Holding

Resignation, as distinct from voluntary retirement, results in forfeiture of service and disqualifies an employee from pension benefits under the LIC Employees' Pension Rules, 1995, and the retrospective operation of those rules cannot confer benefits on persons who resigned before the scheme’s existence.

Summary

Shree Lal Meena resigned from LIC in 1990 because no voluntary retirement scheme existed, and later sought pension benefits under the LIC Employees' Pension Rules, 1995 which were retrospectively applied from 1993. The Supreme Court examined whether a resignation could be treated as voluntary retirement and whether the retrospective rules could confer pension rights on a former employee who had resigned before the scheme’s introduction. It held that the Rules expressly differentiate between "retirement" and "resignation", and that resignation triggers forfeiture of service under Rule 23, disqualifying the employee from pension benefits. The Court also emphasized that the term "retired" in Rule 3(1)(a) does not include resignations, and that extending benefits by implication would contravene the scheme’s financial design. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal that upheld the High Court’s dismissal of Meena’s claim and dismissed the other related appeals. The judgment reaffirmed the principle that voluntary retirement must be created by a statutory provision, whereas resignation is a unilateral termination of service.

Issues considered

Whether a resignation can be treated as voluntary retirement for the purpose of the LIC Employees' Pension Rules, 1995.
Whether the retrospective operation of the Pension Rules can confer pension benefits on an employee who resigned before the Rules came into force.
Whether the term "retired" in Rule 3(1)(a) includes employees who resigned.
Whether the forfeiture clause in Rule 23 bars pension entitlement for resigning employees.

Legislation cited

Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995s. Rule 22, s. Rule 23, s. Rule 2(j), s. Rule 2(s), s. Rule 31, s. Rule 3(1)(a)
Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960s. Regulation 18, s. Regulation 76
Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. Section 2(s), s. Section 6N

Subjects

voluntary retirementresignationpension benefitsforfeiture of serviceretrospective legislationpublic sector employerservice jurisprudencestatutory interpretation

Judgment

[2019] 5 S.C.R. 391 391

SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, LIFE INSURANCE A
CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. & ORS.
v.
SHREE LAL MEENA
(Civil Appeal No.14739 of 2015) B
MARCH 15, 2019
[RANJAN GOGOI, CJI, SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND
K.M. JOSEPH, JJ.]
Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 C
– Regn. 18 – Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees)
Pension Rules, 1995 – rr. 3(1)(a) and 23 – Respondent tendered a
letter of resignation on 14.7.1990 – Resignation was accepted by
the appellant-LIC – There was no scheme or provision for
voluntary retirement applicable to respondent during this period of
time – More than 5 years later, Pension Rules, 1995 were brought D
into force and made applicable to all the employees who were in
service of the LIC on or after 1.1.1986, but had retired before
1.11.1993 – Respondent sought application of the Pension Rules –
Pursuant thereto, the respondent filed writ petition – High Court
decided in his favour – On appeal, held: Pension Rules show that E
the resignation entails forfeiture of the entire post service and
consequently, would not qualify for pensionary benefits – In the
instant case, on the relevant date respondent took a conscious
decision to dis-engage himself from the services of the appellant,
on the terms and conditions as prevalent on that date – As to what
happened five years hence, would have no bearing on any benefit, F
which can accrue to such employee as a respondent except to the
extent which is specifically made applicable to him – Also, r.3(1)(a)
has used a clear and unequivocal expression ‘retired’ and it has
not used any alternative expression, for determination of the
relationship of employer-employees, like ‘resignation’ – When the G
pension Rules are applicable and an employee resigns, the
consequences are forfeiture of service, u/r.23 of the Pension Rules
– Any attempt to apply the Pension Rules to the respondent would
be self-defeating argument – Thus, impugned orders unsustainable.

H
391
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R.

A General Insurance (Termination, Superannuation and
Retirement of Officers and Development Staff) Scheme, 1976 – Cl.
4(4A) – General Insurance (Employees’) Pension Scheme, 1995 –
Appellant tendered his resignation on 1.10.1993, however, termed
it as ‘premature retirement’ – Letter of resignation was accepted –
After three years of the resignation, an amendment was made to the
B
1976 Scheme by inserting Cl.4(4A), introducing the concept of
Voluntary Retirement Scheme on 1.11.1996 – This clause was made
retrospectively applicable from 1.11.1993 – The object was to have
consonance with the ‘1995 scheme’ – Appellant sought pension on
the basis of the 1995 scheme resting his case on Sheel Kumar Jain v.
C New India Assurance Company Limited – Writ petition filed by
appellant, was rejected by the High Court – On appeal, held: The
reasoning of the Division Bench of High Court was that the case of
the appellant was of resignation and not of voluntary retirement –
The opinion of the Division Bench of High Court was also based
on a relevant fact, that the condition in terms of Cl.4(4A) required
D
completion of 55 years of age, while the appellant was not of 55
years of age on the date of his resignation or its acceptance –
Besides, there is a clause of forfeiture of service in case of
resignation – Appellant did not fulfill the pre-requisites to avail the
benefits of the new pension scheme – Mere categorisation by the
E appellant himself of his resignation as ‘premature retirement’ was
not sufficient – Appellant did not have the requisite age when he
resigned even were the 1976 scheme to be made applicable – Apart
from that, the appellant remained silent for years together and that
Supreme Court, taking a particular view subsequently, in Sheel
Kumar Jain, would not entitle state claims to be raised on this
F
behalf, like that of appellant – Thus, relief sought by the appellant
rejected.
Andhra Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995 –
Andhra Bank officers’ Service Regulations, 1982 – Appellants were
employees of the respondent-Bank, viz., Andhra Bank, who resigned
G from service during the window period of 1991 and 1993 –
Thereafter, Pension Regulations, 1995 were introduced and it was
made applicable for employees, who retired on or after 01.01.1986
but before 01.11.1993 – Appellants sought benefit of these pension
Regulations – Writ petition by appellants – High Court rejected the
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SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, L.I.C. OF INDIA LTD. v. 393
SHREE LAL MEENA

writ petition – On appeal, held: Rule 2(y) under pension A
Regulations, 1995 had brought in ‘voluntary retirement’ in the
definition of ‘retirement’, but had not considered it appropriate to
bring in the concept of ‘resignation’ – Service jurisprudence,
recognising the concept of ‘resignation’ and ‘retirement’ as
different, and in the same regulations these expressions being used
B
in different connotations, left no manner of doubt that the benefit
could not be extended, especially as resignation was one of the
disqualifications for seeking pensionary benefits, under the
Regulations.
Words and Phrases – ‘Voluntary Retirement’ and ‘
Resignation’ – Discussed. C

