Holding

The suit was within the limitation period and the appellant’s criminal admission is admissible evidence, so the appeal is dismissed.

Summary

The borrower, Laxmi Prasad, had pledged jewellery to money‑lender Seth Ramdayal Jat in 1987 for a loan. After the lender was convicted in a criminal case for charging excess interest, the borrower served a notice on 12 May 1998 demanding the return of the jewellery, which was ignored. A suit for recovery of the pledged ornaments was filed on 26 June 1998 and decreed in the borrower’s favour. The lender appealed, arguing that the suit was barred by limitation and that the criminal judgment and his admission of guilt could not be used as evidence. The Supreme Court held that Article 70 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies, the suit was filed within the three‑year period from the date of refusal of the demand, and the appellant’s admission in the criminal case is admissible as evidence under Sections 43 and 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, though the criminal judgment itself is not. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the suit for recovery of pledged ornaments is barred by limitation under Article 70 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Whether an admission of guilt made in a criminal proceeding is admissible as evidence in a civil suit under the Indian Evidence Act.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order VIII, Rule 5
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 43, s. 58
Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 70

Subjects

LimitationPledged ornamentsAdmission of guiltEvidence ActCivil and criminal proceedingsMoney lenderArticle 70Section 43Section 58

Judgment

[2009]7 S.C.R 17

SETH RAMDAYAL JAT A
v
LAXMI PRASAD
Civil Appeal No. 2543 of 2009
APRIL 15, 2009
B
[S.B. SINHA AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ.)
_,,
"\ Limitation Act, 1963: Article 70 - Suit for recovery of
pledged ornaments - Applicability of Article 70 - Held: Is
' applicable - In terms of Article 70, period of limitation is three
years and begins to run from the date of refusal after demand c
- Money lender did not respond to the notice issued by
borrower asking him to return the pledged jewellery- Suit was
filed within one and a half months after date of receipt of such
notice - Thus, was instituted within the period of limitation -
r Admission of money lender was recorded in writing - He D
accepted that he had made admission in the criminal case,
the same was admissible in evidence - Thus, suit was rightly
;
decreed in favour of borrower - Evidence Act, 1872 - ss.43
and 58.
Evidence Act, 1872: ss.43 -Admissibility of judgment in E
criminal proceedings vis-a-vis civil proceedings - Held: Save .
and except for s. 43, judgment of criminal court shall not be
admissible in civil suit - However, admission made by party
in previous proceeding would be admissible - Judgment in
criminal case shall be admissible provided it is a relevant fact F
in issue, otherwise its admissibility is limited - Thing admitted
need not be proved.
Respondent pledged certain items of jewellery with
appellant-money lender for obtaining loan. Appellant
G
charged excess interest. Respondent filed criminal case
__,.
against appellant. Appellant pleaded guilty and fine was
imposed. Respondent served notice to the appellant on
12.5.98 to return the pledge jewellery, however, jewellery
17 H
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 7 S.C.R.

A was not returned. On 26.6.98 Respondent filed suit for
recovery of the pledged jewellery. Suit was decreed in
favour of respondent. Appellant filed appeal which was
allowed. Respondent then filed second appeal. High Court
held that the suit was filed within a period of three years
from the date of refusal of the demand to return the
B
pledged ornaments and the admission of guilt in criminal
case would be admissible in evidence. Hence the present
appeal. •
;..

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
c HELD: 1.1 The law relating to the admissibility of a
judgment in a criminal proceedings vis-a-vis the civil
proceedings and vice-versa is governed by the provisions
of the Evidence Act, 1872. In terms of s. 43 of the Act, the
judgment in a criminal case shall be admissible provided
it is a relevant fact in issue. Its admissibility otherwise is
D
limited. A judgment in a criminal case, thus, is admissible
for a limited purpose. Relying only on or on the basis
thereof, a civil proceeding cannot be determined, but that
would not mean that it is not admissible for any purpose '
~

