SEEMA ARSHAD ZAHEER AND ORS.versusMUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI AND ORS.

              SEEMA ARSHAD ZAHEER AND ORS.                                  A
                           v.
    MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI AND ORS.

                              MAY 5, 2006

                [S.B. SINHA AND R.V. RAVEENDRAN, JJ.]                       B


      Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

      Order XXXJX Rule I-Temporary injunction-Grant of-Principles-
Power of appellate court to vacate temporary injunction-Defendant issued C
show-cause notice to plaintiff to remove/pull down unauthorized and illegal
structures constructed by him in the suit premises-Trial court granted
temporary injunction restraining the defendants from taking action in
pursuance of the said show-cause notice-However, High Court vacated the
temporary injunction holding that the trial court had failed to consider D
relevant material and proceeded in a vague manner-Correctness of-Held:
Temporwy injunction may be granted when (i) prima facie case exists; (ii)
balance of convenience is infavour of the plaintiff and against the defendant
and (iii) irreparable injwy would be caused to the plaintiff if temporary
injunction is not granted-Exercise of discretion by granting a temporary
injunction when there is ··no material", or refusing to grant a temporary E
injunction by ignoring the relevant documents produced, is arbitrary,
capricious or perverse-Jn the instant case, there was 'no material' to make
out a prima facie case-Hence, High Court justified in vacating the temporary
injunction-Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, S. 351.

       The respondent-Corporation issued show-cause notices followed by final F
orders under Section 351 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 to
remove/pull down the unauthorized and illegal structures constructed by the
appellants in the suit premises. The Commissioner of the Corporation, after
considering the objections received in reply to the show-cause notices and
the documents produced by the appellants, held that the appellants failed to G
prove that the structure which was the subject-matter of the notice existed
pri.or to the datum line (1.4.1962) or that it was subsequently constructed
authorisedly.


                                   865
                                                                            H
    866                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A         Being aggrieved the appellants filed suits before the City Civil Court
    and obtained a temporary injunction restraining the respondent-Corporation
    from taking action in pursuance of the said show-cause notices. However, the
    High Court vacated the temporary injunction holding that the appellants had
    failed to make out a primafacie case that the structure was authorized, or
    put up prior to 1.4.1962, and that the trial court had, without noticing and
B   drawing correct inferences from the documents, had proceeded in a vague
    manner. Hence the Special Leave Petition.

          Dismissing the petition, the Court

           HELD: I. The discretion of the Court is exercised to grant a temporary
C   injunction only when the following requirements are made out by the plaintiff:
    (i) existence of a prima facie case as pleaded, necessitating protection of the
    plaintim rights by issue of a temporary injunction; (ii) when the need for
    protection of the plaintiffs' rights is compared with or weighed against the
    need for protection of the defendant's rights or likely infringement of the
D   defendant's rights, the balance of convenience tilting in favour of the plaintiff;
    and (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury being caused to the plaintiff if
    the temporary injunction is not granted. In addition, temporary injunction
    being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be exercised
    only when the plaintifrs conduct is free from blame and he approaches the
    Court with clean hands. (879-B-C]
E
          Wander Ltd v. Antox India P. Ltd, (1990( Supp. SCC 727 and Laxmikant
    V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah. (2002( 3 SCC 65, referred to.

          2. It is true that in cases relating to orders for demolition of buildings,
    irreparable loss may occur if the structure is demolished even before the trial,
F   and an opportunity to establish by evidence that the structure was authorized
    and not illegal. In such case, where prima facie case is made out, the balance
    of convenience automatically tilts in favour of the plaintiff and a temporary
    injunction will be issued to preserve status quo. But where the plaintiffs do
    not make out a primafacie case for grant of an injunction and the documents
G   produced clearly show that the structures are unauthorized, the Court may
    not grant a temporary injunction merely on the ground of sympathy or
    hardship. To grant a temporary injunction, where the structure is clearly
    unauthorized and the final order passed by the Commissioner {of the
    Corporation) after considering the entire material directing demolition, is
    not shown to suffer from any infirmity, would be to encourage and perpetuate
H
      SEEMA ARSHAD ZAHEER v. MUNI. CORPN. OF GREAlER MUMBAI [RAVEENDRAN, J.]   867
an illegality. [879-D-Fl                                                             A
      M.J. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu, (1999) 6 SCC 464,
referred to.