Answering the reference, the Court
HELD: C.A. No.14739 of 2015
1.The undisputed fact is that as on the date when
respondent was revolving the thought in his mind of voluntary D
retirement, there was no such provision in the Life Insurance
Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 applicable. Thus,
his repeated communications setting forth a thought process for
‘voluntary retirement’ had no legal backing on that date. It is in
these circumstances that no response was forthcoming to his E
letters, when he talked about a concept which did not exist.
Conscious of this aspect and wanting to leave the services of the
appellant-LIC, the respondent took recourse to what was
permissible on that date, i.e., ‘resignation’. Section 3 of the Staff
Regulations has a heading ‘Termination’. The other expression
used before the relevant Regulation 18 is ‘Determination of F
Service’. The Regulation itself uses the expression ‘leave or
discontinue’ service. In whatever manner these expressions are
understood, in legal and common parlance, they amount to, first
a unilateral act on the part of an employee, desirous of not
continuing with her/his service with the employer and then,the G
acceptance of the same by the employer, subject to a notice
period, which, in the present facts, had been waived at the
request of the employee. Thus, on the relevant date he took a
conscious decision to dis-engage himself from the services of
the appellant, on the terms & conditions as prevalent on that
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394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R.

A date. As to what happened five years hence, would have no
bearing on any benefit, which can accrue to such employee as a
respondent, except to the extent which is specifically made
applicable to him. [Para 17] [403-D-H]
2. It is trite to say that statutory provisions must be given
B their clear meaning unless there is ambiguity in the wordings.
There is no ambiguity in the Life Insurance Corporation of India
(Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 in question as to require any
import to be given that is different from its plain words. The
Pension Rules have been brought into force from a
retrospective date of 1.11.1993. Thus, they would logically apply
C to all employees in service on or after 1.11.1993. The
respondent was not such a person. There is only one further
twist to the Pension Rules. Rule 3(1)(a) of the Pension Rules
refers to applicability of these Pension Rules even to such of the
employees who “retired” on or after 1.1.1986 and before
D 1.11.1993. Even for such of the employees, there is a
requirement for an option to be exercised, in writing, that within
a period of time of 120 days from the notified date they become
member of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees)
Pension Fund, and refund within 60 days thereafter, the entire
amount of LIC’s contribution to the Provident Fund, including
E interest accrued thereon. This is so, as employees who retired
during this period of time had availed of the contributory
provident fund benefit under the then existing Staff Regulations,
and would have to surrender the benefits under those
Regulations to the extent they were contributed for by the LIC,
F for the new Pension Rules to be made applicable to them. The
expression used in Rule 3(1)(a) is clear and
unequivocal– ‘retired’. It has not used any alternative
expression also, for determination of the relationship of
employer-employee, like ‘resignation’. In the same Rules,
expressions like ‘resignation’, ‘dismissal’, ‘removal’ have been
G used, more specifically in Rule 23 of the Pension Rules. When
different expressions are used in the same Rules, in different
contexts then all of them cannot be given the same meaning.
[Para 18] [404-A-F]

H
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, L.I.C. OF INDIA LTD. v. 395
SHREE LAL MEENA

3. What is most material is that the employee in this case A
had resigned. When the Pension Rules are applicable, and an
employee resigns, the consequences are forfeiture of service,
under Rule 23 of the Pension Rules. Attempting to apply the
Pension Rules to the respondent would be a self-defeating
argument. As, suppose, the Pension Rules were applicable and
B
the employee like the respondent was in service and sought to
resign, the entire past service would be forfeited, and
consequently, he would not qualify for pensionary benefits. To
hold otherwise would imply that an employee resigning during
the currency of the Rules would be deprived of pensionary
benefits, while an employee who resigns when these Rules were C
not even in existence, would be given the benefit of these Rules.
[Para 19] [405-A-C]
4. Ther e ar e some obser vations on the pr inciples of public
sectors being model employers and provisions of pension being
beneficial legislations. When the Legislature, in its wisdom, D
brings forth certain beneficial provisions in the form of Pension
Regulations from a particular date and on particular terms and
conditions, aspects which are excluded cannot be included in it
by implication. The provisions will have to be read as they read
unless there is some confusion or they are capable of another
interpretation. It is also to be noted that while framing such E
schemes, there is an important aspect of them being of a con-
tributory nature and their financial implications. Such financial
implications are both, for the contributors and for the State. Thus,
it would be inadvisable to expand such beneficial schemes
beyond their contours to extend them to employees for whom F
they were not meant for by the Legislature. [Para 25] [411-C-E]
C.A. No.10904 of 2016
5. In the year 2011, this Court in Sheel Kumar Jain v. New
India Assurance Company Limited gave benefit of General
Insurance (Employees’) Pension Scheme, 1995 to certain G
employees. The judgment was delivered on 28.7.2011. Once
again, almost after two years, the appellant made a
representation dated 4.4.2013 seeking pension on the basis of

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396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R.

A the 1995 Scheme, resting his case on the aforesaid judgment.
There was no response to this representation, resulting in the
appellant filing a writ petition before the Bombay High Court.
The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, in terms of the
impugned judgment dated 07.04.2016 rejected the same. The
reasoning of the Division Bench was that the case of the
B
appellant was of resignation and not of voluntary retirement. The
appellant had tendered his resignation before 1.11.1993, while
the conditions for availing of the benefit were: (i) the employees
must have retired on or after 1.11.1993, and before the notified
date; and (ii) the employee must have exercised the option to
C voluntarily retire within120 days from the notified date, to
become a member of the General Insurance Corporation
(Employees’)Pension Fund while refunding the amount of
Provident Fund contributed by the insurance company. These
two aspects were stated to be absent in the case of the appellant,
who had never opted for voluntary retirement within the
D
requisite period nor refunded the amount, which were
pre-requisites for availing the benefit of the new pension scheme.
The opinion of the Division Bench was also based on a relevant
fact, that the condition in terms of clause 4(4A) required
completion of 55 years of age, while the appellant was not of 55
E years of age on the date of his resignation or its acceptance.
[Paras 28, 29] [412-C-H; 413-A]
6. Mere categorisation by the appellant himself of his
resignation as “premature retirement” is of no avail. The
principle of forfeiture of service, would be applicable here and
F the appellant did not have the requisite age when he resigned
even were the General Insurance (Termination, Superannuation
and Retirement of Officers and Development Staff) Scheme, 1976
to be made applicable. [Para 35] [414-G-H]
7. Also that the appellant remained silent for years together
G and that this Court,taking a particular view subsequently, in Sheel
Kumar Jain, would not entitle stale claims to be raised on this
behalf, like that of the appellant. In fact the appellant slept over
the matter for almost a little over two years even after the
pronouncement of the judgment. [Para 36] [415-A-B]

