SELVI J. JAYALALITHAA & ORS.versusSTATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

                      [2013] 17 S.C.R. 759


               SELVI J. JAYALALITHAA & ORS.                           A
                                   v.
               STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.
              (Writ Petitiori_ (Crl.) No.154 of 2013)
                     SEPTEMBER 30, 2013
                                                                      B
        [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND S.A. BOBDE, JJ.]

        Advocates ..'.. Appointment of Special Public Prosecutor
  (SPP) - Withdrawal/revocation of the appointment - Validity
  - Proceedings against the petitioners for allegedly having          C
  assets disproportionate to their known income - Warrant case
  under the Prevention of Corruption Act - Respondent no.4
  appointed as SPP - Seven months thereafter, when the trial
  was nearing completion, appointment of respondent no.4
  withdrawn by the State Government - No_tificatidn purporting        D
  to revoke the appointment of respondent no.4.·C3s SPP -
  Validity - Held: On facts, it is liable to be struck down -
  Appointment of respondent no.4 was made' by the
   Government without questioning the ability or suitability of the
  incumbent nor the government raised any issue in respect of         E
   the manner/issue of consultation - If the Government found
   the name of respondent no.4, which was sent by the Acting
   Chief Justice of the High Court, not acceptable on any
  ground, it was duty bound to refer the name back to the Acting
   Chief Justice along with views and suggestions, which was not
                                                                      F
   done - On the contrary, they proceeded to appoint respondent
  no.4 as SPP without demur, who had already been a Public
  Prosecutor for several years - Nothing on record to indicate
   that the State Government had been forced by anyone to
   appoint respondent no. 4 - The Government voluntarily              G
   acquiesced in the process and is now not entitled to raise
· grievance - Further, the appointment continued un-objected
   for almost seven months - Though there is undoubted power
   with the Government to withdraw or revoke appointment within
                                759                                   H
    760      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 17 S.C.R.


A s,21 of the General Clauses Act, but that exercise of power
   appears to be vitiated in the present case by malafides in law
   inasmuch as it is apparent on record that the switch-over of
  .government in between resulted in a sudden change of
   opinion for no discernable Je.gally sustainable reason ~ The"
s sharp transitional decision was an act of clear unwarranted
  ind1seretion actuated by intention that does not appear to be
   founded on good faith - Order of removal of respondent no. 4
   was a product of malafides - ~eneral Clauses Act, 1897 -
   Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
c      Criminal Trial - Fair trial - Held: Is th1;3 .rnain object of
  criminal procedure and such fairness shotl1d not be
  hampered or threatened in any manner - Fair tri;Jl,entails the
  interests of the accused, the victim and of the sociefi -Free
  and fair trial is a sine qua non of Art. 21 of the Constitution -
D Any hindrance in fair trial could be violative of Art. 14 of the
  Constitution - Fair trial is the heart of criminal jurisprudence
  and, in a way, an important facet of a demo(J(atic polity and
  is governed by rule of law - Denial of fair trial .is crucifixion of
  human rights - Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts. 12 and 14
E -Universal Declaration of Human Rights - Art. 12.

           Criminal Trial - Proceedings against thflpetitioners for
    allegedly having ·assets -disproportionate to their known
    income - Warrant case under the Prevention of Corruption
F Act - Trial nearing completion - Impending retirement of the
  · Special Judge concerned - Prayer made before Supreme
     Court for direction to extend the tenure of the Special Judge
    till the conclusion of the trial - Held: It is a matter within the
    jurisdiction of the State in accordance with the relevant law -
G SeNices of judicial officers in the State governed by the 2004
    Rules - State Government competent to appoint Special
    Judge on contractual basis after his retirement for the period
    required to conclude the present trial, though with the
     consultation of the High Court as required u/Art.235 of the
     Constitution - Further, such a course must be adopted in the
H
SELVI J. JAYALALITHAA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 761
                                                               .

manner prescribed under the 2004 Rules - Matter referred             A
to the High Court to decide· on the administrative side as to
whether, in order to conclude the trial expeditiously as
gµa~anteed unper Arf.21 of the Constitution requires the
extension of the· services of the Special Judge - Karnataka
Judicial Service (Recruitment) Ru/es, 2004 - r.11(2) - Maxim         B
"Expressio unius est exclusio alterius"..:. Constitution of India,
 1~90,. Arts. ·?1,af)d 235--:. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

 .,... Prosecution was launctied against the petitione~ for
 '' I         .                ,,   .   '   ·   .   •• t   •
all~gedly hl!vipg assets disproportionate to their known             C
income in': rthe
 .      .._
                     State of
              ;; ' ... • . . .
                  •. - .       .,
                           ..! :
                                  tam
                                    • .
                                        ii Nadu. The petitioners
app:roached. the Supreme Court for transferring their trial
to the neighb.ouring State of Karriataka in the interest"of
justice, on the ground that a.fair trial was not possible in
the State of Tamil Nadu. While transferring the matters to
the State of Karnataka, the Supreme Court issued                     D
directions for appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor
(SPP).
    The Government of Karnataka appointed 'B', a
former Advocate General, as SPP to conduct the                       E.
prosecution. 'B', however, expressed his inability to
continue as SPP. The Government of Karnataka then
issued a Notification appoiriting respondent no.4 as SPP.
Subsequently, after about seven months, the State
Government issued letter dated 10-09-2013, asking                    F
respondent no.4 not to appear in the pending matter
before the Special Judge. The petitioners then filed a Writ
Petition challenging the said letter written to the
respondent no.4 and to direct the Special Judge to
conclude the trial.
                                                                     G
    While the said writ petition was pending in this Court,
the Government of Karnataka consulted the Chief Justice
of the Karnataka High Court for withdrawing the
appointment of respondent no.4 as SPP. The Chief
Justice concurred with the view Of the State Government,             H
    762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A   vide communication dated 14.9.2013 and thus, the
    appointment of respondent no.4 stood withdrawn by the
    Government of Karnataka vide Notification dated
    16.9.2013. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed another Writ
    Petition, challenging the said orders dated 14.9.2013 and
B   16.9.2013.