whatsoever. [Paras 13, 14 and 15] [25-F; 25-H; 26-A;
E 27-H; 28-A]
Anil Behari Ghosh v. Smt. Latika Bala Dassi and Ors.
AIR 1955 SC 566; Perumal v. Devarajan and Ors. AIR 1974
Madras 14; Lalmuni Devi and Ors. v. Jagdish Tiwary and Ors.
AIR 2005 Patna 51; Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi
F (2004) 1 SCC 438; K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police
and anr. (2002) 8 sec 87 - referred to.
1.2 A civil proceeding as also a criminal proceeding
may go on simultaneously. No statute puts an embargo
in relation thereto. A decision in a criminal case is not
G binding on a civil court. If a primacy is given to a criminal
proceeding, indisputably, the civil suit must be determined
.....
on its own keeping in view the evidence which has been
brought on record before it and not in terms of the
evidence brought in the criminal proceeding. [Para 17]
H [28-E; 29-B]
'·

- SETH RAMDAYAL JAT V LAXMI PRASAD 19

* M. S. Sheriff & Anr. v. State of Madras and Ors. Al R 1954
SC 397; Mis Karam Chand Ganga Prasad and Anr. etc. v.
A

Union of India and Ors. (1970) 3 SCC 694; Syed Askari Hadi
Ali Augustine Imam and Anr. v. State (Delhi Admn.)and Anr.
2009 (3) SCALE 604; Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. v.
Meenakshi Marwah and Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 370; P. Swaroopa B
Rani v. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu AIR 2008 SC 1884
- referred to.
""\
1.3 Save and except for Section 43 of the Evidence
Act which refers to Sections 40, 41, and 42 thereof, a
judgment of a criminal court shall not be admissible in a c
civil suit. What, however, would be admissible is the
admission made by a party in a previous proceeding. The
admission of the appellant was recorded in writing. While
,. he was deposing in the suit, he was confronted with the
question as to whether he had admitted his guilt and D
pleaded guilty of the charges framed. He did so. Having,

- thus, accepted that he had made an admission in the
criminal case, the same was admissible in evidence. He
could have resiled therefrom or explained away his
admission. He offered an explanation that he was wrongly E
advised by the counsel to do so. The said explanation
was not accepted by the trial court. It was considered to
\·
be an afterthought. His admission in the civil proceeding
was admissible in evidence. [Paras 18 and 19] [31-D-F]
1.4 In view of the s. 58 of the Evidence Act, there F
cannot be any doubt or dispute that a thing admitted need
not be proved. [Para 20] [32-B]
Vice~Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Anr.
v. Girdharilal Yadav (2004) 6 SCC 325; LK. Verma v. HMT
G
Ltd. and Anr. (2006) 2 SCC 269; Avtar Singh and Ors. v. Gurdia/
_.,,
Singh and Ors. (2006) 12 SCC 552; Gannmani An as u ya
and Ors. v. Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary and Ors. (2007)
10 sec 296 - referred to.
1.5 Although the judgment in a criminal case was not H
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A relevant in evidence for the purpose of proving his civil
liability, his admission in the civil suit was admissible. The
question as to whether the explanation offered by him
should be accepted or not is a matter which would fall
within the realm of appreciation of evidence. The trial court
B had accepted the same. The first appellate court refused
to consider the effect thereof in its proper perspective.
The appellate court proceeded on the basis that as the
judgment of the criminal court was not admissible in
evidence, the suit could not have been decreed on the
c said basis. For the said purpose, the admission made by
the appellant in his deposition as also the effect of charge
had not been taken into consideration. Therefore, the High
Court cannot be said to have committed any error in
interfering with the judgment of the first appellate court.
D [Para 21] [32-E-G]
2. As regards the applicability of the period of
limitation, Article 70 of the Limitation Act would be
applicable. In terms of the said provision, the period of
limitation, thus, begins to run from the date of refusal after
-
E demand. Appellant did not respond to the notice issued
by the respondent asking him to return the pledged
jewellery. The date of receipt of such a notice is 14.05.1998.
The suit having been filed on 26.06.1998, thus, must be
held to have been filed within the prescribed period of
F limitation. [Paras 22 and 23] [32-H; 33-B-C]
3. Having regard to the fact that the averments
contained in the paragraph 3 of the plaint were not
traversed, the same would be deemed to have been
G admitted by him in terms of Order VIII, Rule 5 CPC.
[Para 24] [33-D]
Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetty (2008) 7 SCC 85;
Ranganayakamma and Anr. v. K.S. Prakash (D) By LRs and
Ors. 2008 (9) SCALE 144 - referred to.
H
SETH RAMDAYAL JAT V. LAXMl PRASAD 21

