Holding

The Collector does not have the power under section 6E to release seized essential commodities to the owner; the power of release is confined to sale or distribution to the public.

Summary

The petitioner, a mustard oil manufacturer, had 562 bags of mustard seeds and 262 tins of oil seized under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 for alleged licence violations. After the seizure, the Collector, invoking section 6E, ordered the release of the goods to the petitioner, even though confiscation proceedings were pending. The State Government challenged this order, and the Calcutta High Court set it aside, holding that the Collector lacked authority to release the seized commodity. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the scheme of sections 6A, 6B, 6C and 6E, concluding that the term "release" in section 6E is limited to sale or distribution to the public and does not permit the Collector to return the commodity to its owner while prosecution is ongoing. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court’s decision and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the Collector, under section 6E of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, is empowered to release seized essential commodities to the owner or person from whom they were seized during pending confiscation and prosecution.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Essential Commodities Act, 1955s. 3, s. 6A, s. 6B, s. 6C, s. 6E, s. 7(1)(b)

Subjects

Essential Commodities Actseizureconfiscationrelease of goodscollector's powerssection 6Epublic interestsale of essential commodity

Judgment

SHAMBHU DAYAL AGARWALA
A
v.
I STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR.
~··
MAY 3, 1990

[S. RANGANATHAN AND A.M. AHMADI, JJ.] B

Essential Commodities Act, 1955: Sections 3, 6A to 6C, 6£ and ·
7( l)(b)-:-Seizure of essential commodity under section 6A-Breach of
?rder under ~ection 3-Prosecution proceedings pending-,-Bar on
courts to make an order with regard to the possession, delivery, dis-
oosal, rel~ase or distribution of such commodity except the Collector-
_r Whether the Collector empowered to release the seized goods to owner c
or to the person from whom the commodity is seized?

t On September. 20, 1987 the officers of the Enforcement Branch
raided the factory premises of the Appellant engaged in the
manufacture of Mustard Oil. 562 bags of mustard seeds and 262 tins of D
oil were seized for alleged violation of the conditions of licence as well as
orders issued under section 3 of the Act. An F .I.R. was lodged with the
police and as required under section 6A, the report of the seizure of the
goods was also made to the Collector followed by filing of a Charge-
sheet before the Special Judge. The petitioner moved the High Court by
a Writ Petition for quashing the proceedings. The learned single Judge E
of the High Court disposed of the Writ Petition reserving liberty to the
Petitioner to move the concerned Collector for release of the seized
goods. The Petitioner accordingly moved an application under section
6E before the concerned Additional Collector for release of the seized
~oods. The Collector dropped the confiscation proceedings and ordered
the release of the seized goods to the Petitioner. Against this order the F
State Government preferred a Revision to the High Court. The High
Court allowed the Revision and set aside the order of release of the
"ized goods passed by the Collector holding that .;oder the provision•
of section 6A read with section 6E of the Act, the Collector had no
power to release the seized goods. Aggrieved by this order the Petitioner
has come up in appeal by special leave to this Court. G

Dismissing the appeal, th\s Court.

HELD: The Scheme of sections 6A. 6B and 6C makes it clear that
after the es~ential commodity is seized and the same is inspected hy the
concerned Collector, the latter has to decide after complying with th• H

987
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

A procedure set out in section 6B, whether or not to confiscate the essen-
\
tial commodity. Since the procedure delineated in section 6B is time
consuming, the Collector has been given special power to sell the essen-
tial commodity as stated in sub-section (2) of section 6A ifit is subject to
-
speedy and natural decay or it is expedient in public interest so to do. If
the Collector decides not to confiscate the commodity and if no prosecu-
B tion is launched or contemplated the commodity has to he returned to
the owner or person from wltom it was seized. If in the meantime it is
sold in exercise of power under sub-section (2) of Section 6A, the price
of eomniodity has to-·be ·paid as provided hy sub-section (3) of section
6A.;/998l:-E]
.ca; -
C Suh-section (2) of section 6C uses the prefix 'return' followed by
the words 'the essential commodity seized' and not the word 'release'.
It seems that having regard to the scheme of the Act, the object and
.J
purpose of the statute and the mischief it seeks to guard against, the
word 'release' is used in the limited sense of release for sale, etc., so that
the same becomes available to the consumer public. There could be no
D question of releasing the commodity in the sense of returning it to the
owner or person from whom it was seized even before the proceeding
for confiscation stood complet~ and before the termination of the pro-
.secution in the acquittal of the offender. [998F-H]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
E No.310of1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated Jl.5.1988 of the Calcutta
High Court in Cr!. Rvn. No. 402 of 1988.