       Tt:ie petitioners submitted before this Court that the
  order. withdrawing the appointment of respondent no.4
  as SPP was a calculated step to protract the trial in view
  of the impending retirement of the Special Judge; that the
C trial had .almost been completed and in the
  circumstances, the withdrawal of appointment of SPP
  after seven months of his functioning was motivated by
  malaf.ides with a view to protract the trial as there had
  b.een. a change -of the government in the State. Prayer was
D accordingly made before this Court to quash the order
  of: withdrawal/revocation of the appointment of
  respondent no.4 as SPP and to also further extend the
  duration of tenure of the Special Judge till the conclusion
  of the trial.
E
        Disposing of the writ petitions, the Court

        HELD:1. The order of removal of respondent no.4 is.
    a product of malafides and the impugned order is not
    sustainable in the eyes of law as such the same is hereby
F   quashed. [Para 32J [785-C-D]
       2. The reason put forth by the Government of
   Karnataka for removing respondent no.4 as SPP appears
   to be rather unusual. It may be true that the name of
G respondent no.4 was not in the list of four names
   submitted by the Government .of Karnataka to the then
 _.Acti!!g ChiElf Justi.ce of t.he High Court and the name
  ·originated from the Acting Chief Justice, prior to making
   of appointment of SPP by the Government of Karnataka;
H but it is equally true that the. appointll).ent was made by
 SELVI J. JAYALALITHAA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 763

the Government without" questioning the ability or ·A
suitability of the incumbent nor the government raised
any issue in respect of the manner/issue of consultation.
On the contrary, upon receiving the recommendation, the
Government proceeded to appoint respondent no.4 by
issuing a Notification without any demur. Apart from this B
the appointment continued un-objected for almost seven
months. [Para 15) [775-C-E]
       3. Whenever consu.ltation is mandated .by law, it
  necessarily involves two authorities; one, on whom a
  duty is cast to consult and the other who has the C
  corresponding right(s~to be consulted. The grievance that
  there has been no consultation or insufficient
  consultation is normally raised by the authority who has
  a right to be consulted, iA this case the Chief Justice. It
  is not legitimate for the party who has a duty to consult D
   and who has failed in that duty, to make a grievance that
   there has been no consultation. This is exactly what has
   happened in the present case. If the Government found
   the name of respondent no.4, which was sent by the
   Acting Chief Justice, notacceptable on any ground, it E
   was duty bound to refer 'the name back to the Acting
   Chief Justice along with their views and suggestions,
   which was not done by them. On the contrary, they
   proceeded to appoint respondent no.4 as SPP without
   demur, who had already been a. Public Prosecutor for F
   several years. There is nothing on record to indicate that
   the Government of Karnataka had been forced by ~yone
   to make the said appointment. .Ttie Government thus
   voluntarily acquiesc.ed in the process and is now not
   entitled to raise this' grievance. The grievance is thus G
.. baseless and does not carry any conviction. [Para 17)
    [7n~~                                .

      Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. "The.J:'atna High Court &
 Ors. AIR 1970 SC 370: .1970 (2) SCR 666; 'Union of India v.
 Sankalchand HimatlaLSheth & Anr. AIR 1977 SC 2328: 1978       H



                                    ~)   .
    764      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 17 S.C.R.

    '
A   (11. SCR'423:· State.''o; Gujarat· 'v.' Gujarat Revenue Tribunal
    Bi:il' 'Associaitioh: \An'f~o13 sc 101~:;2012 (1 O) scR 816 and
    State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Justice R.A. Mehta (R-etired) & Ors.
    (2013);3,,SCC 1: 2013 (1) SCR 1 - held. inapplicable.

B      4. ln the instant case, as disclosed durilig 'the course
  of arguments,' there has been a change of the political
  party in "ower in May 2013 and thus, the order of the
  Stafe G'civefllment is alleged to be politically motivated.
  Though tllere" i's an und·oubted p-0wer with the'
  Government to withdraw or revol<e the appointment'
C within Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, but that
  exercise of pciwer appears to be vitiated in the present
  case by malafides jn law inasmuch as it is apparent on
  record that the switch-over of government in between
  has resulted in a sudden change of opinion that is abrupt
D for no discernable legally sustainable reason. The sharp
  transitional decision was an act of clear unwarranted
  indiscretion actuated by an intention that does not
  appear to be founded on good faith. [Para 20] [778-D-F]

E      5. The record of the case reveals that the Special
  Judge had started hearing of the present case on
  20.11.2012. He had recorded the statements of the
  accused in December 2012 and January 2013 under
  Section 313 Cr.P.C. The Judge examined 99 defence
F witnesses and 384 defence exhibits were marked before
  him. The defence concluded its argument before the
  Special Judge and SPP commenced the final arguments
  on 23.8.2013. He was interrupted abruptly as on
  26.8.2013, the SPP was asked not to continue with the
G work. The evidence led in the case is very bulky as it runs
  into 34000 pages. In case a new Judge starts hearing the
  matter, he is bound to take a long time to understand the
  factual and legal niceties involved in the case.
  Accordingly, the Notification purporting to revoke the
  appointment of respondent no.4 as SPP is liable to be
H struck down. [Para 21] [778-G-H; 779-A-B]
SELVI J. JAYALALITHAA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 765


     6.1. The principles of governance have to be tested          A
on the touchstone of justice, equity and fair play. Unless
it is fouRd that the act done by the authority earlier in
existence is either contrary to the statutory provisions or
unreasonable, or is against public interest, the State
should not change its stand merely because the other              B
political party has come into power. If discretionary power
has been exercised for an unauthorised purpose, it is
g.enerally immaterial whether its repository was acting in
good faith or in bad faith and the order becomes
vulnerable and liable to be set aside. {Paras 22 and 25]          c
[779-C-E; 780-F] ·
     6.2. Fair tri~I is the main object of crf~inal procedure
and such fairness should not be hampered or threatened
in any manmir. Fair trial entails the inten~1:1t!? of the
accused, the victim and of the societ.y,,"ln all                  D
circumstances, the courts have a duty to maintaltl public
confidence in the administration of justice and such duty
is to vindicate and uphold the 'majesty of the law' and the
courtS cannot turn a blind eye to vexatious or oppressive
conduct that occurs in relation to criminal proceedings.          E
[Para 26] [780-G-H; 781-A-B]                        .