"
1 Case Law Reference A
AIR 1955 SC 566 Referred to. Para 14
AIR 1974 Madras 14 Referred to. Para 14
AIR 2005 Patna 51 Referred to. Para 14
B
(2004) 1 sec 438 Referred to. Para 16

~ (2002) 8 sec 87 Referred to. Para 16
AIR 1954 SC 397 Referred to. Para 17
(1970) 3 sec 694 Referred to. Para 17 c
2009 (3) SCALE 604 Referred to. Para 17
(2005) 4 sec 310 Referred to. Para 17
~· AIR 2008 SC 1884 Referred to. Para 18 D
(2004) 6 sec 325 Referred to. Para 20
(2006) 2 sec 269 Referred to. Para 20
(2006) 12 sec 552 Referred to. Para 20
E
(2001) 1o sec 296 Referred to. Para 20
(2008) 1 sec 85 Referred to. Para 24
~
(2008) 9 SCALE 144 Referred to. Para 24
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2543 F
Of2009
From the Judgement and Order dated 07.08.2007 of the
Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, in Second
Appeal No. 881 of 2009
G
Anurag Sharma (for Prashant Kumar), fortheAppellant(s).
~

RohitAryan, (for Ashok Mathur), for the Respondent(s) .
....
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by
H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A 5.8. SINHA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. What would be the period of limitation for institution of a
suit for recovery of 'pledged ornaments' is the question involved
B herein.
3. It arises in the following factual matrix:
On or about 26.06.1998, the respondent filed a civil suit
against the appellant for recovery of certain items of jewellery
c allegedly pledged with him on 2.12.1987 for the purpose of
obtaining loan of a sum of Rs. 7000/-.
On the premise that the appellant had violated the
provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Money Lenders Act, 1934 in
relation to the aforementioned grant of loan, a criminal
D proceeding was initiated against him, which was marked as
Case No. 511 of 1997. In the said criminal case, he admitted
his guilt. A fine of Rs. 150/- was imposed on him. The charge
was read over to him, which reads as under:
"The charge on you is that before date 29.3.97 complainant
E
Laxmi Prasad was paid borrowed money to you but even
after that you were demanding interest at 5%. Your this act
is criminal offence under section 3, 4 of Money Lenders
Act. Therefore, show cause as to why you should not be
held guilty of the said offence."
F
4. Respondent thereafter, as noticed hereinbefore, filed
the aforementioned Civil Suit before the XIVth Civil Judge, Class
11, Jabalpur being civil suit No. 4-A/1998 for recovery of the
pledged jewellery. The said suit was decreed directing the
G appellant to return the said jewellery or in the alternative a decree
for a sum of Rs. 20,000/-.
5. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith the appellant
preferred an appeal thereagainst. The said appeal was allowed
by the learned XVlthAdditional District Judge, Jabalpur, holding:
H
SETH RAMDAYAL JAT V. LAXMI PRASAD 23
' [S.B: SINHA, J.]
-f (i) The judgment .of the criminal court rendered on the A
basis of the purported admission of guilt made by
the appellant was not admissible in evidence.
(ii) An admission of the guilt on the basis of a wrong
legal advice is not binding on the appellant.
B
(iii) The suit was barred in terms of Article 70 of the
Limitation Act.
\
6. The second appeal preferred by the respondent herein
has been allowed by the High Court by reason of the impugned
judgment. c
The High Court formulated the following substantial
questions of law:
"1. Whether the suit filed by the appellant was barred by
,. limitation while the suit was filed within 3 years from the D
date of demand and refusal by the respondent?
2. Whether the admission of guilt in criminal case in respect
of some transaction made by respondent is admissible in
the present case to the extent of fact that there was
transaction between the parties?" E
By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court
opined that the suit had been filed within the prescribed period
t of limitation having been brought within a period of three years
from the date of refusal of the demand to return the pledged
ornaments. The question No. 2 was also determined in favour F
of the respondent holding that admission of guilt in a crimii;ial
case would be admissible in evidence being relevant to the fact
in issue.
7. Mr. Anurag Sharma, learned counsel appearing on
G
.....,,
behalf of the appellant would urge:
(i) The alleged pledge of jewellery having admittedly
been made in the year 1987 and the suit filed on
26.06.1998, the same must be held to be barred by
limitation. H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.
""
A (ii) No document of pledge having been produced, +
service of notice by itself cannot give rise to a cause
of action for filing a suit for recovery of the pledged
ornaments.
8. Mr. Rohit Arya, learned senior counsel appearing on
B behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would contend:

