Holding

Section 125 CrPC permits maintenance to be awarded from the date of application if expressly ordered, without requiring special reasons, and the pre‑2001 Rs.500 ceiling barred any higher award before the 2001 amendment, so the proper maintenance is Rs.1,000 each payable from the amendment’s commencement.

Summary

Shail Kumari Devi and her minor daughter filed a Section 125 CrPC maintenance suit against Krishan Bhagwan Pathak in 1997, seeking Rs.500 each per month. The Family Court later ordered maintenance of Rs.2,000 and Rs.1,000 respectively, payable from the date of application (July 21, 1997). The High Court reduced the amounts to Rs.750 each and directed payment from the date of the order (Nov. 29, 2006). The Supreme Court held that under the original 1973 CrPC the ceiling was Rs.500, which was removed only by the 2001 amendment, so the Family Court could not award amounts above Rs.500 before that date and could at most make the order effective from the amendment’s commencement. The Court clarified that maintenance may be ordered from the date of application if expressly directed, without the need to record special reasons, and that interim maintenance can be granted even before the 2001 amendment. Accordingly, the appropriate quantum was set at Rs.1,000 each per month, payable from September 24, 2001, and the appeal was partly allowed.

Issues considered

Whether interim maintenance can be granted under Section 125 CrPC in the absence of an express provision.
From which date maintenance may be payable – the date of the order or the date of application – and whether special reasons must be recorded.
Whether the pre‑2001 ceiling of Rs.500 per month applies to the Family Court's order of Rs.2,000/1,000.
What quantum of maintenance is appropriate given the parties' circumstances.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 125(1), s. 125(2), s. 354(6)
Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2001s. 125(1), s. 125(2)

Subjects

MaintenanceSection 125 CrPCInterim maintenanceDate of paymentQuantum of maintenanceAmendment Act 2001Family CourtCriminal Revision

Judgment

[2008] 11 S.C.R. 386
I

A SHAil KUMARI DEVI & ANR. ~
\I.
KRISHAN BHAGWAN PATHAK @ KISHUN B. PATHAK
(Civil Appeal No.4666 of 2008)
JULY 28, 2008
B
[C.K. THAKKER AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.] )' ~

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 125:
Maintenance - Entitlement to - From date of applica-
c tion or from date of order- Held: Maintenance can be awarded
from the date of order, or, if so ordered, from the date of appli-
cation for maintenance, as the case may be - For awarding
maintenance from date of application, express order is nee-
essary - No special reasons, however, are required to be re-
D corded by the Court - No such requirement can be read in
sub section (1) of s.125 in absence of express provision to
that effect.
Maintenance - Quantum of- Family Court granted main-
tenance to wife as well as minor daughter at the rate of Rs. 20001
E
- and Rs. 10001- respectively from date of application i.e. July
21, 1997 - Challenge to - Held: Before amendment of 2001,
the ceiling was Rs. 5001- - Therefore, the Family Court could
not have granted maintenance exceeding Rs.5001- p.m ei-
ther to wife or minor daughter from date of application i.e. July
F 21, 1997-At the most, such an order could have been made
effective from the date, the Amendment Act, 2001 (amending
s. 125) came into force.
Interim maintenance - Grant of - Held: In absence of
any express bar or prohibition, s. 125 can be interpreted as
G
conferring power by necessary implication to make interim
order of maintenance subject to final outcome in the applica-
tion for maintenance - In the present case, Magistrate was
f
right and wholly justified in ordering interim maintenance -

H 286
SHAil KUMAR! DEVI & ANR. v. KRISHAN 387
BHAGWAN PATHAK@ KISHUN B. PATHAK
+- Interim maintenance could have been granted by the Magis- A
trate even before the amendment of s. 125 in 2001.
Appellant No.1 is the wife of Respondent. On July
21, 1997, a case for maintenance under s.125 CrPC was
filed whereunder Appellant No.1 claimed maintenance of
Rs.500/- p.m. for herself and Rs.500/- p.m. for her minor B
.. 1
daughter, Appellant No.2. It was the case of Appellant No.1
that Respondent had neglected to maintain her as also
Appellant No.2. Subsequently, an application was filed by
Appellants requesting the Court to grant 'interim' mainte-
nance during pendency of proceedings before the Court. c
The Trial Court allowed the said application and fixed in-
terim maintenance at the rate of Rs.300/- p.m. for each of
the applicants. Later the case was transferred to the Family
Court, which finally disposed of the matter on November
29, 2006 by directing Respondent to pay maintenance of D
Rs.2,000/- p.m. to Appellant No.1 and Rs.1,000/- p.m. to
Appellant No.2 with effect from the date of application i.e.
July 21, 1997. Appellants filed Criminal Revision in High
Court, which reduced the amount of maintenance from
Rs.2,000/-to Rs.750/-for Appellant No.1 and from Rs.1,000/ E
- to Rs.750/- for Appellant No.2. The High Court also di-
rected that the amount of maintenance would be payable
to the Appellants not from the date of the application i.e.
July 21, 1997 but from the date of the order i.e. November
29, 2006. F
In appeal to this Court, the questions which arose
for consideration are: 1) Whether the Family Court erred
in granting maintenance to the Appellants from the date
of application made by them under s.125 CrPC and was
also wrong in allowing maintenance of more than Rs.500/ G
- either to Appellant No.1 or to Appellant No.2 before 2001
when the relevant provisions of law (s.125 CrPC as it then
-~
stood), allowed Rs.500/- p.m. as maximum amount of
maintenance; 2) Whether the High Court was justified in
H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A reducing the amount as also issuing direction to make
payment from the date of the order passed by the Family
Court; 3) Whether no 'interim' maintenance could have
been awarded before the amendment in CrPC in 2001 and
4) Whether even on merits, the Family Court was not jus-
B tified in ignoring the evidence on record and in granting
maintenance to Appellant No.1 by observing that she was
unable to maintain herself when the evidence clearly re- r ~