      3. Where the lower court acts arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely in
the exercise of its discretion, the appellate court will interfere. Exercise of B
discretion by granting a temporary injunction when there is 'no material', or
refusing to grant a temporary injunction by ignoring the relevant documents
produced, are instances of action which are termed as arbitrary, capricious
or perverse. Acting on 'no material' (similar to 'no evidence') refers not only
to cases where there are total dearth of material, but also to cases where there
is no relevant material or where the material, taken as a whole, is not              c
reasonably capable of supporting the exercise of discretion. In this case, there
was as 'no material' to make out a primafacie case and, therefore, the High
Court in its appellate jurisdiction, was justified in interfering in the matter
and vacating the temporary injunction granted by the trial court. (880-8-D)
                                                                                     D
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C) No. 9479
of2005.

      From the Jugment/Order dated 21/22.2.2005 of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay in Appeal From Order No. 1025 of 2003.
                                                                                     E
                                     WITH

      [SLP (C) Nos. 9490/2005, 9688/2005, 10016/2005, 10095/2005, 10280/2005
and 10294/2005]

     Shekhar Naphade, S.K. Srivastav, Santosh Paul, Rajeev Sharma, Shweta            F
Gupta, Mitali Manda!, A.K. Rao and M. J. Paul for the Appellants.

     K.K. Singhvi, (With M/s. Pallav Shishodia), S.H. Ujjainwalla, Shabbir H,
and D.N.Mishra and Balraj Dewan for the Respondents.

     The Judgment of the· Court was delivered by :
                                                                                     G
      RA YEEND RAN, J. These matters relate to certain alleged unauthorized
structures put up in plot nos. X, XI, XIIA later renumbered as Plot Nos. 7 to
10 of Palton Road Estate, Saboo Siddique Road, Mumbai - 40 bearing Cedestral
Survey No.14/1504 of Fort Division, Mumbai, belonging to the Central Works
Public Department, Government of India. The said land, it is alleged, was H
    868                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A leased to one Mohamedbhai Abdullabhai Moonim under lease-deed dated
    6.7.!939. The said property was thereafter known as Moonim compound.

           2. According to the petitioners, the said tenant - Mohamedbhai
    Abdullabhai Moonim, who was carrying on business therein under the name
    of Mis Abdullabhai Faizullabhai, assigned his business to M/s Abdullabhai
B   Faizullabhai Private Ltd, a company promoted by him, in or about the year
     1947; and the said company let out several portions thereof to different sub-
    tenants. lt is alleged that Abdullabhai Faizullabhai Private Ltd. assigned all
    its right, title, interest and claim in the said property to M/s Global Marketing,
    a partnership firm, under deed of assignment dated 21.9.2000, for a consideration
C   of Rs.18 Lakhs, on 'as is, where is basis' subject to the condition that it shall
    be the sole responsibility of the assignee to obtain tenancy/occupancy/
    possessory rights of the assignor in respect of the said property and to
    continue to use and enjoy the said property on such terms and conditions
    that the CPWD may stipulate in that behalf.

D        3. It is alleged by the petitioners that Global Marketing obtained
  possession of various portions of Moonim Compound from the respective
  sub-tenants, made improvements/partitions in the existing old structures and
  then let out the same to different sub-tenants (who are the petitioners herein)
  in the year 2001-02~ It is further alleged that the Municipal Corporation of
  Greater Mumbai (Brihan Mumbai Municipal Corporation, for short 'the
E Corporation') issued seven show cause notices dated 13.5.2003 followed by
  final orders dated 2.9.2003 under section 351 of the Mumbai Municipal
  Corporation Act, 1888 ('Act' for short) to remove/pull down seven unauthorized
  and illegal structures in the said premises (Moonim Compound). The occupants
  of these seven structures filed seven suits (O.S. Nos.4344 to 4350/2003) in the
F City Civil Court, Mumbai and obtained a temporary injunction (by common
  order dated 25.11.2003) restraining the Corporation from taking action in
  pursuance of such notices. The seven appeals (A.O. Nos.1024 to 1030/2003)
  filed by the Corporation against the said order of temporary injunction were
  allowed by the Bombay High Court by common order dated 21/22.2.2005 and
  the temporary injunction was vacated. These petitions seeking special leave
G are filed against the said common order of the High Court. We will briefly refer
  to each case separately.

    SLP(c) No.9479/2005 (from L.C. Suit No. 4345/2003/ A.O. No.1025/2003)

          4. It is alleged that one Abdul Samad was carrying on business under
H
     SEEMA ARSHAD ZAHEER "·MUNL CORPN. OF GREATER MUMBAI [RAVEENDRAN, J.]   869
the name and style of' A to Z Auto Garage' in a portion of Moonim Compound; A
that he surrendered possession of the said portion to Global Marketing who
converted the shed situated in the said portion, that is South-Eastern corner,
into 33 shops and let out the said shops to different tenants [Seema Arshad
Zaheer & Ors.] under various unregistered tenancy agreements.

