Supreme Court of India

SH. MOHAN SINGH AND ORS.versusINTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF INDIA AND ORS.

Citation: 1996 INSC 1304
Decided: 7 November 1996
Disposal: Dismissed
Bench: K RAMASWAMY

Holding

When the urgency power under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act is exercised, the statutory requirement of newspaper publication and local notice under Section 4(1) is directory, not mandatory, and a Section 6 declaration must be published in the Gazette after at least a one‑day gap, so the earlier declaration remains valid and the appeal is dismissed.

Summary

The International Airport Authority of India acquired land for airport expansion by invoking the urgency power under Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, dispensing with the Section 5‑A enquiry and taking possession under Section 17(4). The appellants challenged the validity of the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6, arguing that all three steps of Section 4(1) (Gazette publication, newspaper publication, and local notice) were mandatory before exercising the urgency power. The Supreme Court held that while the three steps are mandatory for a regular acquisition under Section 4(1), they are directory when the urgency clause under Section 17(4) is invoked; only Gazette publication is required, and a one‑day gap between the Gazette notification and the Section 6 declaration is sufficient. The Court restored the original Section 6 declaration, held that no fresh declaration was needed, and confirmed that the land vested in the State free of encumbrances. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The statutory requirement of publishing the Section 4(1) notification in newspapers and giving local notice – whether it is mandatory or directory when the urgency power under Section 17(4) is exercised.
Whether a declaration under Section 6 must be published after a minimum one‑day gap from the Gazette notification and whether the actual printing date matters.
Whether the declaration under Section 6, once quashed by a single judge, is revived by the division bench and whether a fresh declaration is required.
Whether the government can withdraw a Section 6 declaration under the General Clauses Act after the land has vested under Section 17.
Whether land taken possession of under Section 17(1) or 17(2) stands vested in the State free of all encumbrances.

Legislation cited

General Clauses Act, 1897s. 21
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 11-A, s. 17(1), s. 17(2), s. 17(4), s. 23(1), s. 4(1), s. 48(1), s. 5-A, s. 6(1), s. 6(2)

Subjects

Land acquisitionUrgency clauseSection 17Section 4Statutory interpretationMandatory vs directoryDeclaration under Section 6Vesting of landPublic purpose

Judgment

SH. MOHAN SINGH AND ORS. A
v.
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF INDIA AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 7, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] B

Land Laws:

Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Sections 17(/), (2) and (4), 4(1) and 6.

Urgency provisions-Invoking of--Preconditions for·-Reld: C
publication of notification in newspapers and giving notice of substance
thereof-Mandatory for exercising power ofeminent domain under S.4(/)-
There must be a time gap of at least one day between publication of
notification in Gazette under S.4(1) and declaration under S.6--But when
urgency provision was invoked publication of notifiction in newspapers D
and in locality could not be insisted upon for exercising power of eminent
domain under S.4(/)-Dates of notification and declaration mentioned in
Gazette conclusive and not actual date ofprinting-Declaration under S.6
must be published after publicatfon of notification under S.4(1) though
signed earlier-Expressions "hereinafter" and "last of the dates of such
publication" in S.4(1) were for purpose ofcomputation of/imitation under E
S.6 and not for exercising power under S.17(4)-Equal/y purpose ofS. 6(2)
was to compute period of limitation provided in S.11-A.

Section 48(/)-Possession of/and-Held: once possession taken land
stood vested in State free from all encumbrances-Subsequently, power of
withdrawal under S.48(1) not available-Nor Government has power to F
withdraw S.6 declaration-General Clauses Act, 1897, S.21.

Section 6--Declaration-Quashed by Single Judge-Division Bench
set aside judgment ofSingle Judge-Held: S.6 declaration stood restored-
Subsequent declaration published under S.6 was only superfluous and of G
no consequence.

Interpretation of Statutes :

Interpretation-Subsidiary rules of-Mandatory or directory-
Legislative intention-Determination of-Held: Regard must be had to H
569
570 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A context, subject-matter and object of statutory provision-Use of word
"Shall" not always decisive-Statutory remedy for violation of general
obligation was mandatory.

Words and Phrases :

B "hereinafter", "last of the dates of such publication"-"Meaning
of-In the context of S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, I 894.

The appellant's land was acquired by the respondent, dispensing
with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
by invoking urgency clause under· Section 17(1) of the Act. The
C possession of the land was taken under Section 17(4) of the Act. The
notification and declaration under sections 4(1) and 6(1) were
published and notice of substance thereof was given in the locality.
The appellants filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging
the aforesaid acquisition. The declaration published under section 6
of the Act was quashed by the Single Judge. On appeal, the Division
D Bench set aside the judgment of the Single Judge. Being aggrieved
the appellant preferred the present appeal.

On behalf of the appellants it was contended that the exercise of
the power under Section 17(4) of the Act by invoking urgency clause
E under Section 17(1) of the Act was conditional upon the publication
of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act; that Section 4(1)
contemplated three mandatory steps; that after completion of all the
three steps enquiry under Section 5-A could be dispensed with and
declaration under Section 6(1) could be made after publication of
notification under Section 4(1) of the Act; that the respondent, after
F the judgment of the Single Judge, superseded the declaration and
published a fresh declaration; and, therefore, the declaration was
not valid.

