SEWARAM AND ANOTHERversusSTATE OF U.P.

    I

    ~-I



                            SEWARAMANDANOTHER                                     A
                                     v.
                                STATE OF U.P.
                                DECEMBER 11, 2007
                 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ]                          B

                Penal Code, 1860: s. 302 read with s. 34 - Conviction under
          -Accused beating deceased to death with la/this and Kanthis due
          to enmity - Conviction by courts below - Correctness of - Held :
          Jn view of the facts of the case and the legal principles, conviction   c
          of accused by courts below upheld.
               s.34-Applicability of- Nature and scope of-Discussed.
                According to the prosecution case, on account of enmity of
          litigation between the parties, accused persons murdered 'GD'. D
          On the fateful day, three accused armed with lathis and one
'         accused armed with Kanthi beat 'GD'. The complainant and 'JN'
          who were with 'GD' cried for help. Accused 'RP' and 'SR' beat
          complainant with Lathis. 'GD' succumbed to her injuries. FIR
          was lodged. The investigations were carried out. Accused were E
          charged under section 302 read with section 34 and section 323
          read with section 34 IPC. The trial court relying on testimony of
          complainant and 'JN', convicted and sentenced the accused under
          section 302 read with section 34 IPC. Appellant 'SR' and 'RP'
          were also convicted under section 323 read with section 34 IPC.
                                                                            F
          However, during pendency accused 'RP' died, and thus his appeal
          abated. The High Court upheld the order. Hence the present
          appeal.
                Appellant-accused persons contended that even if
          prosecution version is accepted in totality, offence under section G
          302 is not made out, much less by application of section 34 IPC.
               Dismissing the appeal, the Court
               HELD: 1.1. Section 34 has been enacted on the principle
                                      165                              H
                                                                                 I
                                                                            ,l_
                                                                             (



    166     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007)13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A of joint liability in the doing, of a criminal act. The section is only
  a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. The
  distinctive feature of the section is the element of participation in
  action. The liability of one person for an offence committed by
  another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several
B persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in
  furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in
  committing the crime. Direct proof of common intention is seldom
  available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from
  the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case
C and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge
  of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence,
  whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting
  of minds of all the accused persons to commit the offence for
  which they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be it pre-
D arranged or on the spur of the moment; but it must necessarily be
  before the commission of the crime. The true concept of the section
  is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the
  position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it
  individually by himself. [170-G-H; 171-A-C)
E       1.2. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons
    charged with commission of an offence jointly must be the same
    or identically similar. The acts may be different in character, but
    must have been actuated by one and the same common intention
    in order to attract the provision. (Para 12) [171-D]
F
        1.3. The section does not say 'the common intentions of all',
  nor does it say "an intention common to all" Under the provisions
  of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to be found in the
  existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to
G the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. As a
  result of the application of principles enunciated in Section 34,
  when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section
  34, in law it means that the accused is liable for the act which
  caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it was
H done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in
     \'
               SEWARAMANDANOTHER v. STATEOFU.P.                             167
                        [PASAYAT, J.]
_.        which it may be difficult to distinguish between the acts of individual A
          members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention
          of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them.
          (Para 13) (171-E-F]
                1.4. Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused B
          by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 it is not
          necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused.
          (Para 13) (171-G]
              . 2. The High Court rightly held that the evidence of the
          eye-witnesses complainant-PW 1 and JN-PW 3 suffered from no C
          infirmity. When the factual background is considered in the light
          of the principles highlighted above, the inevitable conclusion is
          that the appellants were rightly convicted in teJ"8'S of Section 302
          read with Section 34 IPC. (Paras 10 and 15) (170'-E; 172-A-B]
                Ashok Kumar v State of Punjab 1977 (1) SCC 746; Chinta D
          Pulla Reddy vs. State ofA.P 1993 Supp.(3) SCC 134; Girija Shankar
          vs. State of UP 2004(3) SCC 793 - relied on.
               CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
          No.1695 of2007                                        E
               From the final Judgment and Order dated 27.5.2005 of the High
          Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Crl. A. No. 1845/1981.
                Balraj Dewan, for the Appellant.
               Sahdev Singh, Sandeep Singh and Anuvrat Sharma, for the F
          Respondent.
               The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
               Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
                                                                                   G
                2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division
          Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the
          appellants. Before the High Court three persons had filed the appeal.
          During the pendency of the appeal, appellant no.2 Ram Prasad died.
          Therefore, the appeal was held to have abetted so far he is concerned. H
                                                                                  J.
                                                                                  I