(i) in view of Article 70 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the
/>
suit has rightly been found to have been instituted
within the period of limitation.
c (ii) Having regard to the provisions contained in Section
43 of the Indian Evidence Act, the judgment of the
criminal court was admissible in evidence.
(iii) In terms of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act,
things admitted need not be proved. The suit filed by 1
D
the respondent has rightly been decreed.
9. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties
raised before us, we may notice that the purported pledge of
jewellery was made by the respondent herein for taking a loan
E of Rs. 7,000/- on 2.12.1987. Appellant indisputably is a money
lender. A criminal case for charging excess interest was
instituted against him on 29.03.1997. On or about 29.11.1997,
he pleaded guilty by reason whereof a fine of Rs. 150/- was
imposed on him.
F Respondent thereafter served a notice upon the appellant
asking him to return the pledged jewellery. As neither the said
noticed was replied to nor the jewellery was returned, he filed
the suit on 26.06.1998.

G 10. The cause of action for filing the suit was stated in
para 3 of the plaint, which reads as under:
"3. The plaintiff through counsel sent registered notice
dated 12.5.98 and demanded the pledged jewels. Still the
defendant has not returned the jewels of the plaintiff.
H Therefore, this suit is being preferred. The aforesaid notice
SETH RAMDAYAL JAT V. LAXMI PRASAD 25
[S.B SINHA, J.]
'·
4 sent by the counsel of the plaintiff was received by the A
defendant on 14.5.98."
.....
~
11. Respondent examined himself as a witness in the suit.
He stated that the appellant being his cousin brother, no
document was executed. He also testified that in the criminal
case, appellant having admitted his crime and pledge of B
jewellery with him, a fine of Rs. 150/- was imposed and on in
default thereof, imprisonment of five days was ordered.

12. Indisputably, the judgment in the criminal case was
marked as an exhibit. Appellant also in his deposition stated as c
under:
" ... This is correct that plaintiff filed a complaint against
me before police and case was registered. This is also
correct that I confessed upon advise from my advocate.
l· This is correct that fine of Rs. 150/- was imposed on me D
..... in that case. This is correct that I do the money lending."
He admitted that even one Chandra Kumar had borrowed
money from him.
It was furthermore admitted by him that he received the E
notice (Exhibit P1) from the plaintiff but he had not replied thereto.

