Supreme Court of India
SCIENTIFIC ADVISER TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND ORS. ETC. ETC.versusS. DANIEL AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
- Citation
- 1990 INSC 134
- Decided
- 10 April 1990
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- S RANGANATHAN
Holding
Delegation of the power of appointment under Rule 9(1) does not deprive the designated disciplinary authority, and Rule 2(a) envisages only the authority to whom the appointment power has been delegated, making the delegate competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings.
Summary
The respondents, Class III civil servants in the Ministry of Defence and Group C/D railway employees, were appointed by delegates (the Director and Divisional Superintendents) under a delegation of appointment power from the Scientific Adviser and General Manager respectively. Disciplinary proceedings were later initiated against them by those same delegates. The respondents argued that only the original appointing authorities could discipline them, invoking Rule 2(a) and Section 16 of the General Clauses Act. The Supreme Court held that delegation of appointment power does not strip the delegator of disciplinary authority, and that Rule 2(a) refers only to the authority to whom the appointment power has been delegated, not both delegator and delegate. Consequently, the delegates were competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings. The Court set aside the CAT orders quashing the proceedings (except where the CAT’s merits were already decided) and directed the continuation of disciplinary actions.
Issues considered
- The identity of the competent disciplinary authority under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules.
- Whether delegation of appointment power under Rule 9(1) affects the power to institute disciplinary proceedings.
- The applicability of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to confer disciplinary powers on the appointing authority.
- The proper interpretation of Rule 2(a) and the phrase ‘whichever authority is the highest authority’.
- Whether the acts of a delegate can be treated as those of the principal for disciplinary purposes.
Legislation cited
Subjects
delegation of powerappointing authoritydisciplinary proceedingsCentral Civil Services RulesRailway Servants RulesGeneral Clauses Actadministrative lawinterpretation of statutes
Judgment
SCIENTIFIC ADVISER TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
A
AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
v.
S. DANIEL AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
APRIL 10, 1990
B
[S. RANGANATHAN AND K.N. SAIKIA, JJ.]
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1965: Rules 2(a), 9( 1), Proviso, 12, 13 and Schedule Part V, Item No.
XIV.
c Ministry of Defence-Research Laboratories attached to Minis-
try-Civil posts-Class III Employees-'Appointing Authority'-
Authority to Institute Disciplinary proceedings-Who is-Specified
Jlppointing authority, Scientific Adviser-Delegation of power of
appointment to Director-Appointments made by Director-Initiation
D of disciplinary proceedings by Director-Validity of.
Rule 2(a)-Only envisage the authority to whom the power of
appointment has been delegated and not both Delegator and Delega-
tee-Expression "Appointing Authority"-Scope and meaning of-
Whether means highest of authorities mentioned in sub-clause (i) to
E (iv )-Expression "whichever is highest authority"-whether governs
only sub-clause (iv) of Rule 2(a) and not other clauses-Purpose of
Rule 2ja) explained.
Rule 9( 1)-Proviso--Power of Appointment-Delegation of-
Consequences of Delegation-Both authorities viz. Delegator and
f' Delegatee whether can be treated as 'authority empowered to appoint.'
Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968: Rules
2( l)(a), 2( l)(c), 7 & 8/Railway Establishment Code.
Railway Servanrs-Group C · and D employees-Appointing
G authority-Descip/inary authority-Who is-Competent appointing
authority, General Manager-Delegation of power of .appointment to
Zonal Officers/Divisional Superintendents-Appointments made by
Divisional Superintendents/Zonal Officers-Initiation of Disciplinary
Proceedings by Divisional Superintendents-Validity of.
Administrative Law-Delegation of power of Appointment-
440
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE v. S. DANIEL 441
Consequences of Delegation-Scope of Delegate's power-Theory of
imputation to the principal the acts of the delegate-Whether applicable A
to Service Rules which make distinction between power to appoint and
power to take disciplinary proceedings-Power to take disciplinary
proceedings-Whether adjunct to power of appointment.
General Clauses Act, 1897: Section 16-Applicability of-Whe- B
ther confers power on the factual appointing authority to conduct disci-
plinary proceedings or impose penalties.
Practice and Procedure: Special Leave Petition-Dismissal in
limine_:_Supreme Court-Whether precluded from considering the issue
in appeal on merits.
c
The respondents were holding class III civil posts in the Research
Laboratories attached to the Ministry of Defence. Under the Central
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, their
'appointing authority' was the Scien.tific Adviser. But the appointing
authority, the Scientific Adviser, delegated his power of appointment to the D
Director under Proviso to Rule 9(1). Pursuant to the delegated power,
the Director appointed the respondents. Subsequently, the Director
initiated disciplinary proceedings against the respondents.
Similarly for the respondents, in the connected appeals, belonging
to Group C and D employees of the Railways the competent authority, E
prescribed under the Railway Establishment Code, to make appoint-
ments was the General Manager. But the General Manager delegated his
power of appointment to Zonal Officers/Divisional Superintendents.
Pursuant to the delegated power the Divisional Superintendents
appointed the respondents. Subsequently, disciplinary proceedings
were initiated against the respondents by the Divisional Superinten- F
dents.
The respondents challenged the disciplinary proceedings before
the Central Administrative Tribunal contending that they were without
jurisdiction since the Director and the Divisional Superintending were
not competent to initiate the disc!J>linary proceedings. The Central G
Administrative Tribunal accepted the plea and quashed the proceedings.
In appeals to this Court it was contended on behalf of the respon-
dents fi) that the Director was not competent to initiate disciplinary
proceedings against them and only the Scientific Adviser, a higher
authority, could do so; the expression "whichever authority is the high- H
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 2 S.C.R.
A est authority" in Rule 2(a) governs only sub-clause (iv) of Rule and thi<
expression seeks to ensure that though the power to appoint may have beeu
delegated under the Provm to Rule 9( 1), such delegation does not extend to
the exercise of disciplinary powers; (ii) that appointnients made by the Scien-
tific Adviser should he treated as .appOi.'ltmeuts made by the Scientific
Adviser himself with the ~tthat'a subordinate authority could uot initiate
B disciplinary action against the respondent.
