Holding

A mere plea of divorce in a written statement, unaccompanied by proof of pronouncement, does not effect a talaq; the marriage remains subsisting and the husband continues to be liable for maintenance.

Summary

Shamim Ara, a Muslim wife, filed an application under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code seeking maintenance on grounds of desertion and cruelty. The husband, Respondent No.2, denied the claim and in his written statement asserted that he had divorced her on 11 July 1987, relying on the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The Family Court, relying on an affidavit and the written statement, held that the divorce was effective and denied maintenance; the High Court later limited maintenance only up to the date the written statement was filed (5 December 1990). On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a mere plea of divorce in a written statement, without any proof of pronouncement, does not constitute a valid talaq and therefore does not dissolve the marriage. Consequently, the husband remains liable for maintenance until it lawfully ceases, and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

The validity of a divorce pleaded in a written statement without proof of pronouncement under Muslim personal law
Whether such a plea can be treated as communication of talaq for purposes of terminating maintenance liability under Section 125 CrPC

Legislation cited

Subjects

Section 125 CrPCTalaqMuslim personal lawDivorceMaintenanceWritten statementProof of pronouncementFamily CourtHigh CourtSupreme Court

Judgment

SHAMIM ARA A
v.
STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.

OCTOBER I, 2002

[R.C. LAHOTI AND P. VENKATARAMA REDD!, JJ.] B

Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1973-Section 125-Claimfor maintenance
ly Muslim wife-Husband taking a plea of divorce in written statement without
any proof of talaq-Family court and High Court holding it as talaq-On C
appeal, held mere plea of divorce taken in written statement cannot be treated
as pronouncement of talaq on wife on the date offiling of the written statement
in the court followed by delivery of a copy thereof to the wife-Thus marriage
does not dissolve and wife entitled to maintenance.

Words and Phrases: D
'Pronounce '-Meaning of-Discussed

Appellant-wife filed an application for mainte'nance complaining
desertion and cruelty on the part of her husband, Respondent No.2. The
husband pleaded in the written statement that he had divorced the E
appellant on 11.7.87. Family Court referred to some affidavit of 1988 filed
in civil suit wherein respondent No. 2 had stated that he had divorced
appellant a year ago and held that appellant having been divorced was
not entitled to any maintenance. Appellant filed a revision. High Court
held that communication of divorce stood completed on the date
respondent No.2 filed written statement in the present proceedings and F
appellant was entitled to claim maintenance upto the date of
communication of divorce, whereafter the maintenance would cease. Hence
the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
G
HELD: 1.1. A mere plea taken in the written statement, of a divorce
having been pronounced sometime in the past cannot by itself be treated
as effectuating talaq on the date of delivery of the copy of the written
statement to the wife. So also an affidavit filed in some previous judicial
19 H
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R ..

A proceedings not inter parte, containing a self-serving statement of
respondent No.2-husband, could not have been read in evidence as relevant
and of any value. The talaq to be effective has to be pronounced. The term
'pronounce' means to proclaim, to utter formally, to utter rhetorically,
to declare, to utter, and to articulate. There is no proof of talaq having
B taken place on 11. 7.1987. Respondent No. 2 ought to have adduced
evidence and proved the pronouncement of talaq on 11.7.1987 and if he
failed in proving the plea raised in the writteu1 statement, the plea ought
to have been treated as failed. Thus High Co11rt erred in upholding the
plea taken in the written statement and its communication to the wife by
·delivering a copy of the written statement as talaq. (28-G, H; 29-A-CI
c 1.2. Neither tht marriage between the parties stands dissolved on the
date of filing written statement nor does the 1.iability of respondent No.2
to pay maintenance come to an end on that d!ay. Respondent No.2 shall
continue to remain liable for payment of main1tenance until the obligation
comes to an end in accordance with law. (29-D-Ef
D
Syed Jama/uddin v. Va/ian Bee and Anr., (1975) 2 APLJ 20 and Sri
.liauddin Ahmed v. Mrs. Anwara Begum, (1981) I GLR 358, disapproved.

