Supreme Court of India

SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT AND OTHERSversusA.CJ. BRITTO

Citation: 1996 INSC 1519
Decided: 19 December 1996
Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Bench: S C AGRAWAL

Holding

Non‑compliance with a lawful order is a gross misconduct that provides a good and sufficient reason to initiate disciplinary proceedings, and the Tribunal erred in quashing the dismissal.

Summary

The respondent, a Sub‑Inspector of Police, was reinstated after a prior dismissal was set aside, but subsequently remained on extended medical leave and failed to appear before a Medical Board despite orders from his Superintendent. The State initiated disciplinary proceedings for his non‑compliance, found him guilty and dismissed him again. The Tribunal quashed the dismissal, holding that only the disciplinary authority could initiate proceedings, that the lack of a copy of the inquiry report and the denial of certain documents deprived the respondent of a fair defence, and that non‑appearance before the Medical Board was not a valid ground for discipline. The Supreme Court rejected these views, stating that disobeying a lawful order is a gross misconduct providing a "good and sufficient reason" for disciplinary action, and that the Tribunal erred in its findings on document production and the effect of the earlier dismissal. Consequently, the Court allowed the State's appeal, set aside the Tribunal's order and affirmed the respondent's dismissal.

Issues considered

Whether a disciplinary proceeding under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 can be initiated by an officer other than the designated disciplinary authority.
Whether the non‑furnishing of a copy of the inquiry report invalidates the dismissal order.
Whether failure to appear before a Medical Board, despite orders, constitutes misconduct constituting a "good and sufficient reason" for disciplinary action.
Whether denial of certain documents to the respondent deprived him of a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
Whether the Tribunal erred in setting aside the dismissal order.

Subjects

disciplinary proceedingsgood and sufficient reasonnon‑compliance with ordersdepartmental inquirypolice servicedocument productionprocedural fairness

Judgment

SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS A
v.
A.CJ. BRITTO

DECEMBER 19, 1996
B
[S.C. AGRAWAL AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.J

SERVICE LAW-Tamil Nadu subordinate Services Discipline and Ap-
peal) Rules, 1955---Rules 3(b) and ];-/)isciplinary proceeding-Whether con-
tinuous absence and not reporting for medical examination-"Good and C
sufficient" reason for initiati11g discipli11ary proceeding, though not specified
by a Rule to be misconduct-Held : Non-abeyance of legitimate orders of
superior officers is a gross misconduct and 'good and sufficient' ground for
initiating proceeding-Supply of documents in inquiry-Tribunal should see
whether documents asked are relevant or not-Non-furnishing a copy of the
enquiry report-Non-compliance prior to decision in Md. Ranjan Khan's case D
not violative of law. •

The respondent, a Sub-Inspector of Police, was dismissed from
service on 3.11.1979 on being found guilty. in a departmental enquiry
initiated against him. But on appeal tbe order of dismissal was set aside E
and he was reinstated by tbe Inspector General of Police on tbe ground
that there was violation of prescribed procedure in conducting tbe enquiry.
The enquiry Officer was directed to proceed further with the enquiry from
tbe stage it was found to be bad. The respondent joined duty on 12.11.1980
and proceeded on casual leave from 13.11.11180 to 111.11.80. Instead of
resuming duty after tbe expiry of tbe leave, tbe respondent kept on extend· F
Ing his leave on health ground.

As tbe respondent remained continuously absent on medical ground,
the Superintendent of Police by his memos dated 22.4.1981 and 4.6.11181
directed him to appear before tbe District Medical Officer for examination
by Medical Committee regarding his fitness to retum\to duty, but tbe G
respondent did not comply with tbe same. Considering ooh-compliance of
tbe orders as misconduct, enquiry was initiated against him and on being
found guilty he was dismissed from service on 24.5.1984. On appeal tbe
Tribunal quashed and set aside the order of dismissal. Hence this appeal
by the State Government. H
441
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1996] SUPP.10 S.~.R.

A Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. The view taken by the Tribunal that only the disciplinary
authority can initiate a departmental proceeding against a Government
servant is contrary to the law laid down by this Court. [445-F-G]
•'

B Inspector General of Police v. Thavasiappan, [1996) 2 SCC 145,
referred to.

2. The view taken by the Tribunal regarding the effect of non-furnish-
ing of a copy of the enquiry report is also contrary to the law laid down by
C this Court. In this case the order of dismissal was passed on 24.5.1984.
Therefore, the Tribunal could not have nullified the order of dismissal in
view of decisions in Md. Ramzan Khan and Karunakar. Md. Ramzan Khans
case has prospective operation only. [445-H; 446-B]

Union of India v. Md. Ramzan Khan, [1991) 1SCC588 and Managing
D Director ECIL Hyderabad v. Karunakar, [1993) 4 SCC 611, relied on.
•
3.1. Proceeding was initiated against the respondent for his indis-
ciplined conduct in disobeying a lawful order passed by his superior officer
who :was competent to pass such an order. There were good reasons for
the authorities not to accept the explanation of the respondent for not
E presenting himself before the Medical Board on 9.6.1981. Such an act of
insubordination or disobedience of an order by a police officer has to be
viewed seriously, as higher degree of discipline is expected of a member
belonging to the police force. Therefore, it can not be said that there was
no good and sufficient reason or a valid justification for initiating the
F disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. [446-B-C; 446-E-G]

3.2. Rule 2 of the Tamil Nadu Subordinate Services (Discipline and
appeal) Rules empowers the competent authorities to impose upon the
members of the service penalties specified therein "for good and sufficient
reason". The Tribunal ought to have considered whether there was "good
G and sufficient reason" for initiating disciplinary proceedings against the
req>ondent, before holding that there was no justification to initiate dis-
ciplinary proceedings against the respon_dent The Tribunal was not jus-
tified in taking that view on the ground that such an act of delinquency
/
has not been specified in the Rules'as an act of misconduct. Not obeying
H a legitimate order of a superior by a member of th.e police force has to be
SECY.TOGOVTv. ACJ.BRITTO[NANAVATl,J.) 4431

regarded as an act of indiscipline and would certainly provide a good and A
sufficient reason for initiating disciplinary proceeding. [448-B-D]

Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Others, [1987] 4 SCC 611, relied
on.

A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation of India, [1984) 3 B
SCC 316 and Union of India & Others v. Giriraj Shanna, [1994) Supp. 3
sec 755, referred to.
4. Relevant record was made available to the respondent for his
perusal and he had perused the same. The respondent in addition to that C
had asked for copies of certain document which were held to be irrelevant
by the enquiry officer for the respondent's defence. The tribunal without
considering how these documents were relevant upheld the contention of
the respondent that by non-supply of the copies of these documents, he
was denied a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The enquiry officer
was right in rejecting the request of the respondent to supply those D
documents and the respondent has not suffered in any manner in defend-
ing himself as a result thereof. [450-B-F; 451-B]

CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4187 of
1994.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.7.93 of the Tamil Nadu
Administrative Tribunal in T.A. No. 606 of 1991.

P.P. Rao, V. Krishnamurthy and V. Ramasubramaniam for the Ap-
pellants.
F
S. Ravindra Bhat, Sudarsh Menon, Naveen R. Natu, Ms. Kiran
Bharadwaj and Ms. Hetu Arora for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

NANAVATI, J.: The respondent was appointed as a Sub-Inspector G
of Police in 1962. While posted at Madurai, a departmental action was
initiated against him under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subor-
dinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules and on being found guilty
he was dismissed from service by an order dated 3.11.79. That order was
set aside in appeal by the Inspector General of Police on the ground that H
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l996] SUPP.10 S.C.R.

A in conducting the inquiry there was violation of the prescribed procedure.
The enquiry officer was directed to proceed further with the inquiry from
the stage it was found to be bad.