Also, in the connected railway cases, it was couteuded on behalf of the
respondents that notwithstanding the delegation of powers t1f
appointment by the General Manager, he, being the highest amongst the
various appointing authorities, was alone competent to institute disciplinary
C proceedings.
On behalf of the appellant, Union of India, 'it was contended: (i) that
on a proper interpretation of the rules, the Director Zonal Officer/Divisional
Superintendents were competent to initiate the proceedings and (ii) that;
irrespective of the provi.<ions in the rules, a person who makes an appoint-
D ment has always an implied power of suspending or dismissing the appointee
under section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
Disposing of the appeals, this Court,
HELD: 1. The delegation of the power of appointment under the Pro-
viso to rule 9( 1) does uot necessarily deprive the disciplinary authority
E specified in the main part of the rule from exercising the delegated power of
appointment in any case or class of cases. [459BI
Godawari S. Paru/ekar v. State of Maharashtra, [1966) 3 S.C.R. 314;
followed.
Ramachandra Rao v. State, [1984] 3 S.L.R. 768; Halsbury's Laws of
England, 4th Edn., pare 32; Wade on Administrative Law, 6th Edn., P.
F 365, referred to. ·
King Emperor v. Shibnath Banerjee, 72 I.A. 241; Huth v. Clarke,
(1890] 25 Q.B.D. 391, cited.
2. A proper and harmonious reading of rules 2(a) and rule 9
G shows that sub-rule (a) of rule 2 only envisages the authority lo whom
the power of appointment has been delegated under rule 9 and not both
the delegator and the delegatee. Rule 2(a) directs the ascertainment of
the authorities specified, in such of clauses (i) to (iv) of the rule as may
he applicable to a particular case and designates the highest of them as
'the 'appointing authority'. It envisages only one authority as falling
H ,tinder each of these clauses and not more. An inter-pretation of clause
'
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE v. S. DANIEL 443
(i) or (ii) as contemplating more than one authority runs counter to the
A
tenor of the rule. The said rule does not contemplate any. authority
other than the one empowered to appoint a pe~son belonging to the post
or grade which the concerned government employees holds. In that
sense the two parts of clause (i) and clause (ii) are not to be read
disjnnctively to ascertain the authority empowered to make appoint-
ments (a) to the service (b) to the grade and (c) to the post and consider B
the highest of them. One has to restrict oneself to the post or grade of
the government servant concerned and invoke clause (i) or (ii) as the
case may be. f459F-H; 460C-Dl
Dharma Dey v. Union of India, [1980) 2 S.C.R. 554; Om Prakash
Gupta v. Union of India, A.LR. 1975 S.C. 1265, el!'plained and held
inapplicable.
c
Murishwar v. Union, [1976) S.L.C. 82; Union v. Choudhary,
[ 1976] 2 S.L.R. 819; Choudhary v. Union, [1977) All India Services Law
Journal I, cited.
D
.2.1 In Rnle 2(a), not only do tl\e words "whichever is the highest
authority" occur in the Rules separately from the four suh-clauses hut the
t~rms thereof also clearly envisaKe a determination of one who, among
several authorities, is the highest. It, therefore, clearly means that the
'authorities' falling under the definition in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) have to
be ascertained and the highest amonll. them taken as the disciplinary E
authority for purposes of rule J2(2)(b). [449B)
3. The appointing authOrity under the Schedule is a high-ranking
authority and, in an organisation like the Railways for instance, it will
be virtually impossible for him to consider each and every case of
appointment of; or disciplinary action against, all the Class III or Class F
IV employees in the organisation. It is indeed this realisation that has
rendered necessary a delegation of the power of appointment and cannot
be ignored, in the absence of compelling reasons, in the matter of disci-
plinary powers. [461C-D)
4. In the context of rules 2(a) and 12(2) which outline a contrast G
between the person who is empowered to appoint and the person who
actually appoints, it is impossible to treat the Scientific Adviser/General
Manager as the person who appointed the respondents. l456H; 457 Al
Roop Chand v. State, [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 539, held inap-
plicable. H
,
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 2 S.C.R.
B. Daniel & Ors. v. Union of India, [1980] 2 S.L.R. 477, referred
A to.
4.1 A delegation of power does dot enhance or improve the
hierarchical status of the delegate. [456G I
B Krishna Kumar v. Electrical Engineer Central Raliway & Ors.,
I 1980] 1 S.C.R. 50, referred to.
5. It is doubtful how far, in the context of the service rules which
make a clear distinction between the power to appoint and the power to
take disciplinary proceedings, the latter can be said to be adjunct or
ancillary to the former. [4570-E]
c
Daluram Pannalal Modi v. Commissioner, [1964] ~ S.C.R. 286,
held inapplicable.
b. Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 confers on the
D factual appointing authority, in terms, only a power to suspend or
dismiss and not a power to conduct disciplinary proceedings or impose
the various other kinds of penalties envisaged in the rules. To say that
the latter power also comes within S. 16, one would need to make a
further assumption that the power to suspend or dismiss is a more.
comprehensive power which would include the power to impose smaller
B penalties too and this assumption is said to run counter to the rules
which deal with the two powers separately. The said section applies only
"unless a different intention appears". It applies only where a general
power of appointment i~ conferred under an Act or Regulation. Here
the Act or Regulation i.e. the Rules envisage the power of appointment
conferred by them on certain authorities being delegated. The power
F co11ferred on the delegatees is circumscribed by the instrument of such
delegation and cannot be extended beyond its ambit. [454B-E]
Heckett Engineering Co. v. Workmen, [1978] I S.C.R. 693;
Gafoor Mia and Ors. v. Director, DMRL, [1988] 2 CAT 277, referred to.
7. The dismissal in limine of the Special Leave Petition cannot.predude
G the Tribunal or Court from considering the issue in the appeals on
merits. f452H; 453A]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: __ Civil Appeal Nos. 1210 ~
to 1217 of 1980 etc.
H From the Judgment and Order dated the 22nd April, 1980 of the
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE v. S. DANIEL (RANGANATHAN, J] 445
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal Nos. 499, 500 to 505 of
1979 and 144 of 1980. A
·-y:·
Anil Dev Singh, G.B. Pai, K. Madhva Reddy, P.A. Choudhary,
Heniant Sharma, P. Parmeshwaran, B. Parthasarthi, C. Y.. Subba Rao,
Abbas Naqvi, R.P. Gupta, N.K. Nair, B. Kanta Rao, Chandrashekhar
'Panda, A.T.M. Sampath, P.N. Ramalingam, R.D. Upadhyay, Ms. B
S. Janani and A. Subba Rao for the appeating parties. ·
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RANGANATHAN, J. In the Special Leave Petitions, we grant
leave and proceed to dispose of all these appeals by a common order.