vealed that some of the properties of Respondent were
with Appellant No.1 and she also inherited land from her
c father.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The ceiling which was fixed under the
original enactment of 1973 (i.e. CrPC, 1973) of Rs.500/-
p.m. has been removed and now it is open to a Court un-
D
der the amended law to fix such amount as it 'thinks fit'.
There is no substantial change so far as the date of pay-
~
ment is concerned. Under sub-section (2) as originally en-
acted, it was provided that such maintenance could be
made payable from the date of the order or if so ordered,
E from the date of application. Even after the amendment
of 2001, an order for payment of maintenance can be
made by a Court either from the date of the order or where
an express order is made to pay maintenance from the
date of application, then the amount of maintenance can
F be paid from that date, i.e. from the date of application.
[Paras 19, 20] [399-G, 400-A,B,C]
r-
1.2. The High Court, in the present case, was not right
in holding that as a normal rule, the Magistrate should grant
maintenance only from the date of the order and not from
G
the date of the application for maintenance. And if he intents
to pass such an order, he is required to record reasons in
support of such order. Duration of litigation is not within the
power or in the hands of the applicant and entitlement to -r
maintenance should not be left to the uncertain date of dis-
H
SHAil KUMAR! DEVI & ANR. v. KRISHAN 389
BHAGWAN PATHAK@KISHUN B. PATHAK

posal of the case. [Paras 44, 45] [410-G, 411-A,B] A
1.3. Again, maintenance is a right which accrues to a
wife against her husband the minute the former gets mar-
ried to the latter. It is not only a moral obligation but is also
a legal duty cast upon the husband to maintain his wife.
Hence, whenever a wife does not stay with her husband 8
and claims maintenance, the only question which the Court
is called upon to consider is whether she was justified to
live separately from her husband and still claim mainte-
nance from him and if the reply is in the affirmative, she is
entitled to claim maintenance. It is, therefore, open to the C
Magistrate to award maintenance from the date of applica-
tion and there is nothing which requires recording of 'spe-
cial reasons' though he must record reasons as envisaged
by sub-section (6) of Section 354 of CrPC in support of the
order passed by him. [Para 46] [411-C,D,E,F] D
1.4. While deciding an application under Section 125
of CrPC, a Magistrate is required to record reasons for
granting or refusing to grant maintenance to wives, chil-
dren or parents. Such maintenance can be awarded from
the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the E
application for maintenance, as the case may be. For
awarding maintenance from the date of the application,
express order is necessary. No special reasons, however,
are required to be recorded by the Court. No such require-
ment can be read in sub section (I) of Section 125 of the F
Code in absence of express provision to that effect. [Para
47] [411-F,G, 412-A]
1.5. So far as 'interim' maintenance is concerned, it
is true that Section 125 of CrPC as it originally enacted G
did not expressly empower the Magistrate to make such
order and direct payment of interim maintenance. But the
Code equally did not prohibit the Magistrate from making
such order. Now, having regard to the nature of proceed-
ings, the primary object to secure relief to deserted and H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C,R.

A destitute wives, discarded and neglected children and dis-
abled and helpless parents and to ensure that no wife,
child or parent is left beggared and destitute on the scrap-
heap .of society so as to be tempted to commit crime or to
tempt others to commit crime in regard to them, the Mag-
8 istrate had 'implied power' to ma.ke such order. The juris-
diction of the Magistrate under Chapter IX (Order for Main-·
tenance of Wives, Children and Parents) is not strictly
criminal in nature. Moreover, the remedy provided by Sec-
tion 125 of the Code is a summary remedy for securing
C reasonable sum by way of maintenance subject to a de-
cree passed by a competent civil Court. Hence, in ab-
sence of any express bar or prohibition, Section 125 could
be interpreted as conferring power by necessary impli-
cation to make interim order of maintenance subject to
final outcome in the application. In absence of prohibi-
D tion to grant 'interim' maintenance such power could be
read in the salutary provision of Section 125 of the Code
ensuring maintenance to unable wife to maintain herself
during the pendency of proceedings. Even Parliament
took into account the reality and by the Amendment Act,
E 2001 express provision has been made for the purpose.
The Magistrate in the present case was right and wholly
justified in ordering interim maintenance. There is no in-
firmity in that part of the order and interim maintenance
could have been granted by the Magistrate even before
F the amendment of s.125 in 2001. [Paras 21, 27, 45] (400-
C,D,E,F,G, 404-0,E, 411-8,C]
1.6. In the present case, the Family Court granted
maintenance to the appellants-wife as well as daugh-
ter-at the rate of Rs.2000/- and Rs. 1000/- respectively
G from the date of application i.e. July 21, 1997. Before the
amendment of 2001, the ceiling was Rs.500/-. Therefore,
the Family Court could not have granted maintenance ex-
ceeding Rs.500/- p.m either to appellant No.1 or appellant
No.2 from the date of application i.e. July 21, 1997. At the
H most, such an order could have been made effective from
SHAil KU MARI DEVI & ANR. v. KRISHAN 391
..,.. BHAGWAN PATHAK@ KISHUN 8. PATHAK

the date the Amendment Act, 2001 came into force. To that A
extent, therefore, the order passed by the Family Court
was not in accordance with law. [Para 48] [412-B,C,D]
1.7. But even on merits, the Family Court was not
right in fixing the amount of maintenance. From the mate-
' )j rial on record, it is clear that the appellant No.1-wife is re- 8
siding in the house belonging to Respondent-husband
and such finding has been recorded even by the Family
Court. It is also in evidence that she was receiving income
from the land in her possession which belonged to her
~
husband-Respondent. It is true that Respondent could c
I
not state as to the actual amount received by the wife from
the cultivation of the land. But it is also one of the consid-
erations which is relevant and material while fixing the
amount of maintenance. Moreover, Appellant No.1 has in-
herited some land from her father. [Para 49] [412-D,E,F,G] D
..... 1.8 In view of overall facts and circumstances, ends of
justice would be served if it is held that both the Appellants
are entitled to an amount of Rs.1000/- each per month as
maintenance. Appellants would be entitled to the said
amount of maintenance from the date the Amendment Act, E
2001 came into force. i.e. September 24, 2001. So far as the
order of payment of 'interim' maintenance passed by the
Magistrate is concerned, the same was in consonance with
law and no interference is called for. [Para 50] [412-G, 413-A]
F
Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat (1985) 4 SCC 337 - re-
lied on.
K. Sivaram v. K. Mangalamba & Ors., 1990 CrLJ 1880
(AP) - approved.
G
Mohd. /naytullah Khan v. Sa/ma Bano, 1983 Jab LJ 55,
Rameshwar v. Ramibai, 1987 CrLJ 1952 (MP), Lachhmani v.
....,, Ramu, (1983) 1 Crimes 590 MP, Qamruddin v. Smt. Rashida,
(1992) 1 WLC 305 (Raj), Shyamlal v. Mansha Bai, 1998 CrLJ
2704 (Raj), Mohd. Ismail v. Bilquees Bano, 1998 CrLJ 2803
H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 11 S.C.R.
":-
---f"