      6.3. Free and fair trial is a sine qua non of Article 21
of the Constitution. Right to get a fair trial is not only a
basic fundamental right but a human right also.                   F
Therefore, any hindrance in a fair trial could be violative
ot Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 12 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights provides for the right to a
fair trial what is enshrined in Article 21 of our Constitution.
Therefore, fair trial is the heart of criminal jurisprudence      G
and, in a way, an important facet of a democratic polity
and is governed by rule of law. Denial of fair trial is
crucifixion of human rights. [Para 26] [781-D, F-G]

    State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. v. K. Shyam Sunder & Ors.
AIR 2011 SC 3470: 2011 (11) SCR 1094; M. /. Builders Pvt.         H
    766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A  Ltd. v. V. Radhey Shyam Sahu & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 2468:
   1999 (3) SCR 1066; Onkar Lal Bajaj etc. etc. v'. Union of India
   & Anr. etc.etc. AIR 2003 SC 2562: 2002 (5) Suppl. SCR 605;
  ·State of Karnataka & Anr. v. All India Manufacturers
   Organization & Ors. AIR 2006 SC 1846: 2006 (1) Suppl. SCR'
B 86; A.P. Dairy Development Corporation Federation v. B.
   Narasimha Reddy & Ors. AIR 2011 SC 3298; Smt. S.R.
   Venkataraman v. Union of India & Anr. AIR 1979 SC 49: ·
   1979 (2) SCR 202; Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector,
   Raigad & Ors. AIR 2012 SC 1339: 2012 (3) SCR 775;
c Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania &•
   Ors. AIR 2010 SC 3745: 2010 (10) SCR 971; Smt.
   Triveniben v. State of Gujarat AIR 1989 SC 1335: 1989 (1)
   SCR 509; A.R. Antulay & Ors. v. R.S. Nayak AIR 1992 SC
   1701: 1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 325; Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State
D of Bihar (1999) 7 SCC 604: 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 124;
   Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) by L.Rs. & Anr. v. B.D. Agarwal
   & Ors. AIR 2003 SC 2686: 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 336; K.
   Anbazhagan v. Supdt. of Police AIR 2004 SC 524: 2003 (5)
   Suppl. SCR 610; Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of
   Gujarat AIR 2006 SC 1367 2006 (2) SCR 1081; Noor Aga v.
E State of Purijab.& Anr. (2008) 16 SCC 417: 20QS (10) SCR
   379; Capt. Amarinder Singh v. Parkash Singh Badal & Ors.·
   (2009) 6 SCC 260: 2009 (9) SCR 194; Mohd. Hussain @ .
   Julfikar Ali v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) AIR 2012 SC 750:
   2012 (1) SCR 64; Sudevanand v. State through CBI (2012)
F 3 SCC 387; Rattiram & Ors. v. State of M.P. (2012) 4 SCC
   516: 2012 (3) SCR 496 and Natasha Singh v. CBI (2013) 5
   sec 741 - relied on.
      7.1. The petitioner contended that this would be a fit
G case for exercise of powers under Article 142 of the
  Constitution for a direction to the competent authority to
  extend the tenure of the Special Judge, who is due to ·
  reach the ·age of retirement on 30th September, 2013;
  however, such powers are used in consonance with the
H statutory provisions. This Court generally should not
                      I           '
  SELVI J. JAYALALITHAA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 767


  pass any order in exercise of its extraordinary power             A
  under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete
I justice if such order violates any statutory provisions.
  This is not to say that it would· be illegal to extend the term
  of the special judge, but that it is a matter within the
  jurisdiction of the State in accordance with the relevant         B
  law. When-the statute provides for a particul11r procedure,
  the authority has to follow the same and cannot be
  permitted to act in contravention of the same. The
  aforesaid settled legal proposition is based on a legal
  ma.xim "Expressio unius est exclusio a/terius", meaning           c
  thereby that if a statute provides for a thing to be done
   in a particular way, then it has to be done in that manner
  and in no other manner and following any other course
   is not permissible. [Paras 27, 28 and 29] [782-C, H; 783-
   B-E]
                                                                    D
       7.2. So far as judicial officers are concerned, their
 services were governed by the Karnataka Judicial
 Services (Recruitment) Rules, 1983. The Rules of 1983
 stand repealed by the Karnataka Judicial Service
 (Recruitment) Rules 2004. From R1;1le 11(2) thereof, it is E
 evident that the. State Government is competent to
 appoint the Special Judge on contractual basis after his
 retirement for the period required to conclude the present
 trial, though with the consultation of the High Court as
 required under Article 235 of the Constitution. Further, F
 such a course must be adopted in the manner presc.ribed
 under the 2004 Rules and in view thereof-' the_ma.tter--
 requires to be considered by the State Government with
 the- consultation of the High Court. [Para 30] [784-C-D, G-
 H; 785-A]                                                   G
      7 .s .. The matter is referred to the High Court of
  Karnataka to decide on the administrative side as to
  whether, in orde_r to conclude the trial expeditiously as
  guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution requires
                                                                    H
    768       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             (2013) 17 S.C.R.


A the extension of the services of the Special Judge. [Para
  31) [785-8)

      A.B. Bhaskara Rao v. Inspector of Police, CBI
  Vishakapatnam (2011) 10 SCC 259: 2011 (12) SCR 718; Teri
  Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. UT, Chandigarh & Ors. (2004) 2 SCC
8
  130: 2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 1235; Manish Goel•(. Rohini Goel
  AIR 2010 SC 1099: 2010 (2) SCR 414; State of Uttar
  Pradesh v. Sanjay Kumar (2012) 8 SCC 537: 2012 (7) SCR
  359; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh & Ors. AIR
  1964 SC 358 and Accountant General, State of Mac;lhya
C Pradesh v. S.K. Ou~ey
                      .
                          & Anr. (2012) 4 SCC             .
                                           . 578 - relied on.
          Taylor v. Taylor (1876) 1 Ch D - referred to.