       5. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai [Brihan Mumbai B
Municipal Corporation, for short the 'Corporation'] issued a notice dated
13.5.2003 under section 351 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act l 888
('Act' for short] to the occupants thereof namely Mohamedbhai Abdullabhai
Moonim and A. R. Shaikh (one of the partners of Global Marketing) alleging
that an unauthorized structure with brick masonary walls and A.C. Sheet C
roofing measuring 17 .Sm X 7m (with a sloping roofof 3.50m on one side and
3.1 Om on the other) had been unauthorizedly constructed, and calling upon
them to show cause why the said unauthorized construction should not be
removed or pulled down. A reply dated 26.5.2003 was sent through counsel
by 33 occupants of the said Building, to the said notice, alleging that the
entire property (Moonim Compound) measured 2766 sq.yds., that it had several D
structures, that !he structure in regard to which the notice had been issued
was in existence even prior to 1961-62 and was earlier in the occupation of
Abdul Samad who was carrying on business therein under the name and style
of Mis A to Z Auto Garage, that the said structure had been assessed to
municipal tax by the Corporation and provided with electricity and water E
connection, that Abdul Samad who was running A to Z Auto Garage
surrendered the said structure in his occupation to Global Marketing, and that
Global Marketing partitioned the said existing structure into 33 shops and let
out those shops to 33 tenants. It was contended that as per the policy of the
Corporation contained in its Circular dated 11.11.1980, all non-residential
structures, authorized or unauthorized, which were in existence prior to datum F
line ( 1.4.1962) were to be "tolerated" and regularized, and therefore, the said
structure should not be demolished.

      6. The Commissioner of the Corporation after considering the objections
received in reply to the notice dated 13.5.2003 and the documents produced
by the objectors, passed a considered order dated 2.9.2003 holding that the G
objectors have failed to prove that the structure which was the subject matter
of the notice, existed prior to the datum line (1.4.1962) or that it was
subsequently constructed authorisedly. He, therefore, directed the said
unauthorized construction to be removed within 15 days failing which it
would be demolished.
                                                                                  H
    870                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A          7. Feeling aggrieved, the 32 occupants of that structure (Seema Arshad
    Zaheer and Others) filed L.C. Suit No. 4345/2003 in the City Civil Court,
    Mumbai for a declaration that the notices dated 13.5.2003 and 2.9.2003 were
    illegal and for a permanent injunction restraining the Corporation from taking
    any action pursuant to the said notices. They also moved a notice of motion
B   seeking a temporary injunction restraining the Corporation from taking any
    action in respect of the said structure. The City Civil Court passed a common
    order dated 25.11.2003 (in the said suit and connected suits relating to similar
    suits filed by occupants of other structure in the said property), granting a
    temporary injunction restraining the Corporation and its officials from taking
    any action in pursuance of the notices dated 13.5.2003 and 2.9.2003 respectively.
c         8. The Corporation challenged the said temporary injunction by filing
    an appeal before the Bombay High Court in A.O. No.1025/03. A learned Single
    Judge of the High Court, by judgment dated 21122.2.2005 (passed in the said
    appeal and connected appeals) set aside the order of the temporary injunction
    granted by the City Civil Court and dismissed the notices of motion for
D   temporary injunction. Leave is sought in this special leave petition [SLP( c)
    No. 9479/05] to challenge the said order.

        9. The trial court was of the view that the plaintiffs had established
  primafacie that the structure in which the 33 small shops were situated, was
  in existence for several years and was assessed to property tax, and therefore,
E the plaintiffs were entitled to the temporary injunction sought till disposal of
  the suit. On the other hand, the High Court held that the occupants-plaintiffs
  had failed to make out a prima facie case that the structure was authorized,
  or put up prior to 1.4.1962, and that the trial court had, without noticing and
  drawing correct inferences from the documents, had proceeded in a very
F vague manner. The High Court, after referring to the documents in detail, has
  concluded that the structure was of recent origin and unauthorized and there
  was no justification for staying the action in pursuance of the notices dated
  13.5.2003 and 2.9.2003. The question for consideration is whether the order
  of the High Court calls for interference.