As the order of dismissal was set aside the respondent was reinstated
B in service. He was posted at Tiruchirapalli (Trichy) as Sub-Inspector
In.charge of Vikkirarnangalam Police Station. He joined the duty at that
Police Station on U.11.80 and proceeded on casual leave from 13.11.80 to
19.11.80. Instead of resuming duty on 20.11.80 he applied for medical leave
and thereafter went on extending it continuously till he was placed under
suspension on 14.6.81. A~ he was remaining continuously absent on the
~ C ground of health, the Superintendent of Police, Tiruchirapalli by his memo
dated 22.4.81 directed him to appear before the District Medical Officer
for being presented before the Medical Committee for examination as
regards his fitness to return to duty. He did not appear before the District
Medical Officer on that day. The Superintendent of Police, therefore, again
D by a memo dated 4.6.81 directed him to appear before the District Medical
Officer for the said purpose. That memo was served upon the respondent
on 4.6.81 itself. The District Medical Officer, Trichy by a letter dated 4.6.81
requested the Superintendent of Police to direct the respondent to appear
before the Medical Board at Government Headquarters Hospital, Trichy
on 9.6.81 at 10 hours for medical examination. A communication to that
E effect was also served upon the respondent. As the respondent did not
appear for medical examination on 9.6.81 the District Medical Officer by
his letter dated 10.6.81 informed the Superintendent of Police about non-
compliance of the said directions. His non-appearance and non-com-
pliance with the order of the Deputy Superintendent of Police were
F reported to Inspector General of Police. Considering it as an act of
misconduct the respondent was suspended on 14.6.81 and a departmental
proceeding by issuing a charge-memo was initiated against him on 27.7.81.
The said charge-memo could not be served upon the respondent earlier
than 2.11.81 as he was not available. The enquiry officer concluded the
inquiry and found him guilty and on the basis thereof an order of dismissal
G was passed against him by the disciplinary authority on 245.84.

He challenged that order of dismissal by filing a writ petition in the
High Court of Madras. That petition was subsequently transferred to the
Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal and was numbered as TA No. 606
H of 1991. The respondent challenged his dismissal on the ground that the
',[
'
SECY.TOGOVTv. ACJ.BRITTO(NANAVATI,J.] 445

inquiry and the dismissal order were vitiated as the disciplinary proceed- A
ings were initiated, against him by an officer subordinate in rank to the
disciplinary authority. It was also challenged on the ground that by not
appearing before the Medical Board the respondent cannot be said to have
disobeyed the order of the superior authority and in any case, that did not
amount to a misconduct of grave nature. It was also challenged on the B
ground that the enquiry officer, by denying him the documents which he
wanted, deprived him of a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The
Tribunal, relying upon its earlier judgments, held that the disciplinary
authority alone can initiate a disciplinary proceeding against a Government
servant under Rule 3(b) of the said Rules and as the charge-memo in this
case was issued by an officer subordinate to the disciplinary authority the C
entire disciplinary proceeding stood vitiated. The Tribunal also held that
the applicant wanted a railway warrant to enable him to appear before the
Medical Board at Trichy and as the same was not given to him he cannot .·
be said to have disobeyed the order of a superior authority. For that reason
and also on the ground of absence of any provision under which non-ap- D
pearance before a Medical Board can be considered as an act of miscon-
duct the Tribunal held that there was no justification for initiating a
disciplinary proceeding against, him. The Tribunal also held that the en-
quiry officer by denying his_ request to have the docume.;_ts which he had_
asked for and for perusal of a file had deprived him of a reasonable
opportunity to defend himself. The Tribunal also held that as the applicant E
was=-not given a copy of the inquiry report and as the order was passed
without giving him a further ndtic() his dismissal has to be regarded as bad.
The Tribunal, therefore, quashed and set aside the order of dismissal.

The State has, therefore, filed this appeal. The learned counsel for F
the State submitted that the view taken by the Tribunal that only the
disciplinary authority can initiate a department.il proceeding against the
delinquent Government servant, is contrary to the law laid down by this
Court. This point ·is covered by the decision of this Court in Inspector
General of Police v. Thavasiappan, [1996] 2 SCC 145 and, therefore, the
contrary finding recorded by the Tribunal will have to be set aside. The G
learned counsel for the respondent has fairly conceded this position.