P.P. Rao, R.K. Gupta and P.C. Kapur for the Appellant.
-
F
Kapil Sibbal, Additional Solicitor General, G. Venkatesh Rao, -.J
D.K. Sinha, J.R. Das, H.K. Puri and A. Paul for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G AHMADI, J. Special /eave granted.

The short que~tion which arises for our determination is whether ~.
the Collector to whom a report of seizure of any essential commodity is
made under section 6A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955
H' (hereinafter called 'the Act'), is empowered by virtue of section 6E of
the Act to release the goods seized in pursuance of an order made
S.D. AGARWALA v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [AHMADI, l.l 989

_J_ undersection 3 in relation thereto during the pendency of the proceed-
ings before the Special Court? The facts, in brief, are as Under:
A

The petitioner being engaged in the manufacture of mustard oi1
at his factory at 1, Canal Road, Police Station Behala, Calcutta-53,
was required to maintain a stock of mustard seed at his factory pre-
mises. A contingent of officers of the District Enforcement Branch led B
by the Investigating Officer Gopal Mosat, the complainant, raided the
factory premises of the petitioner on the morning of Sunday,
September 20, 1987, in the absence of the petitioner. The said raid
continued till the early hours of September 21, 1987. During the said
raid 562 bags of Mustard Seeds and 267 tins of Mustard Oil, weighing
about 39. 92 quintals, were seized for purported infraction of the condi-
tions of the licence as well as the orders issued under section 3 of the c
t Act. The Investigating Officer filed a written complaint in that behalf
at the Behala Police Station which came to be treated as the First
Information Report. The report of the seizure of the essential com-
modity was made to the concerned Collector as required by section 6A
of the Act for initiating confiscation proceedings. On September 27, D
1987, a charge-sheet was filed before the learned Special Judge. It may
be mentioned that before the submission of the charge-sheet a Writ
Petition was filed in the High Court wherein certain interim orders
were made with which we are not concerned. Suffice it to say that the
said Writ Petition was disposed of by a learned Single Judge of the
High Court on February 2, 1988, reserving liberty to the petitioner to E
apply for release of the seized goods to the Collector before whom the
confiscation proceedings were pending. Thereupon, the petitioner
preferred an application on February 9, 1988 under section 6E of the
Act before the Additional Collector for release of the seized com-
modities. On March 11, 1988 the said officer dropped the confiscation
proceedings, albeit without prejudice to the prosecution pending F
before the Special Judge, and directed the release of the seized com-
modities. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of release, the State
Government invoked .the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.
The said Criminal Revision No. 402 of 1988 was allowed by the High
Court on May 11, 1988. The High Court set aside the impugned order
of release of the seized goods holding that under the provisions of G
section 6A read with section 6E of the Act, the Collector had no power
to order release of the seized commodity. The High Court approached
the question thus:

"Under Section 6A of the Act the Collector has under
certain circumstances been given power to confiscate the H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

goods. By Section 6A the Collector has not been given any \
A
power to release the goods. Section 6E is to be read in the '--
perspective of the provision of Section 6A of the Act be-
cause of the phrase "pending confiscation" under Section
6A used in Section 6E. If the Collector has not been given
any power to release the goods under Section 6A, it can
B never be assumed that by Section 6E which gives some
interim power to the Collector with reference to the pro- ':..·
ceeding under Section 6A, the Collector has been given any
power to release the goods after finding that the goods
cannot be confiscated. Under Section 6A the Collector may
order confiscation of the essential commodities so seized. -\ -
He has not been given any power to release the goods."
c
Mr. P.P. Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant )
contended that on the Collector having dropped the confiscation pro-
ceedings it was incumbent on him to pass the consequential order of
release under section 6E of the Act. According to him since the juris-
D diction of the Court to make orders with regard to the possession,
delivery, disposal, release or distribution of such essential commodity
is specifically and expressly barred by section 6E of the Act, the Col-
lector alone has jurisdiction to order release of the seized goods. The
words 'pending confiscation' employed in section 6E of the Act go with
the word 'seize' and are, therefore, descriptive of the essential com-
E modity and are not intended to limit the powers of the Collector.
argued counsel. He, therefore, submitted that section 6E confers wide
powers on the Collector to release the goods at any stage of the pro-
ceedings and the High Court was not justified in placing a narrow
construction on the language of the said provision. On the other hand
-
Mr. Kapil Sibal, the learned Additional Solicitor General while sup-
F porting the impugned order of the High Court, argued that tlle power
to release conferred by section 6E on the Collector refers to release in
favour of a third party and not the party from whom the essential
commodity was seized. According to him if the construction placed on
section 6E on behalf of the petitioner is accepted it would defeat the
very purpose of the Act. He. therefore, submitted that this was not a fit
G case to interfere with the order passed by the Division Bench of the
High Court.

