SHAHABUDDIN ABDUL KAHLIK SHAIKHversusSTATE OF GUJARAT
- Citation
- 1995 INSC 250
- Decided
- 5 April 1995
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- A S ANAND
Holding
The conviction was set aside because the sole eyewitness's testimony was materially contradictory and not credible, rendering the trial court's appreciation of evidence erroneous.
Summary
Shahabuddin Shaikh was convicted under IPC Section 302 read with Section 34 and TADA Section 3 for the murder of Manoharbhai, based solely on the testimony of the victim's brother (PW‑2). PW‑2 gave materially contradictory statements about the place from which he observed the incident, the role of the accused, and the presence of light, yet the trial court accepted his evidence and upheld the conviction. On appeal under TADA Section 19, the Supreme Court examined whether such contradictions rendered the testimony unreliable and whether the trial court erred in its appreciation of evidence. The Court held that the contradictions were material, the identification was untenable in darkness, and the Panch witness was not competent to testify on illumination. Consequently, the conviction was set aside and the appellant was ordered to be released.
Issues considered
- Whether material contradictions in an eyewitness's testimony affect its credibility and can sustain a conviction.
- Whether the trial court erred in accepting the sole testimony of PW‑2 despite contradictions.
- Whether the alleged overt act of the appellant aligns with the charge under Section 34 IPC and TADA Section 3.
- Whether lack of illumination at the scene defeats identification of the accused.
- Whether the Panch witness's testimony on lighting is admissible and relevant.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
A SHAHABUDDIN ABDUL KAHLIK SHAIKH
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT
APRIL 5, 1995
B (DR. AS. ANAND AND M.K. MUKHERJEE, JJ.]
Indian Penal Code 186()-Section 302 r/w Section 34-Te"orists and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1987-Appellant prosecuted for mur-
der-Prosecution case based on the sole testimony of the brother of the
C deceased-contradictions in his statements-Convicted for both the charges by
Trial Court-On appeal conviction set aside.
Evodemce Act, 1872 :
Evidence-Appreciation of-Acceptance of contradictory evidence-To
D depend upon the consideration whether contradiction apparent or rea~ in
consequential or materia~ explainable or irreconciliable-lnconsistency in the
evidence of brother of the deceased-close scrutiny-Need for.
Appellant with 3 others, caused death of a person and was )
prosecuted u/s 302 r/w Section 34 UPC and Section 3 of Terrorists and
E Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.
Prosecntion relied solely on the testimony of the eye witness P.W. 2,
brother of the deceased. It his statement, PW 2 stated that he saw the
appellant and accused 'A' attacking him with 'Guptis' and the other 2
accused holding him from the first floor of the 'Chawl'. With regard to
F lights he stated that there was light at and aronnd the place of occurrence.
There were material inconsistencies in the evidence of P.W. 2.
Regarding the place from where he saw the incident, his evidence was
controverted by his own statement. During investigation he said that he
G saw the incident from the upper floor of the 'Chawl' and in his cross
examination said that he was at the corner of the 'Chawl'.
Statement regarding overt act played by the appellant was con·
troverted by the charge wherein it was specifically stated that appellant
and accused 'I' caught hold of deceased and the other two accused dealt
·H 'Gupti' blows.
200
SHAHABUDDIN SHAIKH v. STATE 201
The claim of existence of light was controverted by P.W. 6 who stated A
that the_ area was under curfew that night. Further, he himself stated that
the street lights were off.
The Trial Court, discarding the inconsistencies regarding the place,
observed that from whatsoever place the incident was seen the crucial
point was that the incident was seen by him. The inconsistency regarding B
the actual role played, was held as immaterial, once it was proved that
appellan~ was one of the persons causing murder in pursuance to their
common intention. As for the light, relying on the Panch witness, the
-
- -~-
court held that inspite of street lights not working , the place was il-
luminated by lights from surrounding places. Thus the Trial Court con- C
victed him in respect of both the charges.
The appellant preferred appeal u/s 19 of Terrorists and _Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.
Allowing the Appeal, this Court
D
HELD : 1.1 P.W. 2 materially contradicted himself as to the place
wherefrom he saw the incident. Findings of Trial Court recorded on
-( erroneous and perverse mode of appreciation of evidence & a patently
\. wrong process of reasoning. [204-G]
1.2. The claim of PW ?. that he saw the incident could be accepted E
notwithstanding the contradiction brought in his evidence in this regard.
The Trial Court was required to first consider whether contradictions are
apparent or real, inconsequential or material, explainable or irreconcili-
able and acceptance of the claim of the witness was to depend nn the
answer thereon. Instead of approaching the matter from that angle &
F
perspective-the court accepted the claim of PW 2 as gospel truih, con-
_)\
temptuously ignoring the material contradiction altogether. [205-B, C]
2. The overt act allegedly committed by the applicant did not lit in
with the prosecution case as reflected in the charges. The observation of
: the Trial Court in this regard may be u11exceptionable as a proposition G
of law, but the said inconsistency warranted a close scrutiny of the
evidence of PW 2, as he happened to be brother of the deceased and the
result of the trial solely rested upon his testimony. [206-E, 205-E]
).-
3. There was no light around the place of incident. PW 2's claim to
have seen the incident & identified the miscreants is wholly unacceptable H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 3 S.C.R.