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SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, L.I.C. OF INDIA LTD. v. 397
SHREE LAL MEENA

Civil Appeal Nos. 3138-3141 of 2019 @ SLP(C) Nos.5716-5719 A
of 2016
8. It is relevant to note that M.R. Prabhakar & Ors. dealt
with a similar scheme for employees of the Canara Bank, and the
plea was that such of the employees who had resigned must be
construed as voluntarily retired, thus, entitling them to B
pensionary benefits. Suffice to say that, once again, the principle
was of differentiation between the concept of ‘voluntary
retirement’ and ‘resignation’. Regulation 2(y)as applicable to
the employees of Canara Bank, being pari materia to Rule 2(y)
under the Pension Regulations of 1995,had brought in ‘volun-
tary retirement’ in the definition of ‘retirement’, but had not C
considered it appropriate to bring in the concept of ‘resignation’.
Service jurisprudence, recognising the concept of ‘resignation’
and ‘retirement’ as different, and in the same regulations these
expressions being used in different connotations, left no manner
of doubt that the benefit could not be extended, especially as D
resignation was one of the disqualifications for seeking
pensionary benefits,under the Regulations. [Para 42] [416-A-D]
JK Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur
v. State of U.P., AIR 1990 SC 1808 : [1990] 3 SCR
523 – distinguished. E
Reserve Bank of India & Anr. v. Cecil Dennis Solomon
& Anr. (2004) 9 SCC 461: [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 465;
UCO Bank & Ors. v. Sanwar Mal (2004) 4 SCC
412 : [2004] 2 SCR 1125; M.R. Prabhakar & Ors. v.
Canara Bank & Ors. (2012) 9 SCC 671 : [2012] 8 F
SCR 1072 ; CIT v. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd.
(1992) 4 SCC 363 : [1992] 1 Suppl. SCR 732;
Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall
[1955] 2 SCR 842 ; Kanhaiyalal Vishindas Gidwani v.
Arun Dattatray Mehta (2001) 1 SCC 78; Shashikala
Devi v. Central Bank of India (2014) 16 SCC 260 ; G
Asger Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation of
India (2016) 13 SCC 797:[2015] SCR 865
– relied on.
J.M. Singh v. Life Insurance Corporation of India&
Ors. CWP No.10157/1996 decided on 8.1.2010 ; Sheel H
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R.

A Kumar Jain v. New India Assurance Company Limited
(2011) 12 SCC 197 : [2011] 9 SCR 574; Sudhir
Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. & Ors.
(1984) 3 SCC 369 : [1984] 3 SCR 325 – referred to.
Grundy v. Pinniger (1852) 21 LJ Ch 405; Pinner v.
B Everett [1969] 3 All ER 257 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1990] 3 SCR 523 distinguished Para 7
[1955[ 2 SCR 842 relied on Para 18
C (2001) 1 SCC 78 relied on Para 18
[1992] 1 Suppl. SCR 732 relied on Para 20
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 465 relied on Para 21
[2004] 2 SCR 1125 relied on Para 23
D [2012] 8 SCR 1072 relied on Para 24
(2014) 16 SCC 260 relied on Para 24
[2015] SCR 865 relied on Para 25
[2011] 9 SCR 574 referred to Para 28
E
[1984] 3 SCR 325 referred to Para 32
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.14739
of 2015.
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.08.2011 of the High Court
F of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, in D.B. Civil Special Appeal
(Writ) No. 172 of 2008 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6026 of 1997
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 3138-3141 of 2019, 10904 of 2016.

G P. P. Malhotra, Sr. Adv., D. N. Goburdhan, Ms. Gauri Goburdhan,
Ms. Pallavi Chopra, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Puneet Jain, Adv. Mr. R.K. Pathak,
Abhinav Gupta, Bikash Chandra, Ms. Laxmi, Ms. Christi Jain, Manish
Kumar, Ms. Shehla Chaudhary, Md. Anas Chaudhary, Subrat, Ansar
Ahmad Chaudhary, T. V. Ratnam Mohit Paul, Vineet Malhotra, Vishal
Gohri, Shubhendra, O. Ghosh, Advs. for the appearing parties.
H
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, L.I.C. OF INDIA LTD. v. 399
SHREE LAL MEENA

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. 1. Employees resigned from
service. We are concerned with one employee of the Life Insurance
Corporation of India; one employee of the United India Insurance
Company Limited and a batch of employees of Andhra Bank. These
employees resigned when the pension schemes in respect of these B
institutions in question were not in force. The pension schemes came
into force subsequently, but with retrospective effect. The question,
which, thus, arose was whether these employees, who had resigned
from service post the date from which the pension schemes were made
applicable, but prior to the date on which the schemes got notified, would
be entitled to the benefit of the pension schemes in question. A Bench of C
two Judges of this Court found that there was a divergence of judicial
views of this Court, and the matter needed to be examined by a larger
Bench. The reference order was passed in CA No.14739/2015 and that
is how the matter is before us.
D
2. We deem it appropriate to set forth the factual matrix, relevant
for the determination of the controversy, in respect of the lead matter
and thereafter, we will analyse the legal principles and accordingly
decide the connected matters.
C.A. No.14739 of 2015
E
3. Shree Lal Meena, the respondent in the appeal was an
employee of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Limited (for short
‘LIC’). On completion of more than 20 years of service, he addressed
a letter dated 15.6.1990 to the LIC, expressing concerns about the poor
health of his wife and himself and the possibility that he may be seeking
voluntary retirement on account thereof. There being no response to F
this letter, Shree Lal Meena followed the said letter with another letter
dated 18.6.1990, reiterating the same aspect. Once again, there was no
response. Finally, he tendered a letter of resignation on 14.7.1990, for it
to take effect immediately, by waiving off the mandatory notice period
of three months under Regulation 18 of the Life Insurance Corporation G
of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Staff
Regulations’). The acceptance of the resignation was communicated
by the LIC vide letter dated 11.1.1991, to take effect from 14.7.1990,
waiving off the statutory notice period.

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400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R.