A (All), Nitha Ranjan Chakraborty v. Smt. Kalpana Chakraborty,
2002 CrLJ 4768 (Cal), Samaydin v. State of UP & Anr, 2001
CrLJ 2064 (All); Bijay Kapri v. Smt. Kanishta Devi & Anr,
(2000) 2 PLJR 241; Gnanaselvi & Ors. v. lllavarasan, (1999)
1 Crimes 22 (Mad); PN. Duda v. P Shiv Shankar, (1988) 3
SCC 167 39; Amarjit Kaur v. Sartaz Zingh, 1996 CriLJ 4476
,,.
B r
(P&H) and Krishna Jain v. Dharam Raj Jain, 1992 CriLJ 1028
(MP) - referred to.
Case Law Reference

c (1985) 4 sec 337 relied on Para 22·
1983 Jab LJ 55 referred to Para 34
1987 CrLJ 1952 (MP) referred to Para 34
(1983) 1 Crimes 590 MP referred to Para 34
D
(1992) 1 WLC 305 (Raj) referred tq Para 34 >-
'1998 CrLJ 2704 (Raj) referred to Para 34
1998 CrLJ 280.3 (All) referred to Para 34
E 2002 CrLJ 4768 (Cal) referred 'to Para 34
2001 CrLJ 2064 (All} referred to Para 34
(2000) 2 PLJR 241 referred· to Para 35
(1999) 1 Crimes 22 (Mad) referred to Para 38
F }--
(1988) 3 sec 1 s1 referred to Para.38
1996 CriLJ 4476 (P&H) referred to Para 39
1992 CriLJ 1028 (MP) referred to Para 40
G 1990 CrLJ 1880 (AP) approved Para 43
CJVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4666 ~,

of 2008 ·
From the final Judgment and Order dated 3.5.2007 of the
H High Court of Judicature of Patna in C.R. No. 67 of 2007
SHAil KUMARI DEVI & ANR. v. KRISHAN 393
1" BHAGWAN PATHAK @ KISHUN B. PATHAK [C.K. THAKKER, J.J

Abhinav Prakash and Kanhaiya Priyadarshi for the Ap- A
pellants.
Kumar Rajesh Singh and Niranjana Singh for the Respon-
dent.

_.; ... The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B
1

C.K. THAKKER, J. 1. Leave granted.

- 2. The present appeal is filed by appellant No.1-wife and
appellant No.2-daughter of respondent herein-Krishan Bhagwan
Pathak. The appellants have approached this Court being ag-
grieved by the judgment and order passed by the High Court of
c
Judicature at Patna on May 3, 2007 in Criminal Revision No.
67 of 2007. By the said order, the High Court partly allowed the
revision filed by the respondent-husband and modified the or-
der passed by the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court,
D
Bhojpur on October 30, 2006 in Miscellaneous Case No. 280
' ~
of 1997, renumbered as No.1 of 2005.
3. Shortly stated the facts of the case are that the mar-
riage between appellant No.1 and the respondent was solem-
nized according to Hindu rites, customs and ceremonies be- E
fore more than three decades. From the said wedlock, nine
children were born. Appellant No.2-KumartBabli is the young-
est among all and she is the only child staying with her mother-
appellant No.1. At the time of filing of the application, she was
of twelve years. F
4. On July 21, 1997, the appellants filed a case for main-
tenance in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhojpur un-
der Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (here-
inafter referred to as 'the Code') (Misc. Case No. 280 of 1997)
claiming maintenance of Rs.500/- p.m. for appellant No.1 and G
Rs.500/- p.m. for appellant No.2. It was the case of the appel-
'i-- lant No.1 that her husband had neglected to maintain his wife-
appellant No.1 as also his legitimate daughter-appellant No.2.
On November 20, 1999, an application was filed by the appel-
lants requesting the Court to grant 'interim' maintenance during H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.
_...,..
A the pendency of proceedings before the Court. The learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate allowed the said application, granted
the prayer and fixed interim maintenance at the rate of Rs.300/
- p.m. for each of the applicants with effect from February 12, ~
.,..
1998. The parties, thereafter, led the evidence which was closed
B on September 3, 2001 and the case was adjourned for final
arguments. During the pendency of proceedings, however, Fam- ... ~

ily Court came to be established and the case was transferred
to the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bhojpur.
5. From the evidence, it was clear that the respondent was
c working as Cashier with the State Bank of India, Bihita Branch
and was getting gross salary of Rs.18,508-98. After deduction, ~
his pay packet was of Rs.9,831-76. The respondent retired from
service in January, 2006. The appellants filed a petition on Sep-
tember 12, 2006 with a prayer to direct the respondent to pay
D arrears of maintenance which came to Rs.11,600/- and the
Family Court on October 30, 2006, allowed the application and
~
directed the respondent to pay the entire amount of the arrears
in lump sum by the next date of hearing.
6. The matter was finally disposed of by the Family Court
E on November 29, 2006 and the learned Principal Judge of the
Family Court directed the respondent to pay maintenance of
Rs.2,000/- p.m. to applicant-appellant No.1-wife and Rs.1,000/
- p.m. to applicant-appellant No.2-minor daughter with effect
from the date of application i.e. July 21, 1997 with further order
F to pay arrears within three months of the order after deducting
the amount which had already been paid under the interim or- >----
der passed by the Court earlier.
7. The appellant was dissatisfied with the order passed
by the Principal Judge of the Family Court and preferred Crimi-
G
nal Revision No. 67 of 2007 in the High Court.
8. The High Court partly allowed the Revision and modi-
~
fied the direction issued by the Family Court. The High Court
reduced the amount of maintenance from Rs.2,000/-to Rs.750/
H - to appellant No.1-wife and from Rs.1,000/- to Rs. 750/- to ap-
SHAil KUMARI DEVI & ANR. v. KRISHAN 395
BHAGWAN PATHAK@ KISHUN B. PATHAK [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