                     Case Law Reference :
                                     ' •
D   1970 (2) SCR 666         held inapplicable Para 17
    1978 (1) SCR 423               held inapplicable Para 17
    2012 (10) SCR 816 .            held inapplicable Para 17

E   2013 (1) SCR 1                 held inapplicable Para 17
    2011 (11) SCR 1094             relied on       Para 22

    1999 (3) SCR 1066              relied on       Para 22
    2002 (5) Suppl. SCR 605        relied on       Para 22
F
    2006 (1) Suppl. SCR 86         relied on       Para 22
    AIR 2011 SC 3298               relied on       Para 22
    1979 (2) SCR 202               relied on       Para 23
G   2012 (3) SCR 775               relied on       Para 24
    2010 (10) SCR 971              relied on       Para 24

    1989 (1) SCR 509               relied on       Para 26

H   1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 325        relied on       Para 26
SELVI J. JAYALALITHAA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 769


 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 124       relied on        Para 26      A
 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 336       relied on        Para 26
 2006 (2) SCR 1081             relied on        Para 26
 2008 (10) SCR 379             relied on        Para 26      B·
 2009 (9) SCR 194              relied on        Para 26
 2012 (1) SCR 64               relied on        Para .26
 (2012) 3 sec 387              relied on        Para 26
                                                             c
 2012 (3) SCR 496              relied on       ;Para 26
 (2013) 5 sec 741              relied on        Para 26
 2011 (12) SCR 718             relied on        Para 26
 2003 (6) Suppl. SCR. 1235 relied on            Para.26      D

 2010 (2) SCR 414             ..Ielie.d on      Para 26
 2012 (7} SCR 359              relied on        Para 26
 AIR 1'964 SC 358              relied on        Para 26      E
 (1876) 1 Ch D                 referred to      Para 29
 (2012) 4 sec 578              relied on        Para 26
     CRIMINAL ORIG.INAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition
                                                             F
(Criminal) No. 154 of 2013 etc.

    Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

                              WITH
                                                             G
W.P. (Crl.) No. 166 of 2013

    Shekhar Naphade, B. Kumar, C. Manishankar, S. Senthil,
A. Ashokan, Jay Kishor Singh for the Petitioners.
    Ravi Verma Kumar, A.G Prof. Vikas Singh, R.              H
    770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2013] 17 S.C.R.


A Shunmugasundaram, Anita Shenoy, Visruti Vijay, Neha Singh,
  V. G. Pragasam, S. Prabhu Ramasubramanian, S. J. Aristotle,
  Deepika Kalia, Sanket, Deeptakirti Verma, Neha Sharma, M.
  Yogesh Kanna, A. Shanta Kumar, K. Sasikala, Vanita
  Chandrakant Giri for the Respondents.
B
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. The petitioners have
  challenged the order dated 10.9.2013 passed by the
  Government of Karnataka asking Shri G. Bhavani Singh -
C respondent no.4, Special Public Prosecutor (hereinafter
  referred to as 'SPP') in a pending prosecution against the
  petitioners not to appear in the said matter; the communication
  dated 14.9.2013 passed by the Chief Justice of High Court of
  Karnataka at Bangalore by which the Chief Justice has
D approved the removal of Shri G. Bhavani Singh as SPP, as well
  as the consequential order dated 16.9.2013 issued by the
  State Government removing the respondent no.4 from the post
  of SPP.

E       2. A prosecution was launched against the petitioners for
  having assets disproportionate to their known income in the
  year 1996-1997 in the State of Tamil Nadu. Thiru. ·K.
  Anbazhagan (respondent no. 5) is a political rival of the
  petitioner no.1, who is and has been the Chief Minister of Tamil
  Nadu on a number of occasions. The petitioners approached
F this Court on 18.11.2003 for transferring the petitioners' trial to
  the neighbouring State of Karnataka in the interest of justice,
  on the ground that a fair trial was not P.ossible in the State of
  Tamil Nadu. While transferring the matters tQ the State of.
  Karna'taka, this Court for appointment of SPP issued the
G following directions:

        "The State of Karnataka in consultation with the Chief
        Justice of High Court of Karnataka shall appoint a senior
        lawyer having experience in criminal trials as public
H       prosecutor to conduct these cases. The public prosecutor
SELVI J. JAYALALITHAA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 771
            [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    so appointed shall be entitled to assistance of another        A
    lawyer of his choice. The fees and all other expenses of
    the Public Prosecutor and the Assistant shall be paid by
    the State of Karnataka who will thereafter be entitled to
    get the same reimbursed from the State of Tamil Nadu. "
                                                                   B
                                           (Emphasis added)

     3. On 19.2.2005, the Government of Karnataka, after
consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court of
Karnataka, appointed Shri B.V. Acharya, a former Advocate
General, as SPP to conduct the prosecution. On 12.8.2012,          C
Shri Acharya expressed his inability to continue as SPP. The
Government of Karnataka accepted his resignation in January,
2013 and discharged him from the case.

     4. The Government of Karnataka then initiated the process     D
for appointment of a new SPP and in accordance with the
directions of this Court, submitted names of four Advocates to
the High Court for consideration by the Chief Justice.

      5. The Acting Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court on
29.1.2013 recommended the name of Shri G. Bhavani Singh,           E
respondent No.4 for appointment though his name was not
submitted by the Government of Karnataka, The Government
of Karnataka accepted the same and issued a Notification
appointing Shri G. Bhavani Singh as SPP. After issuance of
the notification dated 2.2.2013, Shri G. Bhavani Singh started     F
working and 99 defence witnesses were examined and 384
defence exhibits were marked· between 28.2.2013 and
29.7.2013. The defence commenced arguments on 2.8.2013
and concluded the same. However, it was on 13.8.2013 that
respondent no.5 filed an application under Section 301 (2)         G
Cr.P.C. The learned Special Judge permitted respondent no.5
vide order dated 21.8.2013 to file Memo of Arguments and to
render such assistance to the SPP as he may require. The
respondent no.5 filed two applications on 23.8.2013 before the
trial court, o'ire under Section 309 Cr.P.C. seeking adjournment   H
           ., "
    772      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013) 17 S.C.R.