13. Indisputably, the law relating to the admissibility of a
judgment in a criminal proceedings vis-a-vis the civil
proceedings and vice-versa is governed by the provisions of
the Indian Evidence Act. F

14. Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act reads, thus:
"43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in
... Sections 40, 41 and 42, when relevant,- Judgments,
orders or decrees other then those mentioned in Sections G
A
40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant, unless the existence of such
judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant,
....
under some other provision of this Act."
In terms of the aforementioned provision, the judgment in
H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A a criminal case shall be admissible provided it is a relevant fact ~
in issue.
Its admissibility otherwise is limited. ~
>
It was so held in Anil Behari Ghosh v. Smt. Latika Bala
B Dassi and others [AIR 1955 SC 566] in the following terms:
"The learned counsel for the contesting respondent
suggested that it had not been found by the lower appellate
f
court as a fact upon the evidence adduced in this case,
that Girish was the nearest agnate of the testator or that
c Charu had murdered his adoptive father, though these
matters had been assumed as facts. The courts below
have referred to good and reliable evidence in support of
the finding that Girish was the nearest reversioner to the
estate of the testator. If the will is a valid and genuine will,
D there is intestacy in respect of the interest created in favour ·f

of Charu if he was the murderer of the testator. On this
question the courts below have assumed on the basis of
the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the .
High Court in the sessions trial that Charu was the .
E murderer. Though that judgment is relevant only to show
that there was such a trial resulting in the conviction and
sentence of Charu to transportation for life, it is not evidence
of the fact that Charu was the murderer. That question has
to be decided on evidence."
F In Perumal v. Devarajan and others [AIR 1974 Madras
14], it was held:
"2. Even at the outset, I want to state that the view of the
lower appellate court that the plaintiff has not established
satisfactorily that the first defendant or the second ~

G
defendant or both were responsible for the theft is perverse
and clearly against the evidence and the legal position. )._.

The lower appellate Court refused to rely on Exhibit A-3
"'
which is a certified copy of the judgment in C.C. No. 1949
of 1965. It is true that the evidence discussed in that
H
SETH RAMDAYAL JAT V LAXMI PRASAD 27
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
""""""'
i judgment and the fact that the first defendant had confessed A
his guilt in his statement is not admissible in evidence in
the suit. But it is not correct to state that even the factum
that the first and the second defendants were charged
under Sections 454, and 380, l.P.C. and they were
convicted on those charges could not be admitted. The B
order of the Criminal Court is, in my opinion, clearly
~
admissible to prove the conviction of the first defendant
\ and the second defendant and thatis the only point which
the plaintiff had to establish in this case ... "
A similar issue is dealt in some details in La/muni Devi c
and Ors. v. Jagdish Tiwary and Ors. [AIR 2005 Patna 51] wherein
it was held:
"14. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Anil
Behari Ghosh v. Smt. Latika Bala Dassi and Ors., (supra),
D
a Division Bench of this Court in its judgment reported in
1968 BLJR 197, Mundrika Kuer v. President, Bihar State
Board of Religious Trusts, and 8 others, has laid down to
the same effect. Paragraph 7 of the judgment is set out
hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference :-
E
"7. It is true that, if the Board acted capriciously and
arbitrarily without any material whatsoever and attempts
·to administer private property, saying that it is a public
· refigious trust, this Court may have to interfere in
appropriate cases; but it cannot be said here that there F
were no prima facie materials to show that the trust is a
public religious trust. The acquittal of the petitioner in the
criminal case (Annexure-A) was very much relied upon;
but it is well settled that acquittal or conviction in a criminal
case has no evidentiaryvalue in.a subsequent civil litigation
G
except for the limited purpose of showing that there was
-< a trial resulting . in acquittal or conviction, as the case may
be. The findings of the criminal Court are inadmissible."
15. A judgment in a criminal case, thus, is admissible for a
limited purpose. Relying only on or on the basis thereof, a civil H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.
,'
A proceeding cannot be determined, but that would not mean that }

it is not admissible for any purpose whatsoever.
16. Mr. Sharma also relies upon a decision of this Court in
Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi [(2004) 1 SCC 438]
to contend that a judgment of a civil court shall be binding on the
B
criminal court but the converse is not true. Therein it was held:
"(3) A decision by a criminal court does not bind the civil '
f
court while a decision by the civil court binds the criminal
court. An order passed by the Executive Magistrate in
c proceedings under Sections 1451146 of the Code is an
order by a criminal court and that too based on a summary
enquiry. The order is entitled to respect and wait before
the competent court at the interlocutory stage. At the stage
of final adjudication of rights, which would be on the
D evidence adduced before the court, the order of the
Magistrate is only one out of several pieces of evidence."
With respect, the ratio laid down therein may not be entirely
correct being in conflict with a Three-Judge Bench decision of
this Court in K. G Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and anr.
E [(2002) 8 sec 87].