On behalf of the respondents it was contended that in
G- j.a(erpreting the provisions of Sections 4(1), 6 and 17 of the Act the
public purpose behind each of the three Sections should be kept in
~iew;that the words "hereinafter" and "last of the dates of such
'publication" used in Sections 4(1) and 6(2) of the Act are for the
purpose of computation of t!Je limitation prescribed under Section
11-A of the Act and, therefore, Sections 4( I) and 6(2) of the Act were
H directory; that the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act was
MOHAN SINGH v. I.A.A.I. 571

published within a gap of one day and hence the exercise of power A
under Section 17(4) and taking of possession under Section 17(1) were
valid; and that it was not necessary that before exercise of power
under Section 17(1) the three steps mentioned is section 4(1) should
be completed.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court B

HELD: I.I. Though compliance with publications of the three
steps required under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is
mandatory while exercising the power of eminent domain under section
4(1), when the appropriate Government exercises the power under
Section 17(4) of the Act dispensing with the enquiry under section 5- C
A and directs the Collector to take possession of the land before making
the award as the lands are needed urgently either under sub-section (1)
or (2) thereof, it is not mandatory to publish the notification under
Section 4(1) in the newspapers and giving of notice of the substance
thereof in the locality; the last of the dates of publication should not D
be the date for the purpose of exercising the power under Section 17(4).
This interpretation would subserve the public purpose and suppress
mischief of non-compliance and seeks to elongate the public purpose,
namely, taking immediate possession of the land needed for the public
purpose, envisaged in the notification. (589 C-F)
E
1.2. It cannot be said that there is no necessity for fresh
publication of the declaration under Section 6, after possession was
taken under section 17(1) or 17(2) of the Act. The object of Section
4(1) is to enable the Government to have the land tested whether it is
needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose and is suitable;
after its consideration by the appropriate Government that the land F
is needed or is likely to be needed for the public purpose, publication
of declaration under Section 6(1) is mandatory to give its conclusiveness
to the public purpose published under Section 4(1). Therefore, it is a
mandatory requirement that the declaration under Section 6(1) should
be published. (589 A, 590 AB) G

2.1. The object of Section 17 of the Act appears to be that when
the Government exercises the urgency power under Section 17(1) or
emergency power under Section 17(2), they form the opinion that
the land is needed for public purpose. If the possession of the land is
needed urgently or immediately they are required to have the H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A notification under Section 4(1) published in the official Gazette and
within a gap of one day to make the declaration under Section 6 and
have the same published under Section 6(1 ). Thus, what is mandatory
is publication of the notification under Section 4(1) in the Gazette.
Thereafter within a gap of a day publication of the declaration under
Section 6(1) is mandatory. Thereby, the public purpose becomes
B conclusive, as envisaged under Section 6(3) and the Collector is
empowered to take immediate possession of the land for the said public
purpose. (582 B-D)

2.2. Though the compliance of the three steps required under
Section 4(1) is mandatory; for the exercise of the power under Section
C 17(4) it is not necessary that all the three steps should be completed
before making the declaration under Section 6(1) and have it published
for directing the Collector to take possession under Section 17(1) or
17(2). What is needed is that there should be a gap of time of at least
a day between the publication of the notification under Section 4(1)
and of the declaration under Section 6(1). The date of the notification
D and declaration published as mentioned in the Gazette is conclusive
but not the actual date of printing of the Gazette. [582 E-H)

2.3. When the land is urgently needell under Section 17(1 ), notice
under Section 9(1) would be given to the owner and steps would be
E taken to resume its possession after the expiry of 15 days. If it is
needed emergently under Section 17(2), even without waiting for 15
days on issue of notice under Section 9(1) to the owner, the appropriate
Government would direct the Collector to take possession of the
land immediately. If the publication in the newspapers and in the
locality is also insisted upon as preliminary to the exercise of power
F under Section 17(4) which are mandatory requirements and until
last of them occurs, the immediate or urgent necessity to take
possession of the land under Section 17(1) or 17(2) before making the
award would be easily defeated by dereliction of duty by the
subordinate officers or by skillful manoeuvre. The appropriate
G Government is required to take the decision for acquisition of the
land and to consider the urgency or emergency and to make the
notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 and
have them published in the Gazette that the land acquired under
Section 4(1) is needed for public purpose; they become conclusive
under Section 6, and to give direction to the Collector to take its
H possession. [582 H, 583 A-D[
MOHAN SINGH v. I.A.A.I.

2.4. Making of the declaration under Section 6 is not merely A
signing by the officials; the official is empowered to sign at any time
before its actual publication. What is material is that the declaration
under section 6 should be published in the Gazette after the notification
under Section 4(1) was published, i.e., after a gap of at least one day.
Therefore, declaration is required to be published though signed earlier,
after the publication of notification under Section 4(1) in the Gazette. B
What is crucial is not the actual date of printing, but the date of the
publication in the Gazette as appears from the Gazette. [585-B-D]

State of UP. and Ors. v. Radhey Shyam Nigam and Ors.,[1989] I
SCR 92, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Anr. v. Makrand Singh & Ors.
[1995] 2 SCC 497 and State of Haryana and Anr. v. Raghubir Dayal, C
(1995] I SCC 133, relied on.

Khadim Hussain v. State of UP. and Ors., [1976] 3 SCR I and Lt.
Governor of H.P. and Anr. v. Sri Avinash Sharma, [1970] 2 SCR 149,
held inapplicable.
D
3. The expressions "hereinafter" and "last of the dates of such
publication" in Section 4(1) of the Act shall be for the purpose of
computation of limitation of one year under Section 6 and tQ determine
compensation under Section 23(1). As regards publication of the
declaration under Section 6(2) and the meaning of the
word "hereinafter", it is referred t~ for the purpose of computation E
of the limitation prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act.
The word "hereinafter" used in Section 4(1) is, therefore, directory.
It seeks to prescribe limitation under Section 6 for publication of the
declaration under Section 6(1) within one year from the date of the
publication of the notification under Section 4(1). The last of the F
dates was intended only for the purpose of computation of limitation.
(580-H & 581-A-C]

4.1. It is true that after the possession of the land is taken either
under Section 17(1), 17(2) or 16 of the Act, the land stands vested in
the State absolutely free from all emcumbrances. Subsequently, the G
power of withdrawal under Section 48(1) would no more be available.
Nor had the Government the power to withdraw the declaration under
Section 6(1) of the Act envisaged under Section 21 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897. [590-F-H]

Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma, [1970[ 2 SCR 149; held H
574 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A inapplicable.