G        10. The documents produced show that the Corporation had earlier
  issued a notice dated 21.10.1991, under section 351 to Abdul Samad carrying
  on business under the name of A to Z Auto Garage alleging that a L-shaped
  structure had been constructed in the Moonim compound (as shown in the
  sketch annexed to the notice). It showed that by using the compound wall
H as the support wall, and by fixing MS Poles parallel to the compound wall and
     SEEMA ARSHAD ZAHEER 1•. MUNI. CORPN. OF GREAlER MUMBAI [RAVEENDRAN, J.)   87)

using MS angle purlins and AC sheets and G.I. sheets, a structure (longer A
wilJg of the L-shaped structure measuring l 8. I5m X 4.25 m and shorter wing
measuring 2.5m X 2.7 m with an average height of3m) had been unauthorisedly
constructed. The notice called upon Abdul Samad to show cause why it
should not be pulled down. Abdul Samad filed a Long Cause Suit no. 8446/
 1991 in the City Civil. Court, Bombay to restrain the Corporation from enforcing B
the said notice. On 5.11.1991, on a notice of motion moved by the said Abdul
Samad, the City Civil Court granted an ex parte interim temporary injunction
in the said suit restraining the Corporation from giving effect to the notice
dated 21.10.1991. During pendency of the said suit, a final order dated 27 .12.1996
was made by the Corporation in regard to the said unauthorized structure.
Abdul Samad, by another notice of motion sought a temporary injunction, C
and the court by order dated 22.1.1997 granted another temporary injunction
restraining the Corporation from taking any action in pursuance of the said
notice dated 27.12.1996, subject to Abdul Samad filing an undertaking not to
carry out any additional construction, alteration, or extension to the suit
property. In view of the said temporary injunctions, the unauthorized structure
could not be demolished by the Corporation. Subsequently, the said suit (LC D
Suit No. 8446/1991) was dismissed for non-prosecution on 10.12.1998. No
attempt was made to revive the said suit and the dismissal became final. It
would appear that Abdul Samad thereafter delivered possession to Global
Marketing. It is also evident that between 2001-2002, Global Marketing either
dismantled the said unauthorized construction (subject matter of notice dated E
21.10.1991) and put up a new unauthorized structure in its place, or made
extensive extensions/additions/alterations to the said unauthorized structure
and converted it into 33 shops. It is in these circumstances, a fresh notice
under section 351 of the Act was issued by the Corporation on 13.5.2003
followed by final order dated 2.9.2003.
                                                                                     F
      11. In the meanwhile, it would appear that the partners of Global Marketing
were found to be engaged in organized crime and the Special Court functioning
under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crimes Act, 1999 (MOCA Act)
passed an order dated 19.5.2003 in MCOC Special Case No.3 of2003, appointing
a Receiver to take possession of the entire property with the structures
thereon. In the said suit, the special court has made an order directing the G
Corporation to take action only by following due process of law.

     12. The petitioners assert that the 33 small shops in their possession
have been carved out of the existing structure wherein A to Z Auto Garage
was run. In para 15 of the plaint, the petitioners alleged that 'the structure H
    872                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A mentioned in the notice issued in the year 1991 and the suit structure which
   is the subject matter of the impugned notice and present suit are one and the
  same.' There was already an order for demolition of the said structure by the
  Corporation in pursuance of the notices dated 21.10.1991 issued under section
  351 of the Act. The challenge thereto in LC Suit No. 8446/1991 having ended
  in dismissal, the said order for demolition became final. The structure could
B not be demolished in pursuance of the earlier notice, on account of the
  pendency of L.S. Suit No.8446/1991 and the orders of temporary injunction
  granted therein. When the suit was dismissed and when it was found that the
  said structure has been either extended or replaced by a new structure, action
  was rightly taken by the Corporation, by issuing the notice dated 13.5.2003
C followed by trial order dated 2.9.2003. Admittedly, no plan was sanctioned in
  regard to the structure. No document is produced to show that the structure
  in question existed prior to or on the datum line 1.4. 1962. The documents
  produced only show that a temporary shed was unauthorisedly put up in the
  year 1991 and the order for its demolition has become final. The High Court
  was, therefore, justified in vacating the temporary injunction.
D
           13. Some documents were produced to show that Abdul Samad was
    running an Auto Garage in an area measuring about 81.158 sq. meters and he
    took permission to use an additional space of 70 sq. feet for the Auto Garage;
    that the small temporary structures were erected in the 1970s; and that those
E   had been replaced by an unauthorized structure in the year 1991, leading to
    the first notice by the Corporation and again by another unauthorized structure
    in the year 2002-03 leading to the second notice by the Corporation dated
    13.5.2003. Some other documents produced by the petitioners refer to existence
    of structures bearing Ward Nos. A3357, A3358 and A3369, but a careful
    examination of the documents shows that they do not relate to the area in
F   question which were earlier in occupation of Abdul Samad, (A to Z Auto
    Garage) or to existence of the present structure prior to 1.4.1962. Petitioners
    also produced certain documents to show that there were, in fact, two structures
    in the premises prior to 1.4.1962 which had been assessed to municipal tax
    by producing documents relating to the same. Moonim compound is a huge
    property, more than half an acre in extent. The two old structures were
G   demolished and in their places two new structures (in the occupation of Sara
    Shoppee and Sahara Shoppee) have come up, constructed in the year 1997
    and 2001 respectively, after obtaining licence. Therefore, merely showing that
    some structures had existed prior to 1.4.1962 and assessed to tax, is not
    sufficient unless it is shown the demolition order has been passed in regard
H   to that structure. We are concerned with the structure on the South-Eastern
     SEEMA ARSHAD ZAHEER 1•. MUNI. CORPN. OF GREAlER MUMBAI [RA VEENDRAN, l. J   873
portion corner which was earlier in occupation of Abdul Samad, proprie~or of A
A to Z Auto Garage. No document is produced to show that any structure
of the size or shape now existing, existed prior to 1.4.1962 in the said area.
Nor any document is produced to show that any licence/sanctioned plan was
obtained for putting up the existing structure at any point of time. The
Commissioner of the Corporation in his final order dated 2.9.2003 has considered
the documents and found that they did not establish that the existence of the B
structure in regard to which the notice was issued. The High Court has also
considered these documents and found them to be not relevant. Therefore,
this S.L.P. is liable to be rejected.