A as credit worthy. The Panch witness who was relied on in this regard does
not disclose the statement attributed to him by the Trial Judge. Even if he
had made any statement, this court could not have relied, as he being only
witness to seizure of blood and other articles on the following morning and
not of the incident itself. He is not competent to testify as to whether the
B place of incident was illuminated on the previous night notwithstanding
the curfew and the admitted fact that the street lights were not on that
night. [206-E, B, Cl
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
242 of 1994.
c '
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.3.94 of the Additional Desig-
nated Court, Ahmedabad in T. Crl. Case No. 166 of 1993.
S.C. Patel for the Appellant.
D Anip Sachthey for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M.K. MUKHERJEE, J. On February 1, 1995 we heard and disposed )
of this appeal with the following order : · r
E
"For the reasons to be stated later, the judgment of the Additional
Designated Judge, Abmedabad dated 4th March, 1994 in TCC No.
166/93 cannot be sustained. This appeal succeeds and is allowed.
The conviction and sentences imposed upon the appellant are set
aside and he is directed to be released from custoCly forthwith if
F not required in any other case".
We now state the reasons for the order.
The appellant was placed on trial before the Additional Designated
Judge, Court No. 2. Ahmedabad to answer charges under Section 302 read
G with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the Terrorists
and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 ('Act' for short) which
centred around the death of a person belonging to the Hindu Community
on December 23, 1992. On conclusion of the trial the learned Judge
recorded an order of conviction and sentence against the appellant in
H respect of both the charges. Hence this appeal under Section 19 of the Act.
J
.•
0
SHAHABUDDIN SHAIKH v. STATE [MUKHERJEE, J.] 203
Briefly stated the case of the prosecution is that on December 24, A
1992 Rajubhai Govindbhai (P.W.l) a resident of Chatursing's Chawl, near
f· Char Toda Kabrastan of Gomtipur in the city of Ahmedbad lodged a
complaint with Gomtipur Police Station to the effect that on December 23,
1992 at or about 11 P.M. while he was sitting in front of his house along
with his friends Hariphal Manoharbhai Solanki and Sanjay Kumar
Kishorebhai he saw Manoharbhai Kaluram Koli, who was a resident of the
B
same Chaw! and working as a labourer at the Railway Station platform
Canteen, coming towards them from the side of Patrawali Mosque. When
he got as far as the road in front of the ES! Dispensary No. D-23 four
persons named Kallar, Anif Hanif, Shahbuddin (the appellant) and Ishrar
Kaliyo waylaid him. While the appellant and Ishrar Kaliyo caught hold of c
him the other two stabbed him, with Guptis. Resultingly, Manoharbhai
received serious injuries and started bleeding profusely. When Rajubhai
and his friends started shouting for help the miscreants fled away towards
Patrawali's Chaw!. They then rushed the injured to the hospital where the
doctor declared him dead. In his complaint Rajubhai alleged that the
D
murder was a sequel to the demolition of the structure of Babri Mosque
, at Ayodhya on December 6, 1992 and the communal riot that broke out in
-I the city of Ahmedbad in its wake. On that complaint a case was registered
'· and the appellant was. arrested. On completion of investigation police
submitted charge- sheet against the appellant, and the other three accused
named· in the complaint showing them as absconding. The appellant E
pleaded not guilty to the charges levelled against him and contended that
he was falsely implicated.
That Manoharbhai met with his homicidal death on the fateful night
stands conclusively proved by overwhelming evidence on record. In fact F
'
-~.
that part of the prosecution case was not challenged by the defence. The
' uncontroverted evidence of Head Constable Kantilal. (P.W.5), who held
inquest, with the contemporaneous panchnama prepared by him (Ex.11)
and that of Dr. P.R. Patel (P.W.3) who held post-mortem examination
' upon the deceased, when read together indicate that the deceased sus-
tained and died of two stab injuries, one below the left middle and other G
on the upper lateral part of the right shoulder blade.
"c The next and the crucial question that falls for determination is
whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond all reasonable
doubts, that the appellant was one of the persons who caused the death of H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995]3 S.C.R.