pellant No.2-daughter. The High Court also directed that the A
amount of maintenance would be payable to the applicants-
appellants not from the date of the application i.e. July 21, 1997
but from the date of the order i.e. November 29, 2006. The said
order is challenged by the appellants in the present appeal.
9. On September 5, 2007, the matter was placed for ad- B
mission hearing. Delay of eight days in filing Special Leave
Petition was condoned and notice was issued to the respon-
dent. Considering the nature of the litigation, the Registry was
directed by an order dated April 16, 2008 to place the matter
for final disposal on a non-miscellaneous day and that is how C
the matter is placed before us.
10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
•., 11. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the
~ High Court was wrong in partly allowing Revision filed by the D
"'""' respondent and in modifying the directions issued by the Fam-
ily Court. It was submitted that the High Court was in clear error
in reducing the amount of maintenance to appellant No.1-wife
and appellant No.2-daughter. Similarly, the High Court was in
error in holding that the appellants were not entitled to mainte- E
nance from the date of application but only from the date of
order passed by the Court. It was, therefore, submitted that the
order passed by the High Court deserves to be set aside by
restoring the order of the Family Court.
12. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other F
hand, supported the order passed by the High Court. It was
urged that the Family Court was not right in granting mainte-
nance to the appellants from the date of application. It was sub-
mitted that the Family Court was again wrong in allowing main-
tenance of more than Rs.500/- _either to appellant No.1-wife or G
to appellant No.2-daughter before 2001 when the relevant pro-
visions of law (Section 125 of the Code as it then stood), al-
lowed Rs.500/- p.m. as maximum amount of maintenance. The
High Court was, therefore, justified in reducing the amount as
also issuing direction to make payment from the date of the H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A order. It was also urged that no 'interim' maintenance could have
been awarded before the amendment in the Code in 2001.
13. The counsel submitted that even on merits, the Family
Courtwas not justified in ignoring the evidence on record and
in granting maintenance to wife observing that appellant No.1
8 was ·unable to maintain herself. The evidence clearly revealed,
s'ubmitted the counsel, that some of the properties of the re-
spondent-husband were with the appellant No.1-wife. She has
also inherited land from her father. Those facts, therefore, ought
to have been taken into account by the Family Court in fixing
C the amount of compensation. On all these grounds, it was sub-
mitted that no interference in the order passed by the High Court
is called for in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Ar-
ticle 136 of the Constitution and the appeal deserves to be dis-
missed.
D
. 14. ,Three questions arise for our consideration; (i) whether
interi111 maintenance could be awarded in absence of specific
ancf express proyision jn the Code; (ii) whether the appli_cant-
yvife aod her daug,ht~r are entitled to maintenance from the date
of the order passed by the Family Court or from the date of
E application made by them under Section 125 of the Code; and
(iii) what could be the amount of maintenance which could be
awarded by the Court.
15. Before we proceed to consider these questions, it
F would be appropriate if we examine the relevant provisions of
law. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 125 of the-Code, as
they were originally enacted in 1973, read thus:
125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and
parents. - (1) lf any person having sufficient means neglects
G · or refuses to maintain-
(a) . his wife, unable to maintain herself, or
(b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether
married or not, unable to maintain itself. or
H
SHAil KUMARI DEVI & ANR. v. KRISHAN 397
~ BHAGWAN PATHAK @ KISHUN B. PATHAK [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

(c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married A
daughter) who has attained majority, where such child
is by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or
injury unable to maintain itself, or
(d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or
.... .._, ~
herself,
a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such
neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly
allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child,
father or mother, at such monthly rate not exceeding five c
hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks
fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate
may from time to time direct:
Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a
minor female child referred to in clause (b) to make such D
allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate
is satisfied that the husband of such minor female child,
if married, is not possessed of sufficient means.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this Chapter, -
E
(a) "minor" means a person who, under the provisions
of the Indian Majority Act, 1875( 9of1875) is deemed
not to have attained his majority;
(b) "wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by,
or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and F
has not remarried.
(2) Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the
order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application
for maintenance. G
(emphasis supplied)
.......
·' 16. Bare reading of sub-section (1) of Section 125 leaves
no room for doubt that if any person having sufficient means,
neglects or refuses to maintain his wife who is unable to main-
H
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R. '""
--4-
_,.

A tain herself or his legitimate (or illegitimate) child (children) un-
able to maintain itself (themselves), or his father, or mother, un-
able to maintain himself or herself, a Court, upon proof of neg-
ligence or refusai, order such person to pay maintenance to his
wife or child(children) or parents, as the case may be. It is also
8 clear that maximum amount which could be ordered to be paid y
"'"'
was Rs.500/- p.m. which was clear from the expression "not
exceeding Rs.500/- in the whole".
17. It is further clear that under sub-section (2), such main-
tenance can be made payable "from the date of order" or "if so
c ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance". \
,,

18. By the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act,
2001 (Act 50 of 2001 ), sub-sections (1) and (2) came to be
amended with effect from September 24, 2001. The amended
sub-sections now read thus:
D
~-
'12'5. Order for maintenance of wives, c17ildren and
parents.- (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects
or refuses to maintain-
(a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or
E
(b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether ....
'
married or not, unable to maintain itself, or
(c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married
daughter) who has attained majority, where such child
F is by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or ~
injury unable to maintain itself, or
(d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or ·
herself,
G a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such
neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly _,,_--
allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, ~
~

father or mother, at such monthly rate,. as such Magistrate
thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the
H Magistrate may from time to time direct:
SHAil KUMARI DEVI & ANR. v. KRISHAN 399
BHAGWAN PATHAK@ KISHUN 8. PATHAK [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

+ Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a A
minor female child referred to in clause (b) to make such
allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate
is satisfied that the husband of such minor female child,
if married, is not possessed of sufficient means.
Provided further that the Magistrate may, during the 8
pungency of the proceeding regarding monthly allowance
~
-..
for the maintenance under this sub-section, order such
person to make a monthly allowance for the interim
maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother,
and the expenses of such proceeding which the Magistrate c
considers reasonable, and to pay the same to such person
as the Magistrate may from time to time direct:
Provided also that an application for the monthly allowance
for the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding
under the second proviso shall, as far as possible, be D
disposed of within sixty days from the date of the service
of notice of the application to such person.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this Chapter, -
(a) "minor" means a person who, under the provisions E
of the Indian Majority Act, 1875( 9 of 1875) is deemed
not to have attained his majority;
(b) "wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by,
or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and
has not remarried. F
(2) Any such allowance for the maintenance or interim
maintenance and expenses of proceeding shall be
payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from
the date of the application for maintenance or interim
maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case G
may be.
(emphasis supplied)
--.,.
i' 19. It is apparent that the ceiling which was fixed under the
original enactment of 1973 of Rs.500/- p.m. has been removed H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A and now it is open to a Court under the amended law to fix such +
amount as it 'thinks fit'.
20. Again, there is no substantial change so far as the
date of payment is concerned. Under sub-section (2) as origi-
nally enacted, it was provided that such maintenance could be
B made payable from the date of the order or if so ordered, from
the date of application. Even after the amendment of 2001, an
order for payment of maintenance can be made by a Court ei-
r ~

ther from the date of the order or where an express order is
made to pay maintenance from the date of application; then the
c amount of maintenance can be paid from that date, i.e. from
the date of application.
21. So far as 'interim' maintenance is concerned, it is true
that Section 125 bf the Code as it originally enacted did not
expressly empower the Magistrate to make such order and di-
D
rect payment of interim maintenance. But the Code equally did
not prohibit the Magistrate from making such order. Now, hav-
ing regard to the nature of proceedings, the primary object to
secure relief to deserted and destitute wives, discarded and
neglecte~ children and disabled and helpless parents and to
E ensure that no wife, child or parent is left beggared and desti-
tute on the scrap-heap of society so as to be tempted to com-
mit crime or to tempt others to commit crime in regard to them,
it was held that the Magistrate had 'implied power' to make
such order. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Chapter IX
F (Order for Maintenance of Wives, Children and Parents) is not
strictly criminal in nature. Moreover, the remedy provided by
Section 125 of the Code is a summary remedy for securing ~
reasonable sum by way of maintenance subject to a decree
passed by a competent civil Court. Hence, in absence of any
G express bar or prohibition, Section 125 could be interpreted
as conferring power by necessary implication to make interim
order of maintenance subject to final outcome in the applica-
tion. -r

H
22. A direct question came up for consideration _before !
SHAil KUMAR! DEVI & ANR. v. KRISHAN 401
BHAGWAN PATHAK@ KISHUN B. PATHAK [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

t- this Court in Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat, (1985) 4 SCC 337 A
: 1986 CriLJ 41. The Court considered that though there was
no specific provision for grant of interim maintenance, consid-
ering the object underlying the provision and social purpose
behind the legislation, such a power must be conceded to the
Court. 8
... "" 23. Speaking for the Court, Venkataramaiah, J. (as His
Lordship then was) observed;
"It is true that there is no express provision in the Code
which authorises a magistrate to make an interim order c
directing payment of maintenance pending disposal of an
application for maintenance. The Code does not also
expressly prohibit the making of such an order. The
question is whether such a power can be implied to be
vested in a magiStrate having regard to the nature of the
D
proceedings under Section 125 and other cognate
provisions found in Chapter IX of the Code which is entitled
...... "Order For Maintenance of Wives, Children and Parents".
Section 125 of the Code confers power on a magistrate
of the first class to direct a person having sufficient means
but who neglects or refuses to maintain (i) his wife, unable E
to maintain herself, or (ii) his legitimate or illegitimate minor
child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or
(iii) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married
daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is,
by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury F
unable to maintain itself or (iv) his father or mother, unable
to maintain himself or herself, upon proof of such neglect
or refusal, to pay a monthly allowance for the maintenance
of his wife or such child, father or mother, as the case may
be, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees G
in the whole as such magistrate thinks fit. Such allowance
shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered ·
from the date of the application for maintenance".

24. Interpreting the relevant provisions of the Code, put-
H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A ting emphasis on the duty of a person liable to pay maintenance + I

and applying the principle of 'social justice', His Lordship pro-
ceeded to state;
"In view of the foregoing it is the duty of the court to interpret
the provisions in Chapter IX of the Code in such a way
B that the construction placed on them would not defeat the
very object of the legislation. In the absence of any express r ~
prohibition, it is appropriate to construe the provisions in
Chapter IX as conferring an implied power on the
magistrate to direct the person against whom an
c application is made under Section 125 of the Code to
pay some reasonable sum by way of maintenance to the
applicant pending final disposal of the application. It is
quite common that applications made under Section 125
of the Code also take several months for being disposed
D of finally. In order to enjoy the fruits of the proceedings
under Section 125, the applicant should be alive till the
date of the final order and that the applicant can do in a ~

large number of cases only if an order for payment of
interim maintenance is passed by the court. Every court
E must be deemed to possess by necessary intendment all
such powers as are necessary to make its orders effective.
This principle is embodied in the maxim ubi aliquid
conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non
potest (Where anything is conceded, there is conceded
F also anything without which the thing itself cannot exist.)
(Vide Earl Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law 1959 Edn.
P. 1797). Whenever anything is required to be done by
law and it is found impossible to do that thing unless
something not authorised in express terms be also done
then that something else will be supplied by necessary
G
intendment. Such a construction though it may not always
be admissible in the present case however would advance
the object of the legislation under consideration. A contrary
....-
view is likely to result in grave hardship to the applicant,
who may have no means to subsist until the final order is
H
SHAil KUMARI DEVI & ANR. v. KRISHAN 403
BHAGWAN PATHAK@ KISHUN B. PATHAK [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