SLP (C) No. 9490/2005 (from L.C. Suit No. 4344/2003/ A.O.No.1024/2003)                 C
       14. This relates to another structure in Moonim Compound measuring
11.30 m x 6.60 m (with a height of3.IO m on one side and 3.50 m. on the other
side) with brick masonary walls and A.C. sheet roofing. The structure is
situated on the Southern side of the Moonim compound property and lies
between Sara Shoppee on the Western side and the unauthorized structure                D
which is the subject matter of SLP (c) No.9479/2005 on the Eastern side.

       15. Mohd. Hajif A Hamid and 16 others filed L.C. SuitNo.4344/2003 in
the City Civil Court, Mumbai for quashing the notices dated 13.5.2003 and
2.9.2003 issued by the Corporation and for an injunction. These occupants
also claimed that the structure (which has been divided to small shops and             E
let out to them by Global Marketing) was earlier in the occupation of Abdul
Samad (A to Z Auto Garage). The documents relied on and contentions urged
are the same as those in SLP (c) No.9479/2005. This petition is liable to be
rejected for the reasons stated above, for dismissing SLP (c) No. 94 79/2005.
                                                                                       F
SLP (c) No.9688/2005 (from L.C. Suit No. 4346/2003/ A.O. No. 1026/2003

       16. This relates to another structure consisting of ground plus two
floors with brick masonary walls measuring 38.35 m x 3.85 m with a ground
floor (height 3.2 m), first floor (height 3.2 m) and second floor with AC sheet
roofing (2.85 M on one side and 2.55 M on the other). The structure is G
situated north of the Sahara Shoppee in Moonim Compound, in the set back
area between the northern boundary wall and Sahara Shoppee.

      17. One Fatimabi Abdul Rehman Shaikh filed L.C. Suit No.4346/2003 in
the City Civil Court, Mumbai, in regard to the said property for declaring the
notices dated 13.5.2003 and 2.9.2003 issued by the Corporation as illegal and          H
    874                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A for an injunction. She claims to be the tenant of the premises under Global
    Marketing. She also claimed that the structure was earlier in the occupation       ....
    of Abdul Samad (A to Z Auto Garage).

         18. The facts of the case and the documents relied on are the same as
  earlier cases, dealt with in SLP [CJ No.9479/2005. In fact the structure in
B question by the side of the northern boundary has nothing to do with the
  area or structure on the south-eastern side of the property which was in
  occupation of A to Z Auto Garage. No document is produced to show the
  existence of any old structure in the area where the present structure is
  situated. For the reasons stated in regard to SLP (C) No.9479/2005, this SLP
C is liable to be dismissed.