In order to appreciate the rival view-points we may at the outset
examine the scheme of the Act. The Act, as the Preamble reveals, was
enacted to provide, in the interest of the general public, for the control
H of production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in
S.D. AGARWALA v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [AHMADI, J.[ 991

certain commodities. It extends to the whole of India. The dictionary
A
of the Act is contained in section 2. Section 2(ia) defines 'Code' to
mean the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 2(f) says that
words and expressions used but not defined in the Act and defined in
the Code shall have the meanings assigned to them in the Code. Sec-
tion 3 empowers the Central Government to provide for regulating or
prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of essential com- B
modity and trade and commerce therein if the same is considered
necessary or expedient inter alia for maintaining or increasing supplies
of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution
and availability at fair prices. Sub-section (2) of section 3 outlines what
an order made under sub-section (1) thereof may provide. Besides
regulating by licences, permits or otherwise the manufacture or pro-
duction of any essential commodity or the storage, transport, distribu-
c
tion, disposal, acquisition, use, consumption, etc., thereof, the order
may, inter alia, provide for controlling the _prices at which the essential
commodity may be bought or sold and may also require any person
holding in stock any essential commodity to sell the whole or a
specified part of the quantity held in stock or produced or received by D
him or likely to be produced or received by him to the Central Govern-
ment or a State Government or to an officer or agent of such Govern-
ment, etc. Sub-section (3) of section 3 provides for determination of
r the price to be paid to the person from whom the essential commodity
is so purchased. Section 6 lays down that an order passed under section
3 will have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith con- E
tained in any other enactment or instrument. Then comes section 6A
which provides for the confiscation of essential commodity. Sub-
section ( 1) of this section may be reproduced for ready reference:

"6A-Where any essential commodity is seized in pur-
suance of an order made under section 3 in relation thereto F
it shall be reported without any unreasonable delay to the
Collector of the district in which such essential commodity
is seized and the Collector may, if he thinks it expedient so
to do, inspect or cause to be inspected such essential com-
modity, whether or not the prosecution is instituted for the
contravention of such order and the Collector, if satisfied G
that there has been a contravention of the order, may order
confiscation of-

(a) the essential commodities so seized;

(b) any package, covering or receptacle m which such H
essential commodity is found; and
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

A (c) any animal,. vehicle, vessel, or other conveyance used
in carrying such essential commodity;"

Sub-section (2) of the said section empowers the Collector to sell any
\
-
essential commodity, if the same is subject to speedy and natural decay
or it is otherwise expedient so to do in public interest, at the controlled
B price, if any, fixed therefor or by public auction if no such price is
fixed. If the Central or the State Government has fixed the retail sale
price of such commodity under the Act or under any other law, the
Collector is empowered to order its sale through fair price shops at the
price so fixed. Section 6B posits that no order of confiscation of any
essential commodity or conveyance, etc., shall be made unless the
c owner or the person from whom it is seized has been served with a
notice informing him of the grounds. on which it is proposed to con-
fiscate the same and he has been given reasonable time to make a l
representation in writing against the grounds set out in the notice and
has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. This section
incorporates the principles of natural justice to ensure that the owner
D of person from whom the essential commodity is seized has the fullest
opportunity to satisfy the Collector against passing a confiscation
order under Section 6A. An appeal is provided by section 6C against
the order of confiscation passed under section 6A. Section 60 clarifies
that an award of confiscation under the Act by the Collector shall not
prevent the infliction of any punishment to which the concerned
E person is liable under the Act. We then come to Section 6E which was
inserted in the Act in place of the existing provision by Act No. 42 of
1986 with effect from 9th September, 1986. Since the incident in ques-
tion relates to a date subsequent to 9th September, 1986, it is unneces-
sary to notice the earlier provision. Section 6E which confers exclusive
-
jurisdiction on the Collector and in the State Government concerned I
F under section 6C to pass certain orders pending confiscation reads as
under:

"Whenever any essential commodity is seized in pursuance
of an order made under Section 3 in relation thereto, or any
package, covering or receptacle in which such essential·
G commodity is found, or any animal, vehicle, vessel ~r other
conveyance used in carrying such essential commodity is
seized pending confiscation under Section 6-A, the Collec-
tor, or, as the case may be, the State Government con-
cerned under Section 6-C shall have, and, notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the
H time being in force, any court, tribunal or other authority
S.D. AGARWALA v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [AHMADI, J.] 993

shall. not have, jurisdiction to make orders with.regard to
the possession, delivery, disposal, release or distribution.of
A
such essential commodity, package, covering, receptacle,
animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance".

It is obvious on a plain reading of this provision that the same was
brought on the statute book with a view to debarring the courts from B
making any order with regard to the possession, delivery, disposal or
distribution of any essential commodity seized under an order made
under section 3 of the Act. Section 7 prescribed the penalties for the
contravention of any order made under section 3 and provides for the
forfeiture of the essential commodity to the Govermnent and for the
-·~ forfeiture of any anim.U, vehicle or other conveyanre used in carrying
the said essential commodity, if the court so orders. Section lOA
( makes every offence under the Act cognizable and non-bailable,
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code. Section 11 provides
that no Court shall take congnizanre of any offence punishable under
the Act except on a report made by a public servant as defined by
section 21, l.P.C., or any person aggrieved or any recognised con- D
sumer association. Section 12A empowers the State Govermnent to
constitute by notification as many Special Courts as may be necessary
and Section 12AA, which begins with a non-obstante clause-notwith-
standing an)'thing contained in the Code-provides that all o.ffences
r under the Act shall be triable only by the Special Court constituted for
the area in which the offence was committed. Section 12AC makes the E
provisions of the Code (including the provisions as to bail and bonds)
applicable to the proceedings before the Special Courts as if it is a
--(
Court of Sessions unless the Act provides otherwise.

The above resume of the relevant provisions of the Act makes it
·' clear that once an order is made by the Central Government under F
~ section 3 for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and dis-
tribution of any essential commodity it shall have effect notwithstand-
ing anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other enactment
or instrument. Any person who contravenes any order made unless
section 3 becomes liable to penal action under section 7 and the pro-
perty in respect of which the oraer has been contravened becomes G
liable to forfeiture .. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code,
the offence punishable under the Act for the contravention o.f an order
under section 3 is cognizable and non-bailable and may be tried by the
Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence was com-
mitted. Thus the breach of an order made under section 3 attracts
penal consequences, i.e., imprisonment and fine, and also renders the H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

property seized liable to forfeiture. This is one consequence of the
A
breach of an order made under section 3 of the Act. The Act also
provides, section 6A, that where any essential commodity has been
seized in pursuance of an order made under section 3 in relation
thereto, a report of the seizure must be sent to the Collector without
unreasonable delay, on receipt whereof the Collector may inspect the
B seized property and on being satisfied about the contravention of the
order made under Section ·3 may order the confiscation of such essential
commodity and any package, covering or receptacle wherein such
essential commodity is found as well as any animal, vehicle or con-
veyance used for carrying such essential commodity. If the essential
commodity is liable to speedy decay, the Collector is empowered to
sell it at the controlled price, if any, or by public auction or through
c fair price shops if the retail sale price for such commodity is fixed. The
price so realised minus the expenses incurred for effecting the sale has
to be paid to the owner of the essential commodity or the person from
whom it was seized (a) where no order of confiscation is ultimately
passed by the Collector, or {b) where the appellate order passed under
D Section 6C so requires or (c) where in a prosecution under the Act the
person concerned is finally acquitted. An order of confiscation made
after following the requirements of section 6B does not prevent the
infliction of punishment under the other provisions (sections 7 to 10)
of the Act. Thus confiscation of the essential commodity etc., is not in
lieu of punishment but can be in addition to the penal consequences. It
E is in this background that we must examine the controversy before us.