passed. There is no room for the apprehension that the A
recognition of such implied power would lead to the
passing of interim orders in a large number of cases where
the liability to pay maintenance may not exist. It is quite
possible that such contingency may arise in a few cases
but the prejudice caused thereby to the person against B
whom it is made is minimal as it can be set right quickly
after hearing both the parties. The magistrate, may,
however, insist upon an affidavit being filed by or on behalf
of the applicant concerned stating the grounds in support
of the claim for interim maintenance to satisfy himself that c
there is a prima facie case for making such an order.
Such an order may also be made in an appropriate case
ex parte pending service of notice of the application
subject to any modification or even an order of cancellation
that may be passed after the respondent is heard. If a civil
0
court can pass such interim orders on affidavits, there is
no reason why a magistrate should not rely on them for the
purpose of issuing directions regarding payment of interim
maintenance. The affidavit may be treated as supplying
prima facie proof of the case of the applicant. If the
allegations in the application or the affidavit are not true, E
it is always open to the person against whom such an
order is made to show that the order is unsustainable.
Having regard to the nature of the jurisdiction exercised
by a magistrate under Section 125 of the Code, we feel
that the said provision should be interpreted as conferring F
power by necessary implication on the magistrate to pass
an order directing a person against whom an application
is made under it to pay a reasonable sum by way of
interim maintenance subject to the other conditions
referred to there pending final disposal of the application". G
(emphasis supplied)
25. Parliament considered the object of the legislation,
the decision of this Court in Savitri and the fact that though the
remedy is of a summary nature, the applicant who is unable to H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A maintain herself may have to wait for 'several years' for getting _..,.
such relief. It, therefore, amended the provision expressly au-
thorizing the Magistrate to grant interim maintenance.
26. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it was stated;

8 "It has been observed that an applicant, after filing
application in a Court under Section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, has to wait for several years for
getting relief from the Court. It is, therefore, felt that express
provisions should be made in the said Code for interim
maintenance allowance to the aggrieved person under said
c Section 125 of the Code. Accordingly, it is proposed that
during the pendency of the proceedings, the Magistrate
may order payment of interim maintenance allowance and
such expenses of the proceedings as the Magistrate
considers reasonable, to the aggrieved person. It is also
D proposed that the order be made ordinarily within sixty days
from the date of the service of the notice".
27. In view of the decision of this Court in Savitri, in our
opinion, the learned Magistrate was right and wholly justified in
E ordering interim maintenance by an order dated November 20,
1998. We see no infirmity in that part of the order and hold that
interim maintenance could have been granted by the learned
Magistrate even before the amendment of Section 125 in 2001.
28. Regarding date from which such amount should be
F paid to the appellants, the Family Court held that the appellants
would be entitled to claim maintenance from the date of appli-
cation i.e. July 21, 1997.
29. The Family Court stated;
"This order will be effective from the date of application
G
i.e. 21. 7.1997. The opposite party is directed to pay the
arrears within three months of this order and shall pay the
current monthly amount of maintenance by 15th of every
succeeding months."

H (emphasis supplied)
SHAil KU MARI DEVI & ANR v. KRISHAN 405
BHAGWAN PATHAK@ KISHUN B. PATHAK [C.K. THAKKER, J.j

30. The Family Court thus exercised the power under sub- A
section (2) of Section 125 which enables the Court to make an
order whether the applicant would be entitled to maintenance
from the date of the order or from the date of the application.
The Family Court ordered payment of maintenance from the
date of application. B
31. The High Court, however, set aside that part of the
order of the Family Court. It, inter a/ia, observed;
"On a consideration of the aforesaid arguments of the
parties, this Court finds that the court below has not c
considered the present matter in a proper manner and
keeping in view the purpose of the provisions of Section
125 of the Code. As held in a catena of decisions, the
purpose of the said provision is to prevent vagrancy and
destitution and essentially to financially support the
0
deserted wife or other to say that her own son has grabbed
the property and that she will sit back and will take no
steps in the matter. As a matter of fact, under Section 125
of the Code of Criminal Procedure itself, it is the duty of
the son to maintain his father and mother, if they are unable
to maintain themselves; whereas the court has not even E
considered the said fact. When the petitioner has raised
the issue that the opposite party has income from the land
and house of her matrimonial village, the same ought not
to have been ignored by the Court in the manner, which
has been done. It raises the strong suspicion that the F
Court below had made up its mind to disbelieve everything
that was stated on behalf of the petitioner and believe the
contention of the opposite party, which is not the correct
way of looking at the evidence that comes in course of the
said proceedings. It is for the court, in such matter, to G
consider the probability of the facts and then to come to
a fair conclusion as to what is the real state of affairs.
From the impugned order, it does not appear that any
such attempt has been made by the Court below and
even the important admission made by the opposite party H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

r-
A No.1 has been lost sight of by the Court below. --+
In the aforesaid view of the matter, this Court does not find
that the Court below has rightly looked into the aspect of
the matter. The Court below has also not considered as
to what was the justification for passing an order for
B maintenance from the date of application, which goes
back to more than 9 years from the date of the order. As
laid down in the decision of this Court such an order may r
be necessitated if the party shows the dire need of money
for the purpose of maintaining herself, for which she had
c to raise debts, during the period when the application
had been pending. There is no such material on the record.
rather the opposite party was getting interim maintenance
from November, 1998 itself by order dated 20.11.1998
although as a matter of fact the provision for interim
D maintenance has been brought into existence for the first
time by the Amendment Act, 2001 with effect from
24.9.2001. However, since the said order is not under
challenge, therefore, this Court would not like to go into
that issue any further. In any case, it is a relevant fact that
E right from 1998, opposite party Nos. 1 and 2, have been
paid interim maintenance, by which they had managed to
sustain themselves during that period and thus there is no
reason for passing the order to pay maintenance with
effect from the date of application going back more than
F 9 years from the date of passing of the said order."
(emphasis supplied)
~
32. The above observations manifestly show that accord-
ing to the High Court, there must be ;ustification on the part of
the Court in making the order of maintenance from the date of
G
the application rather than from the date of the order. As there
was no such reason granting maintenance from the date of the
application, the Family Court was. not justified in doing so. To
\