4.2. The Single Judge had quashed the declaration published
under Section 6 of the Act. Consequently, the question ofsupersession
of the declaration already quashed is superfluous. It is settled legal
position that appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. As
B a result of the setting aside of the judgment of the Single Judge by
the Division Bench of the High Court, the declaration published under
Section 6 of the Act quashed by the Single Judge stood restored. Hence,
the declaration published under section 6 of the Act is only superfluous
and of no consequence. [590-D-E)

C 5.1. The distinction of mandatory compliance or directory effect
of the language depends upon the language couched in the statute
under consideration and its object, purpose and effect. The distinction
reflected in the use of the word "shall" or "may" depends on
conferment of power. In the present context, "may" does not always
mean may. "May" is a must for enabling complaince of provision
D but there are cases in which, for various reasons, as soon as a person
who is within the statute is entrusted with the power, it becomes duty
to exercise. Where the language of statute creates a duty, the special
remedy is prescribed for non-performance of the duty. [585-E-G]

5.2. General rule of law is that where a general obligation is
E created by statute and statutory remedy is provided for violation,
statutory remedy is mandatory. The scope and language of the statute
and consideration of policy at times may, however, create exception
showing that legislature did not intend a remedy (generality) to be
exclusive. Words are the skin of the language. The language is the
F medium of expressing the intention and the object that particular
provision or the Act seeks to achieve. Therefore, it is necessary to
ascertain the intention. The word 'shall' is not always decisive. Regard
must be had to the context, subject matter and object of the statutory
provision in question in determining whether the same is mandatory
or directory. No universal principle of law could be laid in that behalf
G as to whether a particular provision or enactment shall be considered
mandatory or directory. It is the duty of the Court to try to get at the
real intention of the legislature by carefully analysing the whole scope
of the statute or section or a phrase under consideration. As stated
earlier, the questiou as to whether the statute is mandatory or directory
depends upon the intent of the legislature and not always upon the
H language in which the intent is couched. The meaning and intention
MOHAN SINGH v. I.A.A.I. 575

of the legislature would govern design and purpose the Act seeks to A
achieve. (585 GH, 586 A-CJ

5.3. The word "shall", though prima facie gives impression of
being mandatory character, it requires to be considered in the light
of the intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the scope
of the statute, its nature and design and the consequences that would B
flow from the construction thereof one way or the other. In that behalf,
the Court is required to keep in view the impact on the profession,
necessity of its compliance; whether the statute, if it is avoided,
provides for any contingency for non-compliance; if the word 'shall'
is construed as having mandatory character, the mischief that would
ensue by such construction; whether the public convenience would be C
subserved or public inconvenience or the general inconvenience that
may ensue if it is held mandatory and all other relevant circumstances
are required to be taken into consideration in construing whether the
provision would be mandatory or directory. If an object of the
enactment is defeated by holding the same directory, it should be
construed as mandatory whereas if by holding it mandatory serious D
general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons of general
public without much furthering the object of enactment, the same
should be construed as directory but all. the same, it would not mean
that the language used would be ignored altogether. Effect must be
given to all the provisions harmoniously to suppress public mischief
and to promote public justice. (588-G,H & 589 A-CJ E

State of UP. and Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, (1961] 2 SCR 679;
K Narasimhiah v. HC. Singri Gowda and Ors., (1965] 3 SCR 618; The
Remington Rand of India Ltd v. The Workmen, (1968] I SCR 154; Hiralal
Agrawal v. Rampadarath Singh and Ors., (1969] l SCR 328; Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay v. The B.E.S.T. Workers' Union, (1973] 3 F
SCR 285; Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd v. Municipal Board, Rampur,
(1965( l SCR 970; Virji Ram Sutaria. v. Nathalal Premji Bhanvadia and
Ors., (1969) 2 SCR 627 and Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram and Ors., (1974)
3 SCR 20, relied on.
G
"Craies on Statute Law" (7th. Edu.) "Sutherland Statutory
Construction (3rd. Edn.) Vol.I, p.81, para 316, "Crawford on the
Constrution of Statutes" p. 516 and "Maxwell on the Interpretation
of Statutes'', 10th. Edn. p. 381, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14363 of H
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A 1996 Etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.2.96 of the Delhi High Court
in L.P.A. No. 53 of 1994.

Shanti Bhushan, Alok Agarwal, Ramesh Singh, Ms. Bina Gupta,
B Ms. Rakhi Verma, N.S. Vashisht, Raj iv Dutta, Vipin Nair and D.R. Nigam
for the Appellants.

K.S. Sidhu, P.A. Choudhary, Ms. Pinky Anand, Ms. Geeta Luthra,
D.N. Goburdhan, Ms. Maldeep Sidhu and R.S. Suri, (A.K. Srivastava)
for B.K. Prasad, for the Respondents.
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. RAMASWAMY, J. Leave granted.

D The International Airport Authority of India (for short, "!AA!) had
requisitioned the Lt. Governor, Delhi and the Government of India to
acquire 713 bighas, 2 biswas of land for rehabilitation of 1,000 families
displaced by acquisition of land for Indira Gandhi International Airport.
The i.t. Governor, exercising the power under section 17(1) dispensed
with the enquiry under Section 5-A and directed under Section 17(4) to
E take over possession. The notification under Section 4( I) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the 'Act') was published on December
23, 1986. The same was published in two newspapers on January 3, 1987.
The notice of substance of such notification was given at convenient places
in the locality. The declaration under Section 6(1) was published on
December 24, 1986 and notice of substance thereof was given in the locality
F thereafter. The possession of the land was taken over on January 29, 1987.
The awards also were made by the Collector under section 11 on December
23, 1987. .

It would appear that, admittedly, a batch of writ petitions was filed
G in the High Court impugning the notification under Section 4(1) and the
declaration under Section 6( I) and the exercise of the power under Section
17(4 ). The whole batch of cases was dismissed and became final. These
two Civil Writ Petition Nos. 133 and 2440 of 1987 were segregated due to
amendment of their pleadings wherein the appellants had pleaded that the
notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6(1)
H were actually published on January 28, 1987 and January 29, 1987
MOHAN SINGH v. I.A.A.I. [K. RAMASWAMY,!.] S77

respectively. Therefore, it was contended before the learned single Judge A
that in either event, notification under Section 4(1) was published in the
newspapers on January 3, 1987. While the Government exercised the power
under Section 17(4) before publication of the notification under Section
4(1 ), as contemplated in the manner prescribed under Section 4( 1), the
learned Single Judge accepted the contention and held that the exercise of
the power by the Government dispensing ..with the enquiry under Section B
SA and publication of the declaration under Section 6 was illegal.
Accordingly, she quashed the declaration under Section 6 and gave liberty
to the Lt. Governor to have the declaration published afresh in accordance
with law. On appeal, the Division Bench, in the impugned judgment in
LPA No. S3/94 and batch, dated february 28, 1996, reversed the judgment
of the single Judge dated May 20, 1994. Thus, these appeals by special C
leave.

Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the appeilants,
contended that the exercise of the power under Section 17(4) invoking
urgency clause under Section 17(1) is conditioned upon the publication of
the notification under Section 4(1). Thereafter, the Government has the D
power to invoke Section 17(4). Section 4(1) contemplates three mandatory
conditions to be complied with, i.e. (I) publication of the notification
under Section 4(1) in the.official Gazette; (2) publication of the notification
in two daily newspapers having circulation in that locality of which at
least one shall be in the regional language; and (3) the Collector shall
cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at E
convenient places in the said locality. The last of the dates of such publication
and the giving of such public notice has reference to the date of the
publication of the notification. Unless all the three steps are complied
with and after compliance of last of it or any one of them which will be
the last of it, the Act gives power to the appropriate Government to exercise F
the power under Section 17(1) and empowers thereafter to dispense with
the enquiry under Section SA and declaration under Section 6(1) may be
made in respect of that land at any time "after the publication of the
notification under Section 4(1 )".In support thereof, he placed strong reliance
on State of UP. and Ors. v. Radhay Shyam Nigam and Ors. etc., [1989] l
SCR 92. He also contended that the publication of the three steps required G
to be taken under Section 4(1) is mandatory. There is a distinction between
making a declaration and publication thereof in the newspapers and in the
locality. Making the declaration is a condition precedent for exercise of
the power under Section 17(4). The said making should be only after the
publication of the notification under Section 4(1) as contemplated in sub-
section (I) of section 4. In support thereof, he relied upon the judgments H
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP.8 S.C.R.

A in Khadim Hussain v. State of U.P. and Ors., [1976] 3 SCR I and Krishi
Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Anr. v. Makrand Singh and Ors., [1995] 2
sec 497.
Shri P.A. Chowdhary, learned senior counsel for the Union of India,
has contended that in interpreting the provisions of Sections 4(1), 6 and
B 17, the purpose behind each of the three sections should be kept in view.
Though the language in Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) is capable of
more than one interpretation, as is sought to be pressed for acceptance by
Shri Shanti Bhushan, the Court is required to consider what purpose each
Section seeks to serve. The effect of interpretation on the public purpose
and the resultant consequence are required to be kept in view in giving
C interpretation to the respective provisions. According to the learned counsel,
the purpose of Section 4(1) is to intimate to the owner that (I) the land is
needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose; (2) it is a notice to
the public that the land is encumbered for public purpose; and (3) the
officers are authorised to enter upon the land to take measurements thereof
etc. to find out whether it is suitable for public purpose. Therefore, the
D requirement of the publication of the notification in the Gazette, in the
newspapers and giving of notice of substance thereof at the convenient
place in the locality is mandatory. The purpose of Section 6 is to give
conclusiveness to the public purpose envisaged in S.ection 4(1 ). While the
procedural step of its publication in sub-section (I) of Section 6 is
mandatory, the procedural steps of publication in the newspapers and notice
E of substance thereof in the locality under Section 6(2) are only ministerial
acts, the last of which is intended as "hereinafter", namely, computation
of limitation of two years to make the award thereafter under Section 11
and also computation of the limitation under Section I IA. The word
"hereinafter" in Section 4(1) is also for the purpose of computation of the
F limitation of the one year for publication of the declaration under section
6(1 ). Section 17 gives power to the appropriate Government .to dispense
with the enquiry under section 5-A which exercise depends upon the nature
of the urgency. In cases of urgency, Section 17(4) gives power to the
appropriate Government to dispense with the enquiry under Section SA,
make and thereafter publish the declaration under Section 6(1) in the
G Gazette. The possession would be taken after expiry of 15 days from the
date on which notice under Section 9 was published. Sub-section (2) of
Section 17 dispenses with the limitation on taking possession without
awaiting the expiry of 15 days from the date of issue of Section 9(1)
notice and immediately the appropriate Government may take possession
of the land, when it is urgently needed. The scheme, thus, would indicate
H that interpretation of the provisions is required to be put up in such a way
MOHAN SINGH v. I.A.A.I. [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 579

that each of the above objectives are achieved. In support thereof, he A
relies upon The State of UP. and Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, [1961] 2
SCR 679.

Shri S.K. Sidhu, learned senior counsel for IAAI, contended that
preceding the Amendment Act 68 of 1984, the State had power to have the
notification under Section 4( 1) and the declaration under Section 6 B
simultaneously published in the Gazette to take possession, when enquiry
under Section 5A was dispensed with. After the Amendment, the
notification under Section 4(1) should be published in the Gazette and the
declaration under Section 6(I) should be published thereafter within a gap
of one day. Then, the exercise of the power under Section 17(4) and
taking possession under Section 17(1) or (2) becomes valid. In this case, C
the said procedure was adopted. Even if the date of the publication, as
mentioned in the notification, or date of actual printing which is found
different from the date of printing is taken into account, they were published
on December 23 and December 24, 1986 respectively and again on January
28 and January 29, 1987 respectively. In either event, the declaration under
Section 6( I) is valid in law. It is not necessary that the procedure of D
compliance of three conditions required under Section 4(1) should be
completed before exercising the power under Section 17(4) read with
Secti1;m 17(1); there is power to issue declaration under Section 6(1), In
support thereof, he relies upon Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh and
Anr. v. Sri Avinash Sharma, [I970] 2 SCR 149. The Government having
already published the declaration under section 6 and taken possession of E
the land on January 29, 1987, there was no necessity for the Government
to make any further declaration under Ssection 6( 1).