17. A civil proceeding as also a criminal proceeding may
go on simultaneously. No statute puts an embargo in relation
thereto. A decision in a criminal case is not binding on a civil
F court.
In M.S. Sheriff&Anr. v. State of Madras & Ors. [AIR 1954
SC 397], a Constitution Bench of this Court was seized with a
question as to whether a civil suit or a criminal case should be
stayed in the event both are pending. It was opined that the
G criminal matter should be given precedence.

In regard to the possibility of conflict in decisions, it was ).

held that the law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly
refrains from making the decision of one Court binding on the
H other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such
·\

SETH RAMDAYAL JAT V LAXMI PRASAD 29
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
-t
as sentence or damages. It was held that the only relevant A
consideration was the likelihood of embarrassment.
If a primacy is given to a criminal proceeding, indisputably,
the civil suit must be determined on its own keeping in view the
evidence which has been brought on record before it and not in
terms of the evidence brought in the criminal proceeding.
B

The question came up for consideration in K. G.
Premshanker (supra), wherein this Court interalia held:
11
30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is -
( 1) the previous judgment which is final can be.relied upon c
as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act;
(2) in civil suits between the same parties, principle of res
judicata may apply; (3) in a criminal case, Section 300
CrPC makes provision that once a person is convicted or
acquitted, he may not be tried again for the same offence D
if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied; (4) if the
criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same
cause, judgment of the civil court would be relevant if
conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it
cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except E
as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which
judgment would be conclusive proof of what is stated
therein.
' 31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a
previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided under F
Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence
Act then in each case, the court has to decide to what
extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s)
decided therein. Take for illustration, in a case of alleged
trespass by A on B's property, B filed a suit for decla'ration G
of its title and to recover possession from A and suit is
decreed. Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution by B against
A for trespass, judgment passed between the parties in ·
civil proceedings would be relevant and the court may
hold that it conclusively establishes the title as well as H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ·[2009] 7 S.C.R.

A possession of B over the property. In such case, A may be
convicted for trespass. The illustration to Section 42 which
is quoted above makes the position clear. Hence, in each
and every case, the first question which would require
consideration is - whether judgment, order or decree is
B relevant, if relevant --- its effect. It may be relevant for a
limited purpose, such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This
would depend upon the facts of each case.
-
It is, however, significant to notice a decision of this Court
in Mis Karam Chand Ganga Prasad & Anr. etc. v. Union of
C India & Ors. [(1970) 3 SCC 694], wherein it was categorically
held that the decisions of the civil court will be binding on the
criminal courts but the converse is not true, was overruled,
stating:
~33. Hence, the observation made by this Court in V.M. +
D
Shah case that the finding recorded by the criminal court
stands superseded by the finding recorded by the civil
court is not correct enunciation of law. Further, the general
observations made in Karam Chand case are in context
of the facts of the case stated above. The Court was not
E required to consider the earlier decision of the Constitution
Bench in M. S. Sheriff case as well as Sections 40 to 43
of the Evidence Act."
[See also Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam and Anr.
F v. State (Delhi Admn.) and Anr. 2009 (3) SCALE 604]
Another Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion
to consider the question in Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. v.
Meenakshi Marwah &Anr. [(2005) 4 SCC 370]. Relying on M. S.
Sheriff (supra) as also various other decisions, it was
G categorically held:
"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be
made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and
criminal courts, it is necessary to point out t~at the standard
of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely
H
• SETH RAMDAYAL JAT V. LAXMI PRASAD 31
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of A
preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the
entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond
reasonable doubt has to be given."