    SLP(c) No. 10294/2005 (from L.C. Suit No. 4349/2003/A.0. No.1029/2003)

          19. This relates to an unauthorized structure measuring North to South:
    35.80 m and East to West 4.20 m constructed in the set back area on the
D   Western side of Moonim compound with brick masonary walls. The structure
    consists of a ground floor ( 150.36 sq.m.) and part first floor (92.4 sq.m.). It
    abuts the structures of Sara Shoppee and Sahara Shoppee as also the
    unauthorized structure which is the subject matter of SLP (C) No. I0095/2005.

          20. M. Yunus M. Ali and 41 others filed L.C. Suit No. 4349 of 2003 in
E the City Civil Court, Mumbai for declaring the notices dated 13.5.2003 and
    2.9.2003 issued by the Corporation as invalid and for a permanent injunction.
    They claimed that the present structure was earlier in the occupation of one
    Zulfikar son of Masook Khan, who was carrying on business under the name
    and style of 'Masook. & Sons', and that the structure formed part of the
F   property assigned the No.A3357-58(1) and assessed to municipal tax. They
    rely on the property register extract for the year 1997 to contend that the
    property bearing ward no. A3357-58(1) was assessed to property tax prior to
    1961-62. As in the earlier cases what is significant is that no document has
    been produced to show that the structure is an authorized structure constructed
    after obtaining a sanctioned plan and licence nor is any document produced
G   to show that the said structure existed prior to datum line 1.4.1962 so as to
    attract the benefit of the Corporation circular dated I l.11.1980. On the other
    hand, the Corporarion contends that earlier there was a smaller unauthorized
    structure in that portion of Moonim Compound and it had issued a show
    cause notice dated 21.10.1991 for its demolition; and the present unauthorized
    structure of a larger area had been put up in 2001-02. While the documents
H
     SEEMA ARSHAD ZAHEER 1•. MUNI. CORPN. OF GREATER MUMBAI [RAVEENDRAN, J.]   875

produced show the existence of some smaller unauthorized structure in Moonim A
compound around 1990, they do not show or refer to the structure of the
measurements now existing. The High Court after referring to the documents
(in paras 29 to 31) has rightly recorded a clear finding after that none of the
documents show the existence of the structure in that area prior to 1.4.1962.

                                                                                     B
SLP(c) No. 10280/2005 (out of LC. Suit No. 4347/2005/ A.O. No.1027 of
2003)

      21. This relates to an unauthorized structure measuring East to West :
13.4 M and North to South : 12.8 M (in all 171.52 sq.m.) situated on the
Eastern side of Moonim compound, to the south of Sahara Shoppee and C
north of the unauthorized structure which is the subject matter ofSLP (c) No.
10016!2005.

       22. Dawood Vadia Hussain and 7 others filed L.C. Suit No. 4347/2003 in
the City Civil Court, Mumbai alleging that they were the occupants of different
portions of the said structure. They alleged that the said structure was earlier D
in the occupation of Crescent Gas Supply Agency who had been granted
trade licence by the Corporation and the structure was in existence prior to
1.4.1962. It is stated that Crescent Gas Supply Agency surrendered the premises
to Global Marketing who converted the structure into several shops. None
of the documents produced disclose or establish that the said structure was
in existence on or before 1.4.1962 or that it was constructed thereafter after E
obtaining licence and sanction plan. A copy oflicence dated 29.3.1983 issued
by the Corporation to Crescent Gas Supply Agency is produced. This merely
shows that licence was granted to keep 26 gas cylinders in the premises of
Moonim compound and does not show the size of the structure or the age
of the structure. In fact, it is stated that the Corporation had issued a notice F
dated 15.12.1987 under section 351 of the Act to Crescent Gas Supply Agency
alleging that an unauthorized structure measuring 8.35 m X 4.65 m (in all 38.83
sq.m.) with brick masonary walls and Shahabad flooring had been put up and
calling upon them to remove the same. Even assuming such structure was
situated in the area which was earlier occupied by Crescent Gas Supply
Agency in the year 1987, it is evident that unauthorized additions have been G
subsequently made to such structure which was in existence in 1987 or it has
been demolished or replaced by a new unauthorized structure. Further, there
is nothing to show that even the structure mentioned in the notice dated
15.12.1987 was in existence on or before 1.4.1962. The High Court after
referring to the documents in detail (in paras 20 to 25) has rightly recorded H
    876                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A a finding that there is no evidence to show that the present structure is the
    shed of Crescent Gas Supply Agency or that it was in existence on or before
    1.4.1962.