A 4. It is pertinent to note that there was no scheme or provision for
voluntary retirement applicable to Shree Lal Meena during this period of
time. Shree Lal Meena was paid all his dues as were admissible to him.
The beneficial scheme operating at the relevant time was a
Contributory Provident Fund Scheme under Regulation 76 of the Staff
Regulations.
B
5. More than 5 years later, the Life Insurance Corporation of
India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 (for short ‘Pension Rules’) were
promulgated, on 28.6.1995, but were brought into force with
retrospective effect, from 1.11.1993, unless expressly provided against.
The applicability of Section 3(1)(a) of the Pension Rules made the scheme
C applicable to all the employees who were in service of the LIC on or
after 1.1.1986, but had retired before 1.11.1993, given that the
employees satisfied the other conditions provided for in the Pension Rules.
6. Shree Lal Meena was in service after 1.1.1986. He had,
however, resigned with effect from 14.7.1990. Had he not resigned he
D would have continued in service and would have retired sometime around
the year 2000. He had also made an endeavour, prior to his resignation,
proposing voluntary retirement for himself. Shree Lal Meena was, thus,
of the view that the Pension Rules should be made applicable to him and
accordingly made a request, which was, however, declined on 6.4.1996
E by the LIC on the ground that he had ‘resigned’ from service. He, thus,
issued a notice of demand vide letter dated 28.8.1997, which met with
the same fate and finally filed a writ petition before the Rajasthan High
Court in 1997 itself, which was decided in his favour, by the learned
Single Judge of that Court, vide judgment dated 8.9.2006.

F 7. The gravamen of the judgment of the learned Single Judge is
the request made by Shree Lal Meena for voluntary retirement and that
it was the absence of any provision for the same under the Staff
Regulations, which had caused him to tender his resignation. This view
was sought to be supported by the judgment of this Court in JK Cotton
Spinning &Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur v. State of U.P.,1 opining
G that where an employee voluntarily tenders his resignation, termination
of service, post acceptance of such resignation by the employer would
fall in the category of ‘voluntary retirement’, given all other ingredients
of voluntary retirement were being met. It may be noted that in the
1
AIR 1990 SC 1808
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SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, L.I.C. OF INDIA LTD. v. 401
SHREE LAL MEENA [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

factual contours of the controversy of that judgment, the question really A
posed was whether in the case of services of an employee being
terminated consequent toa voluntary resignation, such termination so
brought about would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of
Section 2(s) read with Section6N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. As per the provisions of Section 2(s) of that Act,
B
the definition of ‘retrenchment’ excludes a case of voluntary retirement.
Since the employee had tendered his resignation voluntarily, and had
subsequently claimed compensation on account of retrenchment, this
Court, in that case had opined against the employee. The learned Single
Judge of the Rajasthan High Court also recorded that there was no
disputethat Shree Lal Meena had the requisite years of service to be C
entitled to pensionary benefits if the scheme had existed at the relevant
point of time.
8. LIC, aggrieved by this order, appealed to the Division Bench of
the High Court, which endeavour, however, failed as the appeal was
dismissed vide order dated 16.8.2011. The plea of the LIC, based on the D
judgment of this Court in Reserve Bank of India & Anr. v. Cecil
Dennis Solomon &Anr.2 and of the Division Bench of the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in J.M. Singh v. Life Insurance Corporation of
India& Ors.3 was repelled.
9. The present appeal has thereafter been filed by the LIC, in E
which the reference order was passed.
10. In order to appreciate the reasoning of the Courts below,
supported by the respondent in the appeal and the arguments advanced
on behalf of the appellant also on the same lines, but repelled by the
Courts below, we consider it necessary to first appreciate the Pension F
Rules, which have been brought into force.
11. Rule 2 is the definition rule, defining the various expressions
used in the Pension Rules. The relevant Rule 2(j) reads as under:
“2. Definitions – In these rules, unless the context
otherwise requires – G
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
(j) “employee” means any person employed in the service of the
Corporation on full-time work on permanent basis and who opts
2
(2004) 9 SCC 461 H
3
CWP No.10157/1996 decided on 8.1.2010
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R.

A and is governed by these rules but does not include an employee
retired before the commencement of these rules and who is
drawing pension from the Pension Fund of the Oriental
Government Security Life Assurance Company Limited in
accordance with sub-regulation(2) of regulation 76 of the Life
Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, made
B
under the Act;”
12. A reading of the aforesaid clause shows that there is a
specific exclusion of an employee in whose case the twin conditions of
having ‘retired’ before the commencement of the Pension Rules and
drawing of pension under the Staff Regulations is satisfied. Rule 2(s)
C reads as under:
“2. Definitions – In these rules, unless the context
otherwise requires –
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
D (s) “retirement” means,-
(i) retirement in accordance with the provisions contained in
sub-regulation (1) or sub-regulation (2) or sub-regulation (3) of
regulation 19 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff)
Regulations, 1960 and rule 14 of the Life Insurance Corporation
E of India Class III and Class IV Employees (Revision of Terms
and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1985 made under the Act;
(ii) voluntary retirement in accordance with the provisions
contained in rule 31 of these rules;”
13.Thus, the definition of ‘retirement’ envisages two eventualities
F
– first a person who had retired in terms of the Staff Regulations; and
secondly, a voluntary retirement under the provisions of the Pension
Rules themselves.
14. Another relevant provision to be taken note of is Rule 23 of
the Pension Rules, which reads as under:
G
“23. Forfeiture of service - Resignation or dismissal or removal
or termination or compulsory retirement of an employee from the
service of the Corporation shall entail forfeiture of his entire past
service and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary
benefits.”
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SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, L.I.C. OF INDIA LTD. v. 403
SHREE LAL MEENA [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

15. The aforesaid Rules, thus, show that resignation entails A
forfeiture of the entire past service and consequently would not qualify
for pensionary benefits. Rule 31 deals with ‘Pension on voluntary
retirement’, which is admissible on completion of 20 years of qualifying
service, with a notice of not less than 90 days in writing.
16. The moot point which, thus, arises for consideration is the B
effect of the retrospective application of these Rules in the given factual
scenario. Had the Pension Rules been only prospective in application,
there is no doubt that Shree Lal Meena could not even have
endeavoured to prefer a claim. In order to appreciate this aspect, the
extent to which retrospectivity applies would have to be analysed, strictly
on the basis of these Pension Rules, which are also contributory in their C
character.
17. The undisputed fact is that as on the date when Shree Lal
Meena was revolving the thought in his mind of voluntary retirement,
there was no such provision in the Staff Regulations applicable. Thus,
his repeated communications setting forth a thought process for D
‘voluntary retirement’ had no legal backing on that date. It is in these
circumstances that no response was forthcoming to his letters, when he
talked about a concept which did not exist. Conscious of this aspect and
wanting to leave the services of the LIC, Shree Lal Meena took
recourse to what was permissible on that date, i.e., ‘resignation’. E
Section 3 of the Staff Regulations has a heading ‘Termination’. The
other expression used before the relevant Regulation 18 is
‘Determination of Service’. The Regulation itself uses the expression
‘leave or discontinue’ service. In whatever manner these expressions
are understood, in legal and common parlance, they amount to, first a
unilateral act on the part of an employee, desirous of not continuing with F
her/his service with the employer and then, the acceptance of the same
by the employer, subject to a notice period, which, in the present facts,
had been waived at the request of the employee. Thus, on the relevant
date he took a conscious decision to dis-engage himself from the
services of the appellant, on the terms & conditions as prevalent on that G
date. As to what happened five years hence, in our view, would have no
bearing on any benefit, which can accrue to such employee as a
respondent, except to the extent which is specifically made applicable to
him.