that extent, therefore, the order passed by the Family Court was y-
vulnerable and accordingly, it was set aside by granting main-
H
SHAil KUMAR! DEVI & ANR. v. KRISHAN 407
~ BHAGWAN PATHAK @ KISHUN 8. PATHAK [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

tenance from the date of the order passed by the Family Court. A
33. Now, no direct decision of this Court is available on
the point as to from which date a Magistrate may order pay-
ment of maintenance to wife, children or parents. VVe may, how-
~ ever, refer to decisions of some High Courts.
/
i B
34. It seems that there is a cleavage of opinion on the
question. According to one view, since sub-section (2) of Sec-
tion 125 declares that maintenance shall be payable "from the
date of the order", or, "if so ordered, from the date of applica-
tion for maintenance", normal rule is that a Magistrate should c
pass an order directing payment of maintenance only from the
date of the order. If he decides to deviate that course and makes
an order granting maintenance not from the date of the order
but from the date of application for maintenance, he must record
reasons in support of such order [vide Mohd. lnaytullah Khan v.
D
~ Salma Bano, 1983 Jab LJ 55, Rameshwar v. Ramibai, 1987
CrLJ 1952 (MP), Lachhmani v. Ramu, (1983) 1 Crimes 590
MP, Qamruddin v. Smt. Rashida, (1992) 1 WLC 305 (Raj),
Shyamlal v. Mansha Bai, 1998 CrLJ 2704 (Raj), Mohd. Ismail
v~ Bilquees Bano, 1998 CrLJ 2803 (All), Nitha Ranjan
Chakraborty v. Smt. Kalpana Chakraborty, 2002 CrLJ 4 768 E
(Cal), Samaydin v. State of UP & Anr., 2001 CrLJ 2064 (All)].
35. The High Court, in the impugned order, also referred
to a decision in Bijay Kapri v. Smt. Kanishta Devi & Anr., (2000)
2 PLJR 241, wherein it was held that such order could be ne- F
--I
cessitated if the party shows 'dire need' of the money for the
purpose of maintaining herself for which she had raised debts
during the period when the application had been pending. No
such material had been brought on record. Rather, the appli-
cants were getting interim maintenance from November, 1998
G
by an order passed by the Magistrate though such provision of
.....,. interim maintenance had been brought in the statute book for
the first time by the Amendment Act, 2001 with effect from Sep-
tember 24, 2001.

36. In Samaydin, the High Court of Allahabad observed H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.
--+
A that there may not be a discussion of such circumstances which
warranted the Court to allow it to grant maintenance from the
date of application, But, no other inference is permissible in the
light of the language of sub-section (2) of Section 125. The Court,
by way of illustrative cases considered certain situations, such
as, 'dilatory tactics adopted by the husband in the disposal of
_).-P

B 'r
the proceeding', 'untold cruelty practised against wife', etc. In
absence of special circumstances, however, maintenance can-
not be ordered from the date of appliGation.
37.'.Some other High Courts, have taken a contrary view. It
c was held that normally, maintenance should be granted from
the date of the application and not from the date of. the order. If
the .Magistrate is inclined to make an order granting mainte-
nance f~om the date of the order and not from the date of appli-
catiqn, he shou.ld record reasons to do so.
D
38-. In Gnahaselvi & Ors. v. /llavarasan, (1999) 1 Crimes
22 (Mad), the High Court of Madras observed that when the
wife approaches a Court claiming maintenance by filing appli-
cation on the ground that she is not able to maintain herself, it is
for her to prove such inability from the date of application. Hence,
E when the Court ultimately decides after conducting the inquiry
that she is entitled to maintenance, the said decision must nee-
essarily be based upon the material showing that the wife was
unable to maintain .herself when she filed an application. As a
general rule, therefore, the Magistrate should pass an order di-
F recting maintenance from the date of application. It was. also ).....

observed .that the remedy is a speedy remedy and summary
procedure is provided by the statute. Despite this, usually, in
such proceedings, the Court notices that the husband does not
al lo~ the proceedings to go on by raising one objection or the
G .other. The.. Court is required to deal with all s_uch objections,
which takes time. Again, even after the order is passed, the
y-
nusband rushes to the higher forum and challenges it. Some-
times, he obtains interim orders which results in further delay.
The deserted wife and children are the sufferers who seek shel-
H ter of the protective umbrella provided by Section 125 of the
SHAil KUMAR! DEVI & ANR. v. KRIS HAN 409
~ BHAGWAN PATHAK @ KISHUN B. PATHAK [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

Code. If maintenance is not granted from the date of applica- A
"T
' tion, the weaker sections are sure to lose confidence in the jus-
tice. delivery system. The Court noted the deep concern ex-
pressed by this Court in PN. Duda v. P Shiv Shankar, (1988}

-"
"1
I
3 sec 167 that "justice cries in silence for long' far too long".
39. In Amarjit Kaur v. Sartaz Zingh, 1996 CriLJ 4476
(P&H), the High Court of Punjab & Haryana held that sub-sec-
tion (2) of Section 125 does not require the Magistrate to record
B

special reasons for granting maintenance from the date of ap-
plication. What it says is that if the order is silent as to the date
from which such maintenance is payable, it has to be paid from c
the date of the order. Where, however, the maintenance Is to be
paid from the date of the application itself, then there should be
a specific order in that behalf by the Court. There is nothing in
the statutory provision to hold that the Magistrate must record
special reasons if he is to order that maintenance shall be pay- D
able from the date of application.
40. In Krishna Jain v. Dharam Raj Jain, 1992 CriLJ 1028
(MP), the Division Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh
considered the ambit and scope of sub-section (2) of Section
125 in the light of other provisions of the Code. It overruled Mohd. E
/naytullah Khan, Rameshwar and Lachhmani referred to above
and held that plain reading of sub-section (2) of Section 125
makes it clear that allowance of maintenance can be awarded ·
from the date of' the order or from the date of the application. To
-4, hold that, normally maintenance should be made payable from F
the date of the order and not from the date of the application
unless such order is backed by reasons would amount to in-
serting something more in the sub-section which the Legisla-
ture never intended. The Court observed that it was unable to
read in sub-section (2) laying down any rule to award mainte- G
nance from the date of the order or that the grant from the date
of the application is an exception.