Mrs. Pinky Anand, learned counsel for the acquiring authority,
contended that the purpose of Section 6 is different from the purpose of
Section 4. Publication is required to be completed within one year from F
the date of the notification published under Section 4(1) and the compliance
of the three steps, the last of which provides the limitation. This Court in
State of Haryana and Anr. v. Raghubir Dayal, [1995] I SCC I33 had held
that the compliance of three steps required under Section 4( I) and of
publication of the declaration in the Gazette is mandatory. Th;s Court G
further held that the publication in the locality and newspapers was directory.
Thus, this Court had, by interpretation, facilitated achievement of the
objects of the Act. Similar interpretation also requires to be given to Section
17(4). What requires to be published is the notification under Section 4(I)
in the Gazette. The later two steps required under Section 4(I) may be
taken later, but to enable the appropriate Government, taking possession H
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A under Ssection 17(1) or 17(2) read with Section 17(4) of the Act after
publishing the declaration under Section 6(1), is necessary.

Shri Shanti Bhushan raised another contention that the Lt. Governor,
after the judgment of the learned single Judge, superseded the declaration
published on December 24, 1986, by causing publication of the declaration
B of May 19, 1995. Therefore, in the eye of law, there is no declaration
published on December 24, 1986. The Division Bench, therefore, was not
right to uphold such declaration which is non est. The contention was
refuted by the learned counsel for the res~ondents.

In view of the diverse contentions, the first question that arises for
C consideration is: what is the meaning of the phrase " a declaration may be
made under Section 6 in respect of the land at anytime after the date of the
publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (l)" used in
Section 17(4) of the Act and when is the power under Section 17(4) to be
exercised? It is seen and well settled legal position that the appropriate
Government exercises its power of eminent domain to acquire the land in
D any locality when it is needed or is likely to be needed for any public
purpose or for a company, in the later event in part VII. The notification
for the said purpose shall be published in the official Gazette. After the
amendment Act 68 of 1984, the same shall be published in two daily
newspapers having circulation in that locality of which at least one shall
be in the regional language. The Collector shall cause notice of the substance
E of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality,
the last of the dates of such publication "being hereinafter" referred to as
the date of the publication of the notification. It would, thus, be seen that
(1) the notification under Section 4(1) shall be published in the official
Gazette; (2) the same should be published also in two daily newspapers
F having circulation in that locality at least one of which would be in the
regional language; and (3) the Collector shall cause public notice of the
substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said
locality. It is well settled legal position thatthe publication of the notification
under Section 4(1) in the Gazette is mandatory. Similarly, preceding the
Amendment Act 68 of 1984, publication of the substance of such
G notification in the convenient locality was also held mandatory. After the
Amendment Act, in Raghubir Dayal 's case (supra), this Court had held
that the requirement of compliance of three steps envisaged under Section
4( I) is mandatory. The expressions "hereinafter" and "last of the dates of
the publication" shall be for the purpose of computation of limitation of
one year under Section 6 and to determine compensation under Section
H 23(1).
MOHANSINGHv. I.A.A.I. [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 58I

As regards publication of the declaration under Section 6(2) and the A
meaning of the word "hereinafter'' it is referred to for the purpose of
computation of the limitation prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act.
In Makrand Singh 's case (supra), this Court had held that the purpose of
the word "hereinafter" is t0 compute the limitation under Section 11-A.
In Raghubir Dayal's case (supra), it was also held that the publication of
the declaration in two newspapers and substance thereof at the convenient B
places in the locality is directory. The word "hereinafter" used in Section
4(1 ), is therefore, also required to be understood in the same context. It
seeks to prescribe limitation under Section 6 for publication of the
declaration under Section 6(1) within one year from the date of the
publication of the notification under Section 4(1 ). The last of the dates
was intended only for the purpose of computation of limitation. C

It is seen that Section 17 envisages two situations, viz., where the
appropriate Government is of the opinion that it is a case of urgency to
take possession of the land for public purpose, the appropriate Government,
• even before making an award under Section 11, is empowered to direct
the Collector to take possession of the land, after the expiry of 15 days D
from the publication of notice under Section 9(1). Such land shall,
thereupon, vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances.
Further urgency has been emphasised in sub-section (2) of Section 17 and
the embargo to wait 15 days is also lifted in Section 17(2). Sub-sections
(3), (3A), and (3B) are not relevant for the purpose of this case. Sub-
section (2) further enlarges the power of the Government after invoking E
urgency clause and provides that if owing to any sudden change in the
channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it becomes
necessary for any Railway Administration to acquire the immediate
possession of any land for the maintenance of the traffic or for the purpose
of making thereon a river-side or ghat station, or of providing convenient F
connection with or access to any such station etc. the Collector, immediately
after the publication of the notice under Section 9(1), without waiting the
lapse of 15 days time, is empowered to enter upon and take possession of
such land. Thereupon, such land shall vest absolutely in the Government
free from all encumbrances. That would indicate the nature of the extreme
urgency as they intend to avoid public inconvenience in the service of the G
notice to the owner under Section 9(1) of the Act and to wait for 15 days.
Sub-section (4) follows the heels of publication in Gazette under Section
4(1), within a gap of one day, publication of declaration under Section 6
and tracks on section 17(1) or 17(2). In the case of the exercise of the
power under sub-section (I) or (2) the appropriate Government is
empowered to direct that the provisions of Section SA shall not apply and H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A if it so directs "a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of
the land at any time after the date of publication of the notification under
Section 4, sub-section (!)".

It is seen that Section 4( I) and Section 6( I) have expressly mentioned
the pharase "hereinafter", while similar language does not find place in '
B Section 17(4). Equally Section 17(4) does not mention the last of the
dates of the publication, i.e., the three steps required under Section 4(1)
or Section 6(2). In other words, the object of Section 17 appears to be that
when the Government exercises the urgency power under Section 17(1)
or emergency power under SectioP 17(2), they form the opinion that the
land is needed for public purpose. If the possession of the land is needed
C urgently or immediately they are requirod to have the notification under
Section 4(1) published in the official Gazette and within a gap of one day
to make the declaration under Section 6 and have the same published
under Section 6(1 ). Thus, what is mandatory is publication of the notification
under Section 4(1) in the Gazette. Thereafter within a gap of a day
publication of the declaration under Section 6(1) is mandatory. Thereby,
D the public purpose becomes conclusive, as envisaged under sub-section
(3) of Section 6 and the Collector is empowered to take immediate
possession of the land for the said public purpose.

