not ask Majhruba’s mother whether Majhruba was in
a position to give a statement or not. …..”
308 [2026] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
A perusal of the above extracted statement makes abundantly clear
that nowhere did the officer state to the effect that the deceased not
of sound mind. It is also evident that the duty doctor had given a
certificate of her condition. PW-15 (Dr. Tez Pratap Singh) the duty
doctor has testified that prior to giving the certificate on a blank
paper he had examined the condition of the deceased. It stands
to reason that, after the condition has been certified, only then,
would the doctor record the statement on paper. The fact that it
was on the flip side of the same paper does not affect the sanctity
thereof. That being the case, we cannot appreciate the ground as
raised by the appellant.
11. Yet another point also needs to be addressed. Before the learned
Trial Court the counsel for the accused attempted to argue that
the parents of the deceased tutored her into giving the statement
that she gave. However, we are of the considered view that such
a submission, was correctly, not accepted by the Trial Court. It
appears to us, to be nothing but a bald assertion.
12. In this case, the eyewitnesses PW-2 (Brajmohan) and PW-3
(Mamta Bai) have turned hostile and supported the prosecution
case. In ordinary circumstances this would accrue to the favour of
the accused. However, given the consistency of medical evidence
with the dying declaration, the difference in events testified to by
the above two witnesses would lose its significance. In respect of
PW-3 and PW-8 (parents of the deceased), it be observed that
apart from a vague implication of tutoring which has not made
its way into either the examination-in-chief or cross examination,
their statements cannot be challenged or kept aside. As such their
statements cannot be of any use to the appellant, in discrediting
the case of the prosecution. That apart the medical evidence as
given by PW-9 (Dr. Navneet Parashar) and PW-10 (Dr. Rakesh
Sharma) are consistent with the statement of the deceased that
she was burnt. One of the grounds raised is that the evidence of
PW-10 cannot be relied upon by the Court for the reason that he
was not a practicing doctor and was only a ‘medical jurist’. That
in our view, cannot be a reason to disregard his testimony for it
is not the case that he was unqualified to give such a testimony
nor is it the case that he was underqualified. Additionally, his
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 309
Shankar v. State of Rajasthan
testimony is also in line with the testimony of PW-9, Medical
Officer at MBS Hospital, who has also deposed that the deceased
was burnt and the cause of death was septicaemia due to
burning.
13. Taking a cumulative view of the above discussion, the appeal must
fail, and is accordingly dismissed. However, before parting with the
matter we deem it necessary to pen down a postscript.
14. The offence in question is of the year 2011. At that point in time, we
were 64 years into being an independent country. The Constitution
promises equality, non-discrimination on the basis of sex and the
right to life and liberty amongst others. However, cases such as
these, demonstrate that even after so many years, rights enshrined
in the founding Charter are still elusive for many. It could be argued
and very well proved that a further fourteen years down the line, in
spite of incremental progress the issues highlighted by the incidence
such as in the present case, largely remain the same. Over the
years numerous legislations were enacted, schemes brought into
force, and judgments delivered, focussed on the upliftment of
women and eradication of difficulties faced by them arising out of
inherent social stigma and deep-rooted patriarchal and conservative
practices.
The process of unshackling the society from these deeply stigmatic
understandings of women and their roles, began immediately after
independence. Early legislative efforts such as the Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961 were aimed at dismantling one of the most deep-rooted
practices of patriarchal control, i.e., dowry. This was followed by
introduction of provisions like Section 498A, IPC addressing cruelty
by husbands and relatives, and later the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 20054 which recognized domestic abuse
as a civil wrong requiring immediate relief and protection. When it
comes to equality in workplace, the Sexual Harassment of Women
at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013
institutionalized safeguards following the Vishaka guidelines laid
down by this Court.
4 DVA
310 [2026] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
The interpretation of these rights and their expansion into varied
aspects of women’s life has taken place through a series of judicial
pronouncements. In Shayara Bano v. Union of India5, the practice
of instant triple talaq was declared unconstitutional, affirming women’s
rights within personal law frameworks. In Joseph Shine v. Union
of India6, the Court struck down the adultery law, emphasizing
equality and autonomy. In Secretary, Ministry of Defence v.