It may be noted that, except in C.A. 3044/89, the Union of India is the c
appellant.
The short common question arising in this large batch of appeals
is: who is the authority competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings
against the Government servi!Ilts who are the parties here (hereinafter D
referred to, for convenience, .as 'the respondents')? There are two sets
of appeals before us, one arising out ofproceedings in the Ministry of
Defence, and the other in the Ministry of Railways. The rules govern- •
ing the former are the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control &
Appeal) Rules (hereinafter referred to as "the Civil Services rules")
and those governing the latter are the Railway Servants (Discipline E
and Appeal) Rules (hereinafter referred to as 'the Railway rules').
S/Shri G.B. Pai, Anil Dev Singh, P.A. Choudhary, Madhava
Reddy, B. Kanta Rao, A. Subba Rao, A.T.M. Sampath, R.D.
Upadhyay and others have argued the matters at length and in great
detail and we proceed to dispose of these appeals after considering all F
the aspects urged before us.
We shall take Daniel's case (C.A. Nos. 1210 to 1217 of 1980) as
illustrative of the cases under the Civil Service Rules. Though the
employees in these and connected matters are Class Ill employees of
Research Laboratories attached to the Ministry of Defence (shortly G
referred to as DRDL, DMAL, DERL and DLRL), they are serving in
civil posts therein and, hence, governed by the Civil Service Rules.
They had been appointed by the Director of the Laboratory. Discipli-
nary proceedings were initiated against tliem by the Director. There is,
therefore, no possibility of any eventual violation of the constitutional
prohibition in Article 311(1) against a Government servant being dis- H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990) 2 S.C.R.
A missed or removed from office by an authority subordinate to the
appointing authority. Still, the respondents contend that the Director
is not competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against them and
that it is only the Scientific Adviser to the Government of India-a
higher authority-that can do so. This co~tention, based on the rele-
vant provisions of the Civil Service Rules, proceeds on the following
B lines.
Rules 12 and 13 of the Civil Service Rules deal with this topic and
read as follows:
"12. Disciplinary Au,thorities-(l)The President may
impose any of the penalties specified in rule 11 on any
q
Government servant.
(2) Wilh!Jut prejudice to the provisions of sub-rule (1), but
subject to the provisions of sub-rule (4), any of the .--./ .
penalties specified in rule 11 may be imposed on-
0
(a) xx xx xx
• (b) a person appointed to a Central Civil post included in
the General Central Service, by the authority specified in
this behalf by a general or special order of the President or,
/
where no such order has been made, by the appointing ~
authority or the authority specified in the Schedule in this
behalf.
,A3. Authority to institute proceedings-
(1) The President or any other authority empowered by
him by general or special order may-
(a) institute disciplinary proceedings against any Govern-
ment servant;
(b) direct a disciplinary authority to institute disciplinary
proceedings against any Government servant on whom that
alsciplinary authority is competent to impose under Ithese
rules any of the penalties specified in rule 11.
(2) A disciplinary authority competent under these rules to
impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE v. S. DANIEL [RANGANATHAN, J] 447
rule 11 may institute disciplinary proceedings against any
Government servant for the imposition of any of the A
penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of rule 11 notwith-
standing that such disciplinary authority is not competent
under these rules to impose any of the latter penalties."
In these cases, the disciplinary proceedings have been instituted B
neither by the President nor by an authority directed by him to do so,
nor by any other authority empowered by him, by general or special
order,to do so. The disciplinary authority (D.A.) in the present case,
therefore, has to be in terms of rule 12(2)(b), ''the appointing autho-
rity or the authority specified in the schedule in this behalf". The
"authority specified in the schedule in this behalf", admittedly, is the
Scientific Adviser to the Government.of India. The question next is c
whether the Director is the "appointing authority" in the case of the
re$pondents. This matter is dealt within Rule 9(1) read with its proviso
""--· whiclt<"ead thus:
"9. Appointments to other Services and Posts- D
(1) All al'Pointments to the Central Civil Services (other
than the General Central Service) Class II, Class III and
Class IV, shall be made by authorities specified in this
behalfin the Schedule."
E
"Provided that in respect of Class III and Class IV civilian
services, or civilian posts m the Detence services appoint-
ments may be made by officers empowered in this behalf by
the aforesaid authorities."
The 'appointing authority' specified in the schedule referred to in p
Rule 9( 1), in the case of the respondents, is, again, the Scientific
Adviser to the Government of India: But, by a notification made in
exercise of the power conferred by the proviso, he had authorised the
Director to make appointments to Class III and Class IV posts in his
establishment and, it is common ground, the Director had appointed
the respondents in exercise of that power. In other words, there is no G
dispute that the Director is the "appointing authority" of the respon-
dents not only in the sense that he was empowered to appoint them
under rule 9 but also in the sense that he actually made these appoint-
r ments. Nevertheless, it is said, he is not the 'appointing authority' in
the case of the respondents within the meaning of rule 12(2)(b). In
support of this argument, attention is drawn to rule 2 which contains H
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1990) 2 S.C.R.
the definitions of various expressions for the purposes of the rules
which will be applicable in the absence of anything to the contrary in
the relevant context. Rule 2(a) reads:
"(a) 'appointing authority' in relation to a Government
servant means-
(i) the authority empowered to make appointments to the
Service of which the Government servant is for the time
being a member or to the grade of the service in which the
Government servant is for the time being included, or
(ii) the authority empowered to make appointments to the
c posts which the Government servant for the time being
holds, or
(iii) the authority which appointed the Government ser- -~ ·
van! to such Service, grade or post, as the case may be, or
D
(iv) where the Government servant having been a perma-
nent member of any other Service or having substantively
held any other permanent post, has been in continuous
employment of the Government, the authority which
appointed him to that Service or to any grade in that
/
E Service or to that post. --"
whichever authority is the highest authority."