Mohammed Haneefa v. Pathummal Beevi, (1972) K.L.T. 512; A. Yousuf
Rawther v. Sowramma, AIR (1971) Kerala 261; Must. Rukia Khatun v. Abdul
E Khalique laskar, (1981) 1 GLR 375 and Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain, AIR
(1979) SC 362, referred to.

Dr. Tahir Mahomood's, 'The Muslim law of India' (Second Edition,
pp. 113-119); Mui/a on Principles of Mahomedan law (Nineteenth Edition,
1990 para 310) and Chambers 20thCenllllJ' Diclionwy, New Edition, p 1030,
F referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLXTE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
465 of 1996.

From the Judgment and. Order dated 28.2.1995 of the Allahabad r
G High Court i'Jl Crl. R. No. 710 of 1993.

Praveen Swarup for Pramod Swarup, for the Appellant.

A.S. 'Pundir (NP), for the Respondent No. I.

H Arvind Varma for Mis. K.L. Mehta & Co. for the Respondent No. 2.
SHAMIM ARA v. STATE OF U.P. [R.C. LAHOTI, .I.) 21
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
R.C. LAHOTI, J. Shamim Ara, the appellant and Abrar Ahmad, the
respondent no.2 were married some time in 1968 according to Mus)im Shariyat
Law. Four sons were born out of the wedlock. On 12.4.1979, the appellant,
on behalf of herself and for her two minor children, filed an application
under Section 125 Cr.P.C. complaining of desertion and cruelty on the part B
of respondent no.2 with her. By order dated 3.4.1993 the learned Presiding
Judge of the Family Court at Allahabad· refused to grant any maintenance to
the appellant on the ground that she was already divorced by the respondent
and hence not entitled to any maintenance. However, maintenance at the rate
of Rs. 150 per month was allowed for one son of the appellant for the period C
during which he remained a minor; the other one having become major
during the pendency of the proceedings.

The respondent no.2 in his reply (written statement) dated 5.12.1990,
to the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C., denied all the averments made
in the application. One of rhe pleas taken by way of additional pleas is that D
... he had divorced the appellant on 11.7.1987 and since then the parties had
ceased to be spouses. He also claimed protection behind the Muslim Women
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 and submitted that the respondent
no.2 had purchased a house and delivered the same to the appellant in lieu
of Mehar (Dewer), and therefore, the appellant was not entitled to any
maintenance. No particulars of divorce were pleaded excepting making a E
bald statement as already stated hereinabove.

The appellant emphatically denied having been divorced at any time.
The respondent no.2, when he appeared in the witness-box, stated having
divorced the appellant on 11.7.1987 at 11 a.m. in the presence of Mehboob F
and other 4-5 persons of the neighbourhood. He further stated tha~ since 1988
he had not paid anything either to the appellant or to any of the four sons for
their maintenance. The divorce said to have been given by him to the appellant
was a triple talaq though such a fact was not stated in the written statement.

The Family Court in its order dated 3 .4.1993 dealt with and upheld a G
strange story of divorce totally beyond the case set up by the respondent
no.2. The learned Presiding Judge referred to some affidavit dated 31.8.1988
said to have been filed by the respondent No.2 in some civil suit details
whereof are not available from the record of the present case but certainly to
which litigation the appellant was not a party. In that affidavit it was stated
by the respondent no.2 that he had d.ivorced the appellant 15 months before. H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A The learned Judge held that from such affidavit the plea of the respondent
no.2 found corroboration of his having divorced the appellant. The learned
Judge concluded that the appellant was not e:ntitled to any maintenance in
view of her having been divorced.