Babita Puniya7, the Court upheld the right of women officers to
be granted permanent commission in the Indian Army, rejecting
institutional stereotypes about gender roles. In Vineeta Sharma v.
Rakesh Sharma8, daughters were recognized as equal coparceners
in Hindu joint family property. The Court has also addressed the
complexities of domestic violence, in Arnesh Kumar v. State of
Bihar9, while cautioning against misuse of Section 498A, it reaffirmed
the seriousness of cruelty against married women, and in Hiral P.
Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora10, it expanded the scope
of the DVA to include complaints against female relatives within the
household. The Court has further intervened in matters of personal
liberty and choice. In Shakti Vahini v. Union of India11, it issued
detailed guidelines to prevent honour killings, recognizing that societal
and familial control over women’s choices in marriage is a direct
assault on their fundamental rights. Similarly, in Shafin Jahan v.
Asokan K.M12., the Court upheld an adult woman’s right to choose
her partner, affirming that neither the State nor the family can dictate
personal decisions central to individual dignity and autonomy.
15. Parallel to legal reform, the State has also invested in welfare and
social transformation schemes. Programmes such as Beti Bachao,
Beti Padhao, are aimed at correcting gender imbalances and
improving girls’ education, while initiatives like Sukanya Samriddhi
5 (2017) 9 SCC 1
6 (2018) 2 SCC 189
7 (2020) 7 SCC 469.
8 (2020) 9 SCC 1
9 (2014) 8 SCC 273
10 (2016) 10 SCC 165.
11 (2018) 7 SCC 192.
12 (2018) 16 SCC 368.
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 311
Shankar v. State of Rajasthan
Yojana and Ujjwala Yojana aim to enhance financial security and
improve living conditions for women.
16. Yet, despite this sustained intervention from different branches of
Government, empirical data shows that all is not well. It presents
a sobering picture indeed. As per the National Crime Records
Bureau, more than 4.48 lakh crimes against women were recorded
in 202313. Dowry-related violence continues to claim over 6,000
lives annually, revealing the persistence of practices that have long
been outlawed. Complaints before the National Commission for
Women also consistently show domestic violence as one of the most
reported grievances14. What makes this reality particularly troubling
is the context in which it exists. India has experienced significant
economic growth, rising literacy, and increased participation of
women in education and the workforce. Gender Roles do not apply
strictly anymore in many urban areas. One cannot assume that all
house-hold related work falls to the woman, whereas it is only the
male who is tasked with bread winning. Yet, in rural and semi-urban
scenarios, patriarchy remains a facet of everyday life. Authority
within the household is still overwhelmingly male, and women’s
autonomy is often conditional and constrained. Even if the woman
earns, it would still be expected of her that she would set the house
right before leaving for work, and busily engage herself in similar
work including preparation of meals, when she returns from work.
17. The coexistence of progress and violence signals to a paradox.
Legal and economic advancements are visible on a macro-level,
but patriarchy still permeates the everyday. Dowry is outlawed and
has been for decades but the social legitimacy that sustains it is yet
to be dismantled. Welfare schemes can incentivize education, but
cannot alter long-held beliefs about women’s roles within marriage
and family. As a result, practices such as domestic abuse or even
extreme acts like burning a wife (such as in this case) persist
not as aberrations, but as indications of a disease afflicted social
order.
13 https://www.ncrb.gov.in/uploads/files/1CrimeinIndia2023PartI1.pdf
14 https://ncwapps.nic.in/frmReportNatureState.aspx?Year=2023;
https://ncwapps.nic.in/frmReportNatureState.aspx?Year=2024;
https://ncwapps.nic.in/frmReportNatureState.aspx?Year=2025
312 [2026] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
18. After decades of laws, schemes, reforms, and judicial recognition
of equality across workplaces, homes, personal relationships, and
even the armed forces, why does the control over women’s bodies,
choices, and lives still persist so deeply within society? Perhaps,
the answer lies only with “We, the People of India”.
Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "Dying declaration"Sign in to search