The question yet again came up for consideration in P
Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu [AIR 2008 8
SC 1884], wherein the law was stated, thus :
;\
"13. It is, however, well-settled that in a given case, civil
proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed
simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal c
proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and
circumstances of each case,"

18. It is now almost well-settled that, save and except for
Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act which refers to Sections
40, 41, and 42 thereof, a judgment of a criminal court shall not D
be admissible in a civil suit.
19. What, however, would be admissible is the admission
made by a party in a previous proceeding. The admission of
the appellant was recorded in writing. While he was deposing
E
in the suit, he was confronted with the question as to whether he
had admitted his guilt and pleaded guilty of the charges framed.
He did so. Having, thus, accepted that he had made an
t
admission in the criminal case, ·the same was admissible in
evidence. He could have resiled therefrom or explained away
his admission. He offered an explanation that he was wrongly F
advised by the counsel to do so. The said explanation was not
accepted by the trial court. It was considered to be an
afterthought. His admission in the civil proceeding was
admissible in evidence.
G
..., 20. Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as under:
"58 - Facts admitted need not be proved
No fact need to be proved in any proceeding which the
parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing,
H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R. •
A or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any
writing under their hands, or which by any rule of pleading
in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by
their pleadings:
Provided that the court may, in its discretion, require the
B facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such
admission."
In view of the aforementioned provision, there cannot be
.
any doubt or dispute that a thing admitted need not be proved.
c [See Vice-Chairman, Kendriya Vidya/aya Sangathan and
Another v. Girdharilal Yadav (2004) 6 SCC 325, L.K. Verma v.
HMT Ltd. and Another (2006) 2 SCC 269, Avtar Singh and
Others v. Gurdial Singh and Others (2006) 12 SCC 552,
Gannmani Anasuya and Others v. Parvatini Amarendra
Chowdhary and Others (2007) 10 SCC 296]
D
21. We, therefore, are of the opinion that although the
judgment in a criminal case was not relevant in evidence for the
purpose of proving his civil liability, his admission in the civil
suit was admissible. The question as to whether the explanation -
E offered by him should be accepted or not is a matter which would
fall within the realm of appreciation of evidence. The Trial Court
had accepted the same. The first appellate court refused to
consider the effect thereof in its proper perspective. The .
---
appellate court proceeded on the basis that as the judgment of
F the criminal court was not admissible in evidence, the suit could
not have been decreed on the said basis. For the said purpose,
the admission made by the appellant in his deposition as also
the effect of charge had not been taken into consideration.
We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court cannot
G be said to have committed any error in interfering with the
judgment of the first appellate court.
22. So far as the question of the applicability of the period
of limitation is concerned, Article 70 of the Limitation Act would
be applicable. It reads as under:
H
SETH RAMDAYAL JAT V. LAXMI PRASAD 33
[S.B. SINHA, J.)

"Description of suit Period of Time from which A
limitation period begins to run
70. To recover movable Three years The date of refusal
property deposited after demand."
or pawned from a
depository or pawnee. B

In terms of the aforementioned provision, the period of
limitation, thus, begins to run from the date of refusal after
demand.
23. Appellant did not respond to the notice issued by the C
respondent asking him to return the pledged jewellery. The date
of receipt of such a notice is 14.05.1998. The suit having been
filed on 26.06.1998, thus, must be held to have been filed within
the prescribed period of limitation.
D
24. Having regard to the fact that the averments contained
in the paragraph 3 of the plaint were not traversed, the same
would be deemed to have been admitted by him in terms of
Order VIII, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetty [(2008) 7 SCC 85], this E
Court held:
"14. An admission made in a pleading is not to be treated
' in the same manner as an admission in a document. An
admission made by a party to the lis is admissible against him
proprio vigore." F
[See also Ranganayakamma and Another v. K. S.
Prakash (D) By LRs and Others 2008 (9) SCALE 144]
25. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in
this appeal, which is dismissed accordingly. However, in the G
facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as
to costs.

N.J. Appeal dismissed.