It will be noticed that this clause refers to two classes of persons: (a)
the authority empowered to make appointments to the service, grade
F or post with which we are concerned-sub clauses (i) and (ii)-and (b)
the autherity who actually appointed the Government servant to the
service, grade or post in question-sub clauses (iii) and (iv). Each of
these is sub-divided into two categories but we need not, for the
purposes of the present cases, bother about this sub-division. Stop-
ping here, it wili be seen, as pointed out already, that the Director falls
G under both the above categories as he is empowered to appoint the
respondents by virtue of the power delegated to him under the proviSo
to rule 9( 1) and as he has also factually appointed them. But, it is said,
the Scientific Adviser to the Government of India, notwithstanding his
having delegated his power to the Director under the proviso, also
continues to be an authority empowered to appoint persons to the
I-I posts in question under rule 9(1) read with the schedule. So under the
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE v. S. DANIEL [RANGANATIJAN, JI 449
first category of persons indicated above as referred to in rule 2(a)
there are two authorities the Scientific Adviser and the Director and A
~ under the second category we have the Director. And, here comes the
crucial point on which the respondents bank their entire case: the last
few words of rule 2(a) make it clear and specific that the expression
'appointing authority' means the highest of the authorities mentioned
in sub-clauses (i) to (iv). So, it is said, the 'appointing authority' for B
purposes of rule 12(2)(b), in the instant case, will be the highest of the
three authorities we have referred to above, viz. the Scientific Adviser
~ to the Government of India. In short, it is contended that, by using the
last few significant words in rule 2(a), the Civil Rule_s seek to ensure
"'\
that, though the power to appoint persons to a particular post, grade
or service may be delegated under the proviso to rule 9(1), snch dele-
gation should not extend to the exercise of disciplinary powers. It is c
the clear intention of the rule-makers, it is argued, that disciplinary
powers should continue to vest in the appointing authority mentioned
"-....
in the schedule read with rule 9( 1) and should not be allowed to be
exercised by his delegate under the proviso. The emphasis, it is said, is
not on the person who has made, or is empowered to make, the D
appointment of the particular civil servant in question; it is on the
person who makes, or is empowered to make, appointment of persons
generally to the post, grade or service to which the civil servant in
question belongs. It is, therefore, urged that though one Class III
servants in the laboratory may be appointed by the Director and
\__ another by the Scientific Adviser (who can make such appointment E
despite the delegation), the disciplinary authority for both and, indeed
for all dass III servants in the Laboratory, must be the same and
cannot be different. This interpretation of rule 2(a), it is said, is not
only quite plain on the language used but has also received the
> approval of this Court in Dharam Dev v. Union, [1980] 2 SCR 554.
Further force is sought to be lent to the argument by pointing out that F
the expression 'appointing authority' is used only in rules 2, 10, 12 and
)- 24 of, and the schedule to, the Civil Service rules and that, to refuse to
give effect to the definition for purposes of rule 12 is to render the
definition clause virtually otiose. This plea was upheld by the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Danial's case [1980] 2 SLR 477 and, following
it, in the other cases before us. A similar view has been taken in the G
Delhi High Court in Murishwar v. Union, [1976] Service Law Cases 82
in Union v. Tarlok Singh, cited therein, and by the Calcutta High
y Court in Union v. Choudhury, [1976] 2 SLR 819. But a contrary view
' has been taken by the M.P. High Court in Chaudhury v. Union, [1977]
All India Services Journal 1) and by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
W.A. 793/83 and W.P. 2441/79. H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.
The position in respect of ordnance factories which has to be
A co~idered in some of the cases is identical, except for the nomencla-
tures of the respective authorities, and does not need any separate Cf
discusSion.
To tum, next, to the railway cases, we are concerned with ap-
B pointees to Group C and Group D of the services, which correspond to
class III and class IV of the Civil Services. In respect of these persons,
the rel.evant provisions are as follows:
"2(1)(a) 'Appointing Authority', m relation to railway
servant, means:
c {i) the authority empowered to make appointments to. the
sewice of which the railway servant is, for the time being,· a
mt\mber or to the grade of the Service in which the railway
se(Vant is, for the time being, included, or
II> (ii) the authority empowered to make appointments to the
post which the Railway servant, for the time being holds,
or
(iii) the authority which appointed the Railway servant to
such Service, grade or post, as the case may be, or
J
(iv) where the Railway servant having been a permanent
member of any other Service or having substantively held
any other permanent post, has been in continuous employ-
ment under \he Ministry of Railways, the authority which
appointed him to that service or to any grade in that
F Service or to that post , whichever authority is highest
authority".
"2{1)(c) 'Disciplinary Authority' means-
(i) in relation to the imposition of a penalty on a Railway
G Servant, the authority competent, under these rules, to
impose on him that penalty;
(ii) in relation to rule 9 and clauses (a) and {b) of sub-rule
(1) of Rule 11 in the case of any Gazetted Railway servant,
an authority competent to impose any of the penalties
H specified inrule 6.
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE v. S. DANIEL [RANGANATHAN, J) 451
(iii) in relation to rule 9 in the case of any non-gazetted
A
Railway servant, an authority competent to impose any of
the major penalties specified in rule 6;
(iv) in relation to clauses (a) and (b) of sub-rule ( 1) of Rule
11, in the case of a non-gazetted Railway servant, an
authority competent to impose any of the penalties B
specified in Rule 6".
"7. Disciplinary authorities-
(1) The President may impose any of the penalties speci-
fied in Rule 6 on any Railway Servant.
c
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-rule (1), any
--- .........___ of the penalties specified in Rule 6 may be imposed on a
Railway servant by the authorities as specified in Schedules
I, II and III.
D
(3) The discplinary authority in the cases of a Railway
Servant officiating in a higher post, shall be determined
with reference to the officiating post held by him at the
time of taking action" .