    SLP(c) No. 10095/2005 (out of L.C. Suit No. 4348/2003/A.O. No.1028 of
B   2003)

          23. This relates to an unauthorized structure measuring East to West:
    15.40 m and north to south: 12.70 m (in all 195.58 sq.m.) on the western side
    of Moonim compound constructed with brick masonry walls and AC sheet
    roofing. The structure is squeezed between the Sara Shoppee on the south
C   and Sahara Shoppee on the north.

         24. Md. Rizwan Taibani and 31 others filed L.C. Suit no. 4348/2003 for
  declaring the notices dated 13.5.2003 and 2.9.2003 as illegal and for permanent
  injunction restraining the Corporation from interfering with the said structure.
  In the plaint, they alleged that the said structure was earlier in the occupation
D of one Zulfikar son of Masook Khan, who was carrying on business in the
  name and style of Masook & Sons and Global Marketing obtains possession
  from the said tenant and divided them into 32 shops. It is alleged that the
  structure has been in existence prior to 1.4.1962. On the other hand the
  Corporation contended that a show cause notice was issued on 21.10.1991 in
E regard to an unauthorized structure measuring IOM x 6.9M (in all 69 sq.m.)
  in the occupation of Masook & Sons. The facts of the case and the documents
  relied on are similar to those in SLP (C) No. 10294/2005. The High Court has
  considered the documents in detail (in paras 26 to 28) and rightly recorded
  a finding that there is nothing to show that the existing structure was earlier
  in the occupation of Zulfikar (Masook & Sons) or that the structure existed
F prior to 1.4.1962.

    SLP(C) No.10016/2005 (from L.C. Suit No.4350/2005/A.0. No.1030/2003):

        25. This relates to an unauthorized structure measuring about east to
  west : 18.4 Mand north to south : 9.10 M (on the eastern side and lesser
G measurement on the western side) with ground floor and first floor of a total
  constructed area of 323.76 sq.m. The structure is situated on the eastern side
  of Moonim Compound with the unauthorized structure which is the subject
  matter of SLP (CJ No. I0280/2005 on the northern side and vacant space and
                                                                                       -
  thereafter the unauthorized structure in SLP (C) No.9479/2005 on the southern       ' .
H side.                                                                                .
             SEEMA ARSHAD ZAHEER 1·. MUNI. CORPN. OF GREATER MUMBAI [RAVEENDRAN, !. ]   877
              26. Asma Mohamed Rafique and 11 others filed LC Suit No.4350/2003 A
        on the file of the City Civil Court, Mumbai, for declaring the notices dated
        13.5.2003 and 2.9.2003 as illegal and for a permanent injunction restraining the
        Corporation from interfering with the said structure. In the plaint they vaguely
        allege that the structure was part of a structure earlier in the occupation of
        Mis. New Sangam Transport Company. The High Court has considered the
        material in detail (in paras 32-34) and found that nothing is produced to show B
        the existence of any structure earlier, in particular on or before 1.4. 1962. It was
        obviously put up during 2001-02.

        Common submissions :

               27. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that a temporary
                                                                                              c
        injunction granted by the trial court in exercise of its discretion, should not
        ordinarily be interfered by the appellate court, by re-appreciating the entire
        material merely because another view is possible. It is also submitted that
        refusal of temporary injunction would lead to immediate demolition, causing
        of irreparable injury to the petitioners and rendering their suits infructuous. D
        Strong reliance is placed on the following observations of this Court in
        Wander ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd., [1990] Supp SCC 727 in regard to grant
        of temporary injunction and interference by appellate courts in regard to such
        discretionary order :

                "Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a E
                stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff
                and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain
                uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court,
                at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration
                of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and F
                discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated:

               " ... is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights
               for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages
               recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour
               at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the G
               corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury
               resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own
               legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The
               court must weigh one need against another and determine where the
'   '          'balance of convenience' lies."
                                                                                              H
     878                     SUPREME COUR f REPORTS [2006) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A            The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the
             rights of parties which may appear on a prima jacie case ..

             ..... the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion
            of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except
            where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily,
B           or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the
            settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory
            injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an
            appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and
            seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court
            below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on
c           the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in
            interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the
            ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would
            have come to a contrary conclusion. Jfthe discretion has been exercised
            by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the
D           appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify
            interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion."