The question is: whether it is mandatory in such a situation, i.e.,
after the publication of the notification in the Gazette publication in two
E local newspapers and giving of notice of the substance of the notification
at convenient places in the locality, to await the exercise of power under
Section 17(4)? After giving due and deep consideration to the respective
contentions raised by the learned counsel, we are of the considered view
that though the compliance of these three steps required under Section
F 4(1) is mandatory; for the exercise of the power under Section 17(4) it is
not necessary that all the three steps should be completed before making
the declaration under Section 6(1) and have it published for directing the
Collector to take possession under Section 17(1) or 17(2). What is needed
is that there should be a gap of time ofat least a day between the publication
of the notification under Section 4( I) and of the declaration under Section
G 6( l ). Herein, we dispose of the controvers~ and agree with Shri Shanti
Bhushan that the date of the notification and declaration published as I
mentioned in the Gazette is conclusive but not the actual date of printing
of the Gazette.This interpretation of ours would serve the public purpose,
namely, the official functions are duly discharged. When the land is urgently
needed under section 17(1), notice under Section 9(1) would be given to
H the owner and steps would be taken to and resume its possession after the
MOHAN SINGH v. I.A.A.I. [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 583

expiry of 15 days. If it is needed urgently under Section 17(2), even A
without waiting for 15 days on issue of notice under Section 9( I) to the
owner, the appropriate Government would direct the Collector to take
possession of the land immediately. If the publication in the newspapers
and in the locality is also insisted upon as preliminary to the exercise of
power under Section 17(4) which are mandatory requirements and until
last of them occurs, the immediate or urgent necessity to take possession B
of the land under section 17(1) and 17(2) before making the award would
be easily defeated by dereliction of duty by the subordinate officers or by
skillful manoeuvre. The appropriate Government is required to take the
decision for acquisition of the land and to consider the urgency or
emergency and to make the notification under Section 4( I) and declaration
under Section 6 and have them published in the Gazette that the land C
acquired under Section 4(1) is needed for public purpose; they become
conclusive under Section 6; and to give direction to the Collector to take
its possession. The publication in the newspapers ancj giving of notice of
the substance of the notification at the convenient places in the locality are
required to be done by the Collector authorised by the Government under
Section 7 and his subordiante staff. If dereliction of duty is given primacy, D
delay deflects public justice to meet urgent situation by the acts of
subordinate officers for any reason whatsoever. Until that is done and the
last of the dates occurs, Government would be unable to act swiftly for the
public purpose to take immediate possession envisaged under sub-section
(I) or (2) of Section 17 and they would be easily defeated or frustrated.
E
In Raghubir Dayal's case (supra} this Court in paragraph 7 had held
thus:

"Therefore, the word "shall" in Section 4(1) should be
construed to be mandatory because the requirement of Section F
4(1) of the publication of the notification in the Gazette
followed by their publication in the newspapers perhaps in
some cases may not meet the needed purpose of notice to the
owner or person claiming interest in the land proposed to be
acquired. For instance, in rural areas most agriculturists may
not read even the vernacular newspapers. Their fields are G
their world and work therein is their breadwinner. They would
come to know only if the substance of the notification is
published (announced) in the village by beat of drum.
Therefore, publication of the substance of the notification
of Section 4(1) and in the locality is mandatory but it is not
the requirement of the law that it be done simultaneously H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A with the publication in the Gazette or newspapers. Though
there is a time gap of more than six months between the date
of the notification under Section 4(1) in the State Gazette
and the date of the publication of the substance of the
notification in the locality, the delay by itself does not render
the notification under Section 4(1) published in the State
B Gazette, invalid.

In paragraph 8, it was held that the purpose of the declaration under
Section 6 is to render the land notified therein as that is needed for giving
conclusiveness to the public purpose. Though the language of Section
6(2) is pari materia with Section 4(1 ), since the two purposes are different,
C it was held that the publication of the declaration under Section 6 is
mandatory; but publication of the notification in the newspapers and of
notice of the substance thereof in the locality is held directory. The
publication in the Gazette under Section 6(1) accords the conclusiveness
to the need of the public purpose. Section 4(1) speaks of"needed or likely
to be needed." The ministerial acts, thereafter, would not render such
D publication invalid. In Makrand Singh 's case (supra) in paragraphs 4 and
5, the object of Sections 4(1 ), 6(1) and 6(2) is conjointly considered and
it was held that the word "hereinafter" was intended for the purpose of
computing the period of limitation provided in the proviso to sub-section
(1) of Section 6. As held earlier, the word "hereinafter" in sub-section (I)
E of Section 4 is to compute the period oflimitation under Section 6. Equally,
the purpose of sub-section (2) of Section 6 is to compute the period of
limitation provided in Section 11-A.

It is true that in Radhey Shyam Nigam 's case (supra), several
notifications under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6
F simultaneously published had come up for consideration before the Division
Bench of the Allahabad High Court and were upheld, but on appeal, this
· Court considered the effect of the simultaneous publication after the
Amendment Act 68/84. In one of the cases, notification under Section
4(1) was of May 6, 1985 and declaration under Section 6 was published
G on May 22, 1985. Power under Section 17(1-A) as amended by the State
Legislature and Section 17(4) was exercised for taking possession
immediately. The question arose: whether such publication of the
declaration was valid in law? This Court had held at page 106 that the
words 'after the publication of the notification' under sub-section (4) of
Section 17 read simplicitor, clearly indicate that the declaration under
H Section 6 had to be made after the publication of the notification, meaning
MOHAN SINGH v. LA.A.I. [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 585

thereby subsequent to the date of the publication of the notification. The A
question at what gap of time declaration can be published, did not arise
for consideration in that case. It is seen that in this case, the notification
under Section 4(1) was published on December 23, 1986 and declaration
under Section 6 was published on December 24, 1986, i.e., within a gap
ofone day. Making of the declaration under Section 6 is not merely signing
by the officials; the official is empowered to sign at any time before its B
actual publication. What is material is that the declaration under Section 6
should be published in the Gazette after the notification under section 4( I)
was published, i.e., after a gap of at least one day. Therefore, declaration
is required to be published though signed earlier, after the publication of
notification under Section 4(1) in the Gazette. Though it was contended
by the learned counsel for the appellant in the High Court before the C
learned single Judge and Shri Sidhu trod on the same path and brought on
record that the actual Gazettes in respect of the notification under Section
4(1) and declaration under Section 6 were printed on January 28 and
January 29, 1987 respectively, what is crucial is not the actual date of
printing, but the· date of the publication in the Gazette as appears from the
Gazette. Shri Shanti Bhushan has fairly contended that such publication is D
a relevant one. We agree with Shri Shanti Bhushan in that behalf.