    168      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A        3. The appellants were found guilty ofhaving committed an offence
  punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
  Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC') and each was sentenced to undergo
  imprisonment for life. Appellant-Sewa Ram and the deceased-accused
  Ram Prasad were further convicted for offence punishable under Section
B 323 read with Section 34 IPC and each was sentenced to undergo RI
  for six months and to pay a fine ofRs.500/-with default stipulation.
                                        '
         4. The conviction was recorded by IV learned Additional Sessions
    Judge, Pillibhit, in Sessions Trial _No. 249of1980.
C         5. Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as follows:
           The complainant ShaukatAii, son ofNathu Bux, resident ofBarhara,
    P.S. Bisalpur, was doing service at the house of Jagan Nath, Prasad
    resident of village Chandpura who was related to Smt. Genda Devi,
0   widow of Jwala Prasad Kurmi, resident ofNaugamia, P.S. Bilsanda,
    who is hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased'. Litigation was going on
    between Smt. GendaDevi and her step daughter Smt. Savitri Devi, who
    was living as wife of Ram Prasad of village Naugamia. On 22.8.1980,
    the complainant Shaukat Ali along with Jagan Nath and Smt. Genda
E   Devi had gone to Tehsil Bisalpur in connection with the litigation and they
    were returning from Tehsil to village Chandpura at about 4 0 'clock and
    when they reached the outskirts of village Kangawan near the sugar
    cane field ofBabuji at 6 'O clock Smt. Genda Devi was going ahead;
    behind her was the complainant and behind him was Jagan Nath. Suddenly
F   accused Ram Prasad, Sewa Ram and Parmeshwari having 'Lathi s' in                   ..
    their hands and accused Sunder Lal having 'Kanta' in his hand suddenly
    came out from the sugar cane field and began to beat Smt. Genda Devi
    on which the complainant and Jagan Nath cried for help. Accused Ram
    Prasad and Sewa Ram then beat the complainant with 'Lathis'. The
G   complainant and Jagan Nath ran away towards the village Kangavan
    and the accused ran away towards east. The complainant and Jagan
    Nath saw Smt. Genda Devi and found that she had died in the paddy
    field. The accused persons had murdered Smt. Genda Devi due to
    enmity oflitigation. Thereafter the complainant informed the residents of
H   village Chandpura and the 'Chaukidar', Pradhan and other people of
1I
           SEWARAMANDANOTHER v.STATEOFU.P.                                169
                    [PASAYAT, J.]
     the village, who came with the complainant to the spot. It had fallen dark   A
     and due to fear, he at once did not come to the police station to lodge
     the F.l.R. and remained sitting the whole night looking after the dead
     body. In the next morning on 23 .8.1980, the complainant lodged the
     F.1.R.(Ex. Ka. 3) at the Bisalpur police station. The crime was registered
     as crime No. 247 under Sections 302/323 LP.C. at the Bisalpur police         B
     station and the S.O. Ram Lakhan Singh was entrusted with the
     investigation of the case. The details were entered in the G.D., a copy
     of which is Ex.Ka. 4. The LO. along with the S.I. Sahabdin arrived at
     the spot and prepared inquest report (Ex. Ka. 8) of the dead-body of
     Smt. Genda Devi. The dead-body was sealed and sample seal was                c
     preserved, which is Ex. Ka. 11. The 1.0. made spot inspection and
     prepared the site-plan Ex. Ka. 5. The post mortem of the dead-body
     of Smt. Genda Devi was conducted by Dr. VP. Agarwal. The complainant
     Shaukat Ali who received injuries was also examined at the P.H.C.
     Bisalpur. His injury report is Ex. Ka. I. After completion of the            D
~
     investigation, the LO. submitted charge-sheet against the accused persons.
            Finding a prima-facie case against the accused persons, they were
     charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 l.P.C. and Section 323
     read with Section 341.P.C. The charges were read over and explained E
     to the accused persohs who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
           In support of the prosecution version Shaukat Ali, (P. W.1 ), Dr.
     C.K. Chaturvedi (PW2) who conducted the medical examination of
     ShaukatAli and Jagan Nath(P.W.3), Dr. V.P. Agarwal, (PW 4) who
     conducted postmortem ofthe deceased Smt. GendaDevi,A.C. Pancham F
     Singh (PW 5), Constable Rampa! Sharma, (PW 6) and S.I. Ramlakhan
     Singh (PW 7) who conducted investigation were produced. The accused
     were examined who denied the allegations and contended that they have
     been falsely implicated in this case due to enmity.
                                                                                 G
           6. Shaukat Ali the informant (PWl) and Jagan Nath (PW-3)
     claimed to be eye-witnesses. The trial Court relying on the version of the
-j
     eye-witnesses recorded conviction and imposed sentenced as aforesaid.
     Before the High Court the stand was that there was inordinate delay in
     dispatching special report to the Magistrate. In addition, it was submitted H
                                                                                  1
                                                                                  I