A   by #I weeks and another urider Section 311 Cr.P.C. to recall
    PW.259, the Investigating Officer (whose examination was over
    on 24.2.2003) and to examine him as a court witness.

        6. On 26.8.2013, the Government of Karnataka issued a
  Noiification withdrawing the appointment of respondent no.4 as
8
  SPP without assigning any reason and without consulting the
  Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court.       ·

        · 7. The petitioners, apprehending delay in the trial
    approached this Court challenging the removal of respondent
C no.4 as SPP. by filing a Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 145 of~012
    under Article 32 of the Constituti€ln of India (hereinafter referred
    to as' the 'Constitution'). This Court issued notice.to ·the
    respondents on 30.8.2013. On 6.9.2013, Mr. G.E. Vahanvati,
    learned Attqr,oey General aflpear"E!d ic,ir. thfJ. State o~atak-a
o:. and..1fifotmed the tourt ·that-the Notification dated 26.. 8.201;3.
    would be withdrawri·with aview to consult the. Chiet'Justice of
    the Karnataka High'CoUrt. In view thereof, the afore-stated writ
    petition was dismissed as having become infructuous.

E      8. The State Government withdrew the Notification dated
  26.8.2013 vide Notification dated 10.9.2013 and
  simultaneously, vide letter of the same date, asked Shri G.
  Bhavani Singh, respondent no.4 not to appear in the matter
  before the Special Judge. The petitioners then filed the present
  Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 154 of 2013 challenging the said
F letter written to the respondent no.4 and to direct the learned
  Special Judge to conclude the trial. On 13.9.2013, this Court
  issued notice returnable in ten days and stayed the operation
  of the letter being No. LAW 149 LCE 2012 dated 10.9.2013
  passed by respondent Nos.1-2.
G
        9. While the afore-stated writ petition was pending in this
  Court, the Government of Karnataka consulted the Chief Justice
  of the Karnataka High Court for withdrawing the appointment
  of respondent no.4 as SPP. The Chief Justice concurred with
H the view of the State Government, vide communication dated
 SELVI J. JAYALALITHAA v. STATE OF _KARNATAKA 773
             [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
14.9.2013 and thus, the appointment of Shri G. Bhavani Singh        A
stood withdrawn by the Government 'of Karnataka vide
Notification No.LAW 149 LCE 2012 dated 16.9.2013.

     10. Aggrieved, the petitioners have filed Writ Petition
(Criminal) No.166 of 2013, challenging the said orders dated        8
               I
14.9.2013 and 16.9.2013.

     11. Both petitions have been heard together.

       Shri Shekhar Naphade and Shri U.U. Lalit, learned senior
 counsel j:ippearing for the petitioners submitted that ii is settled C
 law that an accused has a right to a speedy trial, as guaranteed
 under Article 21 of the Constitution; the order withdrawing the
 appointment of respondent no.4 as SPP is a calculated step
 to i)rotract the trial in view of impending retirement of the
 learned Special Judge on 30th September, 2013; and any o
·Judge who takes over the matter would require considerable
 time to get familiar with the lengthy record as the .recorded
 evidence oral and documentary run into 34000 pages; the trial
 has almost been completed since the entire evidence of the
 prosecution and the defence has been recorded and E
 statements of the accused persons (petitioners) under Section
 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter
 referred to as 'Cr.P.C.') have also been recorded; the
 withdrawal of appointment of SPP after six months of his
  functioning is motivated by malafides with a view to protract the F
 trial as there has been a change of government in the State of
  Karnataka; the present,.case being a warrant case un)ler the
  Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as
  the 'Act 1988'), final submissions of the defence already stood
  concluded. Eventually, according to the learned counsel, the
  scheduled conclusion of the trial has become impossible and G
 the petitioners face the prospect of remaining under trial for a
  long time, which wo.uld be to the political advantage of their
  rivals in the ensuing •lions. In view thereof, this court must
  quash the order of withdrawal/revocation of the appointment of
  respondent no.4 as St>P:and to also further extend the duration H
    77 4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2013) 17 S.C.R.


A   of tenure of the learned Special Judge till the conclusion of this
    trial.

          12. Shri G.E. Vahanvati, the learned Attorney General
    submitted that the act of revoking the appointment is
    substantially under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act and
8
    has been made in the like manner to the appointment i.e. after
    consultation with the Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court
    as, contemplated by this Court. The main reason for revocation
    of the appointment, according to the learned Attorney General,
    was that the appointment itself was not made after due
C   consultation since the name of Shri G: Bhavani Singh did not
    find place in any of the four names submitted by the Government
    of Karnataka to the then learned Acting Chief Justice of
    Karnataka High Court for appointment as SPP. In an action
    contrary to the true purpose of consultation, the Acting Chief
D   Justice recommended the name of Shri G. Bhavani Singh on
    his own, thus preventing any consultation on the name. Further,
    in exercise of its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the
    Constitution, this court cannot force the Government of
    Karnataka to allow the Special Judge to continue in service
E   after reaching the age of superannuation on 30.9.2013.
    Therefore, the petitions lack merit and are liable to be
    dismissed.

         13. Shri Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing
F for the respondent no.5 has submitted that 'the petitioners
  themselves have been adopting dilatory tactics in the trial and
  it is only in the recent past that they have become very punctual
  and had been forcing the learned Special Judge to proceed
  with the matter in haste. The trial has been conducted in an
G unwarranted manner and an example of the same is that the
  arguments of the defence had been entertained by the learned
  Special Judge before the arguments of the prosecution. Mr. G.
  Bhavani Singh had been appointed on the suggestion of
  learned Acting Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka,
  though his name had not been there in the panel sent by the
H
SELVI J. JAYALALITHM v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 775
            [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
State Government. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the           A
case, no interference is warranted and petitions are liable to
be dismissed.