The distinction of mandatory compliance or directory effect of the
language depends upon the language couched in the statute under
consideration and its object, purpose and effect. The disntiction reflected E
in the use of the word "shall" or "may" depends on conferment of power.
In the present context, "may" does not always mean may. May is a must
for enabling compliance of provision but there are cases in which, for
various reasons, as soon as a person who is within the statute is entrusted
with the power, it becomes duty to exercise. Where the language of statute
creates a duty, the special remedy is prescribed for non-performance of F
the duty. In "Craise on Statute Law" (7th Edn.) it is stated that the Court
will, as a general rule. presume that the appropriate remedy by common
law or mandamus for action was intended to apply. General rule of law is
that where a general obligation is created by statute and statutory remedy
is provided for violation, statutory remedy is mandatory. The scope and G
language of the statute and consideration of policy at times may, however,
create exception showing that legislatur~ did not intend a remedy
(generality) to be exclusive. Words are the skin of the language. The
language is the medium of expressing the intention and the object that
particular provision or the Act seeks the achieve. Therefore, it is necessary
to ascertain the intention. The word "shall" is not always decisive. Regard H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A must be had to the context, subject matter and object of the statutory
provision in question in determining whether the same is mandatory or
directory. No universal principle of law could be laid in that behalf as to
whether a particular provision or enactment shall be considered mandatory
or directory. It is the duty of Court to try to get at the real intention of the
legislature by carefully analysing the whole scope of the statute or section
B or a phrase under Consideration. As stated earlier, the question as to whether
the statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the
legislature and not always upon the language in which the intent is couched.
The meaning and intention of the legislature would govern design and
purpose the Act seeks to achieve. In "Sutherland Statutory Construction"
(3rd Edn) Volume lat page 81 in paragraph 316, it is stated that although
C the problem of mandatory and directory legislation is a hazard to all
governmental activity, it is peculiarly hazardous to administrative agencies
because the validity of their action depends upon exercise of authority in
accordance with their charter of existence the statute. If the directions of
the statute are mandatory, then strict compliance with the statutory terms
is essential to the validity of administrative action. But ifthe language of
D the statute is directory only, the variation from its direction does not
invalidate the administrative action. Conversely, if the statutory direction
is discretionary only, it may not provide an adequate standard for legislative
action and the delegation. In "Crawford on the Construction of Statutes"
at page 516, it is stated that:
E
"The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory
depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the
language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and
intention of the legislature must govern, and these are to be
ascertained, nut only from the phraseology of the provision,
F but also by considering its nature, its design, and the
consequences which would follow from construing it the one
way or the other ... ".

In "Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes", 10th Edition, at page
G 381, it is stated thus:

"On the other hand, where the prescriptions of a statute relate
to the performance ofa public duty and where the invalidation
of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general
inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control
H over those entrusted with the duty without promoting the
MOHANSINGHv. I.A.A.I. (K. RAMASWAMY,J.] 587

essential aims of the legislature, such prescriptions seem to A
be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance
and government of those on whom the duty is imposed, or,
in other words, as directory only. The neglect of them may
be penal, indeed, but it does not affect the validity of the act
done in disregard of them."
B
The two quotations were approved by this Court in Babu Ram
Upadhya 's case and law was laid down thus:

"When a statute uses the word "shall" prima facie, it is
mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of
the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of C
the statute. For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature
the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the statute,
and the consequences which would follow from construing
it the one way or the other, the impact of other provisions
whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in
question is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute D
provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the
provisions, the fact the non-compliance with the provisions
is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial
consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether
the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered." E
In K. Narasimhiah v. H.C. Singri Gowda and Ors., (1965] 3 SCR
618 giving of three day's notice to the councillors of a municipality 'in
convening the no confidence Motion under Section 27(3) of the Mysore
Town Municipalities Act, 1951 was held to be directory as providing shorter
period of such meeting was considered more important to make it F
convenient to the councillors to attend the meeting of Motion of No
Confidence. It was held that the object of giving of notice was to make it
possible for the councillors to so arrange their affairs in the other business
as to be able to attend to the meeting.
G
In the Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. The Workme17, (1968] l SCR
154 the question was: whether publication of the award beyond fixed time
was invalid? Considering the provisions of Section 17( I) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, this Court had held that it was only directory and
not mandatory. Holding it to be directory would defeat the purpose of the
~ H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A In Hiralal Agrawal etc. v. Rampadarath Singh and Ors., (1969] 1
SCR 328 the right of reconveyance under Section 16 of the Bihar Land
Reforms Act, 1962 and giving of notice was held to be directory as it
would effl'ctuate obtaining reconveyance by the con-sharers under that
Act.

B In the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. The B.E.S.T
Worker's Union, (1973] 3 SCR 285 six month's time under Section 78(1)
of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 for imposition of punishment
was held to be directory.

In Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Rampur, (1965]
C 1 SCR 970 the question was whether the whole of Section 131 (3) or the
part of it requiring publication of the requisition in the manner laid down
in Section 94(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, i.e., in the Hindu
newspapers was merely directory. It was held that considering the object
of the provisions for publication, i.e., to enable the public to be able to
D place the view point before the Board, publication is mandatory but the
manner of publication was held to be directory. The same ratio would
apply with equal force to the facts of this case.

The compliance of the requirements in the matter of filing nomi'nation
papers for election to the Legislative Assembly or election petitions has
E consistently been held to be mandatory. Since it is a right conferred under
the Statute, its strict compliance enables the respondent to raise the required
objections. In regard to the nomination, strict complaince of the particulars
in the nomination papers was held to be mandatory in Virji Ram Sutaria v.
Na/halal Premji Bhanvadia and Ors., (1969] 2 SCR 627; similarly,
compliance of the requirement of furnishing particulars in the election
F petitions was held to be mandatory in Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram and
Ors., (1974] 3 SCR 20.