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404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R.

A 18. It is trite to say that statutory provisions must be given their
clear meaning unless there is ambiguity in the wordings.4 There is no
ambiguity in the Pension Rules in question as to require any import to be
given that is different from its plain words. The Pension Rules have
been brought into force from a retrospective date of 1.11.1993. Thus,
they would logically apply to all employees in service on or after 1.11.1993.
B
The respondent was not such a person. There is only one further twist
to the Pension Rules. Rule 3(1)(a) of the Pension Rules refers to
applicability of these Pension Rules even to such of the employees who
“retired” on or after 1.1.1986 and before 1.11.1993. Even for such of
the employees, there is a requirement for an option to be exercised, in
C writing, that within a period of time of 120 days from the notified date
they become member of the Life Insurance Corporation of India
(Employees) Pension Fund, and refund within 60 days thereafter, the
entire amount of LIC’s contribution to the Provident Fund, including
interest accrued thereon. This is so, as employees who retired during
this period of time had availed of the contributory provident fund benefit
D
under the then existing Staff Regulations, and would have to surrender
the benefits under those Regulations to the extent they were contributed
for by the LIC, for the new Pension Rules to be made applicable to
them. The expression used in Rule 3(1)(a)is clear and
unequivocal– ‘retired’. It has not used any alternative expression also,
E for determination of the relationship of employer-employee, like
‘resignation’. In the same Rules, expressions like ‘resignation’, ‘dismissal’,
‘removal’ have been used, more specifically in Rule 23 of the Pension
Rules. When different expressions are used in the same Rules, in
different contexts then all of them cannot be given the same meaning.5
F
4
Grundy v. Pinniger (1852) 21 LJ Ch 405; Pinner v. Everett [1969] 3 All ER 257: “In
determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute the first question to ask
always is what is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context
in the statute. It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably
be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature that it is proper to look for some
G other possible meaning of the word or phrase“
5
Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall (1955) 2 SCR 842;
KanhaiyalalVishindasGidwani v. Arun Dattatray Mehta (2001) 1 SCC 78: “It is true
that when the same statute uses two different words then prima facie one has to construe
that these two different words must have been used to mean differently.”

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SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, L.I.C. OF INDIA LTD. v. 405
SHREE LAL MEENA [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

19. What is most material is that the employee in this case had A
resigned. When the Pension Rules are applicable, and an employee
resigns, the consequences are forfeiture of service, under Rule 23 of the
Pension Rules. In our view, attempting to apply the Pension Rules to the
respondent would be a self-defeating argument. As, suppose, the
Pension Rules were applicable and the employee like the respondent
B
was in service and sought to resign, the entire past service would be
forfeited, and consequently, he would not qualify for pensionary
benefits. To hold otherwise would imply that an employee resigning
during the currency of the Rules would be deprived of pensionary
benefits, while an employee who resigns when these Rules were not
even in existence, would be given the benefit of these Rules. C
20. Now turning to the discussion of the judicial pronouncements
in this behalf, we are of the view that any judgment has to be read for
the law it lays down, by reference given to a factual matrix. Lines or
sentences here and there should not be read in absolute terms, de hors
the factual matrix in the context of which those observations were made.6 D
21. The judgment in JK Cotton Spinning &Weaving Mills Co.
Ltd., Kanpur7 has, thus, to be considered in that context. What was
the issue in that case? The first paragraph of the judgment itself
clarifies that aspect. Whether determination of an employer-employee
relationship amounted to retrenchment, within the meaning of the E
provisions of the Act applicable is what was being looked into. We have
already noticed, while referring to the facts of that case hereinbefore,
that the employee in question tried to act clever by half. He firstly
resigned. The resignation was accepted and the consequent monetary
benefit flowed to him. Thereafter, he sought to bring his resignation
within the meaning of ‘retrenchment’ under Section 2(s) read with F
Section6N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The
definition of ‘retrenchment’ itself clearly excluded voluntary retirement
of the workman. The employee, having voluntarily resigned, the
termination of relationship of employer and employee could not come
within the meaning of ‘retrenchment’. This Court analysed the G
difference between the meaning of resignation and retrenchment. The
resignation was voluntary. It is in this context tha tit was observed that
a voluntary tendering of resignation would be similar to voluntary
6
CIT v. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. (1992) 4 SCC 363.
7
(supra) H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R.

A retirement and not retrenchment. Nothing more and nothing less. Thus,
in our view, the High Court, both the learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench, appeared to have read much more into this judgment
than the legal proposition which it sought to propound. The principles in
the context of the controversy before us are well enunciated in the
judgment of this Court in Reserve Bank of India & Anr. v. Cecil
B
Dennis Solomon &Anr.8 On a similar factual matrix, the employees
had resigned some time in 1988. The RBI Pension Regulations came in
operation in 1990. The employees who had resigned earlier sought
applicability of these Pension Regulations to themselves. The
provisions, once again, had a similar clause of forfeiture of service, on
C resignation or dismissal or termination. The relevant observations are
as under:
“10. In service jurisprudence, the expressions “superannuation”,
“voluntary retirement”, “compulsory retirement” and “resignation”
convey different connotations. Voluntary retirement and resignation
D involve voluntary acts on the part of the employee to leave service.
Though both involve voluntary acts, they operate differently. One
of the basic distinctions is that in case of resignation it can be
tendered at any time, but in the case of voluntary retirement, it
can only be sought for after rendering prescribed period of qualifying
service. Other fundamental distinction is that in case of the former,
E normally retiral benefits are denied but in case of the latter, the
same is not denied. In case of the former, permission or notice is
not mandated, while in case of the latter, permission of the employer
concerned is a requisite condition. Though resignation is a bilateral
concept, and becomes effective on acceptance by the competent
F authority, yet the general rule can be displaced by express provisions
to the contrary. In Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal [AIR 1989
SC 1083] on interpretation of Regulation 20(2) of the Punjab
National Bank Regulations, it was held that resignation would
automatically take effect from the date specified in the notice as
there was no provision for any acceptance or rejection of the
G resignation by the employer. In Union of India v. Gopal Chandra
Misra [(1978) 2 SCC 301] it was held in the case of a judge of
the High Court having regard to Article 217 of the Constitution
that he has a unilateral right or privilege to resign his office and
8
(supra)
H
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, L.I.C. OF INDIA LTD. v. 407
SHREE LAL MEENA [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