The appellant preferred a revision before the High Court. The High
B Court held that the divorce which is alleged to have been given by the
respondent no.2 to the appellant was not given in the presence of the appellant
and it is not the case of the respondent that the same was communicated to
her. But the communication would stand completed on 5.12.1990 with the
filing of the written statement by the respondent no.2 in the present case.
C Therefore, the High Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to claim
maintenance from 1.1.1988 to 5.12.1990 (the later date being the one on
which reply to application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. was filed by the
respondent No.2 in the Court) whereafter her entitlement to have maintenance
from respondent no.2 shall cease. The figure of maintenance was appointed
by the High Court at Rs. 200.
D
The appellant has filed this appeal by special leave. The singular issue
arising for decision is whether the appellant can be said to have been divorced
..
and the said divorce communicated to the appellant so as to become effective
from 5.12.1990, the date of filing of the written statement by the respondent
no.2 in these proceedings.
E
None of the ancient holy books or scriptures of muslims mentions in
its text such a form of divorce as has been accepted by the High Court and
the Family Court. No such text has been brought to our notice which provides
that a recital in any document, whether a plead:ing or an affidavit, incorporating
F a statement by the husband that he has already divorced his wife on an
unspecifie\I or specified date even if not communicated to the wife would
become an effective divorce on the date on which the wife happens to learn
of such statement contained in the copy of the affidavit or pleading served
on her. Mulla on Principles of Mahomedan Law (Nineteenth Edition, 1990)
states vi de para 3 10 :-
G
"310. Talak may be oral or in writing.-A talak may be effected
(I) orally (by spoken words) or (2) by a written document called a
talaknama (d).

( 1) Oral Talak-No particular form of words is prescribed for effecting
H a talak. If the words are express (saheeh) or well understood as
SHAM IM ARA v. STATE OF U.P. [R.C. LAHOTLJ.) 23
implying divorce no proof of intention is required. If the words are A
ambiguous (kinayat), the intention must be proved (e). It is not
necessary that the talak should be pronounced in the presence of the
wife or even addressed to her (f). In a Calcutta case the husband
merely pronounced the word "talak" before a family council and this
was held to be invalid as the wife was not named (g). This case was
cited with approval by the Judicial Committee in a case where the B
talak was valid though pronounced in the wife's absence, as the wife
was named (h). The Madras High Court has also held that the words
should refer to the wife (i). The talak pronounced in the absence of
the wife takes effect though not communicated to her, but for purposes
of dower it is not necessary that it should come to her knowledge (j); C
and her alimony may continue till she is informed of the divorce (k).
As the divorce becomes effective for purposes of dower only when
... communicated to the wife, limitation under Art. I 04 for the wife's
suit for deferred dower ran from the time when the divorce comes to
her notice (I), under the Act of 1908. See also the Limitation Act,
19~. D
··~
Words of divorce.-The words of divorce must indicate an
intention to dissolve the marriage. If they are express (saheeh), e.g.,
"Thou art divorced," "I have divorced thee," or "I divorce my wife
for ever and render her haram from me" [Rashid Ahmad v. Anisa
Khatun, (1932) 59 I.A. 21], they clearly indicate an intention to E
dissolve the marriage and no proof of intention is necessary. But if
they are ambiguous (kinayat), e.g., "Thou art my cousin, the daughter
of my uncle, if thou goest" [Hamid Ali v. lmtiazan, (1878) 2 All.71]
or "I give up all relations and would have no connection of any sort
with you" [Wajid Ali v. Jafar Husain, (1932) 7 Luck, 430, 136 1.C. F
209, ('32) A.0.34], the intention must be proved.

Pronouncement of the word talak in the presence of the wife or
when the knowledge of such pronouncement comes to the knowledge
~. l of the wife, results in the dissolution of the marriage. The intention
of the husband is inconsequential. Ghansi Bibi v. Chu/am Dastagir, G
( 1968) I Mys. L.J. 566.

If a man says to his wife that she has been divorced yesterday or
earlier, it leads to a divorce between them, even if there be no proof
of a divorce on the previous day or earlier."
H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A [(f) Ma Mi v. Ka/lander Amma/, supra; Ahmad Kasim v. Khatoon
Bibi, (1932) 59 Cal. 833, 141 l.C. 689, ('33) A.C. 27; Fulchand
v. Nazib Ali, (1909) 36 Cal. 184, I J.C. 740; Sarabai v. Rabiabai,
(1905) 30 Bom. 536 (obiter).

(g) Furzund Hussein v. Janu Bibee, (1878) 4 Cal. 588.
B
(h) Rashid Ahmad v. Anisa Khatoon, (1932) 59 I.A. 21, 54 All.46,
135 1.C. 762, ('32) A.P.C. 25.