A Manoharbhai. To prove this part of the case, prosecution solely relied -
and the trial Court passed its conviction - on the evidence of Jaydeep
Maluram (P.W.2), the brother of the deceased, as P.W.l turned hostile,
before we refer to the evidence of P.W. 2 we may mention that in the
charges framed against the appellant it was specifically stated that he and
lshrar had caught hold of the deceased and the other two accused had
B taken out Guptis and given blows on different parts of his body. In his
sworn testimony P.W. 2 however categorically sated that the appellant and
Arif attacked him with Guptis while the other two miscreants had caught
him. Then again, P.W. 2 stated in his examination-in-chief that when he
was on the first floor of the Chatursing's Chaw!, where he was residing, he
C saw his brother being attacked by the miscreants in front of B-23 Dispen-
sary. In cross-examination, however, he not only made an altogether dif-
ferent statement when he said that he was standing alone in the flour mill
of Chelaji, which was in the corner of Chatursing's Chaw!, when the
incident took place, but also asserted that it was false to state that at the
D time of the incident he was on the upper storey of the Chaw!. Against the
above assertion when P.W.2's attention was drawn to the part of his
statement made during investigation wherein it was recorded 'I was on the
upper storey of the landlord and when my brother came after escape. I
came down", he denied to have said so. P.S.I. Nagesh Kumar (P.W.6), who
investigated into the case, however admitted that P.W.2 did make such
E statement before him. From P.W.2's evidence we further find that when he
was being cross examined regarding the source of light by which he could
~ecognise the miscreants he stated that the lights in and around the place
were on but then from P.W.6 it was elicited in cross- examination that the
Gomtipur area was under curfew in that night. Indeed, in answer to a
F question put by the Court he admitted "The lights on ways/roads were off
on the date of incident".
On a careful perusal of the impugned judgment in the light of the
evidence of P.W.2 as detailed discussed above we are constrained to say
that the trial Judge recorded its findings on an erroneous and perverse
G mode of appreciation of evidence and a patently wrong process of reason-
ing. In dealing with the glaring and material contradiction in the evidence
of P.W. 2 as regards the place wherefrom he saw the incident, the learned
J ud1;" observed :
H "...... I am of the opinion that be it from hear the flour mill or from
'
SHAHABUDDINSHAIKHv. STATE[MUKHERJEE,J.] 205
the first floor of the building he did see the incident as deposed A
by him and that is the crurjal point".
(emphasis supplied)
In making the above observation the learned Judge has, in our view,
put the part before the horse. In fact, the crucial point before the Court B
was whether the claim of P.W. 2 that he saw the incident could be accepted
notwithstanding the contradiction brought in his evidence in this regard. In
this context the learned Judge was required to first consider whether the
- contradiction was apparent or real, inconsequential, or material, ex-
plainable or irreconciliable and acceptance of the claim of the witness was
to depend on the answer thereon. Instead of approaching the matter from
that angle and perspective the learned Judge accepted P.W.2's claim as
C
gospel truth, contemptuously ignoring the material contradiction al-
together.
We next find that when the learned Judge's attention was drawn to D
the inconsistency in the evidence of P.W.2 regarding the actual role played
by the appellant in the murder, the Judge observed that once the prosecu-
tion succeeded in proving that the appellant was one of the four miscreants
-< who committed the murder pursuant to their common intention, the ques-
tion as to whether he had only caught hold of the deceased or had actually E
stabbed him was redundant. As a proposition of law the above observ~tion
made by the trial judge may be unexceptionable but then it cannot be
gainsaid that the inconsistency pointed out by the appellant warranted a
close scrutiny of the evidence of P.W.2, as he happened to be the brother
of the deceased, and the result of the trial solely rested upon his testimony.
F
Lastly, in rejecting the contention of the appellant that there being
no light in and around the area where the incident took place P.W.2 could
not have seen it much less identified the miscreants, the learned Judge
observed that even though the Investigating Officer said that the electric
poles were not working at the time of the mddent, the panch witness had G
stated in an answer to Court's query th•t the buildings surrounding the area
were having lights whereby the roads were illuminated and the persons on
the road could be identified. The learned Judge then recorded the follow-
ing finding :
"So, even if it may be that the street lights may not be working, yet H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 3 S.C.R.
-
A there was sufficient light thrown from the nearby buildings with
the aid of which the buildings with the aid of which the persons
walking 01' the road can be easily seen, and this also renders a ring ,(
of truth to the straight forwardness and the credibility of the
witness (P.W.2) when he says that he had witnessed the incident".
B On going through the record placed before us we however find that
the only Panch witness who was examined during the trial was one Ishwar
Singh (P.W.4) and his evidence does not disclose the statement attributed
to him by the trial Judge. We hasten to add that even if he had made any
.such statement we would not have placed any reliance thereupon as, being
C a witness only to the seizure of blood and other articles on the following
morning, that is on 24.12.1992 • and not of the incident itself · he was not
competent to testify as to whether the place of incident was illuminated on
the previous night notwithstanding the curfew and the admitted fact that
the street lights were not on in that night.
D For the foregoing discussion we unhesitatingly hold that the reasons
given by the trial Court for accepting the evidence of P.W.2 are wholly
unsustainable. We further hold that having regard to the facts that P.W.2
materially contradicted himself as to the place wherefrom he saw the )-
incident, that the overt act allegedly committed by the appellant did not fit
in with the case of the prosecution as reflected in the charges and that
E there was no light in and around the place of incident, P.W.2's claim that
he had seen the incident and identified the miscreants is wholly unaccep-
table as creditworthy. The appeal must therefore be allowed and we order
accordingly.
K.T. Appeal allowed.
}
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