    14. We have heard learned counsel for all the parties and
perused the record produced before us by the Karnataka High             B
Court.

     15. The reason put forth by the Government of Karnataka
for removing Shri G. Bhavani Singh as SPP appears to be
rather unusual. It may be true that the name of Shri G. Bhavani
Singh was not in the list of four names submitted by the                C
Government of Karnataka to the then Acting Chief Justice of
the High Court and the name originated from the Acting Chief
Justice, prior to making of appointment of SPP by the
Government of Karnataka; but it is equally true that the
appointment was made by the Government without questioning              D
the ability or suitability of the incumbent nor the government
raised any issue in respect of the manner/issue of consultation.
On the contrary, upon receiving the recommendation, the
Government proceeded to appoint Shri G. Bhavani Singh by
issuing a Notification without any demur. Apart from this the           E
appointment continued un-objected for almost seven months.

     16. Even before us, no issue has been r<jised by the
respondents in respect of the eligibility, suitability or credibility
of the respondent no.4 as a SPP.
                                                                        F
     In the letter dated 29.1.2013 communicated by t~e learned
Registrar General of the High Court pf Karnataka to the State
Government, the experience of Shri Bhavani Singh has been
recited as under:
                                                                        G
     "Sri G. Bhavani Singh, who is presently working as State
     Public Prosecutor-II has standing experience of 38 years
     at the Bar exclusively on criminal side, he has conducted
     the cases before the Trial Court as a defence counsel and
     he has served as a Government Pleader from 1977 for a
                                                                        H
       776       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 17 S.C.R.

.A..         period of three years in !lie High Court of Karnataka and
             as Additional Public Prosecutor for a period of 3 years and
             currently for the past 8 years working as State Public
             Prosecutor-II in the High Court of Karnataka."

8            .17. Whenever consultation is mandated by law, it
       necessarily involves two authorities; one, on whom a duty is
       cast to consult and the other who has the corresponding right(s)
       to be consulted. The grievance that there has been no
       consultation or insufficient consultation is normally raised by the
C      authority who has a right to be consulted, in this case the Chief
       Justice. It is not legitimate for the party who has a duty to consult
       and who has failed in that duty, to make a grievance that there
       has been no consultation. This is exactly what has happened
       in.the present case. If the Government found the name of Shri
       G. Bhavani Singh, which was sent by the Acting Chief Justice,
D      not. acceptable on any ground, it was duty bound to refer the
       name back to the Acting Chief Justice along with their views
       and suggestions, which was not done by them. On the contrary,
       they proceeded to appoint Shri G. Bhavani Singh as SPP
       without demur, who had already been a Public Prosecutor for
E      several years. There is nothing on record to indicate that the
       Government of Karnataka had been forced by anyone to make
       the said appointment. The Government thus voluntarily
       acquiesced in the process and is now not entitled to raise this
       grievance. The grievance is thus baseless and does not carry
F      any conviction.

       In the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgments
  relied upon by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High
  Court in his communication, concurring with the suggestion
G made by the Government of Karnataka to withdraw the
  appointment of responder\.l no.4 as SPP. particularly in
  Chandramouleshwar Prasad v.- The Patna High Court & Ors..
  AIR 1970 SC 370; Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal
  Sheth & Anr.. AIR 1977 SC 2328; State of Gujarat v. Gujarat
  Revenue Tribunal Bar Association, AIR 2013 SC 107; and
 H
 SELVI J. JAYALALITHAA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 777
             [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retired) & Ors.,    A
(2013) 3 sec   1, have no application.

     18. We may record that though some criticism was made
of the letter dated 14.9.2013 of the Chief Justice of Karnataka
approving the revocation of the appointment of Shri G. Bhavani 8
Singh and certain observations therein, we are not inclined to
go into the merits, demerits or validity of the letter. In the first·
place, the said letter is not an order that may affect any of the
rights of the petitioners. It is merely an approval given in the
course of consultation for the removal of Shri G. Bhavani Singh C
who has not questioned his removal. The petitioners have
challenged the validity of the action of the State Government
removing Shri G. Bhavani Singh on the ground that fundamental
rights under Article 21 for speedy trial have been bFea<'.hed
thereby. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to. pronounce
on the correctness or otherwise of the contents of the letter D
written by Hon'ble the Chief Justice.

      19. Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for
respondent No. 5, referred to the entire proceedings after the
case was transferred to the State of l.(arnataka and submitted E
that the prosecution ha~ been proceeding in a most undesirable
manner, particularly, a"fter the appointment of Shri G. Bhavani
Singh as SPP. According to the learned counsel, the
Investigating Officer has been permitted to be examined as a
defence witness and the Special Judge has proceeded to pass F
certain orders even in the absence of SPP. These allegations
 have been denied as factually incorrect by Mr. Naphade,
 learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners. We are,
 however, not inclined to go into all these submissions since ·
they would form a subject of entirely different enquiry and the G
 allegedly illegal proceedings and orders if any, can be
 challenged separately: It was also argued by Mr. Vikas Singh
that the Special Judge has wrongly permitted the defence to
 commence their arguments before the arguments of the
pros~cution. On the other hand, according to the petitioners,
                                                                H
    778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A. this is entirely permissible in view of the fact that this is a
   prosecution under Section 13 of the Act 1988 and being so,
   any party including the defence is entitled to begin its
   submissions on the close of its evidence by virtue of Section
   314 Cr.P.C., which applies to warrant cases. Further, by virtue
B of Section 5 of the Act 1988, cases under this Act are liable to
   be tried as warrant cases and there is therefore, no illegality in
   this regard.

       The respondents' contention that the prosecution alone
  must begin their arguments is based on Section 234 Cr.P.C.,
C which is not applicable to the present trial at all. Having regard
  to the scope of the present dispute, we do not consider it
  necessary or appropriate to decide this question either.