(i) Asha Bibi v. Kadir, supra.

U) Fulchand v. Nazib Ali, supra.
c
(k) Ma Mi v. Kallandar Ammo!, supra; Abdul Khader v. Azeeza Bee,
(1944) 1 M.L.J. 17, 214 I.C. 38, ('44) A.M. 227.

(I) Kathiyumma v. Urathe/ Marakkar, (1931) 133 I.C. 375, ('31)
A.M. 647.]
D
The statement of law by Mu Ila as contained in para 310 and footnotes
thereunder is based on certain rulings of Privy Council and the High Courts.
The decision of A.P. High Court in (1975) 2 APLJ 20 has also been cited by
Mu Ila in support of the proposition that the statement by husband in pleadings
filed in answer to petition for maintenance by wife that he had already divorced
E the petitioner (wife) long ago operates as divorce.

Wt. will offer our comments on this a little later. Immediately we proceed
to notice a few other authorities.

In Dr. Tahir Mahmood's 'The Muslim Law of India' (Second Edition,
F at pp. I 13·119), the basic rule stated is that a Muslim husband under all
schools of Muslim Law can divorce his wife by his unilateral action and
without the intervention of the Court. This power is known as the power to
pronounce a talaq. A few decided cases are noticed by the learned author
wherein it. has been held that a statement made by the husband during the
G course of any judicial proceedings such as in wife's suit for maintenance or
restitution of conjugal rights, or the husband's plea of divorce raised in the
pleadings did effect a talaq.

Sue~ liberal view of talaq bringing to an end the marital relationship
between Muslim spouses and heavily loaded in favour of Muslim husbands
H has met with criticism and strong disapproval at the hands of eminent jurists.
SHAMIM ARA v. STATE OF U.P. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.) 25
V. Khalid, J., as His Lordship then was, observed in Mohammed Haneefa A
v. Pathummal Beevi, (1972) K.L.T. 512-"I feel it my duty to ale1i public
opinion towards a painful aspect that this case reveals. A Division Bench of
this court, the highest court for this State, has clearly indicated the extent of
the unbridled power of a muslim husband to divorce his wife. I am extracting
below what Their Lordships have said in Pathayi v. Moideen, (1968) KLT B
763.

"The only condition necessary for the valid exercise of the right
of divorce by a husband is that he must be a major and of sound mind
at that time. He can effect divorce whenever he desires. Even if he
divorces his wife under compulsion, or in jest, or in anger that is C
considered perfectly valid. No special form is necessary for effecting
divorce under Hanafi law ............. The husband can effect if by
conveying to the wife that he is repudiating the alliance. It need not
even be addressed to her. It takes effect the moment it comes to her
knowledge."
D
Should muslim wives suffer this tyranny for all times? Should their personal
.., law remain so cruel towards these unfortunate wives? Can it not be amended
suitably to alleviate their sufferings? My judicial conscience is disturbed at
this monstrosity. The question is whether the conscience of the leaders of
public opinion of the community will also be disturbed."(p.514) In an
illuminating judgment, virtually a research document, the eminent judge and E
jurist V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., as His Lordship then was, has made extensive
observations. The judgment is reported as A. Yousuf Rawther v. Sowramma,
AIR ( 1971) Kerala 261. It would suffice for our purpose to extract and
reproduce a few out of the several observations made by His Lordship:-

"The interpretation of a legislation, obviously intended to protect F
....... a weaker section of the community, like women, must be informed
by the social perspective and purpose and, within its grammatical
flexibility, must further the beneficent object. And so we must
appreciate the Islamic ethos and the general sociological background
which inspired the enactment of the law before locating the precise G
connotation of the words used in the statute. (para 6)