    170      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.


A that the doctor who conducted the post-mortem noticed seven injuries
  and out of them three were incised wounds and injury 3, 4, 5, and 7
  were lacerated wounds. It was submitted that the three accused persons
  who preferred appeal before the High Court were holding lathies and
  the Kanthi was held by Sewa Ram who had been acquitted. Therefore,
B it was submitted that offence under Section 302 IPC was not made out.
         7. The case of the prosecution was that in view of the factual
  background offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34
  IPC is made out. The High Court, as noted above, dismissed the appeal
c filed by the appellants.
         8. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant
    submitted that even if prosecution version is accepted in totality, offence
    under Section 302 is not made out, much less by application of Section
    34 IPC.
D
         9. Learned counsel for the respondent-State supported the
    judgment of the High Court.
        10. (As rightly held by the High Court the evidence of the eye-
  witnesses PWs 1 and 3 suffered from no infirmity.) The trial Court was,
E therefore, justified in convicting and holding appellants guilty.
        11. So far as the question as to whether Section 302 will be
  applied so far as appellants are concerned, it is to be noted that the trial
  Court and the High Court considered their cases in the background of
F Section 34 IPC.
         12. (Section 34 has been enacted on the principle ofjoint liability
  in the doing of a criminal act. The section is only a rule ofevidence and
  does not create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the
  section is the element of participation in action. The liability of one
G person for an offence committed by another in the course ofcriminal act
  perpetrated by several persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal
  act is done in furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join
  in committing the crime. Direct proof of common intention is seldom
  available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the)
H
      SEWARAMANDANOTHER v. STATEOFU.P.                                  171
               [PASAYAT, J.]
(circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the              A
proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge of common
intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or
circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of minds ofall the accused
persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid
of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of the moment; but it          B
must necessarily be before the commission ofthe crime. The true concept
ofthe section is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly,
the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it
individually by himself.) As observed in Ashok Kumar v. State ofPurefab
[1977(1) SCC 746] the existence of a common intention amongst the               C
participants in a crime is the essential element for application of this
section. (It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged
with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically
similar. The acts may be different in character, but must have been
actuated by one and the same common intention in order to attract the           D
provision.)
       13. (The section does not say ''the common intentions of all", nor
does it say "an intention common to all". Under the provisions of Section
34 the essence ofthe liability is to be found in the existence ofa common E
intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in
furtherance of such intention. As a result of the application of principles
enunciated in Section 34, when an accused is convicted under Section
302 read with Section 34, in law it means that the accused is liable for
the act which caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it F
was done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in
which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts ofindividual members
of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to
prove exactly what part was taken by each of them.) As was observed
in Chinta Pulla Reddy v. State of A.P [1993 Supp.(3) SCC 134]. G
(Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the
particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 it is not necessary
to show some overt act on the part of the accused.)
       14. The above position was highlighted in Girija Shankar v.
                                                                                H
    172      SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [2007] 13(Addl.)S.C.R.

A State of UP [2004(3) SCC 793].

         15. (When the factual background is considered in the light of the
  principles highlighted above, the inevitable conclusion is that the appellants
  have been rightly convicted in terms of Section 302 read with Section
B 34 IPC.)
          16. The appeal is without merit and is dismissed.
    NJ.                                                    Appeal dismissed.