         28. Reference was also made to laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah,
    [2002] 3 SCC 65, where this Court, after referring to the above observations
    in Wander (supra), proceeded to observe as follows :
E
            "Neither the trial court nor the High Court have kept in view and
            applied their mind to the relevant settled principles of law governing
            the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunction in trade mark and trade
            name disputes. A refusal to grant an injunction in spite of the
            availability of facts, which are primafacie established by overwhelming
F           evidence and material available on record justifying the grant thereof,
            occasion a failure of justice and such injury to the plaintiff as would
            not be capable of being undone at a later stage. The discretion
            exercised by the trial court and the High Court against the plaintiff,
            is neither reasonable nor judicious. The grant of interlocutory injunction
            to the plaintiff could not have been refused, therefore, it becomes
G
            obligatory on the part of this Court to interfere."

        This Court also observed that this Court in exercise of jurisdiction
  under Article 136, would not ordinarily interfere with the exercise of discretion
  in the matter of grant of temporary injunction by the High Court and the trial            ' ,
H court and substitute its own discretion therefor, except where the discretion
          SEEMAARSHAD ZAHEER 1•. MUNI. <;ORPN. OF GREATER MUMBAI [RAVEENDRAN. J.]   879

     has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely A ·
     or where the order of the court under scrutiny ignores settled principles of
     law.

           29. The discretion of the court is exercised to grant a tempornry injunction
     only when the following requirements are made out by the plaintiff : (i)
     existence ofaprimafacie case as pleaded, necessitating protection of plaintiffs B
     rights by issue of a temporary injunction; (ii) when the need for protection
     of plaintiffs rights is compared with or weighed against the need for protection
     of defendant's rights or likely infringement of defendant's rights, the balance
     of convenience tilting in favour of plaintiff; and (iii) clear possibility of
     irreparable injury being caused to plaintiff if the te~porary injunction is not C
     granted. In addition, temporary injunction being ,an equitable relief, the
     discretion to grant such relief will be exercised ~hly when the plaintiffs
     conduct is free from blame and he approaches th~ court with clean hands.
                                                           I

            30. It is true that in cases relating to orders fdrI demolition of buildings,
     irreparable loss may occur ifthe structure is demolished even before trial, and D
     an opportunity to establish by evidence that the structure was authorized and
     not illegal. In such cases, where prima facie case is made out, the balance
     of convenience automatically tilts in favour of plaintiff and a temporary
     injunction will be issued to preserve status quo. But where the plaintiffs do
     not make out a prima facie case for grant of an injunction and the documents
     produced clearly show that the structures are unauthorized, the court may not E
     grant a temporary injunction merely on the ground ofsympathy or hardship.
     To grant a temporary injunction, where the structure is clearly unauthorized
     and the final order passed by the Commissioner (of the Corporation) after
     considering the entire material directing demolition, is not shown to suffer
     from any infirmity, would be to encourage and perpetuate an illegality. We F
     may refer to the following observations of this Court in Ml. Builders Pvt. Ltd.
     v. Radhey Shyam Sahu, [1999] 6 SCC 464 made in a different context:

             "This Court in numerous decisions has held that no consideration
             should be shown to the builder or any other person where construction
             is unauthorized. This dicta is now almost bordering the rule of law. G
             Stress was laid by the appellant and the prospective allottees of the
             shops to exercise judicial discretion in moulding the relief. Such a
             discretion cannot be exercised which encourages illegality or
             perpetuates an illegality. Unauthorised construction, if it is illegal and
..           cannot be compounded, has to be demolished. There is no way out. H
    880                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A            Judicial discretion cannot be guided by expediency. Courts are not
             free from statutory fetters. Justice is to be rendered in accordance
             with law. Judges are not entitled to exercise discretion wearing the
             robes of judicial discretion and pass orders based solely on their
             personal predilections and peculiar dispositions. Judicial discretion
             wherever it is requires to be exercised has to be in accordance with
B            law and set legal principles."

         31. Where the lower court acts arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely in
  the exercise of its discretion, the appellate court will interfere. Exercise of
  discretion by granting a temporary injunction when there is 'no material', or
C refusing to grant a temporary injunction by ignoring the relevant documents
  produced, are instances of action which are termed as arbitrary, capricious or
  perverse. When we refer to acting on 'no material' (similar to 'no evidence'),
  we refer not only to cases where there are total dearth of material, but also
  to cases where there is no relevant material or where the material, taken as
  a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the exercise of discretion.
D In this case, there was 'no material' to make out a prima facie case and
  therefore, the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction, was justified in interfering
  in the matter and vacating the temporary injunction granted by the trial court.

          32. We find no reason to interfere with the order of the High Court in
    the seven appeals. We accordingly dismiss these SLPs. as having no merit.
E   The petitioners are granted 15 days time to make alternative arrangements.
    Parties to bear their respective costs.

    vs.s.                                                             SLP dismissed.