.Js. Authority to institute proceeding.- E
(1) The President, or any other authority-empowered by
him, by general or special order, may-
(a) institute disciplinary proceedings against any Railway
servant; F
(b) direct a disciplinary authority to institute disciplinary
proceedings against any Railway servant on whom that dis-
ciplinary proceedings against any Railway servant on
whom that disciplinary authority is competent to impose,
under these rules, any of the penalties specified in rule 6. G
(2) A disciplinary authority competent under these rules to
r impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of
Rule 6 may, subject to the provisions of clause (c) of sub-
rule ( 1) of rule 2, institute disciplinary proceedings against
any Railway servant for imposition of any of the penalties H
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1990] 2 S.C.R.
specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of rule 6, notwithstanding
A
that such disciplinary authority is not competent under
these rules, to impose any of the latter penalties".
Schedule II referred to in rule 7(2) lays down that an order of .com-
pulsory retirement, removal or dismissal from service may be ordered,
B in the case of a Group C or Group D Railway servant b)' the appoint-
ing authority or authority equivalent in rank or any higher authority
and Note 2 to the Schedule mentions that'such an authority may also
impose any lower penalty. Under rule 275 of the Railway Establish-
ment Code (Vol. I), which de.als with the. recruitment, training and
promotion of Group C and Group D railway servants, the authority
competent to make a first appointment is the General Manager or any
c lower authority to whom he may delegate the power. The General
Manager of each Railway has delegated his powers under several
heads. One set of the Schedule of Delegation of Powers by the
General Manager of the Southern Railway in Establishment Matters
has been set out in some detail in the order of the Central Administra-
D tive Tribunal (CAT) in the case of Gafoor Mia and Ors. v. Director,
DMRL, (1988] 2 CAT 277, (which is one of the orders in appeal before
us.) It is neither useful nor necessary to repeat them here in extenso.
Here also, the argument i1: that, notwithstanding the delegation of
powers of appointment of Group C and Group D employees to various
other zonal officers, the General Manager has.not divested himself of
E the power to make such appointments and continues to be the
'appointing authority'. Being the highest among the various appoint-
ing authorities, he alone stands vested with the power to institute
disciplinary proceedings and impose penalties. It is, therefore, submit-
ted that the disciplinary· proceedings, in the cases under this batch,
initiated by the Divisional Superintendent and like officers were with-
F out jurisdiction and were rightly quashed by the CAT in Gaffoor Mia's
case, already referred to, and the decisions in the other matters before _..._
(
us following the said decision.
This, in crux, is the argument for the respondents. Before deal-
ing with this argument, it will perhaps be helpful to steer clear of
G certain minor arguments addressed by either side:
(a)· Sri Kanta Rao submitted that the same view as in
Gafoor Mia, had been taken by the C.A.T. in Supriya Roy's,
case and that this Court has already, on 21. 9.88, dismissed
S.L.P. Nos. 9956-57 of 1988 filed against the said order. This
H appears to be correct but the dismissal in limine of that S .L.P.
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE v. S. DANIEL [RANGANATHAN, JI 453
cannot preclude us from considering the issue in these appeals on
merits. It is seen that, in C.A. 3963/88, an application has been A
I(• filed for revocation, on this ground, of the leave granted by this
Court. We dismiss this application.
(b) Much ·store is set, on behalf of the respondents, by the
decision of this Court in Dharam Dev's case '(supra). It is no B
doubt true that the decision refers to the provisions of Rule 2(a)
and applies the same to the case before it. But the context in
7' which the case arose was a very simple and straight forward one.
...., In that case, the employee in question had in fact been appointed
by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) and he
was the highest authority in regard to the service in question. AU
that the decision pointed out was that, in view of this and of c
Article 311, no authority lower in rank to the CAG was compe-
tent to take action against the appellant before the Court. The
""- Court had no occasion to consider the type of controversy that
has arisen her~ and did not consider either the interaction of
sub-clauses (i) and (iii) of clause (a) of rule 2 or the situation as D
to whether there could be more than one authority empowered
to appoint persons to a post, grade or service within the meaning
of sub-clause (i) or (ii) of clause (a) itself. This decision is there-
fore not helpful-and certainly not conclusive-to solve the issue
arising before us. The same is the position in regard to the deci-
.\...- sion of this Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. Union, A.LR. 1975 E
S.C. 1265 which seems to have been relied on, for the Union,
before the CAT. In that case, the appellant was a temporary
Government servant not holding a specified post. All that this
, Court pointed out was that, if the definition in rule 2(a) was not
applicable to such a person, the word 'appointing authority',
understood in its plain and natural meaning would mean the F
authority which appointed him-viz. the Director General of the
Geological Survey of India. If, on the other hand, the terms of
rule 2(a) were applicable-the person empowered to appoint the
appellant being one Sri Mo.ghe and the person who appointed
him being the Director General-the latter, who was the higher
authority, would be the 'appointing authority'. This, again, was G
an instance of a simple and direct application of the rule, involv-
ing no complications as here and cannot be treated as deciding
r the issue before us.
(c) On behalf of the appellant, the Union of India, reliance
is placed on S. 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. It is argued H
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.
that, irrespective of the provisions in the rules, a person who
A
makes an appointment has always an implied power of suspend-
ing or dismissing him-vide: Heckert Engineering Co. v. Work-
men, [ 1978] 1 S.C.R. 693. There are three difficulties in accept-
ing this argunient. In the first place, even if the argument is valid,
it confers on .the factual appointing authority, in terms, only a
B power to suspend or dismiss and not a power to conduct discipli-
nary proceedings or impose the various other kinds of penalties
envisaged in the rules. To say that the latter power also comes
within S. 16, one would need to make a further assumption that
the power to suspend or dismiss is a more comprehensive power
which would include the power to impose smaller penalties too
and this assumption is said to run counter to the rules which deal
c with the two powers separately. Secondly, S. 16 applies only
"unless a different intention appears". If the construction placed
on the Civil Service Rules and the Railway rules on behalf of the
respondents is correct, then the rules express a different inten-
tion and it would therefore not be possible to rest on the general
D principle enunciated by S. 16. The contention has, therefore, to
be examined independently and S. 16 cannot be an answer to it.
Thirdly, S. 16 applies only where a general power of appoint-
ment is conferred under an Act or Regulation. Here the Act or
Regulation (i.e. the Rules) envisage the power of appointment
conferred by them on certain authorities being delegated. The
E power conferred on the delegatees is circumscribed by theiinstru-
ment of such delegation and cannot be extended beyond its
ambit, as observed by the C.A.T. in Gafoor Mia's case (supra).