        20. In the instant case, as disclosed during the course of
D arguments, there has been a change of the political party in
  power in May 2013 and thus, the order of the State Government
  is alleged to be politically motivated. In our opinion, though there
  is an undoubted power With the Government to withdraw or
  revoke the appointment within Section 21 of the General
E Clauses Act, but that exercise of power appears to be vitiated
  in the present case by malafides in law inasmuch as it is
  apparent on record that the switch-over of government in
  between has resulted in a sudden change of opinion that is
  abrupt for no discernable legally sustainable reason. The sharp
F transitional decision was an act of clear unwarranted
  indiscretion actuated by an intention that does not appear to
  be founded on good faith.

      21. The record of the case reveals that the learned Special
  Judge had started hearing of the present case on 20.11.2012.
G He had recorded the statements of the accused in December
  2012 and January 2013 under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The learned
  Judge examined 99 defence witnesses and 384 defence
  exhibits were marked before him. The defence concluded its
  argument before the learned Special Judge and SPP
H commenced the final arguments on 23.8.2013. He was
SELVI J. JAYALALITHAA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 779
            [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
interrupted abruptly as on 26.8.2013, the SPP was asked not          A
to continue with the work. The evidence led in the case is very
bulky as it runs into 34000 pages. In case a new Judge starts
hearing the matter, he is bound to take a long time to
understand the factual and legal niceties involved in the case.
Accordingly, we have no hesitation in holding that the               B
Notification purporting to revoke the appointment of Shri G.
Bhavani Singh as SPP is liable to be struck down.

      22. In State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. v. K. Shyam Sunder &
Ors., AIR 2011 SC 3470, this Court has observed that the
Government has to rise above the nexus of vested interests and       C
nepotism and eschew window-dressing. The principles of
governance have to be tested on the touchstone of justice,
equity and fair play. A decision may look legitimate but as a
matter of fact, if the reasons are not based on values but to
achieve popular accolade, the decision cannot be allowed to          D
operate. Therefore, unless it is found that the act done by the
authority earlier in existence is either contrary to the statutory
provisions or unreasonable, or is against publ.ic interest, the
State should not change its stand merely because the other
                                         1
political party has come into power. 'Political agenda of an         E
individual or a political party should not be subversive of rule
of law."

    (See also: M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. V. Radhey Shyam
Sahu & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 2468; Onkar Lal Bajaj etc. etc. v. F
Union of India & Anr. etc.etc., AIR 200~ SC 2562; State of
Karnataka & Anr. v. All India Manufacturers OrganizatiOQ. &
Ors., AIR 2006 SC 1846; and A.P. Dairy Development
Corporation Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy & Ors., AIR '·
2011 SC 3298).
                                                                     G
    23. In Smt. S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of 1mtfa & Anr.,
AIR 1979 SC 49, this Court explained the concept of legal
malice observing that malice in its legal sense means malice
such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act
    780       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 17 S.C.R.


A   intentienally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of
    reasonable or probable cause.

          24. In Ravi .Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad
    & Ors., AIR 2012 SC 1339, while dealing with the issue, this
    Court held:
8
           "37 ..... Legal malice" or "malice in law" means
          something done without lawful excuse. It is a deliberate
          act in disregard to the rights of others. It is an act which
          is taken with an oblique or indirect object. It is an act done
c         wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable
          cause; and not necessarily an act done from ill-feeling
          and spite. Mala fide exercise of power does not imply ar1
          moral turpitude. It means exercise of statutory po":dr for
          "purposes foreign to those for which it is in laV': intended. "
D         It means conscious violation of the Jaw tci the prejudice
          of another, a depraved inclination an the part of the
          authority to disregard the rights of others, where intent is
          manifested by its injurious acts. Passing an order for
          unauthorized purpose constitlJtes malice in law. "
E
         (See also: Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath
    Narichania & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 3745).

      25. Thus, it is trite law that if discretionary power bas been
  exercised for an unauthorised purpose, it is generally immaterial
F whether its repository was acting in good faith or in bad faith
  and the order becomes vulnerable and liable to be set aside.

       26. Fair trial is the main object of criminal procedure and
  such fairness should not be hampered or threatened in any
G manner. Fair trial entails the interests of the accused, the victim
  and of the society. Thus, fair trial must be accorded to every
  accused in the spirit of the right to life and personal liberty and
  the accused must get a free and fair, just and reasonable trial
  on the charge imputed in a criminal case. Any breach or
H violation of public rights and duties adversely affects the
SELVI .J. JAYALALITHAA v. ST.A:rE OF KARNATAKA 781
      '      [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
                                      -
community as a whole and it becomes harmful to the society               A
in general. In all circumstances, the cdurts have a duty to
maintain public confidence in the administration of justice and
such duty is to vindicate and uphold the 'majesty of the law' and
the courts cannot turn a blind eye to vexatious or oppressive
conduct that occurs in relation to criminal proceedings.                 B

      Denial of a fair trial is as much injustice to the accused as
is to the victim and the society. It necessarily requires a trial
before an impartial judge, a fair prosecutor and an atmosphere
of judicial calm. Since the object of the trial is to mete out justice   C
and to convict the guilty and protect the innocent, the trial should
be a search for the truth and not a bout over technicalities and
must be conducted under such rules as will protect the innocent
and punish the guilty. Justice should not only be done but should
be seem to have been done. Therefore, free and fair trial is a
sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution. Right to get a           D
fair trial is not only a basic fundamental right but a human right
also. Therefore, any hindrance in a fair trial could be violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution.

     "No trial can be allowed to prolong indefinitely due to the         E
lethargy of the prosecuting agency or the State machinery and
that ls the raison d'etre in prescribing the time frame" for
conclusion of the trial.

     Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides for the right to a fair trial what is enshrined in Article F
21 of our Constitution. Therefore, fair trial is the heart of criminal
jurisprudence and, in a way, an important facet of a democratic
polity and is governed by rule of law. Denial of fair trial is
crucifixion of human rights. (Vide: Smt. Triveniben v. State of
Gujarat, AIR 1989 SC 1335; A.R. Antulay & Ors, v. R.S. G
Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701; Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State of
Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 604; Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) by L.Rs.
& Anr. v. 8.0. Agarwal & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 2686; K.
Anbazhagan v. Supdt. of Police, AIR 2004 SC 524; Zahira
Habibul/ah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2006 SC 1367; H
    782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 17 S.C.R.