"Since infallibility is not an attribute of the judiciary, the view
has been ventured by Muslim jurists that the lndo-Anglian judicial
exposition of the Islamic law of divorce has not exactly been just to
the Holy Prophet or the Holy Book. Marginal distortions are inevitable H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A when the Judicial Committee in Downing Street has to interpret Manu
and Muhammad of India and Arabia. The soul of a culture-law is
largely the formalized and enforceable expression of a community's
cultural norms-{;annot be fully understood by alien minds. The view
that the Muslim husband enjoys an arbitrary, unilateral power to inflict
instant divorce does not accord with Islamic injunctions." (para 7)
B
· "It is a popular fallacy that a Muslim male enjoys, under the
Quaranic Law, unbridled authority to liquidate the marriage. ''The
whole Quoran expressly forbids a man to seek pretexts for divorcing
his wife, so long as she remains faithful and obedient to him, 'if they
(namely, women) obey you, then do not seek a way against them'."
c (Quaran IV:34). The Islamic "law gives to the man primarily the
faculty of dissolving the marriage, if tht: wife, by her indocility or her
bad character, renders the married life unhappy; but in the absence of
serious reasons, no man can justify a divorce, either in the eye of
.,
religion or the law. If he abandons his wife or puts her away in
D simple caprice, he draws upon himself the divine anger, for the curse
of God, said the Prophet, rests on him who repudiates his wife
capriciously." (para 7)

"Commentators on the Quoran have rightly observed-and this
tallies with the law now administered in some Muslim countries like
E Iraq-that the husband must satisfy the court about the reasons for
divorce. However, Muslim law, as applied in India, has taken a course
contrary to the spirit of what the Prophet or the Holy Quoran laid·
down and the same misconception vitiates the law dealing with the
wife's right to divorce." (para 7)

F "After quoting from the Quoran and the Prophet, Dr. Galwash
concludes that "divorce is permissible in Islam only in cases of extreme
emergency. When all efforts for effecting 3 reconciliation have failed,
the parties may proceed to a dissolution of the marriage by 'Talaq'
or by 'Khola'. ............. Consistently with the secular concept
of marriage and divorce, the law insists that at the time of Talaq the
G
husband must pay off the settlement debt to the wife and at the time
of Kholaa she has to surrender to the husband her dower or abandon
some of her rights, as compensation." (para 7)

There is yet another illuminating and weighty judicial opinion available
H in two decisions of Gauhati High Court recorded by Baharul Islam, J. (later
SHAMIM ARA v. ST ATE OF U.P. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 27
a Judge of the Supreme Court of India) sitting singly in Sri Jiauddin Ahmed A
v. Mrs. Anwara Begum, (1981) I GLR 358 and later speaking forthe Division
Bench in Must. Rukia Khatun v. Abdul Khalique laskar, (1981) I GLR 375.

- In Jiauddin Ahmed's case a plea of previous divorce, i.e. the husband having
divorced the wife on some day much previous to the date of filing of the
written statement in the Court was taken and upheld. The question posed B
before the High Court was whether there has been valid talaq of the wife by
the husband under the Muslim law? The learned Judge observed that though
marriage under the Muslim law is only a civil contract yet the rights and
responsibilities consequent upon it are of such importance to the welfare of
humanity, that a high degree of sanctity is attached to it. But inspite of the
sacredness of the character of the marriage-tie, Islam recognizes the necessity, C
in exceptional circumstances, of keeping the way open for its dissolution.
(Para 6). Quoting in the judgment several Holy Quranic verses and from
commentaries thereon by well-recognized scholars of great eminence, the
learned Judge expressed disapproval of the statement that "the whimsical and
capricious divorce by the husband is good in law, though bad in theology"
and observed that such a statement is based on the concept that women were D
chattel belonging to men, which the Holy Quran does not brook. The rnrrect
law of talaq as ordained by the Holy Quran is that talaq must bt for a
reasonable cause and be preceded by attempts at reconciliation between the
husband and the wife by two arbiters-one from the wife's family and the
other from the husband's; if the attempts fail, talaq may be effected. (Para E
13). In Rukia Khatun 's case, the Division Bench stated that the correct law
oftalaq, as ordained by Holy Quran, is: (i) that 'talaq' must be for a reasonable
cause: and (ii) that it must be preceded by an attempt of reconciliation between
the husband and the wife by two arbiters, one chosen by the wife from her
family and the other by the husband from his. If their attempts fail, 'talaq'
may be effected. The Division Bench expressly recorded its dissent from the F
Calcutta and Bombay view which, in their opinion, did not lay down the
correct law.