S. 16, therefore, does not come to the rescue of the appellants.
(d) An argument was raised at the earlier stages, that the
F words "whichever is the highest authority" governs only sub-
clause (iv) of rule 2(a) of the Civil Service Rules and not the _.I,
other' sub-clauses. This contention cannot bear a moment's
scrutiny both because the above words occur in the Rules sepa-
rately from the four sub-clause but also because the terms
thereof clearly envisage a determination of one who, among
G several authorities, is the highest. It, therefore, clearly means
that the 'authorities' falling under the definitions in sub-clauses
(i) Jo (iv) have to be ascenained and the highest among them
taken as the disciplinary authority for purposes of rule 12(2)(b). -i-
The above discussion narrows down the controversy before us to
H a very short issue: Can it be said, where the appointing authority under
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE v. S. DANIEL [RANGANATHAN, J) 455
rule 9( 1) has delegated his powers of appointment under the proviso,
A
that both the authorities should be treated as the "authority
empowered to appoint" persons to the post, grade or service or does
this expression get restricted only to the latter, i.e. the delegatee au-
thority? If both fall under the above description within the meaning of
sub-clause (i), the respondent's plea that the definition in rule 2(a) will
mark out only the Scientific Adviser/General Manager would be cor- B
rect. On the other hand, if the second of the above interpretation is
correct, the appellant's stand will have to be upheld.
Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contend that
the authority specified under the schedule read with rule 9( 1) does not
- lose his authority to appoint merely by the act of delegating his powers
to a subordinate authority. Such delegation no doubt empowers the
subordinate authority to appoint but does not take away the power of
c
appointment conferred on the authority specified in the schedule read
with rule 9(1).
Before dealing with the above contention, we may make refe- D
rence to certain decisions cited by counsel on the consequences of such
delegation. In Roop Chand v. State, [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 539 the
petitioner had filed an appeal from the order of the Settlement Officer
to the State Government under S. 21(4) of the relevant Act. But the
State Government, having delegated-under S. 41(1) of the Act-the
right to hear and dispose of the appeals made to it to the Assistant E
Director (Consolidation), the petitioner's appeal was disposed of by
the said Officer who allowed the same. The Respondent thereupon
sought to invoke a power conferred on the State Government under
S. 42 of the Act to revise the orders passed by the authorities under the
Act. On a writ petition filed before it the Supreme Court quashed the
revisional order passed by the State Government on the simple logic F
that the order passed under section 41(1) read with section 21(4) was
>- an order of the State Government (though, in fact, passed by a dele·
gate) and could not be "revised" by the State Government itself under
S. 42. The Andhra Pradesh High Court speaking through P.A. Chou-
dary, J. in Daniel's case (since reported in 1988 2 S.L.R. 477) thought
-~-
that the principle of the case was of no avail to the Union of India G
which appears to have contended, on the strength thereof, that "though
the disciplinary action was initiated by the Director, it must be treated
as having been taken by the Scientific Adviser himself because the
r action of the Director, being that of a delegate, must be regarded in
law as that of the principal himself". The learned Judge repelled the
argument, observing: H
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.
"The ratio of the aforesaid case is that the action of
A
the delegate can be treated as that of the principal himself.
Applying the ratio of the above case to the facts of our
case, it can be said at the most that the orders of appoint-
ments made by the Director, by reason of the statutory
delegation made by the Scientific Adviser under Rule 9( I),
B are those of the Scientific Adviser himself, on the basic that
the exercise, of the power delegated to an authority may be
treated as an exercise of the power by the principal himself.
Accepting the principle, we cannot agree with the
contention of the learned Counsel that the Director's exer-
cise of the disciplinary power against the petitioners should
c be treated as an exercise of disciplinary authority by the
Scientific Adviser himself. The reason is too simple.
Firstly, the statute deals, throughout its provisions, with
the disciplinary power as a different and separate power
from the power to appoint. Secondly, the disciplinary
D power is never delegated by the Scientific Adviser to the
Director either under Rule 9(1) or any other rule of the
CCA Rules. It follows, therefore, that the theory of impu-
tation to the principal the acts of the delegate can have no
application to such a situation as the one before us. We,
therefore, find that the Roop Chand's case is of no avail to
the respondents."
_j
E
Though Sri Choudhary, who appeared before us for the respondents
seemed to have second thoughts about this, we are of opinion that the
observations extracted above set out the correct position and that the
F
Roop Chand decision is of no help. An attempt has been made before us
to invoke the Roop Chand principle in a different way to support the
'
case of the employees and argue that their appointments made by the
Director should be treated as appointments made by the Scientific
Adviser himself and that, therefore, no disciplinary action can be in-
itiated against them by any one other than the Scientific Adviser him-
self. We do not think that this argument can be accepted. As observed
G in Kishore Kumar's case [1980] 1 S.C.R. 50 a delegation of power does
not enhance or improve the heirarchical status of the delegate. The
rule in Roop Chand as to the nature and character of the power exer-
cised by a delegate was enunciated in a particular context. It cannot be
treated as a general principle applicable to all situations. In particular,
in the context of rules 2(a) and 12(2) with which we are concerned and
H which outline a contrast between the person who is empowered to
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE v. S. DANIEL [RANGANATHAN. J] 457
appoint and the person who actually appoints, it is impossible to treat
the Scientific Adviser/General Manager as the person who appointed A
the respondents.
Reference has not been mad1> to Daluram Pannalal Modi v.