The view taken by the Tribunal as regards the effect of non-furnish-
ing a copy of the enquiry report is also contrary to the law declared by this
Court. In this case, the order of dismissal was passed on 24.5.84. Therefore, H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l996) SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A the Tribunal could not have nullified the order of dismissal in view of the
judgments of this Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, [1991)
1 SCC 588 and Managing Director, ECIL Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, [1993)
-
4 SCC 727. The law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case (supra) has
· ·prospective operation only.

B The third reason given by the Tribunal that there was no justification
of initiating a disciplinary proceeding against the respondent is also not
sustainable. The proceeding was initiated against the respondent for his
indisciplined conduct in disobeying a lawful order passed by his superior
officer who was competent to pass such an order. The respondent was
C transferred from Madras to Trichy and was posted as Sub-Inspector In-
charge of the Vikkiramangalam Police _Station. After joining duty there on
12.11.80 he proceeded on leave from 13.11.80 and continuously remained
on leave till he was called upon by the Superintended of Police, by passing
an order on 4.6.81, to appear before the Medical Board at Trichy on 9.6.81.
D As he has remaining absent on medical ground and had produced certifi- .
cates from different Medical Officers the Superintendent of Police becom-
ing suspicious about the genuineness of the ground on which he was
remaining absent had passed that order. The fact that he did not comply
with that order is not disputed. H_is explanation that he had no money to
travel from Madras to Trichy and, therefore, he had requested the Super-
E intendent of Police on 8.6.1981 to issue a railway warrant and as a railway
warrant was not given to him he could not remain present before the
Medical Board on 9.6.81 as directed, was not accepted by the concerned
authorities. We will hereafter point out that there were good reasons for
the authorities not to accept the saici explanation. Such an act of insubor-
dillation or disobedience of an order by a police officer has to be viewed
F
seriously as higher degree of discipline is expected of a member belonging
to the Police Force. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no good
and sufficient reason or a valid justification for initiating· the disciplinary
proceedings against him.

G What was, however, contended on behalf of the respondent was that
in absence of any Rule treating non-compliance with an order of a superior
police officer or non-appearance before a Medical Boards as an act of :..
misconduct no disciplinary proceedings should have been initiated against
him for the said act of delinquency. In support of this submission the
H learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in A.L. Katra v.
SECY. TO GOVT v. AC.J. BRITTO [NANAVATI, J.] 447

Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., [1984] 3 SCC 316. In that A
. case, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against A.L. Kalra by the
Corporation for Committing an act of misconduct under service rule 4(1)
(i) and (iii) which prescribed that every employee of the Corporation shall
at all times maintain absolute integrity and do nothing which is unbecoming
of a public servant. Rule 5 prescribed various misconducts for which action B
could be taken against an emplciyee governed by the rules. Taking note.of
the fact that rule 4 was given the heading 'General' and rule 5 was given
- the heading 'Misconduct' this Court took the view that the draftsmen of
the Rule made a clear distinction about what would constitute misconduct.
It was under these circumstances this Court observed that "failure to keep
such high standard of moral, ethical or decorous behaviour befitting an C
officer of the company by itself cannot constitute misconduct unless the
specific conduct falls in any of the enumerated misconduct in Rule 5." Rule
4 was regarded as vague and of general nature and in that context it was
fiy"ther observed that where misconduct when proved entails penal conse-
quences, it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary define D
it with precision and accuracy so that any ex post facto interpretation of
some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. Construing the rules
this Court held that "Rule 4 styled as 'General' specifies a norm of
behaviour but does not specify that its violation will constitute misconduct."
Rule 4 was thus construed as not specifying a misconduct. Thus the
-Oecision in that case turned upon the scheme of those rules and the E
construction placed upon rules 4 and 5 of those rules. This Court in that
case has not laid down as a general principle that if an act is not specified
by rules to be a misconduct then it cannot be regarded as such and an
employee cannot be punished for committing such an act.
F
The observations made by this Court in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of
India and Ors., (1987] 4 SCC 611 support the view that we are taking. In
that case the question which arose for consideration was whether a dis-
regard of an order to eat food by itself amounted to disobedience to a
lawful command for purposes of section 41 of the Army Act 1950. This
Court observed that the question "has to be examined in the context of the G
imperatives of the high and rigorous discipline to be maintained in the
Armed Forces. Every aspect of life of a soldier is regulated by discipline.
Rejection of food might, under circumstances, amount to an indirect
expression of remonstrance and resentment against the higher authority.
To say that a mere refusal to eat food is an innocent, neutral act might be ·H
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l996] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A an over-simplification of the matter. Mere inaction need not always neces-
sarily be neutral. Serious acts of calumny could be done in silence. A
disregard of a direction to accept food might assume the complexion of
disrespect to, and even defiance of authority."