his resignation becomes effective from the date which he, of his A
own volition, chooses. But where there is a provision empowering
the employer not to accept the resignation, on certain circumstances
e.g. pendency of disciplinary proceedings, the employer can
exercise the power.
11. On the contrary, as noted by this Court in Dinesh Chandra B
Sangma v. State of Assam [(1977) 4 SCC 441] while the
Government reserves its right to compulsorily retire a government
servant, even against his wish, there is a corresponding right of
the government servant to voluntarily retire from service. Voluntary
retirement is a condition of service created by statutory provision
whereas resignation is an implied term of any employer-employee C
relationship.”
22. In our view, the aforesaid principles squarely apply in the facts
of the present case and the relevant legal principles is that voluntary
retirement is a concept read into a condition of service, which has to be
created by a statutory provision, while resignation is the unilateral D
determination of an employer-employee relationship, whereby an
employee cannot be a bonded labour.
23. In UCO Bank & Ors. v. Sanwar Mal9, once again, in the
case of a similar pension scheme, the observations were made as under:
“6. To sum up, the Pension Scheme embodied in the regulation is E
a self-supporting scheme. It is a code by itself. The Bank is a
contributor to the pension fund. The Bank ensures availability of
funds with the trustees to make due payments to the beneficiaries
under the Regulations. The beneficiaries are employees covered
by Regulation 3. It is in this light that one has to construe
Regulation 22 quoted above. Regulation 22 deals with forfeiture F
of service. Regulation 22(1) states that resignation, dismissal,
removal or termination of an employee from the service of the
Bank shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service and
consequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits. In other
words, the Pension Scheme disqualifies such dismissed G
employees and employees who have resigned from membership
of the fund. The reason is not far to seek. In a self-financing
scheme, a separate fund is earmarked as the Scheme is not based
on budgetary support. It is essentially based on adequate
9
(2004) 4 SCC 412
H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R.

A contributions from the members of the fund. It is for this reason
that under Regulation 11, every bank is required to cause an
investigation to be made by an actuary into the financial condition
of the fund from time to time and depending on the deficits, the
Bank is required to make annual contributions to the fund.
Regulation 12 deals with investment of the fund whereas
B
Regulation 13 deals with payment out of the fund. In the case of
retirement, voluntary or on superannuation, there is a nexus
between retirement and retiral benefits under the Provident Fund
Rules. Retirement is allowed only on completion of qualifying
service which is not there in the case of resignation. When such a
C retiree opts for self-financing Pension Scheme, he brings in
accumulated contribution earned by him after completing
qualifying number of years of service under the Provident Fund
Rules whereas a person who resigns may not have adequate credit
balance to his provident fund account (i.e. bank’s contribution)
and, therefore, Regulation 3 does not cover employees who have
D
resigned. Similarly, in the case of a dismissed employee, there
may be forfeiture of his retiral benefits and consequently the
framers of the Scheme have kept out the retirees (sic resigned)
as well as dismissed employees vide Regulation 22. Further, the
pension payable to the beneficiaries under the Scheme would
E depend on income accruing on investments and unless there is
adequate corpus, the Scheme may not be workable and,
therefore, Regulation 22 prescribes a disqualification to dismissed
employees and employees who have resigned. Lastly, as stated
above, the Scheme contemplated pension as the second retiral
benefit in lieu of employers’ contribution to contributory provident
F
fund. Therefore, the said Scheme was not a continuation of the
earlier scheme of provident fund. As a new scheme, it was
entitled to keep out dismissed employees and employees who have
resigned.
7.In the light of our above analysis of the scheme, we now
G proceed to deal with the arguments advanced by both the sides. It
was inter alia urged on behalf of the appellant bank that under
Regulation 22, category of employees who have resigned from
the service and who have been dismissed or removed from the
service are not entitled to pension, that the pension scheme
H
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, L.I.C. OF INDIA LTD. v. 409
SHREE LAL MEENA [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

constituted a separate fund to be regulated on self-financing A
principles, that prior to the introduction of the pension scheme,
there was in existence a provident fund scheme and the present
scheme conferred a second retiral benefit to certain classes of
employees who were entitled to become the members/
beneficiaries of the fund, that the membership of the fund was
B
not dependent on the qualifying service under the pension scheme,
that looking to the financial implications, the scheme framed mainly
covered retirees because retirement presupposed larger number
of years of service, that in the case of resignation, an employee
can resign on the next day of his appointment whereas in the case
of retirement, the employee is required to put in a certain number C
of years of service and consequently, the scheme was a separate
code by itself, that the High Court has committed manifest error
in decreeing the suit of the respondent inasmuch as it has not
considered the relevant factors contemplated by the said scheme
and that the pension scheme was introduced in terms of the
D
settlement dated 29.10.1993 between the IBA and All-India Bank
Employees’ Association, which settlement also categorically rules
out employees who have resigned or who have been dismissed/
removed from the service.”
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
E
“9. We find merit in these appeals. The words “resignation” and
“retirement” carry different meanings in common parlance. An
employee can resign at any point of time, even on the second day
of his appointment but in the case of retirement he retires only
after attaining the age of superannuation or in the case of
voluntary retirement on completion of qualifying service. The F
effect of resignation and retirement to the extent that there is
severance of employment (sic is the same) but in service
jurisprudence both the expressions are understood differently.
Under the Regulations, the expressions “resignation” and
“retirement” have been employed for different purpose and carry G
different meanings. The Pension Scheme herein is based on
actuarial calculation; it is a self-financing scheme, which does not
depend upon budgetary support and consequently it constitutes a
complete code by itself. The Scheme essentially covers retirees
as the credit balance to their provident fund account is larger as
H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R.