Commissioner, [1963] 2 SCR 286. This was a case as to the interpreta-
tion of the scope of a delegate's power. S. 19 of the Madhya Pradesh B
Sales Tax Act, 1958, empowers the Commissioner, if he is satisfied
,, that any sale or purchase of goods, has escaped assessment, to make a
i reassessment. S. 30 of the Act, however, enabled the Commissioner to
"delegate any of his powers and duties under the Act" and the
Commissioner, exercising this power, delegated to the Assistant Com-
missioner his powers and duties to make an assessment or reassess-
ment and to exercise all other powers under Sections 18, 19 and 20. An c
assessee challenged a reassessment notice issued by an Assistant
Commissioner contending that what had been delegated was only the
·""- power of reassessment but not the duty of being satisfied that there
was an escapement which, according to the assessee~ still remained
·.
with the Commissioner. This argument was repelled and it was held D
that the requirement of being satisfied was an adjunct of the power to
initiate reassessment proceedings. That principle cannot apply here as
it is doubtful bow far, in the context of the service rules which make a
clear distinction between the power to appoint and the power to take
disciplinary proceedings, the latter ean be said to be adjunct or ancil-
\ _ lary to the former. . E
This leads us to the question whether the app0inting authority
specified in the schedule can exercise his power of appointment to a
post, cadre or service even after he has delegated that power to a
~ subordinate authority under the eroviso. An answer to this question in
the affirmative is contended for on the stren~th of certain authorities F
which may now be considered. In Godawari S. Parulekar v. State of
).. Maharashtra, [1966] 3 SCR 314 the appellant had been detained by an
order passed by the State Government under rule 30 of the Defence of
India Rules. It was contended on behalf of the appellant, inter alia,
that the State Government had earlier issued a notification delegating
its powers under rule 30 to the District Magistrate and was so not G
competent to make the order of detention in question. Reliance was
placed for this argument on the observations of the Judicial Commit-
tee in King Emperor v. Shibnath Banerjee, 72 I.A. 241. These observa-
r lions were distinguished and the above contention was repelled. It was
held that by issuing the notification in question, the State Government
had not denuded _itself of the power to act under r. 30 (vide Willis J. in H
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990) 2 S.C.R.
Huth v. Clarke, (1890) 25 QBD 391. Learned counsel also referred to
A
the decision of the Kamataka High Court in Ramachandra Rao v.
State, (1984) 3 SLR 768. This case does hold that a power which is ")
delegated can be exercised both by the delegator and the delegatee,
though the Supreme Court decisions cited therein as deciding this issue
do not seem to help. Halsbury 4th Edn., para 32, citing Huth v.
B Clarke, (supra), summarises the English Law on the subject thus:
"In general, a delegation of power does not imply parting
with authority. The delegating body will retain not only the ~
power to revoke the grant but also power to act concur-
rently on matters within the area of delegated authority r
except in so far as it may already have become bound by an
c act of its delegate".
However, the following passage from Wade on Administrative Law
~
(Sixth Edition) at p. 365 would seem to indicate that the position is not
quite clear and may need detailed consideration in an appropriate
D case:
"A statutory power to delegate will normally include a
power to revoke the delegation when desired. While the
delegation subsists it may be arguable whether t.he delegat-
ing authority is denuded of its power or is able to exercise it
E concurrently with the delegate. This question arose where _j
under statutory authority the executive committee of a
county council delegated to a sub-committee its powers to
make regulations for the control of rabies; but before the
sub-committee had done anything the executive commit-
tee, without revoking the delegation, itself issued regula-
F tions for the muzzling of dogs. These regulations were "
upheld, but on inconsistent grounds, one judge holding
that the executive committee had resumed its power and -I
the other that it had never parted with them, and that 'the
word "delegate" means little more than an agent. In a later
case the latter view prevailed, on the ground that 'one can-
G not divest oneself of one's statutory duties'. But the con-
trary was held by the Court of Appeal where a minister had
formally delegated to local authorities his power to requisi-
-
tion houses. By doing this he had for the time being
~
divested himself of his powers, so that an invalid requisi-
tion by the local authority could not be cured by their act-
H ing in his name; and the court rejected the contention that
MINIHRY OF DEFENCE v. S. DANIEL [RANGANATifAN, l] 459
delegation was a form of agency. The Local Government
A
Act 1972 expressly preserves the powers of a local autho-
~ rity concurrently with those delegated to its commits, etc."
We do not think it is necessary to go into this question. In view of the
decision in Godawari (supra), we shall accept the general proposition
that the delegation of the power of appointment under the proviso to
rule 9( 1) does not necessarily deprive the disciplinary authority
/ specified in the main part of the rule from exercising the delegated
7 power of appointment in any case or class of cases .
.... Still the basic question that remains is, whether, in the context of
rule 2(a) read with rule 9(1), the reference to the authority emp,owered
to make the appointment is to the authority mentioned in the proviso c
to rule 9 or to both the authorities falling under the main part of rule
9( 1) as well as the proviso. The sheet anchor of the respondent's case is
that the expression 'appointing authority' is used in very few of the
rules. One of them is rule 12 and there can, therefore, be no valid
reason to refuse to apply the definition clause in the context of those D
rules. It is urged that, by holding the person specified in the schedule
also to be the 'appointing authority' as defined in rule 2(a), none of the
other rules relating to appeal, revision etc. become redundant as urged
on behalf of the appellants. We agree with the respondents that the
expression 'appointing authority' in rule 12 should have the meaning
\..___ attributed to it in rule 2(a). But what is the real and true interpretation E
of Rule 2(a)? What does that sub-rule talk of when it refers to a
'person empowered to make the appointment' in question? These
words clearly constitute a reference to rule 9. Does rule 2(a) refer then
to the authority empowered by the schedule to make the appointments
or the authority to whom he has delegated that power or both? We
think, on a proper and harmonious reading of rule 2(a) and rule 9, that F
1 sub-rule (a) of rule 2 only envisages the authority to whom the power
J.. of appointment has been delegated under rule 9 and not both the
delegator and the delegate. We have come to this conclusion for a
number of reasons. In the first place, it is clear on the plain language of
rule 2(a), that it directs the ascertainment of the authorities specified,
in such of clauses (i) to (iv) of the rule as may be applicable to a G
particular case and designates the highest of them as the 'appointing
authority'. It envisages only one authority as falling under each of
r these clauses and not more. The respondent's contention which
involves interpretation of clause (i) or (ii) as contemplating more than
one authority runs counter to the tenor of the rule. Secondly, the
strictly literal meaning of rule 2(a) insisted upon by the respondents H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.
would render the rules unworkable. For instance, under clause OJ, one
A of the authorities to be considered is the 'authority empowered to
make appointments to the service of which the government servant is ~
for the time being a member'. The respondents belong to one of the
Central Civil Services. Though they belong to class III or class IV,
there are class I and class II officers as well therein. Rule 8 declares
B that only the President can make appointments to Class I in the
service. If each of the clauses is read as envisaging a plurality of
authorities as contended for and if clause (i) is literally interpreted, it
will also include the President who is one of the authorities ~
empowered to make appointments to the service of which the con-
cerned employees is a member. This will render the entire gamut of
the rules unworkable. On this interpretation, the President will be the
C only appointing authority under rule 2(a) in all cases, being the highest
of the authorities envisaged therein. This cannot clearly be correct.