The Rules applicable in this case do not specify acts of misconduct
B for which a delinquent officer can be published. Rule 2 empowers the
competent authorities to impose upon members of the Service penalties
specified therein 'for good and sufficient reason'. Therefore, the decision
of this Court inA.L. Kalra's case (supra) is clearly distinguishable. Before
holding that there was no justification to initiate disciplinary proceeding
C against the respondents, the Tribunal ought to have considered whether
there was 'good and sufficient reason' for initiating such proceedings
against him. It was not at all justified in taking that view on the ground that
such an act of delinquency has not been specified in the Rules as an act
of misconduct. Not obeying a legitimate order of his superior by a member
D of the Police Force· has to be regarded as an act of indiscipline and would
certai,nly provide a good and sufficient reason for initiating a disciplinary
proceeding.

It was next contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that
the intention of the respondent was not to flout the order passed by the
E Superintendent of Police and non-compliance was due to bona fide reason,
namely that he did not have sufficient money for travelling from Madras
to Trichy and he was denied a railway warrant for that purpose. In support
of his contention that mere non-compliance with an order of a superior
officer should not be regarded as an act of misconduct unless there is an
F intention to flout the same, the learned counsel relied upon the decision
in Union of India and Ors. v. Giriraj Shamza, reported in [1994) Supp. 3
SCC 755. In that case the employee was deputed to undergo a course as
an electrician. He sought leave and then applied for extension of leave.
That request was rejected. For overstaying the period of leave his services
were terminated. The said order was challenged in the High Court by filing
G a writ petition. The High Court having set aside the order, the Union of
India preferred an appeal to this Court. While dismissing the appeal this
Court observed that the punishment of dismissal for overstaying the period
of 12 days in the Circumstances of the case was really harsh as the said
circumstances showed that it was not his intention to wilfully flout the
H order, but the circumstances had forced him to do so.
SECY. TO GOVT v. AC.J. BRITTO [NANAVATI, J.] 449

As against that, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the A
appellants that in this case the respondent had started remaining absent
on medical grounds immediately after he was transferred to Trichy from
Madras and that clearly indicated that he did not like the transfer and
wanted to remain at Madras to carry on activities of the Association of
which he was the Secretary. We find some force in this contention. The B
certificates produced by the respondent for obtaining medical leave clearly
show that he was not all the times at Madras but had gone and stayed for
quite a long period at Dindigul and Madurai. This circumstance was
sufficient to raise a suspicion on the mind of the authorities that the ground
given by the respondent for remaining absent at Trichy was really an excuse
and he was not genuinely sick. It was under these circumstances that he C
was directed on 24.4.81 to appear before the Medical Board. Without
assigning any reason he did not do so. Therefore, he was again directed
by an order dated 4.6.81 to appear before the Board on 9.6.81. This
communication was received by the respondent. On 8.6.81 he addressed a
letter to the Superintendent of Police expressing his inability to appear D
before the Medical Board on 9.6.81 on the ground that he had no money
to travel from Madras to Trichy and that he would appear before the
Board only on completion of his leave. He had also stated therein that a
railway warrant for the journey may be _granted to him. What we find from
the material on record is that respondent was already in Trichy on 4.6.81
when the said order was personally served upon him. Even though he knew E
on that day that he was required to appear before the Medical Board at
Trichy on 9.6.81 he went away to Madras and from there sent a letter on
8.6.81. The learned counsel for the respondent could not point out any
provision requiring the police authorities to provide a railway warrant to
a member of the Service under such circumstances. Mr. R. Balakrishnan, p
Deputy Superintendent of Police has filed an additional affidavit stating
clearly that there is no such provision. This statement made in the affidavit
· has not been controverted. It, therefore, clearly appears to us that the
reason given by him for not remaining present before the Medical board
was a false excuse. It was his intention not to comply with the said order.
His not appearing before the Medical Board was with a view to avoid an G
enquiry regarding his true state of health so that he was not compelled to
resuine duty. It was thus an act of disobedience and indiscipline. There-
fore, in the facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be said that there
was no good and sufficient reason for initiating a disciplinary proceeding
against the respondent. H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(1996) SUPP. 10 S.C.R ..