41. Regarding recording of reasons, the Bench observed
that in either case i. e grant of maintenance from the date of the
H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R. '
.., lr
l

A order or from the date of the application, the Court is required
•
to record reasons. The Court referred to sub-section (6) of Sec- '
tion 354 of the Code which reads thus: r
.,-
~
(6) Every order under Section 117 or sub-section (2) of
Section 138 and every final order made under Section ~
8 125, Section 145 or Section 147 shall contain the point .....
"
or points for determination, the decision thereon and the "1--
reasons for the decision.

(emphasis supplied)
c 42. It was, therefore, observed that every final order under
Section 125 of the Code [and other Sections referred to in sub ...
section (c) of Section 354] must contain points for determina-
tion, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision.
43. Our attention was also invited to a decision in K.
D
Sivaram v. K. Mangalamba & Ors., 1990 CrLJ 1880 (AP). In
K. Sivaram, a single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
negatived the argument on behalf of the husband that the main-
tenance could be awarded from the date of the order and such .r
maintenance could be granted from the date of the application
E only by recording special reasons. The Court held that it is the
discretion conferred on the Court by the Code to award main-
~
tenance either from the date of the order or from the date of the
petition as per the circumstances of the case. The Code also
noted that wherever Parliament wanted special reasons to be
F recorded for passing a particular order, specific provision has
been made to that effect [See sub-section (3) of Section 167 of
the Code (default bail), Section 361 (refusal to grant probation)
etc].
44. In our considered opinion, the High Court is not right in
G
holding that as a normal rule, the Magistrate should grant main-
tenance only from the date of the order and not from the date of
'f-
the application for maintenance. Anci if he intents to pass such
an order, he is. required to record reasons in support of such
order. As observed in K. Sivar:im, reasons have to be recorded
H

I
!
SHAil KUMAR! DEVI & ANR. v. KRISHAN 411
BHAGWAN PATHAK@ KISHUN B. PATHAK [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
tr
in both the eventualities. The Court was also right in observing A
that wherever Parliament intended the Court to record special
reasons, care had been taken to make such provision by re-
quiring the Court to record such reasons.

.. i
- 45. Moreover, duration of litigation is not within the power
or in. the hands of the applicant and entitlement to 1Tiaintenance
~hould not be left to the uncertain date of disposal of the case.
Keeping in view this hard reality, this Court in Savitri held that in
B

absence of prohibition to grant 'interim' maintenance such power
could be read in the salutary provision of Section 125 of the
Code ensuring maintenance to unable wife to maintain herself c
during the pendency of proceedings. Even Parliament took into
account the reality and by the Amendment Act, 2001 express
provision has been made for the purpose.
46. Again, maintenance is a right which accrues to a wife
D
against her husband the minute the former gets married to the
-'. latter. It is not only a moral obligation but is also a legal duty
cast upon the husband to maintain ~is wife. Hence, whenever a
wife does not stay with her husband and claims maintenance,
the only question which the Court is called upon to consider is
whether she was justified to live separately from her husband E
• and still claim maintenance from him? If the reply is in the affir-
mative, she is entitled to claim maintenance. It is, therefore, open
to the Magistrate to award maintenance from the date of appli-
cation and there is nothing which requires recording of 'special
reasons' though he mµst .
record reasons as envisaged
.
by sub- F
-"I section (6) of Section 354 of the Code in support of the order
passed by him.
47. We, therefore, hold that while deciding an application
under Section 125 of the code, a Magistrate is ·required to record
G
reasons for granting or refusing to grant maintenance to wives,
children or parents. Such maintenance can be awarded from
-4· the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the ap-
plication for maintenance, as the case may be. For awarding
maintenance from the _date of the application, express order is
H
~
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.
I
~
..
A necessary. No special reasons, however, are required to be
recorded by the Court. In our Judgment, no such requirement ~
can be read in sub section (I) of Section 125 of the Code in
absence of express provision to that effect.
48. The last question relates to quantum of amount of main- .;.-
B tenance.The Family Court granted maintenance to the appel- ~
~

lants-wife as well as daughter-at the rate of Rs.2000/- and .._
!
Rs. 1000/- respectively from the date of application i.e, July 21,
1997. We havereproduced the relevant part of Section 125 as
originally enacted and as amended by the Amendment Act,
c ,it
2001 ,.. Before the (:lmendment of 2001, the ceiling was Rs.500/
-, .In our opinion, therefore, the Family Court could not have
granted maintenance exceeding Rs.500/- p.m either to appel- L-
lant No. i or appellant No.2 from the date of application i.e. July ~
21, 1997. At the most, such an order could have been made l
D effective from the date the Amendment Act, 2001 came into '
t=-
force. To that extent, therefore, the order passed by the Family J-
Court was not in accordance with law. I
!.
49. But even on merits, the Family court was not right in l=
fixing: the amount of maintenance. The learned counsel for the
E respondent took us to the evidence adduced by the parties.
r,.
From the material on record, it is clear that the appellant No.1- ,
~

wife is residing in the house bel,onging to the respondent-hus-
band and such finding has been recorded even by the Family
I
Court. It is also in evidence that she was receiving income from r
F the land in her possession which belonged to her husband-re-
~ 1=
sponde.nt herein. It is true that the respondent could not state as ~

~
to the actual amount received by the wife from the cultivation of
the land. But it is also one of the considerations which is rel-
evarit and material while fixing the amount of maintenance. More-
G over, appellant No.1 has inherited some land fr,om her father.
50. In view of overall facts arid circumstances, in our opin-
.........
ionJ, ends of justice would be served if we hold that both the .
appellants are entitled to an amount of Rs.1000/-, each per month lo--

as maintenance. As already clarified, the appellants would be ~
H
F
SHAil KUMAR! DEVI & ANR. v. KRISHAN 413
BHAGVVAN PATHAK @ KISHUN 8. PATHAK [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
t
entitled to the said amount of maintenance from the date the A
Amendment Act, 2001 came into force. i.e. September 24,
2001. So far as the order of payment of 'interim' maintenance
passed by the Magistrate is concerned, the same was in con-
sonance with law and no interference is called for.
51. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be 8
partly allowed and is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated
above.
B.B.B. Appeal partly allowed.