Section 6A empowers confiscation of the seized essential com-
modity, the package, covering and receptacle in which the essential
commodity was found and the,animal, vehicle or other conveyance in
which such essential commodity was carried. The words 'may order
-
F confiscation' convey that the power is discretionary and not obliga-
tory. Sub-section (2) thereof confers a special power to deal with any
essential commodity which, in the opinion of .the Collector, is subject
to speedy and natural decay or' it is otherwise expedient in public
interest to be disposed of in the manner indicated therein. Section 6A,
therefore, merely confers power of confiscation and not the power of
G release, qisposal, distribution, etc., except to the limited extent
permitted•by sub-section {2) thereof. Of course the second proviso to
sub-section (1) of Section 6A permits the grant of an option to pay, in
lieu of confiscation of any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance,
a fine equal to its market price at the date of seizure. Section 6E was
first enacted to debar courts from making any order with regard to the
H possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of any essential commo-
S.D. AGARWALA v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [AHMADI, J.] 995

dity seized in pursuance of an order made under section 3 in relation A
thereto. By the substituted section 6E as it presently stands the scope
of the provision has been enlarged by extending the bar of jurisdiction
of the Court, tribunal or other authority to the release, etc., of
packages, coverings or receptacles as well as animals, vehicles, vessels
or other conveyances also. It provides that whenever any essential
commodity is seized under an order made in exeCcise of power conferred B
by section 3 in relation thereto no court, tribunal o~ other authority
shall have jurisdiction to make any order with regard to the posses-
sion, delivery, disposal, release or distribution of such essential
commodity save and except the Collector pending confiscation under
section 6A, or the State Government concerned under section 6C. The
qustion then is whether this power of release which is conferred on
the Collector pending confiscation is wide enougb to permit the
c
release of the essential commodity to the owner or to the person from
whom it was seized, notwithstanding the pendency of prosecution for
breach of an order made under section 3 in relation thereto?

The Act was enacted to safeguard public interest. It was thougbt D
necessaiy in the interest of the general public to control the produc-
tion, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, certain
commodities through legislation. With that in view, powers to control
production, supply, distribution, etc., came to be conferred on the
r Central Government by section 3 of the Act. As pointed out earlier, in
order to deter persons dealing in such essential commodities from E
contravening any order made under section 3, the law envisages two
independent proceedings, namely, (i) confiscation under section 6A
and (ii) prosecution leading to punishment provided by section 7 of the
Act. In order to ensure that the steady supplies of essential commo-
dities to the members of the general public is not disrupted, provision
f is made in sub-section (2) of section 6A that the Collector may, if it is F
\ expedient and in public interest so to do; sell the seized commodity at
the controlled price or by public auction if no such price is fixed or
througb the public distribution system if the retail sale price is fixed for
the said commodity. Similar powers can be exercised if the commodity
is subject to speedy and natural decay. The obvious purpose of confer-
ring this power on the Collector without waiting for the completion of G
the confiscation proceedings is to maintain the smooth supplies of
essential commodities to the consumer public, avoid artificial shorta-
ges, maintain the price line and secure equitable distribution thereof
througb fair price shops. If such a power was not conferred and if the
seized commodity could not be dealt with till the completion of the
confiscation proceedings, it would defeat the very object and purpose H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