A During the enquiry the respondeµt had asked for copies of certain
document and had also requested the Enquiry Officer to peruse the file in
C. No. Al/861/81 of D.l.G. The Tribunal has held that as a result of the
refusal the respondent was deprived of a reasonable opportunity of
defending himself. From the additional affidavit filed by R. BalakrishJ.!an
it appears that the relevant record was made available to the respondent
B
for his perusal and he had perused the same. Thereafter by his letter dated
18.1.82 he had asked for (1) a copy of the D.O. letter dated 20.6.81 written
by the Superintendent of Police, Trichy (2) copy of the proceedings of the
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Trichy in connection with establishing a
police association at Trichy (3) copies (3) copies of the daily diaries dated
C 4.6.81 and (4) copies of the letters written in 1980 and 1981 to the Home
Secretary requesting permission of the Government to place him under·
suspension for taking part in formation of police association and the reply
given by the Home Secretary. Enquiry Officer by his order dated 12.5.82
rejected the requests made by respondent by his letters dated 18.1.82 and
-n 5.2.82 on the ground that the file of the D.S.P. which the respondent
wanted to peruse. was not at all relevant to the charge. Similarly, the
request for the letters was rejected on the ground that they were also not
relevant and calling for such records would result in abnormal delay in
. disposal of the enquiry. It also appears that the request for copies of the
daily diaries of the said three police officers was also rejected on the
E ground that they were not relevant. The Tribunal without considering how
those documents were relevant upheld the contention of the respondent
that by not supplying copies of those documents he was denied a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The file of the D.l.G. which the
respondent wanted to peruse was with respect to suspension of the respon-
F dent. Similarly, the two letters addressed to the Home Secretary and the
replies thereto also appeared to be in connection with his suspension
earlier in 1980 and 1981 for a different reason. The respondent had not
even stated in his letter as to who had written those letters and on which
dates they were written. The respondent had not stated why be wanted
copies of the diaries dates 4.6.81 .of those police officers but it appears
G from the letter dated 18.1.82 that possibly the diaries contained some ..
information about the police meeting held on that day. It is difficult to
appreciate how any of those documents and proceedings in connection
with establishing a police association at Trichy could have helped the [
respondent in establishing his case that he could not remain present at
H Trichy on 9.6.81 because he did not have sufficient money to travel from
SECY. TO GOVTv. AC.J. BRITTO [NANAVATI,J.] 451

Madras to Trichy. The fact what he was directed to appear before the A
Medical Board on 9.6.81 and that he did not do so was not in dispute. The
only defence of the respondent was that there was no intention on his part
to flout the said direction but he could not comply with it because of his
inability. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Enquiry Officer was
right in rejecting the request of the respondent to supply those documents B
and that the respondent had not suffered in any manner in defending
himself as a result thereof.

We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order
passed by the Tribunal in T.A. No. 606 of 1991, with the result that the
order or dismissal pa:sed against the respondent stands affrrmed. How- C
ever, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no
order as to costs.

H.K. Appeal allowed.

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