Rule 2(a) does not contemplate any authority other than the one
empowered to appoint a person belonging to the post or grade which
the concerned government employee holds. In that sense the two parts
o of clause (i) and clause (ii) are not to be read distributively to ascertain
the authority empowered to make appointments (a) to the service (b)
to the grade and (c) to the post and consider the highest of them. One
has to restrict oneself to the post or grade of the government servant
concerned and invoke clause (i) or (ii) as the case may be. Thirdly, the
whole purpose and intent of rule 2(a) is to provide that appointing
E authority means either the de facto or the de jure appointing authority.
It will be appreciated that, generally speaking, only the de jure autho-
rity can make the appointment but, occasionally, a superior authority
or even a subordinate authority (with his consent) could have made the
appointment. Again it is possible that the authority empowered to
make the appointment at the time when relevant proceedings in con-
F templation may be higher or lower in rank to the authority which was
empowered to make the appointment or which made the appointment
at a different point of time. The whole intent or purpose of the defini- ....\
tion to safeguard against an infringement of Art. 311(1) and ensure
that a person can be dealt with only by either a person competent to
appoint persons of his class or the person who appointed him, whoever
9 happens to be higher in rank. That rule is not infringed by the interpre- .'
tation placed by the appellants. The provisions of Schedule II in the
case of the Railways which specify the appointing authority or an
authority of equivalent rank or any higher authority as the disciplinary
authority are also consistent with this interpretation. Fourthly, the
,interpretation sought to be placed by the respondents on rule 2(a) is
H artificial and strained. It amounts to saying that a person who .is
-·
MINIS1RY OF DEFENCE v. S. DANIEL [RANGANATHAN, J] 461
empowered to appoint a government servant (as the Director, DERL,
for example, undoubtedly is) and who has also appointed him will not A
be the appointing authority, because, theoretically, even a more
superior authority could have appointed him despite having delegated
his authority in this regard to a subordinate. On the contrary, the
interpretation urged by the Union will not adversely affect the few
employees, if any, who may be appointed by a superior scheduled B
authority despite delegation of such power to a subordinate authority.
For, in such a case, the superior authority would be the person who has
-,: factually appointed such an employee and he will clearly be the
'appointing authority' by virtue of rule 2(a). Lastly, the interpretation
sought for by the Union i~ oonsistent with practical oonsideration. The
appointing authority under the Schedule is a high-ranking authority
and, in an organisation like the Railways for instance, it will be virtu- c
ally impossible for him to oonsider each and every case of appointment
of, or disciplinary action against all the Class III or Class IV employees
in- the organisation. It is indeed this realisation that has rendered
necessary delegation of the power of appointment and cannot be
ignored, in the absence of compelling reasons, in the matter of discipli- D
nary powers.
On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that the intention
of the rules is to restrict powers of discipline from being exercised by
all appointing authorities. Centralisation, it. is urged, is the object.
This contention is not borne out by the table of innumerable discipli- E
nary authorities set out in the schedule, not to speak of those on whom
factual or special powers have been conferred by the President (as was
indeed done in many of these very cases later). As against this, Sri Pai,
for the appellants pointed out that if one has regard to the strength of
the railway staff or the other class III or IV staff employed in various
civil services, the interpretation urged on behalf of the respondents F
would cast an impossible burden of work on the authorities specified in
~ the schedule to whom alone the respondents seek to confine the power
to take disciplinary proceedings. There is force in this contention.
It has been brought to our notice that notifications have since
been issued (for example on 29th August 1979 in the case of the DERL G
and 2.1.87 in the case of Ordnance factories) by the President under
rule 12 empowering certain authorities to exercise disciplinary powers.
We need hardly say that any disciplinary proceedings initiated by such
r authorities from the date when such notifications came into effect will
. be perfectly valid. It has also been brought to our notice that, in some
cases, (for example, C.A. Nos. 1443, 1444 and 4340/88), the CAT has H
, -
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.
also gone into the merits of the cases and set aside the penalties or
A
punishments iinposed on the concerned reSIJOndent. We do not pro-
pose to review the finding on this aspect of the matter under Article --:;,
136. C.A. No. 1444/88, we are told, has also abated as the appellant
has taken no steps to bring on record the legal representatives of the
respondent but, in view of the Tribunal's findings on merits, it is
B unnecessary to go "into this question now. The order of the CAT, in
such cases, will therefore, stand notwithstanding our conclusion being (
different from that of the CAT on the main issue discussed above., .On ,
the other hand, in most cases, the CAT, because "of the view taken by
it on the·main question, ·has not dealt With the merits of the proceed-
ings. For example, it was mentioned that in C.A. 316/81, the respon- r ""·
dent has been removed from service by the Deputy Director, an
c authority subordinate to the Director who had appointed him. This
aspect bas not been considered and will have to be considered now.
Similarly, in C.A. 3044/89 filed by the employee, it is pointed out that
the appellant had been appointed by the Director of Ordnance___,....
Services in 1964. The power of appointment was delegated to Com-
D mandants in 1971 and the . respondent was penalised by the
Commandant, a subordinate authority, to whom disciplinary powers
were delegate by the President only in 1979. Though this point does
not appear to have been raised before the Tribunal, it goes to the root
of the matter and we, therefore, think that it should lie left open to be
considered by the Tribunal now.
E
As the cases before us are many and were decided principally on
the point of law discussed earlier, we have not touched upon the facts
or merits of individual cases. We set aside the orders of the CAT in all
cases-except C.A. Nos. 1443 and 4340/88 which stand dismissed as
mentioned above-and direct the Tribmial/High Court to pass fresh "
F orders disposing of the applications filed before theni in the light of
our judgment. Where disciplinary proceed~gs have been stayed at the
stage of initiation or later because of the view taken by th!fTribunal,~
they should n_ow be Continued and finished without delay in accordance ·
with law. The appeals are disposed ofaccordingly. ·· · ·
G T.N.A. Appeals disposed of.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "delegation of power"Sign in to search