Thus, this Court, keeping in view the objects of the Act, had
considered whether the language in a particular section, clause or sentence
G is directory or mandatory. The word "shall" though prima facie gives
impression of being mandatory character, it requires to be considered in
the light of the intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the
scope of the statute, its nature and design and the consequences that would
flow from the construction thereof one way or the other. In that behalf,
the Court is required to keep in view the impact on the profession, necessity
H of its compliance; whether the statute, if it is avoided, provides for any
MOHANSINGHv.1.A.A.I. [K. RAMASWAMY,J.] 589

contingency for non-compliance; if the word "shall" is construed as having A
mandatory character, the mischief that would ensue by such construction;
whether the public convenience would be subserved or public inconvenience
or the general inconvenience that may ensue if it is held mandatory and all
other relevant circumstances are required to be taken into consideration in
construing whether the provision would be mandatory or directory. If an
object of the enactment is defeated by holding the same directory, it should B
be construed as mandatory whereas if by holding it mandatory serious
general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons of general public
without much furthering the object of enactment, the same should be
construed as directory but all the same, it would not mean that the language
used would be ignored altogether. Effect must be given to all the provisions
harmoniously to suppress public mischief and to promote public justice. C

In the light of the above law, we have no hesitation to hold that
though compliance with publication of the three steps required under
Section 4(1) is mandatory while exercising the power of eminent domain
under Section 4(1), when the appropriate Government exercises the power
under sub-section (4) of Section 17 dispensing with the enquiry under D
Section 5-A and directs the Collector to take possession of the land before
making the award as the lands are needed urgently either under sub-section
(I) or (2) thereof, it is not mandatory to publish the notification under
Section 4(1) in the newspapers and giving of notice of the substance thereof
in the locality; the last of the dates of publication should not be the date
for the purpose of exercising the power under Section 17( 4 ). This E
interpretation of ours would subserve the public purpose and suppress
mischief of non-compliance and seeks to el0ngate the public purpose,
namely, taking immediate possession of the land needed for the public
purpose, envisaged in the notification.

It is true that in Khadim Hussain's case a Bench of four Judges of
F
this Court had held that the declaration mentioned in Section 6( 1) differs
from the notification under Section 4(1) and requires to be signed by a
Secretary or other officers duly authorised. The declaration is in the form
of an order. The notification when published is proof of existence of public
purpose. In that case, the question whether declaration under Section 6(1) G
requires to be published after making declaration, did not come up for
consideration. As held by this Court in catena of decisions, publications of
the declaration under Section 6(1) is mandatory to give conclusiveness to
the public purpose envisaged in sub-section (3) of Section 6. The contention
of Shri Sidhu and Mrs. Pinky that there is no necessity for fresh publication
of the declaration under Section 6, after possession was taken under Section H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A 17(1) or 17(2), cannot be given acceptance. The object of Section 4(1) is
to enable the Government to have the land tested whether it is needed or is
likely to be needed for a public purpose and is suitable; after its
co~ideration by the appropriate Government that the land is needed or is
likely to be needed for the public purpose, publication of declaration under
section 6(1) is mandatory to give its conclusiveness to the public purpose
B published under Section 4(1 ). Therefore, it is a mandatory requirement
that the declaration under Section 6( I) should be published.

The question, therefore, is whether after the publication of the
declaration under Section 6 after it was quashed by the learned single
Judge, there is any necessity for the Government to supersede the
C notification already published under Section 6? It would appear that there
was obvious incongruity. It is indisputable that the learned single Judge
had quashed Section 6 declaration published on December 24, 1986.
Consequently, the question of supersession of the declaration already
quashed is superfluous. It is settled legal position that appeal is a
continuation of the original proceedings. Though the learned single Judge
D quashed Section 6 declaration, on the finding by the Division Bench that
the view taken by the learned single Judge is not correct in law, the
·consequence would be that the act of the learned single Judge quashing the
declaration under Section 6 is vitiated by law. As a result, by operation of
the decision of the Division Bench, the declaration quashed by the learned
single Judge dated December 24, 1986 stood restored. As a result, the
E declaration under Section 6(1) published on May 19, 1995 is only
superfluous and of no consequence.

It is true that after the possession of the land is taken either under
Section 17(1), 17(2) or 16, the land stands vested in the State absolutely
free from all encumbrances. Subsequently, the power of withdrawal under
F Section 48(1) would no more be available. The ratio in Avinash Sharma's
case (supra), relied on by Shri Sidhu has no application to the facts of this
case. Therein, the facts were that after the possession was taken under
Section 17(1) and vested in the State, exercising the power U'ldt.r Section
21 of the General Clause Act, the declaration under Section 6(1) was
G withdrawn by the Government. The question was: whether the Government
had that power? In that context, this Court h~d held that after the land
vested in the state free from all encumbrances under Section 17(! ), the
power of issuing of a notification and the power to withdraw such
notification envisaged under Section 21 of the General Clause Act was not
applicable since the land already stood vested and the Government was
H denuded of its power under the Act.
MOHAN SINGH v. I.A.A.I. [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 591

Jt would, therefore, be seen that the declaration under Section 6 A
published on May 19, 1995 does not have any effect on the declaration
published under Section 6( 1) on December 24, 1986 which has the legal
effect of getting restored. The Division Bench of the High Court, therefore,
was right in setting aside the judgment of the learned single Judge and
dismissing the writ petition. It is already seen that the lands stood vested
in the State on January 29, 1987 and after the lands including the land B
belonging to the appellants to an extent of 81.9 bighas out of total extent
of 713 .2 bighas, were taken possession, they stood vested in the State free
from all encumbrances. The award also became final. Under these
circumstances, the learned single Judge was wholly wrong in the judgment
under appeal before the Division Bench; the reasoning given and
consequences reached by the Division Bench are entirely correct in law C
warranting no interference.

- The appeals are accordingly dismissed, but, in the circumstances,
without costs.

v.s.s. Appeals dismissed. D

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