fo1 which the Act was enacted. By the conferment of this power a duty · \
A is cast on the Collector to see that essential commodities are not "---
locked up in proceedings under the Act; artificial scarcity is not
created to hike up prices; a close watch is kept on the supplies to the
general public; when necessary in public interest the stock of seized
commodities is released to combat short supply and in general to
B ensure the availability of essential commodities at fair prices to the
general public. To ensure that this objective of maintaining supplies and
securing equitable distribution of essential commodities is not
defeated, the legislature has entrusted the task to the Collector in its
entirety and has ruled out interference by courts, tribunals and other
authorities by placing an embargo on their jurisdiction in this behalf by
section 6E of the Act. While conferring wide powers as above on the
c Collector, the legislature has also protected the dealer's interest by
providing that in the event it is ultimately found that he was not guilty ;.'
of contravention of any order made under section 3, he shall be paid
the price realised with reasonable interest. But if the prosecution ends
in a conviction, section 7( J)(b) enjoins thafthe property in respect of
D which the order was contravened 'shall be forfeited' to the Govern-
ment. The language of this clause is clearly mandatory and leaves no
option to the Court but to order forfeiture. This becomes clear if we
read this clause in juxtaposition with clause (c) which confers a discre-
tion on the Court to order forfeiture of any packing, covering or
receptacle in which the essential commodity was found or any animal,
E vehicle, vessel or any other conveyance which was used to carry the
same. If the property is returned to the owner or the person from
whom it was seized in exercise of power under section 6E, it is difficult
to understand how the Court would implement the mandate of clause
(b) of sub-section(!) of section 7 of the Act. But the learned counsel
-
for the appellant argued that even in cases where the Collector sells
F the essential commodity under sub-section (2) of section 6A and
retains the price thereof, the essential commodity ceases to be avail-
able for forfeiture under clause (b) of section 7(1) of the Act. He,
therefore, submitted that the Act itself contemplates a situation which
renders clause (b) of section 7( !) otiose where the essential commodity
is disposed of by the Collector under sub-section (2) of section 6A of
G the Act. He, therefore, saw no harm in releasing the commodity to the
owner or the person from whose possession it was seized on condition
that such person deposits the market price of the commodity on the
date of seizure or gives a bank guarantee for the said sum. In this
connection reference was also made to the provision in sub-section (5)
of Section 452 of the Code which inter a/ia provides that the term
H 'property' shall include, 'in the case of property regarding which an
S.D. AGARWALA v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [AHMADI, J.] 997

offence appears to have been committed, not only such property as has
J A
--".
been originally in the possession or under the control of any party, but
also any property into or for which the same may have been converted
or exchanged, and anything acquired by such conversion or exchange
whether immediately or otherwise'. This definition can be invoked in
view of section 2(f) of the Act which is not inconsistent with any
provision of the Act. But this submission overlooks the fact that the B
power conferred by sub-section (2) of section 6A to sell the essential
~
commodity has to be exercised in public interest for maintaining the
supplies and for securing the equitable distribution of the essential
commodity. If the essential commodity is returned to the person from
whom it was seized or to the. owner thereof, the very objective of the
~• Act would be defeated and the purpose of seizure would be frustrated
c
The seizure has to be effected not for the sake of earning revenue, i.e.
the market price of the commodity at the date of seizure, which may be
~ ultimately forfeited, but to prevent hoarding of essential commodities,
avoid artificial shortages, maintain a steady supply to the community
and ensure equitable distribution at fair and reasonable prices. If the
seized commodity is returned by merely securing its value, this objec- 0
tive of the act will be wholly defeated. That is why section 6A does not
empower the Collector to give an option to pay, in lieu of confiscation
of the essential commodity, a fine not exceeding the market value of
the commodity at the date of seizure, as in the case ot any animal, vehicle,
1 vessel or other conveyance seized along with the essential commodity.
Only a limited power of sale of the commodity in the manner pre- E
scribed by sub-section (2) of section 6A is granted. This shows that the
legislature did not intend to confer a power on the Collector to return
the essential commodity to the owner or the person from whose pos-
session it was seized. That is for the obvious reason that it would run
counter to the very object and purpose of the enactment.

J And now to the structural setting and context in which the word
'release' is used in section 6E. While debarring courts, tribunals and
other authorities from exercising power in relation to the seized com-
modity, power is conferred on the Collector or the State Government
concerned under section 6C, to make orders with regard to the posses-
F

sion, delivery, disposal, release or distribution of such commodity, etc. G
This power can be exercised pending confiscation. The power confer-
red by this section is unqualified. The word 'release' is preceded by the
'?'-- words 'possession, delivery and disposal' and followed by the word
'distribution'. The setting and context in which the word 'release' is
used makes it clear that it is not used in the sense of 'return'. In the
first place as pointed out earlier it would completely defeat the H
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