A compared to employees who resigned from service. Moreover,
resignation brings about complete cessation of
master-and-servant relationship whereas voluntary retirement
maintains the relationship for the purposes of grant of retiral
benefits, in view of the past service. Similarly, acceptance of
resignation is dependent upon discretion of the employer whereas
B
retirement is completion of service in terms of regulations/rules
framed by the Bank. Resignation can be tendered irrespective of
the length of service whereas in the case of voluntary retirement,
the employee has to complete qualifying service for retiral
benefits. Further, there are different yardsticks and criteria for
C submitting resignation vis-à-vis voluntary retirement and
acceptance thereof. Since the Pension Regulations disqualify an
employee, who has resigned, from claiming pension, the
respondent cannot claim membership of the fund. In our view,
Regulation 22 provides for disqualification of employees who have
resigned from service and for those who have been dismissed or
D
removed from service. Hence, we do not find any merit in the
arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent that Regulation
22 makes an arbitrary and unreasonable classification repugnant
to Article 14 of the Constitution by keeping out such class of
employees. The view we have taken is supported by the
E judgment of this Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India v.
Cecil Dennis Solomon & Anr. (supra). Before concluding we
may state that Regulation 22 is not in the nature of penalty as
alleged. It only disentitles an employee who has resigned from
service from becoming a member of the fund. Such employees
have received their retiral benefits earlier. The Pension Scheme,
F
as stated above, only provides for a second retiral benefit. Hence,
there is no question of penalty being imposed on such employees
as alleged. The Pension Scheme only provides for an avenue for
investment to retirees. They are provided avenue to put in their
savings and as a term or condition which is more in the nature of
G an eligibility criterion, the Scheme disentitles such category of
employees as are out of it.”
24. We may only note that in the above discussed judgement, an
argument assailing the Regulation for forfeiture of service, based on

H
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, L.I.C. OF INDIA LTD. v. 411
SHREE LAL MEENA [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

Article 14 of the Constitution of India was repelled. The provisions A
under the new Regulations were held not to be in the nature of penalty,
but a disentitlement, as a consequence of having resigned from service
and, thus, being disentitled from having become a member of the fund.
There are other judgments also in the same line, but not laying down any
additional principles and, thus, it would suffice to just mention them, i.e.
B
M.R. Prabhakar &Ors. v. Canara Bank &Ors.10 and J.M. Singh v.
Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors.11
25. There are some observations on the principles of public
sectors being model employers and provisions of pension being
beneficial legislations.12 We may, however, note that as per what we
have opined aforesaid, the issue cannot be dealt with on a charity C
principle. When the Legislature, in its wisdom, brings forth certain ben-
eficial provisions in the form of Pension Regulations from a particular
date and on particular terms and conditions, aspects which are excluded
cannot be included in it by implication. The provisions will have to be
read as they read unless there is some confusion or they are capable of D
another interpretation. We may also note that while framing such
schemes, there is an important aspect of them being of a contributory
nature and their financial implications. Such financial implications are
both, for the contributors and for the State. Thus, it would be
inadvisable to expand such beneficial schemes beyond their contours to
extend them to employees for whom they were not meant for by the E
Legislature.
26. We are, thus, of the view that the impugned orders in this case
cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside, and the writ petition
filed by the respondent consequently stands dismissed.
F
C.A. No.10904 of 2016
27. The appellant joined the respondent United India Insurance
Company Limited as a Clerk on 13.8.1960 and served for a long period
of 32 years. He, however, tendered his resignation on 1.10.1993 for
“family reasons”, but on his own, termed it as “premature retirement”, G
so as to claim future benefits. Request for waiving of notice period was
also made. The letter of resignation was accepted on 30.11.1993, giving
10
(2012) 9 SCC 671
11
(supra)
12
Shashikala Devi v. Central Bank of India (2014)16SCC260 : Asger Ibrahim Amin v.
Life Insurance Corporation of India (2016)13SCC797 H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R.

A effect to such resignation from that day itself. It is relevant to note that
at the time the appellant resigned, he was governed by the General
Insurance (Termination, Superannuation and Retirement of Officers and
Development Staff) Scheme, 1976 (for short ‘1976 Scheme’), which
had no concept of voluntary retirement. However, almost three years
after the appellant resigned, an amendment was made to the 1976 Scheme
B
by inserting clause 4(4A), introducing the concept of Voluntary
Retirement Scheme on 1.11.1996. This clause, however, was made
retrospectively applicable from 1.11.1993. It appears that the object
was to have consonance with the General Insurance (Employees’)
Pension Scheme, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1995 Scheme’).
C 28. It is in the year 2011 that the judicial pronouncement by this
Court in Sheel Kumar Jain v. New India Assurance Company
Limited13 gave benefit of this scheme to certain employees. The
judgment was delivered on 28.7.2011. Once again, almost after two
years, the appellant made a representation dated 4.4.2013 seeking
D pension on the basis of the 1995 Scheme, resting his case on the
aforesaid judgment. There was no response to this representation, re-
sulting in the appellant filing a writ petition before the Bombay High
Court. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, in terms of the
impugned judgment dated 07.04.2016 rejected the same. The reasoning
of the Division Bench was that the case of the appellant was of
E resignation and not of voluntary retirement. The appellant had tendered
his resignation before 1.11.1993, while the conditions for availing of the
benefit were: (i) the employees must have retired on or after 1.11.1993,
and before the notified date; and (ii) the employee must have exercised
the option to voluntarily retire within120 days from the notified date, to
F become a member of the General Insurance Corporation
(Employees’)Pension Fund while refunding the amount of Provident Fund
contributed by the insurance company. These two aspects were stated
to be absent in the case of the appellant, who had never opted for
voluntary retirement within the requisite period nor refunded the amount,
which were pre-requisites for availing the benefit of the new pension
G scheme.
29. The opinion of the Division Bench was also based on a
relevant fact, that the condition in terms of clause 4(4A) required