A Noor Aga v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2008) 16 SCC 417; Capt.
  Amarinder Singh v. Parkash Singh Badal & Ors., (2009) 6
  SCC 260; Mohd. Hussain @ Julfikar Ali v. State (Govt. of NCT
  of Delhi), AIR 2012 SC 750; Sudevanand v. State through
  CBI, (2012) 3 SCC 387; Rattiram & Ors. v. State of M.P.,
B (2012) 4 SCC 516; and Natasha Singh v. CBI, (2013) 5 .SCC
  741).

       27. It was lastly contended by Mr. Naphade, learned senior
  counsel appearing for the petitioners that this would be a fit
C case for exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution
  for a direction to the competent authority to extend the tenure
  of the Special Judge, who is due to reach the age of retirement
  on 30th September, 2013.

       28. The learned Attorney General, however, submitted that
D this Court could not exercise its powers under Article 142 of
  the Constitution in the present case since such an exercise
  would be contrary to laws under which each Judge must retire
  on reaching the age of superannuation. In order to fortify his
  submission, learned Attorney General placed reliance on the
E judgment of this court in AB. Bhaskara Rao v. Inspector of
  Police, CBI Vishakapatnam, (2011) 10 SCC 259, wherein this
  court held that the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution
  cannot be exercised by this court in contravention of any
  statutory provisions, though such powers remain unfettered and
F create an independent jurisdiction to pass any order in pubic
  interest to do complete justice. However, such exercise of
  jurisdiction should not be contrary to any express provision of
  law.

       The powers under Article ~ 42 of the Constitution stand on
G a wider footing than ordinary inherent powers of the court to
  prevent injustice. The constitutional provision has been couched
  in a very wide compass that it prevents "clogging or obstruction
  of the stream of justice." However, such powers are used in
  consonance with the statutory provisions.
H
SELVI J. JAYALALITHAA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 783
            [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.)
     (See also: Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. UT, Chandigarh & A
Ors., (2004) 2 SCC 130; Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel, AIR
201 O SC 1099; and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sanjay Kumar,
(2012) 8 sec 537).

     29. We find force in the submissions advanced by the
                                                                    8
learned Attorney General that this Court generally should not
pass any order in exercise of its extraordinary power under
Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice if such
order violates any statutory provisions. We do not intend to say
that it would be illegal to extend the term of the special judge,
but that it is a matter within the jurisdiction of the State in     C
accordance with the relevant law.

     There is yet an uncontroverted legal principle that when the .
statute provides for a particular procedure, the authority has to
follow the same and cannot be permitted to act in contravention D
of the same. In other words, where a statute requires to do a
certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that
way and not contrary to it at all. Other methods or mode of
performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden. The
aforesaid settled legal proposition is based on a legal maxim E
"Expressio unius est exclusio alterius", meaning thereby that if
a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular way,
then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner
and following any other course is not permissible.

    In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh & Ors., AIR         F
1964 SC 358, this court held as under:

     "8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor (1876) 1 Ch D
     426 is well recognised and is founded on sound principle.
     Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do G
     an act and has laid down the method-in which that power
     has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of
     the act in any other manner than that which has been
     prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this
                                                                    H
    784       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 17 S.C.R.


A         were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have
          been enacted. "

         (See also: Accountant General, State of Madhya Pradesh
    v. S.K. Dubey & Anr., (2012) 4 SCC 578)
B       30. VVe have examined the scheme of the statutory
'
   provisions in this regard. The Karnataka Civil Services (General
   Recruitment) Rules, 1977 authorise the State Government to
   appoint a retired government servant on contractual basis after
   meeting certain formalities, for a specific period as may be
C ·necessary. So far as judicial officers are concerned, their
   services are governed by the Karnataka Judicial Services
   (Recruitment) Rules, 1983 and Rule 3(2) thereof provides the
   application of the rules framed under any law or proviso under
  Article 309 of the Constitution to judicial officers, though subject
D to the provisions of Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the
   Constitution. The Rules of 1983 stand repealed by the
   Karnataka Judicial Service (Recruitment) Rules 2004
  (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules 2004') and Rule 11 (2)
  thereof reads as under:
E
          "11 (2). All rules regulatinfj the conditions of service of the
          members of the State Civil Services made from time to
          time under any law or the proviso to Article 309 of the
          Constitution of India shall, subject to Articles 233, 234 and
          235 be applicable to the Civil Judges (Junior Division),
F         Civil Judges (Senior Division) and the District Judges
          recruited and appointed under these rules."

         Thus, it is evident that the State Government is competent
  to appoint the learned Special Judge on contractual basis after
G his retirement for the period required to conclude the present
  trial, though with the consultation of the High Court as required
  under Article 235 of the Constitution. Further, in our humble
  opinion, such a course must be adopted in the manner
  prescribed under the Rules 2004 and in view thereof, the matter
H
   Sl;:LVI J. JAYALALITHAA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 785
                 [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
 requires to be considered by the State Government with the                A
 consultation of the High Court.

       31. Therefore, in view of the aforestated facts, we refer the
  matter to the High Court of Karnataka to decide on the
  administrative side as to whether, in order to conclude the trial        B
  expeditiously as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
  requires the extension of the services of the learned Special
. Judge. Considering the urgency of the matter, we request the
  High Court of Karnataka to take a decision in this regard as
  ea~ly as possible.                                                       c
       32. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion
 that the order of remQval of Shri G. Bhavani Singh-respondent
 no.4 is a product ofmala fides and the impugned order is not
 sustainable in the eyes of law as such the same is hereby
 quashed.                                                                  D

       33. Wilh the aforesaid observations/directions, the writ
 petitions stand disposed of.
 Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                        Writ petitions disposed of.