purpose and object of the Act if the essential commodity seized for
A
suspected contravention of the order made under section 3 is returned \
to the owner or person from whom it was seized even before the
confiscation proceedings were completed. Such an intention cannot be
ascribed to the legislature. Secondly, it is not possible to believe that
the legislature would confer unqualified and unrestricted powe.r to
B return the essential commodity to the owner or the person from whose
possession it was seized before a decision whether or not to confiscate
':-
the same is taken. As the section stands, if the interpretation put by
the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, it would be permissi-
ble to the Collector to return or restore the commodity without impos-
ing any condition, pending confiscation proceedings. We are unable to
~
pursuade ourselves to accept the interpretation placed by Mr. Rao on
c the word 'release'. The scheme of sections 6A, 6B and 6C makes it
clear that after the essential commodity is seized and the same is
inspected by the concerned Collector, the latter has to decide, after
complying with the procedure set out in section 6B, whether or not to
confiscate the essential commodity. Since the Erocedure delineated
D in section 6B is time consuming, the Collector has been given special
power to sell the essential commodity as stated in sub-section (2) of
section 6A if it is subject to speedy and natural decay or it is expedient
in public interest so to do. If the Collector decides not to confiscate the.
commodity and if no prosecution is launched or contemplated the
commodity has to be returned to the owner or person from whom it ~
E was seized. If in the meantime it is sold in exercise of power under
sub-section (2) of section 6A, the price of the commodity has to be
paid as provided by sub-section (3) of section 6A. If the Collector has
ordered confiscation but the order is reversed in appeal under section
6C and no prosecution is pending, sub-section (2) of section 6C enjoins
that the essential commodity should be 'returned' and if that is not
F possible its price together with' reasonable interest. It is pertinent to
note that sub-section (2) of section 6C uses the words 'return the
essential commodity seized' and not the word 'release the essential
commodity seized'. It seem to us that having regard to the scheme of
the Act, the object and purpose of the statute and the mischief it seeks
to guard against the word 'release' is used in the limited sense of
G release for sale, etc., so that the same becomes available to the con-
sumer public. There could be no question of releasing the commodity
in the sense of returning it to the owner or person from whom it was .--'..
seized even before the proceeding for confiscation stood completed
and before the termination of the prosecution in the acquittal of the
offender. Such a·.view would render clause (b) of section 7(1) totally
H nugatory. It seems to us that seection 6E is intended to serve a dual
S.D. AGARWALA v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [AHMADI, J.] 999

! purpose, namely (i) to prevent interference by courts, etc., and (ii) to A
effectuate the sale of the essential commodity under sub-section (2)
and the return of the animal, vehicle, etc., under the second proviso to
sub-section(l) of section 6A. In that sense section 6E is comple-
mentary in nature. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High
Court was right in the ultimate conclusion it reached.
B
~· Counsel for the appellant next pointed out that this Court had
passed an interim order on December 8, 1988 for sale of the seized
commodity and for handing over the sale proceeds to the.appellant on
the latter furnishing a bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the Special
,;.. Judge, 24 Paraganas (South), Alipore. Despite this order the seized
- commodity had not been disposed of Mr. Rao, therefore, contended c
that this:Court should not assist the respondent State which had defied
arid.thwarted the order of this Court. It is true that the seized commo·
.( dity has not been disposed of to-date. But it appears from the subse-
quent order of February 13, 1989 as amended by the order of February
15, 1989, that the only direction given to the Special Judge was to
dispose of the pending prosecution within two months. It was further
directed that the Special Judge will pass appropriate consequential
orders regarding the release of the seized goods. It, therefore, be-
comes clear that when the subsequent orders were passed on February
13 and 15, 1989, the appellant did not insist on the sale of the seized
'( commodity as per the order of December 8, 1988. The matter came up
for hearing on subsequent occasions also but at no time did the appel- E
lant press for the implementation of the said order of December 8,
1988. Even after the Special Judge recorded an acquittal and directed

--... -f _
return of the goods, the appellant did not seek implementation of the
said order. Nor did the appellant move the High Court for the
implementation of the said order in the appeal pending against the
1 order of acquital. It is, therefore, too late in the day now to contend F
\ that as the order of December 8, 1988 has remained unimplemented
we should refuse to grant any relief to the respondent State.

For the reasons stated above we see no merit in this appeal and
dismiss the same with costs.
G
R.N.J. Appeal dismissed.