We are in respectful agreement with the abovesaid observations made
( ' by the learned Judges of High Courts. We must note that the observations G
were made 20-30 years before and our country has in recent times marched
steps ahead in all walks of life including progressive interpretation of laws
which cannot be lost sight of except by compromising with regressive trends.
What this Court observed in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain, AIR (1979) SC 362
dealing with right to maintenance of a muslim divorcee is noteworthy. To
qu~: H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A "The meaning of meanings is derived from values in a given society
and its legal system. Article 15(3) has compelling, compassionate
relevance in the context of S.125 and the benefit of doubt, if any, in
statutory interpretation belongs to the ill-used wife and the derelict
divorcee. This social perspective gramed, the resolution of all the -
disputes projected is easy. Surely, Parliament, in keeping with Art.
B 15(3) and deliberate by design, made a special provision to help
women in distress cast away by divorce. Protection against moral and
material abandonment manifest in Art.39 is part of social and economic
jusiice, specificated in Art.38, fulfillment of which is fundamental to
the governance of the country (Art.37). From this coign of vantage
C we must view .the printed text of the particular Code." (para 7)

"Law is dynamic and its meaning cannot be pedantic but purposeful."
(para 12)
:.r
The plea taken by the husband-respondent no.2 in his written statement
D may be re-noticed. The respondent No.2 vaguely makes certain generalized
accusations against the wife-appellant and states that ever since the marriage
he found his wife to be sharp, shrewd and mischievous. Accusing the wife
of having· brought. disgrace to the family, the: respondent No.2 proceeds to
state, vide para 12 (translated into English)--"The answering respondent,
feeling fade up with all such activities unbecoming of the wife-petitioner, has
E divorced her on 11.7.87." The particulars of the alleged talaq are not pleaded
nor the circumstances under which and the persons, if any, in whose presence
talaq was pronounced have been stated. Such deficiency continued to prevail
even during the trial and the respondent No.2, except examining himself,
adduced no evidence in proof of talaq said to have been given by him on
F 11.7.1987. There are no reasons substantiated in justification oftalaq and no
plea or proof that any effort at reconciliation preceded the talaq. ....
We are also of the opinion that the talaq to be effective has to be
pronounced. The term 'pronounce' means to proclaim, to utter formally, to
utter rhetorically, to declare to, utter, to articulate (See Chambers 20th Century
G Dictionary, New Edition, p. l 030). There is no proef of talaq having taken
place on 11.7.1987. What the High Court has upheld as talaq is the plea taken
in the written statement and its communication to the wife by delivering a
copy ofthe written statement on 5.12.1990. We are very clear in our mind ·
that a mere plea taken in the written statement of a divorce having been
pronounced sometime in the past cannot by itself be treated as effectuating
H talaq on the date of delivery of the copy of the written statement to the wife.
t
SHAMIMARA v. STATEOFU.P. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.) 29
The respondent No.2 ought to have adduced evidence and proved the A
pronouncement of talaq on 11.7.1987 and if he failed in proving the plea
raised in the written statement, the plea ought to have been treated as failed.
We do not agree with the view propounded in the decided cases referred to
by Mulla and Dr. Tahir Mahmood in their respective commentaries, wherein
a mere plea of previous talaq taken in the written statement, though
unsubstantiated, has been accepted as proof of talaq bringing to an end the B
marital relationship with effect from the date of filing of the written statement.
A plea of previous divorce taken in the written statement cannot at all be
treated as pronouncement of talaq by the husband on wife on the date of
filing of the written statement in the Court followed by delivery of a copy
thereof. to the wife. So also the affidavit dated 31.8.1988, filed in some C
previous judicial proceedings not inter parte, containing a self-serving statement
of respondent no.2, could not have been read in evidence as relevant and of
any value.

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. Neither the marriage
between the parties stands dissolved on 5.12.1990 nor does the liability of the D
respondent No.2 to pay maintenance comes to an end on that day. The
respondent No.2 shall continue to remain liable for payment of maintenance
until the obligation comes to an end in accordance with law. The costs in this
appeal shall be borne by the respondent No.2.

N.J. Appeal allowed. E
,1