13
(2011) 12 SCC 197
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SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, L.I.C. OF INDIA LTD. v. 413
SHREE LAL MEENA [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

completion of 55 years of age, while the appellant was not of 55 years of A
age on the date of his resignation or its acceptance. The said clause
reads as under:
“(4A) Not-withstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-
paragraphs, an Officer or a person of the Development staff may
be permitted, subject to vigilance clearance, to seek voluntary B
retirement, -
(a) on completion of 55 years of age or at any time thereafter on
giving ninety days notice in writing to the appointing authority of
his intention to retire; or
Provided that on a written request from an officer or a person of C
the Development Staff, such notice may be waived in full or in
part by the appointing authority; or
(b) in accordance with the provisions contained in paragraph 30
of the General Insurance (Employees’) Pension Scheme, 1995,
made under section 17A of the General Insurance Business D
(Nationalisation) Act, 1972, (57 of 1972) and published under
notification of the Government of India, in the Ministry of Finance
(Department of Economic Affairs) Insurance Division number
S.O. 585 (E) dated 28th June, 1995.”
30. The last relevant aspect is that the 1995 Scheme provided in E
clause 22 as under:
“22. Forfeiture of service - Resignation or dismissal or removal or
termination or compulsory retirement of an employee from the
service of the Corporation or a Company shall entail forfeiture of
his entire past service and consequently shall not qualify for F
pensionary benefits.”
31. Thus, once again, there is this clause of forfeiture of service
in case of resignation.
32. In order to elucidate the legal principle further, we may note
that Sheel Kumar Jain14 took note of the judgment of the three Judges’ G
Bench in Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. &
Ors.15 An uncovenanted employee of respondent-Company, paid on a

14
(supra)
15
(1984) 3 SCC 369 H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R.

A monthly basis, sought to recover a sum as gratuity, for continued service
rendered over 29 years, under the Retiring Gratuity Rules, 1937, after
having resigned from service. The employee was paid the provident
fund dues. The High Court of Patna opined against the employee. When
the matter reached this Court, one of the contentions raised by the
respondent-Company was that the employee had resigned and not
B
retired from service. It was noticed that Rule 1(g) defines ‘retirement’
as “the termination of service by reason of any cause other than
removal by discharge due to misconduct.” The employee had not been
removed by discharge due to misconduct. The termination of service,
being on account of resignation, it was held to qualify within the
C definition of ‘retirement’ under the Rules. The rest of the judgment,
dealing with the principles as to how gratuity should be treated, is not
relevant.
33. We, thus, notice that all that was opined by the three Judges’
Bench in the aforesaid case was based on the definition of ‘retirement’
D as per the Retiring Gratuity Rules, 1937, which was expansive and all
inclusive, excluding only the removal by discharge due to misconduct.
Thus, nothing more could have been read into this judgment.
34. We may also add that there are some observations in the
aforesaid case that pension and gratuity are both retiral benefits and an
E employee, with long years of service should be assured social security
to some extent, in the form of either pension or gratuity or provident
fund, whichever retiral benefit is operative in the industrial establish-
ment. In the given facts of the appeal before us, the benefit of provident
fund has been given as that was the scheme applicable at the relevant
stage of time. The principle laid down is not that all of them should be
F simultaneously be granted, but that, at least one of them should be granted,
though there is no prohibition against more than one being granted.
35.In view of what we have discussed aforesaid, all three
aspects stated by us are relevant and disentitle the appellant to any
relief. We have already explained the difference between resignation
G and voluntary retirement. Mere categorisation by the appellant himself
of his resignation as “premature retirement” is of no avail. The same
principle discussed aforesaid, of forfeiture of service, would be
applicable here and the appellant did not have the requisite age when he
resigned even were the 1976 Scheme to be made applicable.
H
SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, L.I.C. OF INDIA LTD. v. 415
SHREE LAL MEENA [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

36. We may also find that the appellant remained silent for years A
together and that this Court, takinga particular view subsequently, in
Sheel Kumar Jain16, would not entitle stale claims to be raised on this
behalf, like that of the appellant. In fact the appellant slept over the
matter for almost a little over two years even after the pronouncement
of the judgment.
B
37. Thus, the endeavour of the appellant, to approach this Court
seeking the relief, as prayed for, is clearly a misadventure, which is
liable to be rejected, and the appeal is dismissed.
SLP(C) Nos.5716-5719 of 2016
38. Leave granted. C

39. The appellants in this case were employees of the respon-
dent-Bank, viz., Andhra Bank, who resigned from service during the
window period of 1991 and 1993 after giving three months’ notice. The
grounds for resignation varied. The employees were governed by the
then existing Service Rules, being the Andhra Bank Officers’ Service D
Regulations, 1982. It was much later that Andhra Bank (Employees)
Pension Regulations, 1995(for short ‘Pension Regulations’) were
introduced, effective from its date of notification. There was no
retrospectivity involved in this case. But the Pension Regulations were
made applicable for employees, who ‘retired’ on or after 01.01.1986 but E
before 01.11.1993.
40.The appellants sought benefit under these Pension Regula-
tions, even though they had ‘resigned’ from their job, which request was
rejected.
41. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in terms F
of the impugned order dated 09.10.2015 rejected the petition filed by the
appellants on the ground that when the appellants resigned, there was
no Pension Regulations providing for voluntary retirement in existence,
and merely because the Pension Regulations have been made appli-
cable for persons retiring within a past period of window, it would not
G
give the same benefit to the employees who had resigned from service.
The reasoning of the judgment is predicated on M.R. Prabhakar &Ors.
v. Canara Bank &Ors.17
16
(supra)
17
(supra)
H
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R.

A 42. It is relevant to note that M.R. Prabhakar &Ors.18 dealt with
a similar scheme for employees of the Canara Bank, and the plea was
that such of the employees who had resigned must be construed as
voluntarily retired, thus, entitling them to pensionary benefits. Suffice to
say that, once again, the principle was of differentiation between the
concept of ‘voluntary retirement’ and ‘resignation’. Regulation 2(y)as
B
applicable to the employees of Canara Bank, being pari materia to
Rule2(y) under the Pension Regulations of 1995,had brought in ‘volun-
tary retirement’ in the definition of ‘retirement’, but had not considered
it appropriate to bring in the concept of ‘resignation’. Service jurispru-
dence, recognising the concept of ‘resignation’ and ‘retirement’as dif-
C ferent, and in the same regulations these expressions being used in dif-
ferent connotations, left no manner of doubt that the benefit could not be
extended, especially as resignation was one of the disqualifications for
seeking pensionary benefits, under the Regulations.
43. In view of the legal principles discussed by us hereinbefore,
D this appeal, thus, must also fail and, is accordingly dismissed.
44. The net result of the aforesaid discussion is that C.A. No.14739
of 2015 is allowed while C.A.No.10904 of 2016 and C.A. Nos. 3138-
3141 of 2019 @ SLP © Nos.5716-5719 of 2016 are dismissed, leaving
the parties to bear their own costs.
E 45. The reference is answered accordingly.
46. We, however, make it clear that for amounts already paid to
the respondent in C.A. No. 14739 of 2015, under the interim directions
dated 26.11.2015, refund of the same would not be claimed.

F
Ankit Gyan Reference answered.

G

18
(supra)

H